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Abstract 
                                             Essa Bah 
“An Examination into the Quality of Regional Trade Institutions: The 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); a Historical, 
Theoretical and Modelling Perspective”. 
Keywords: trade institutions, convergence, history, policy, regionalism, 
modelling, ECOWAS, theory 
This thesis examines the determinants of institutional quality and the 
process of convergence in the ECOWAS in order to inform policy about 
the region’s deep integration scheme. The first part of the thesis 
examines the historical changes that took place in the development of 
common institutions in West Africa in the pre-independence era. The 
findings demonstrated that the region exhibited some common 
institutions, including common currencies, standardised trade rules and 
protection of trade routes which facilitated regional and international 
trade. A single administration system helped in the effective 
implementation of the common institutions. Therefore, historical changes 
after independence led to the loss of some facets of these common 
institutions in West Africa. The second part examined determinants of 
institutional quality and the process of convergence using econometric 
analysis. The findings demonstrated that the process of convergence 
could be accelerated if WAMZ and WAEMU work together as one 
monetary zone under ECOWAS. Moreover, the findings also 
demonstrated that the level of development, state capacity, FDI, regional 
trade, history and regional trade partners institutional quality contain 
useful information in explaining the quality of institutions today. 
Therefore, ECOWAS’s deep integration goal would require improving 
some of these factors in order to facilitate the process of developing 
common institutions and improve their quality. In the long term, a single 
administration system akin to the colonial era and the Empires of Western 
Sudan would be desirable. This will require political commitment to do 
so. ECOWAS members should have the confidence that deep integration 
is feasible given that it existed in the region in the past. 
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Glossary 
Institutions- structures, systems and rules which define how humans 
interact with each other and with their environment 
ECOWAS- the Economic Community of West African states was formed 
in 1975 to foster cooperation and integration in West Africa. 
WAMZ- the West African Monetary Zone is composed of the five English 
speaking countries in West Africa and Guinea Conakry. They aim to 
emulate WAEMU by introducing a single currency and central bank in 
order to prepare ECOWAS for a single currency. 
WAEMU- the West African Economic and Monetary Union is composed 
of eight French speaking countries and Guinea Bissau. They are a 
customs union with a single currency and central bank. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction, research motivation and background 
1.0 Research motivation and background 
The multilateral trading system has attracted considerable debate and 
discussion about how the gains from trade could be spread across the world 
and the extent to which global free trade is more desirable than regional 
integration schemes (Bhagwati, and Panagariya, 1996; Schiff and Winters, 
2003; Venables, 2003; Dunn and Mutti, 2005; Gupta, 2008 and Stiglitz, 
2013). In other words, are north-south integration schemes more desirable 
than south-south integration schemes? The failure of the Doha round is in 
part due to the unequal distribution of gains from trade. Thus, regions are 
increasingly looking inward through the formation of Regional Trade 
Agreements (thereafter RTAs) or to strengthen past agreements in the last 
three decades (Gupta and Yang, 2007 and Gupta, 2008). This highlights 
the importance of trade as part of the overall development initiative for many 
countries. Almost every country is part of one or more regional trading block 
(Gupta and Yang, 2007). The World Trade Organization (WTO) estimated 
that from 1948 to 1994, they were notified of 123 RTAs and 581 in 2014 
which represents a 372 % increase (WTO Report, 2014 p. 7). In Africa, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) was established 
in 1958, advocated the formation of Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) with a view to accelerating growth and poverty reduction initiatives. 
It was perceived that smaller sizes of individual African nations are not 
viable to be able to pull enough resources together in order to promote 
national economic development (Aryeetey and Oduro, 1996 and Borrmann 
and Busse, 2007). 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed 
on the 28th of May 1975 in order to achieve an economic union status as 
stipulated in article 2 of the 1975 treaty and article 3 and 54 of the revised 
1993 treaties (Aryeetey, 2001; Ogunfolu, 2009 and Dijk, 2011). Economic 
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union status requires quality institutions and the harmonization of trade 
policy and institutional framework ((UNECA Report, 1996: Koremonos, 
2001 and Ghazaleh et al, 2013). This was going to be achieved by fostering 
greater regional cooperation, integration and development in all fields. 
Furthermore, ECOWAS intends to conform to the UNECA ambitions for a 
united Africa. ECOWAS is composed of 15-member states, namely; Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo (Nielsen and Zouhon-Bi, 2007 and Dada, 
2013). Mauritania which was the 16th member withdrew in 2002 because 
they didn’t want to be part of the single currency scheme (Nielsen and 
Zouhon-Bi, 2007).  
The increase in intra-ECOWAS trade (9.951% in 2014; UNCTADSTAT, 
2015) is an important element of the strategy to achieve their regional 
integration and development goals (McLenaghan et al, 1982; Omorogbe, 
1993; Aryeetey, 2001 and Assane et al, 2014). However, the increase in 
intra-ECOWAS trade is faced with some challenges due to the tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers to trade (Aryeetey, 2001; Keane et al, 2010 and UNECA 
Report, 2013 and ECA Report, 2013). Progress has been made in reducing 
tariff levels. ECOWAS became a free trade area (FTA) in 1990 with the 
launch of the trade liberalization scheme (TLS) although the implementation 
was slow (Omorogbe, 1993 and UNECA report, 2012). The common 
external tariff (CET) that was supposed to be launched in 2008 came into 
force on the 1st of January 2015 and effectively made ECOWAS a customs 
union (African Research Bulletin, 2015).  
Nonetheless, the non-tariff barriers pose fundamental challenges to 
ECOWAS trade, including poor transport and communication network, non-
convertibility of currencies, differences in invoicing and weak trade 
facilitation institutions. Some aspect of the non-tariff barriers has received 
attention in the existing literature, including transport and communication 
and currency convertibility (Aryeetey, 2001; Ajayi, 2005; Borrmanne and 
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Busse, 2007; Keane et al, 2010; Hertzenberg, 2011; African Union Report, 
2012; Babatunde and Odularu, 2012; Acclassato, 2013; Badiane et al, 2013 
and Assante et al, 2014).  
We argue in this thesis that the quality of institutions could be identified as 
one of the non-tariff barriers that pose the greatest challenge to intra-
ECOWAS trade since they are not easily visible, measurable or amendable2 
(Yansane, 1977; Ellis and Morgan, 1984; Ogunkola, 1998; Aryeetey, 2001; 
Borrmann and Busse, 2007; Ogunfolu, 2009; Keane et al, 2010; Leyaro and 
Morrissey, 2010 and UNECA Report, 2000). Furthermore, weak institutions 
are associated with coordination failures, uncertainty and high trade costs. 
This assertion is corroborated by the findings in the existing literature that 
ECOWAS cross-border trade cost as additional US$100 to US$129 in 
bribes payment per trip at border points and unofficial checkpoints which 
discourage regional investment and trade (Cissokho et al, 2012; Keyser, 
2012 and Brenton, 2012). Additionally, 50% of intra-African trade financial 
settlements are done with banks outside Africa that add to trade costs. 
These extra costs are associated with weak institutions, including regulation 
of cross-border trade, protection of trade routes from bribes, non-convertible 
currencies and sensitization of traders about their rights under the 
ECOWAS protocols on the free movement of goods and people. 
Furthermore, the convergence of institutions, that is a prerequisite to the 
sustenance of any successful integration scheme, is slow within ECOWAS 
despite all the protocols being signed to facilitate it (UNECA Report, 2000; 
2013; Koremenos, 2001; Lejarraga and Shepherd, 2013 and Ghazaleh et 
al, 2013).  
Therefore, this thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature by 
examining the conjunction of factors that determine the quality of institutions 
and the process of convergence in the ECOWAS region as a new case 
study that has not been sufficiently looked at. The findings could provide 
useful policy implications for the ECOWAS deep integration scheme. 
                                                          
2 Other non-tariff barriers that have received attention in empirical research are quotas, subsidies, 
standards and technical barriers to trade. Institutional qualities have just been identified as barriers to 
trade (Page, 2005). 
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The thesis is divided into three research questions that seek to examine the 
issue. Furthermore, the thesis is divided into six chapters where chapters’ 
three to five addresses each of the three research questions chronologically 
while the other chapters consolidate the whole thesis. We argue that as a 
first step, research into the determinants of institutional quality could start 
with a holistic assessment of their development and evolution in order to 
enable readers to know how the present quality of institutions came about. 
Therefore, the first research question aims to; 
1. “Examine the history of West Africa and its relations to the development 
of regional trade institutions from the Empires of Western Sudan to the 
present day”? 
 
This will be the basis for our discussion in chapter three. We will start by 
reviewing the literature about trade institutions during the Empires of 
Western Sudan and the colonial era and how they were developed and 
standardized. The final part of chapter three focuses on the extent to which 
some facets of regional trade institutions in the past continued to exist today 
and how some ECOWAS institutions could consolidate the development 
and standardization of regional trade institutions today. Our assessment 
demonstrates that the Empires of Western Sudan developed regional trade 
institutions that were standardized across the Empires such as common 
currencies, common trade rules, protection of trade routes and single 
administration. Furthermore, our assessment also demonstrates that the 
colonial era also created common regional trade institutions, including 
common currencies and trade rules, although they were intended to 
promote international trade specifically with the colonial power, which 
created distortions rather than regional trade. We argue that historical 
changes in governance in the late 1950s onwards when West Africans 
began to gain their independence resulted in the loss of some facets of 
these regional trade institutions which have yet to be restored today. 
Therefore, the development of regional trade institutions slid backward in 
West Africa that had implication for regional trade. We argue that ECOWAS 
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could reflect on its historical best practices given that the economic and 
political union status they are trying to achieve now existed in the past. 
The second research question aims to assess the degree of ECOWAS trade 
relative to each other and relative to the rest of the world. Furthermore, an 
assessment of ECOWAS trade potential will be made by computing the 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and trade complementarity index 
(TCI). The second research question aims to;  
2. “Assess intra-regional trade flows: the experience of the ECOWAS 
integration scheme”? 
 
The motivation for this assessment hinges on the current debate and 
discussion about the extent to which south-south integration schemes like 
that of ECOWAS are less desirable than north-south integration schemes 
(Bhagwati, and Panagariya, 1996; Schiff and Winters, 2003; Venables, 
2003; Dunn and Mutti, 2005 and Gupta, 2008). Some papers argue that 
RTAs that entail deeper integration schemes could experience significantly 
higher gains from trade because they lower trade costs, coordinate and 
correct market failures and provide a stable trading system which national 
governments alone may fail to achieve (Dunn and Mutti, 2005; Evans et al, 
2006; WTO Report, 2011 and Lejárraga and Shepherd, 2013). Other papers 
argue that deeper integration between north-south could potentially be more 
beneficial because the south could learn best-practices from the north 
(Winters, 1996; Schiff and Winters, 2003 and WTO Report, 2011). 
Therefore, there is a lack of consensus on the matter. However, the 
undesirability of south-south integration scheme could in part, be attributed 
to the lack of deep integration. Some papers have associated the 
undesirability of south-south integration with the skewness of production 
structures toward international trade, lack of complementarity of production 
and the low production base (Aryeetey, 2001; Cernat, 2001; Hertzenberg, 
2011 and UNECA Report, 2013). 
To reinforce my earlier statement, this thesis asserts that weakness in the 
quality of institutions could make any integration scheme undesirable due 
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to its associated costs, uncertainty and coordination failures. Therefore, 
assessing ECOWAS trade would enable us to know where they are in their 
integration process and some of the catalysts and impediments to regional 
trade. 
The second research question will be discussed in chapter four. We will first 
look at trade and regional trade theories as the basis for global free trade 
and regional integration. This will be followed by a review of the literature in 
order to locate ECOWAS’s position in the global and regional trade. The 
final part of chapter four focuses on computing ECOWAS trade potential by 
product category using standard international trade classification (SITC). 
The findings show that ECOWAS intra-regional trade is low relative to other 
RTAs and relative to the rest of the world due to several factors including 
weak institutions. Moreover, our RCA and TCI estimates suggest that 
ECOWAS has the potential to increase regional and international trade 
conditional on minimizing some of the impediments to trade including the 
quality of institutions. 
Therefore, the third and final research question seeks to examine the 
conjunction of factors that determine the quality of institutions and the 
process of convergence in the ECOWAS region. The third research 
question aims to; 
3. “Examine the determinants of institutional quality and the process of 
convergence in the ECOWAS region”? 
 
 The third research question will use econometric method and it is assumed 
that determining institutional quality and convergence is best examined by 
using the positivist quantitative approach. This will be the basis for our 
discussion in chapter five. Research into the determinants of institutional 
quality lacks a coherent methodology and models underpinned by the 
institutional theories. We will pull together different aspects of the 
institutional theories to assist us to link institutional theory to modeling and 
estimation. These models will be used to estimate the conjunction of factors 
that determine the quality of institutions using exclusive ECOWAS dataset 
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as a new case study. Furthermore, we will use the Ben-David (1996) model 
to test the process of convergence of institutions since economic union 
status could not be sustained without harmonization of institutions. We use 
panel data from 1996 to 2015. 
The findings demonstrate that the process of convergence is slow within 
ECOWAS. However, the rate of convergence could be accelerated if the 
West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) and the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) cooperate more or act as one monetary zone. 
Furthermore, the level of development, the capacity of the state, FDI, past 
institutional quality and the quality of institutions of regional trade partners 
contain useful information in explaining current institutional quality. Regional 
trade also influences regulatory quality and rule of law. The statistical 
significance of the rest of ECOWAS institutional quality suggest that there 
is a pull factor and learning from each other. Therefore, ECOWAS should 
be the main driver of regional integration and development.  In the long run, 
full integration would require a single administration system akin to what 
existed during the Empires of Western Sudan and colonial era. We argue 
that ECOWAS should have the confidence that economic and political union 
is feasible given that it existed in the past.  
 
1.1 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter one looks at the main 
research motivation and background and how to address the three research 
questions. Chapter two discusses the general debate within institutional 
economics about the definition, measurement and methodological 
approach in order to motivate the approach that is going to be taken in this 
thesis. This is useful because it allows readers to know which set of 
institutions is referred in the thesis and some of the weaknesses in research 
related to the determinants of institutional quality. For example, there is 
considerable debate about the extent to which the quality of institutions 
could be measured. Chapter three examines the historical changes that 
occurred in the development of regional trade institutions from the Empires 
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of Western Sudan to the present day in order to know how the present came 
about (Acemoglu et al, 2001 and Nunn, 2007). Chapter four assesses the 
degree of ECOWAS trade and its trade potential in order to know the current 
state of regional trade and integration. Chapter four will also assess some 
of the factors driving ECOWAS integration, including the quality of regional 
trade institutions. Chapter five examine the conjunction of factors that 
determine the quality of institutions and the process of convergence. Finally, 
chapter six will bring together key findings from each chapter in order to 
draw policy implications and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Assessing research approaches into the 
determinants of institutional quality: definition, 
measurement and methodology 
2.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss some of the debates and approaches 
in research into the determinants of institutional quality in order to motivate 
our own approach in this thesis. A more detailed discussion of the 
approaches will be made in section 5.2. The first part of this chapter will 
discuss the definition of institutions in order to enable readers to know which 
set of institutions is referred in this thesis. The second aspect of this chapter 
will discuss the debates around whether institutional quality could be 
measured or not. This will enable us to decide whether to use a quantitative 
or qualitative approach. The third aspect of this chapter will discuss the 
methodological approaches in terms of modeling and estimation in order to 
motivate our own. This is useful because research in this area lacks clear 
models underpinned by institutional theories. 
 
2.1 Defining institutions 
There is no single definition of institutions, what it encompasses and its 
functions. Hence, institutions may mean different things to different people 
(Hodgson, 2006; Aoki, 2007; Kaufmann et al, 2010 and Kuncic, 2013). 
While some define institutions in the context of organizational structure 
(Hodgson, 2006), others see institutions as rules that determine the 
interaction between agents or control human interaction (North, 1990). 
Contrasting these two views can be difficult because they are interlinked. 
Organizational structures are shaped by rules while rules also shape 
organizational structures. This interlink has resulted in discussions about 
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what comes first. That is, are economic interactions shaped by institutions 
or institutions shape interactions? Therefore, there is a need to understand 
the delicate difference between the two definitions in empirical research in 
order to allow the reader to establish the direction taken by the author. 
Organizational structure involves looking at the chain of management and 
the various departments within the organization (Powelson, 1972) while 
rules of the organization determine how individual and chain of 
management operate and interact based on consensual arrangements 
(Powelson, 1972 and North, 1990). Either way, institutional quality is 
assumed to function in order to reduce uncertainty, coordinate market 
activities and lower transaction costs (Furubotn and Richter, 2010 and 
Kuncic, 2013). These functions of institutions suggest that there should be 
an aspiration on the part of countries or regions to improve the quality of 
their institutions. 
Powelson (1972) defined institutions as systems (rules) and structures (a 
place) that define set of relationships designed to resolve conflicts between 
agents by specifying the role of people in society. Conflicts here mean that 
decisions made by agents entail conflicting choices, hence; institutions are 
therefore needed to resolve these conflicts through consensus. The 
consensus is obtained when agents perceive mutual benefits or separate 
goals that require cooperation; they will build or improve institutions in order 
to reduce uncertainty and coordinate the cooperation. Thus, the decision to 
cooperate and invest in building or improving institutions is determined by 
the choices of agent’s base on demand and supply. This has important 
implications since it suggests that interaction of agents determine the extent 
to which agents build and improve institutions. Indeed, Milgrom et al (1990); 
Grief et al (1992) and Puga and Trefler, (2012) found that interactions led 
to a demand for institutions which facilitated cooperation in the ancient 
period in Europe. Furthermore, Hurwicz (1996) cited by Aoki (2007) also 
lamented on the impossibility of designing rules (institutions) prior to playing 
the game which suggests that interactions determine institutional quality at 
least in the initial stages. 
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Powlson (1972) definition is consistent with the oligopoly cooperative model 
derived by Rosendorff and Milner (2001). In that model, it is assumed that 
bilateral trade barriers are derived from cooperative outcome provided the 
collective benefits are greater. Hence, this definition is quite useful from an 
RTA point of view since it indicates that regional groupings like ECOWAS 
are likely to establish regional institutions (rules and structures) if there is 
demand for them. Each nation in the RTA will have a utility function that 
determines the probability of investing in improving and converging regional 
institutions (Levechenko, 2012 and Powelson, 1972). We argue that these 
utilities are likely to emanate from economic interactions such as gains from 
trade. 
Furthermore, the Global Competitiveness Index Report (2013) defined 
institutions as a set of legal and administrative measures where businesses, 
individuals and governments interact to generate wealth. This definition 
assumes that institutions help generate wealth, although wealth generation 
could also strengthen institutions? Powelson (1972) argued that the initial 
cultural capital and the willingness to improve or establish new institutions 
based on cost-benefit analysis determine their functional form, shape and 
evolution. Powelson (1972) assertion can be linked to the findings of 
Acemoglu et al (2001) and Nunn (2007) that the colonial history of Africa in 
part, explains the quality of their current institutions. The initial cultural 
capital also suggests that cultures and other economic interactions 
determine the quality of institutions at least in the short run, although a 
unidirectional causality has been contested by the Institutional Political 
Economic theory (IPE) (Zweynert, 2009 and Castellano et al, 2012). 
North (1990) also defined institutions as constraints that political, social and 
economic agents use to conform to the rules of the game (norms) or prevent 
agents from extorting rents from other participants in a way detrimental to 
the general welfare. That is, institutions remove uncertainty and provide a 
stable form of interaction in addition to constraining agents from behaving 
beyond what is acceptable in society. Whether every agent conforms to the 
rules depend on the initial arrangements made and the quality of the 
institution to monitor and regulate behavior or at least initiate some form of 
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punishment for non-conforming agents or what Rodrik (2007) called 
sanctioned force. Another aspect of North (1990) definition of institutions is 
that they emanate from the cultural norms and interaction in societies. 
Hence, the definition of institutions discussed above highlights the motives 
behind two areas of research. The first area focuses on the determinants of 
institutions and institutional quality while the second focuses on the role of 
institutions in economic exchanges. In this thesis, we highlight that if 
institutions are useful in reducing uncertainty and transaction costs, there 
should be an aspiration to improve them. Therefore, it is useful from a policy 
point of view to examine the conjunction of factors that determine the quality 
of institutions. Some papers have demonstrated that interaction of countries 
within an RTA determine the quality of their institutions at least in the short 
run (Milgrom et al, 1990; Grief et al, 1992 and Puga and Trefler, 2012). In 
the long run, institutions would shape interactions. 
 
2.2 Measuring institutional quality indices 
 
2.2.0 Introduction 
There are contrasting views about whether the quality of institutions can be 
measured and the extent to which they could be used for estimation in order 
to inform policy. The first view assumes that institutions cannot be measured 
since they are subjective, and, in most cases, they tend to measure policy 
effectiveness rather than institutional quality (Chang, 2011; Albouy, 2012 
and Castellano et al, 2012). Furthermore, the application of institutions 
(rules) is contextual to the nature of the issue. The second view recognised 
that institutional quality could be difficult to measure, although measurement 
can provide the most comprehensive proxy about rules governing 
interaction (Straub, 2000 and Kaufmann et al, 2010). Furthermore, this 
second view argues that attempts to measure institutional quality should be 
treated as the first step toward a more comprehensive measure.  
These debates have resulted in some papers using a qualitative or 
quantitative approach although the quantitative has been used limitedly. We 
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will look at these two views in order to establish the direction that we will 
take in this thesis. 
 
2.2.1 Institutional quality cannot be measured 
Some papers argue that institutional quality cannot be measured because 
the criteria used are subjective (Chang, 2010 and Albouy, 2012). Their 
argument is that measuring institutional quality rely on survey data which 
asked people about their perception of certain institutions. Responses are 
then indexed into a composite value that represents the quality of 
institutions. They argue that responses from survey data are biased for 
several reasons; 
I. First, economic conditions can influence the respondent's view. For 
example, during economic booms, a view possessed by some business 
managers might be different to their views in recession’s times. Hence, 
responses might be capturing economic performance and policy 
effectiveness rather than the quality of institutions (Alexander, 2010 and 
Chang, 2010). 
 
II. Secondly, the criteria used to design survey questionnaires are skewed 
toward an economic philosophy that may be different from one country to 
another. Chang (2010) and Alexander (2010) have criticized the 
measurement of institutional quality by international institutions such as the 
World Bank as skewed towards the capitalist view of what quality institution 
should look like in one-size-fits-all criteria. Hence, if the questions were 
modified to capture a different philosophical stance, the composite 
numerical value would probably be different, although Maseland (2011) has 
argued that this does not invalidate the current measurement methods. For 
example, land rights are held by the community rather than individuals in 
many African societies (Rodney, 1981). As such, large commercial farming 
is difficult to establish in SSA due to community resistance. Since the rule 
of law in the world governance indicator only consider protection of 
individual property rights, Chang (2010) argued that the indicator did not 
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necessarily capture the quality of institution for some countries. Hence, it 
can be argued that the diverse cultures of many societies across the globe 
make one-size fits all measurement of institutional quality difficult 
(Alexander, 2010). 
 
III. Third, rules and structures cannot be quantified into a composite 
numerical value because the applications of the rules are contextual to 
specific circumstances. For example, contract enforcement rules that are 
binding across a group of countries like ECOWAS may be interpreted 
differently from one case to the other depending on the context in which the 
contract is honored. Hence, deriving a composite numerical value cannot 
capture the contextual application of institutional quality from one period to 
another. 
 
IV. Alonso et al (2013) and Vogit (2013) argued that the models used to 
measure institutional quality face the problem of specification error given 
the presence of collinearity, endogeneity, omitted variable bias that renders 
deficiency in the institutional quality indicators. In part, if institutions are 
defined as rules, what determine these rules given the complexities of 
human behavior makes modeling difficult since it is impossible to identify all 
the relevant variables that capture the specific characteristics of an 
institution. Hodgson (1998) narrated that the introduction of mathematical 
economics made institutional economics redundant from its complexities 
are difficult to capture in a single mathematical equation. 
 
V. Similarly, rules must be enforced by those in power. Hence, the written 
rules are as good as society’s willingness to adhere to them. Moreover, if 
those in power are not willing to enforce the rules, then it makes it difficult 
to ascertain whether the survey data from which institutional quality indices 
are computed captures the quality of enforcers or the quality of the rules in 
place (Kaufmann et al, 2010 p. 17). 
 
Therefore, there are difficulties in measuring institutional quality into a 
composite value. Indeed, Kaufmann et al (2010) recognized that the 
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governance indicators are a proxy since they originate from the imperfect 
perception of stakeholders. However, we must start somewhere with the 
hope that over time, an appropriate set of criteria can be used to capture 
the quality of an institution into a composite value that will assist future 
empirical research. Indeed, Acemoglu et al (2001) and Koremenos et al 
(2001) argued that research related to the determinants of institutional 
quality should take one step at a time to develop theory, quantification, 
models and estimation. 
 
2.2.2 Institutional quality can be measured 
Following Acemoglu et al (2001) assertion that we should start somewhere 
in computing institutional quality, some researchers argue that it is possible 
to measure the quality of institutions from survey data (Straub, 2000; 
Kaufmann et al, 2010; Maseland, 2010 and Alonso et al, 2013). Putting 
aside some of the criticism in section 2.1.1; they argue that since the survey 
data gauges the perception of respondents during their interaction with a 
particular institution, it must contain useful information about the quality of 
that institution and can serve as a good proxy. Thus, research that has used 
these indices in econometric studies is only using them as a proxy. There 
are many sources of institutional quality indices that have been used 
prominently in the existing literature namely the;  
➢ World Economic Forum global enabling trade indices 
➢ Country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) of the World Bank 
➢ Doing Business of the World Bank and 
➢ The World Bank world governance indicators 
 
The World Economic forum enabling trade index measures the 
development of institutions, policies and services, facilitating trade beyond 
borders for individual countries (The Global Enabling Trade Report, 2012). 
The composite enabling trade index is computed from four sub-indices- 
market access, border administration, transport and communication and 
business environment. Each of the four sub-indices are computed from two 
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data sources- opinion surveys, data and hard data from public institutions 
and international organizations engage in trade such as UNCTAD, World 
Bank, World Bank Logistics index performance and WTO. The survey is 
based on the opinion of business people and those engage in trade across 
borders. Respondents are asked to rank from 1-7 their perception of factors 
affecting them during trade transactions. 
The hard data, such as tariff rates derived from the World Bank is then 
normalized or rescaled within 1-7 in order to align them with the survey data 
scale where 1 represent best and 7 represent a worst enabling trade index. 
The formula for rescaling the data is found in equation 2.1 below. 
𝟔 ∗ [
𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞−𝐬𝐚𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐞 𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐦𝐮𝐦
𝐬𝐚𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐞 𝐦𝐚𝐱𝐢𝐦𝐮𝐦−𝐬𝐚𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐞 𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐦𝐮𝐦
] + 𝟏                                          (2. 1) 
Where 
The minimum and maximum are the lowest and highest scores of the sample 
 
The final score for each index are the unweighted averages from each sub-
index and data sources respectively. Although the enabling trade indices 
offer a useful proxy for trade institutional quality, their computation started 
in 2008 which offers a small data set. The CPIA and doing business indices 
also suffer from a similar time series issue because their computation 
started from 2005. Similarly, the CPIA measures the extent to which a 
country policy and institutional framework to promote growth and poverty 
reduction initiatives. Although trade can stimulate the process of growth and 
poverty reduction through export and income generation, the CPIA does not 
measure trade facilitation institutions. The doing business index also 
measures how effective policy and the regulatory environment is to 
business operations. The regulatory aspect of doing the business index can 
be a proxy for trade facilitation. However, there are other indices that are 
perhaps more appropriate as a proxy for trade facilitation with a longer time 
span. 
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Indeed, Straub (2000) highlighted that the World Bank world governance 
indicators offer the most comprehensive proxy for institutional quality since 
they cover a wide range of stakeholders whose views are compiled into a 
composite figure. It covers several hundred variables generated from 31 
individual data sources for each country that includes some aspects of the 
CPIA, enabling trade indices and doing business indices (Kaufmann et al, 
2010). These sources encompass opinion surveys that capture 
respondent’s perception of institutional quality (Governance)3 from a wide 
range of the public and private sector, households, NGOs, international 
organizations, think-tanks, and experts. Kaufmann et al (2010) then 
normalizes the data by combining the different data sources into a 
composite score. In Africa, the data sources include the African 
Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), the 
Afrobarometer, Global Competitiveness Report survey, Reporters without 
Borders, Freedom House and African Electoral index. The final score 
represents the perception of respondents on each indicator. The process 
involves; 
❖ Collecting data from all the 31 different sources. The scale of 
measurement may be different from one source to another. 
❖ An Unobserved Component Model (UCM) is then used to 
a. Standardize the data into comparable units given its diverse sources 
b. Aggregate all the data through weighted average method 
c. And include a margin of error to capture the imprecision in measuring 
institutions. 
 
❖ The composite score is simply the weighted average of all the data 
sources which is rescaled to lie between -2.5 and 2. 5 ranges where 2.5 
represent good institutions. 
 
The advantages of using the governance indicators from the World Bank 
are many. First, they are comprehensive in the sense that they encompass 
most of the existing institutional quality indices such as CPIA. Second, they 
                                                          
3 Kaufmann et al did not make distinction between governance and institutional quality. 
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entail a much longer time series from 1996 to 2015 relative to the other 
indices. Therefore, this thesis aims to use the World Bank governance 
indicators as a proxy for the quality of regional trade institutions. 
Furthermore, research into the determinants of institutional quality should 
move beyond the descriptive approach. Therefore, although it is recognized 
that measuring institutional quality could be difficult, we take the view of 
Acemoglu et al (2001) and Koremenos et al (2001) that we should start 
somewhere by developing theory first, quantification, models, and 
estimation. Institutional theories have been developed. 
2.3 Methodological approaches and debates 
2.3.0 Introduction 
In the previous section, it was demonstrated that there is no consensus on 
whether institutional quality could be measured or not. This has led to the 
use of descriptive (qualitative) and empirical (quantitative) approach or a 
combination of the two. Each of these approaches has their own merits and 
demerits underpinned by a philosophical approach (Creswell, 2009). The 
positivist and post-positivist are aligned with the quantitative method of 
research where it is argued that reality in the natural settings can be 
observed and measured by identifying causal relationships and effect 
(Creswell, 2009 and Saunders et al, 2012). In this sense, institutional quality 
and its determinants can be measured. However, the post-positivist argues 
that knowledge about absolute truth is difficult to ascertain which imply that 
measurements approximate the reality or reject a given hypothesis rather 
than the establishment of facts (Creswell, 2009 and Saunders et al, 2012). 
In contrast, the interpretivism/constructivists are aligned with the qualitative 
research approach where individual are assumed to develop subjective 
meanings of their experiences of the world (Creswell, 2009 and Saunders 
et al, 2012). These meanings vary and take multiple shapes that lead the 
researcher looking for complexities embedded within the subject being 
studied. As such, the researcher avoids narrowing the meanings into a few 
categories and ideas. Instead, participant’s view of the situation is 
constructed as the given nature of the relationship (Schwandt, 2007 and 
Creswell, 2009). 
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These philosophical debates have motivated the general methodological 
approaches to research. However, in the context of determining a 
phenomenon, we argue in this thesis that it is not sufficient to highlight the 
determinants of institutional quality within the interpretivism/constructivists 
paradigm. We need to go a step further by approximating the degree of 
association or causality. Hence, the positivist or post-positivist view could 
serve as a philosophical underpinning in this area of research. Such 
approximations could provide useful policy implications. Moreover, research 
related to the determinants of institutional quality is increasing using 
statistical methods, although there is no cohesiveness in terms of models 
underpinned by institutional theories that could be estimated. The issue of 
endogeneity further makes it difficult to model and estimate the 
determinants of institutional quality. 
Nonetheless, several papers used the least square method of estimation 
without a direct link to model and institutional theory (Straub, 2000; 
Acemoglu et al, 2001; Islam and Montenegro, 2002; Borner et al, 2004, 
Siba, 2008 and Alonso et al, 2013). The least square method has been 
justified by the use of instruments as proxies where they are assumed 
uncorrelated with the error term. However, Albouy (2012) has criticized the 
method used to compute the instruments as poor and lacks strong 
estimation power. Furthermore, Straub (2000) and Chang (2010) argued 
that the main challenge in assessing determinants of institutional quality 
within the positivist paradigm is the lack of models underpinned by theory 
(Straub, 2000 and Chang, 2010). This thesis argues that models could be 
underpinned by institutional theories that could be estimated in the context 
of RTAs if certain assumptions and justifications are made about the 
direction of causality. 
 
2.3.1 Rationale for modeling 
The economic study into the determinants of institutional quality should 
consider identifying appropriate models. This can be challenging given the 
complex nature of institutions (Kaufmann et al, 10). Additionally, the 
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challenges relate to whether the determinants of institutional quality can be 
statistically modeled in a single or multiple of equations; or whether a 
descriptive examination is more appropriate. Indeed, Hodgson (1998) 
highlighted that the introduction of mathematical economics has made 
research related to institutional economics redundant since its complexities 
are difficult to capture in a single mathematical equation. Therefore, there is 
no consensus on the appropriate approach to modeling the determinants of 
institutional quality. 
The descriptive approach could be used, and it could generate an 
ontological4 understanding of the nature of relationships between 
institutions and other factors. However, other papers argue that the 
descriptive approach should be treated as the first step toward a statistical 
approach that can epistemologically5 capture the degree to which such 
relationship exists (Straub, 2000; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Maseland, 2010 
and Alonso et al, 2013).  
Modeling basically involves trying to identify an appropriate set of 
relationships between two or more variables and the nature and direction of 
that relationship (Gilchrist, 2000 and Heij et al, 2004). Two approaches are 
generally used to specify a model namely; 
1. The conceptual approach which uses past information or theoretical 
underpinning to derive the model and 
2. The empirical approach that focuses on gathering data, plot it and then 
derive the model by observing the nature of the relationship. Hence, the 
empirical approach does require extensive repeated research in order to 
determine the robustness of the model. 
Heij et al (2004) argued that economic theory has not been able to explicitly 
suggest an appropriate model for use in estimation due to the abstract 
nature of economic theory. This is even more so in modeling the conjunction 
of factors that determine the quality of the institutions given its lack of 
                                                          
4 Ontology- what constitute reality and how we understand existence 
5 Epistemologically- what constitute real knowledge and how do we obtain that real knowledge 
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theoretical cohesiveness (Borner et al, 2004; Chang, 2010 and Castellano 
et al, 2012). This suggests that the empirical approach to modeling might 
be the most appropriate given the lack of theoretical cohesiveness in the 
conceptual approach. Existing research has generally used both or the 
combinations of the two with no clear justification. 
Indeed, the empirical approach has been used in several research papers 
(Koremenos et al, 2001; Bloch and Tang, 2004; Moss et al, 2006; Aoki, 
2007; Musole, 2009; Keane et al, 2010 and Rothstein et al, 2010). Most of 
these papers attempt to explain the determinants of institutional quality from 
a utility maximization point of view. They found that differences in the quality 
of institutions across countries emanate from imposing resource constraints 
(Subramanian and Matthijs, 2007; Rodrik, 2007; and Furubotn and Richter, 
2010 and Stefanadis, 2010). Hence, models in the empirical approach are 
usually descriptive or derived, without any direct link to estimation methods 
mainly due to endogeneity issues (Chang, 2010). Moreover, the empirical 
approach has the advantage to identify more variables and information 
about the nature of relationships.  
The conceptual approach has also been used in several research papers 
(Ben-David, 1996; La Porta, 1999; Straub, 2000; Rijckeghem et al, 2001; 
Islam et al, 2002; Brunetti et al, 2003; Borner et al, 2004; Rodrik et al, 2004; 
Acemoglu et al, 2005; Zhang, 2006; Mocan, 2008; Herger et al, 2008; 
Levechenko, 2012; Berggren et al, 2013 and Alonso et al, 2013). 
Nonetheless, the link between institutional theories and models has been 
deficient. The lack of a clear theoretical underpinning within the conceptual 
approach is mainly due to the issue of endogeneity (Straub, 2000; Rodrik et 
al, 2004; Herger et al, 2008 and Alonso et al, 2013). Chang (2010) argued 
that the link between institutional theory and estimation methods usually 
collapse in the modeling stage mainly due to the difficulty in identifying all 
the mechanism about how institutions work. This thesis argues that the 
post-positivist paradigm can offer a solution to this issue since it assumes 
that quantitative research attempt to approximate or reject a hypothesis 
rather than establish a fact. It cautions that social science phenomenon is 
subjective (Creswell, 2009). Almost all the conceptual approaches used 
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instrumental variables, including lag or initial values to estimate the 
determinants of institutional quality with the assumption that the instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term. The use of lag as proxies is particularly 
interesting because it could motivate the use of autoregressive models 
underpinned by theory, if certain assumptions are made in the context of 
RTAs. Moreover, these instruments could be used as real variables in the 
context of RTAs if some assumptions are made about the direction of 
causality. 
Ullman and Bentler (2012) argued that the prevalence of endogeneity can 
be modeled as a bidirectional relationship using structural equation models 
(SEM). Rodrik et al (2004) and Herger et al, 2008) have used the SEM to 
estimate the determinants of institutional quality. However, some 
parameters from SEM estimates cannot be retrieved.  Hence, SEM 
modelers eventually use 2SLS, where some of the variables assumed to be 
endogenous, are instrumented or lagged. Thus, the link between theory, 
models and the 2SLS has not been made clear. Similarly, the solution to 
both SEM and 2SLS models is the same where instrumental variables are 
used (Wooldridge, 2013). 
Therefore, both the conceptual and the empirical approaches have 
shortcomings which have contributed to the lack of interest among 
researchers about the determinants of institutional quality (Borner et al, 
2004; Chang, 2010; Vogit, 2013 and Alonso et al, 2013). Our discussion in 
chapter five and six is to attempt to link theory, model and estimation method 
in the context of RTAs. We assume that our proposition would minimize 
endogeneity. 
Furthermore, the thesis will also look at the process of convergence of 
institutions within the ECOWAS region because regional institutions should 
set common rules (Fafchamps, 2004 and Lejarraga and Shepherd, 2013). 
Models within trade and growth theories have been developed to look into 
the convergence of price and income for trade partners (Linder, 1961; Ben-
David, 1996; Zhang, 2006 and Ghazaleh, 2013). The assumption is that 
similarities in demand preferences lead to greater bilateral trade and 
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eventual factor price equalization since producers will adjust their prices to 
match the demand preferences of consumers (Linder, 1961; Quah, 1993 
and Zhang, 2006). Findings from such theoretical assumptions have been 
mixed (Zhang, 2006). Autoregressive models are generally used in the 
papers looking at convergence. We argue that this approach could be 
extended to test the convergence of regional trade institutions. 
In summary, empirical research related to the determinants of institutional 
quality lack clear models underpinned by institutional theory due to the issue 
of endogeneity and the complex behavior of institutions. We assert in this 
thesis that it is feasible to link model with the theory, if certain assumptions 
are made about the direction of causality in the context of RTAs. 
2.3.2 Estimation method approaches 
As we highlighted in section 2.2.0, research related to the determinants of 
institutional quality used either the qualitative method (North, 1990; 
Hodgson, 1998; 2006; De Groot et al, 2003; Bloch and Tang, 2004; Rodrik, 
2007 and Castellano et al, 2012) or the quantitative method. The 
quantitative method mainly uses the method of least squares (OLS) and 
correlation test for estimation (Straub, 2000; Rose, 2005; Lee and Park, 
2007; Turkson, 2012; Javed, 2013 and Salvatici, 2013). However, the 
assumptions of OLS do not always hold in regression equations due to the 
problem of endogeneity and multicollinearity that could potentially make 
estimates bias and inconsistent. These problems could occur in the various 
methods of least squares including the Generalized Least Square (GLS); 
Weighted Least Square (WLS) or Two-Stage-Least Square (2SLS) 
(Triesman, 2000; Staub, 2000; Brunetti et al, 2003; Borner et al, 2004 and 
Alonso et al, 2013). Other methods that have been used less extensively 
are the probability and autoregressive models. The autoregressive models 
are mainly used to test convergence while the probability models take the 
form of dummy dependent variable (Lejarraga and Shepherd, 2013). Hence, 
there is need to review these methods in order to justify our own approach. 
The premise is to ascertain the extent to which the quantitative or qualitative 
approach could be used to answer the research questions set out in this 
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thesis.  Creswell (2009) and Silverman (2013) argue that there is no simple 
distinction between quantitative and qualitative method mainly because 
they can be complementary. In addition, it is impossible to establish which 
method is wrong or right; instead, we should justify the method the 
researcher intends to use (Creswell, 2009 and Maseland, 2011). The 
qualitative approach assumes that a universal theory is impossible for 
institutional behavior could be country or region specific (Chang, 2010). 
Moreover, it is impossible to vividly quantify institutions. Hence, the ideal 
way to describe the determinants of institutional quality is to identify patterns 
which give an indication of the nature of relationship without making any 
quantitative inference (Koremenos et al, 2001; Rodrik, 2007; Chang, 2010 
and Vogit, 2013). In contrast, the quantitative approach generally assumes 
the existence of a universal theory or hypothesis that could capture the 
relationship between institutions and other variables such as trade (Chang, 
2011; Maseland, 2011 and Boettke and Fink, 2011).   
The qualitative approach does not require statistical models and asserts that 
the complex nature of institutions requires describing the nature of the 
relationship. The quantitative approach is being used, but it lacks clear 
models underpinned by institutional theory due to endogeneity issues. 
However, as we highlighted earlier, we should treat the qualitative approach 
as a first step. We argue in this thesis that a quantitative approach could be 
applied when the theoretical underpinnings are justified and if certain 
assumptions are fulfilled. For example, since regional trade institutions 
could not exist prior to the formation of an RTA, it is plausible to assume 
that interaction of countries determines the quality of regional trade 
institutions first. In this way, we could model this phenomenon underpinned 
by the institutional theories that could be universally applied in the context 
of RTAs. Before we get into estimating determinants of institutional quality, 
we will first examine the development and evolution of regional trade 
institutions in West Africa in the next chapter in order to know what has 
remained of them.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Examine the history of West Africa and its 
relations to the development of its regional trade 
institutions 
3.0 Introduction and background 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the historical changes that took place 
in the development and standardization of regional trade institutions in West 
Africa. This will enable us to understand how the present quality of 
institutions came about and to reflect on historical good practices for the 
ECOWAS deep integration scheme. The path dependency theory supports 
the proposition that history contributes to the current development and 
quality of institutions in a country or region (Acemoglu et al, 2001; 2005; 
Nunn, 2007 and Austin, 2008). Institutional theories also argue that the 
quality of institutions emanates from societal norms and interactions and the 
need for certainty in all forms of exchanges (Powelson, 1972; North, 1991; 
Englebert, 2000; Fafchamps, 2004; Hodgson, 2006; Furubotn and Richter, 
2010 and Chang, 2011). Therefore, history can help to explain current 
institutions in Africa or at least provide us with some information about the 
historical changes that took place. However, Jerven (2011) argued that it 
doesn’t make sense to attribute Africa’s poor growth performance to initial 
conditions because there has been ample time to adjust past deficiencies. 
Nonetheless, Acemoglu et al (2001) identified a historical link between 
European settlements in former colonies and variation in the quality of their 
institutions. Their research highlights that colonies where Europeans settled 
tend to have better institutions because Europeans did not create extractive 
institutions. Such claims are supported by Hillbom (2014), who noted that 
British colonies in the southern part of Africa received grants under the 
colonial development fund in order to stimulate investment and institutional 
development.   
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Nevertheless, these analyses suggest that the level of underdevelopment 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and West Africa can be attributed in part to 
weak pre-colonial and extractive colonial institutions (Rodney, 1981; 
Acemoglu et al, 2001; Nunn, 2007 and Richards and Nwanna, 2010). 
Indeed, Boettke and Fink (2011) argued that the quality of institutions 
determines the extent to which society engages in productive activities, 
hence weak and extractive institutions lead to low economic productivity, 
including trade flows.  However, most of the research about regional trade 
institutions and harmonization in West Africa is skewed toward two areas. 
The first focuses on how the trans-Atlantic slave trade and colonial era trade 
favored external relations, which implies that less emphasis was put on 
developing infrastructure and institutions that promoted regional trade 
(Rodney, 1981; Davidson, 1985; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Aryeetey, 2001; 
Nunn, 2007; Nunn, 2008; Richards and Nwanna, 2010; Frankema and 
Waijenburg, 2012; Keyser, 2012; Sousa, 2012 and Hillbom, 2014). Related 
studies also looked at commodity trading in the trans-Saharan trade during 
the Empires of the Western Sudan (Barry, 1998; Thornton, 1999; Lydon, 
2009 and Conrad, 2010). Hence, there was a structural shift in the 
development of institutions in West Africa during the colonial era which 
continued until today (Nunn, 2008).  The second research area focuses on 
the feasibility of a monetary union and the implications of the merger of the 
WAMZ with WAEMU within ECOWAS (Debrun et al, 2005; Fielding and 
Shields, 2005; Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2008; Daboh, 2010; Adamu and 
Itsede, 2010 and Alagidede et al, 2012). Although international trade and 
monetary union are desirable, weakness and variation in regional trade 
institutions have been found to levy high costs to ECOWAS cross-border 
trade (ATPC Briefing, 2010; Keyser, 2012; Cissokho et al, 2012; Diop, 2012 
and Sy, 2014). 
This chapter argues that the current literature relating to ECOWAS lacks a 
holistic view of the development and harmonization of regional trade 
institutions in the pre-colonial and colonial era and pays insufficient attention 
to the history that could enable us to know how the present came about. 
Therefore, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the historical 
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changes about the development and standardization of regional trade 
institutions from a historical perspective which is lacking in the existing 
literature. We argue that the historical reflection could be relevant in 
facilitating trade in West Africa today conditional on further investigation into 
how lessons could be drawn from historical good practices. Hence, it could 
address some recurrent challenges with ECOWAS cross-border trade that 
is associated with the weak regional trade institutions. Furthermore, it can 
also give confidence to ECOWAS members that economic and political 
union is feasible given that it existed in the region. The chapter also enables 
the reader to identify what has remained of regional trade institutions in 
West Africa.  
The history of regional trade institutions in West Africa can be divided into 
three periods, namely; the Empirehood (790 to 1650 AD), the Atlantic slave 
trade and colonialism (1650 to 1960s) and the post- independence and 
subsequent formation of ECOWAS from 1975 onwards. Each of these 
periods played an important role in shaping trade patterns, the rules and 
behavior of West Africans as well as state building (Bovill, 1933; Davidson, 
1985 and Conrad, 2010). Furthermore, the issue of weak pre-colonial 
institutions in the Empires of Western Sudan is controversial. These 
Empires developed regional trade institutions, including protection of trade 
routes, enforcement of trade agreements and common currencies (Polanyi 
et al, 1975; Rodney, 1981 Davidson, 1985; Thornton, 1998; Stiansen and 
Guyer, 1999; Green, 2011 and Hopkins, 2014). Furthermore, institutions 
such as a common currency, single administration and enforcement of 
contracts through the chiefs, existed in the colonial era. Historical changes 
in governance led to the loss of some facets of regional trade institutions in 
post-independence West Africa. Therefore, there is a need to examine 
regional trade institutions in West Africa given its historical past. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. We will first discuss the trade 
institutions in West Africa during the Empires of Western Sudan in section 
3.1. An assessment of trade institutions during the colonial era follows in 
section 3.2.  Section 3.3 investigates the institutional structures of ECOWAS 
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and the extent to which they could promote the harmonization of regional 
trade institutions.  Section 3.4 summarize and concludes the chapter. 
 
3.1 The Empirehood period (790 to 1650 AD) 
The aim of this section is to investigate the evolution of regional trade 
institutions in the Empires of Western Sudan which has not been done 
sufficiently. This will enable us to determine their relative difference to the 
colonial era and today. The study of regional trade institutions in the 
Empires of Western Sudan and the colonial era has not been investigated 
sufficiently in terms of their evolution and the extent to which they were 
standardized. Our discussion here aims to fill this gap. Trade institutions are 
defined as rules and systems which govern and facilitate a trade such as a 
common currency, enforcement of contracts, common trade taxes, 
protection of trade from corruption and the administrative system (North, 
1991). These institutions were of importance during the Empires of Western 
Sudan and the subsequent colonial era and have been discussed in a 
number of papers (Davidson, 1985; Nunn, 2007; Waines, 2010; Conrad, 
2010 and Hopkins, 2014). Their heritage continues to be important in 
facilitating trade across the world today. Western Sudan consisted of three 
major Empires beginning around 790 to 1650AD; the Ghana, Mali and 
Songhai Empires respectively (Conrad, 2010). Figure 3.1 provides a rough 
description of the location of these Empires in West Africa and their main 
trade routes.
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    Figure 3.1 Map of West Africa showing the location of the Empires of Western Sudan and their associated trade routes 
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These Empires covered most of the present-day ECOWAS member states 
and to some extent defined the precolonial history of West Africa 
(Adomakoh, 1962; Munson, 1980; Catchpole et al, 1983; and Barry, 1998; 
Silberman et al, 2012 and Ikpo, 2015). Each of these Empires was 
composed of kingdoms or provinces with their own specialized mode of 
production, which provided the inevitable need for exchange, despite the 
existence of subsistence farming (Rotberg, 1965; Davidson, 1985; 
Shillington, 1995; Conrad, 2010 and Cinyabuguma and Putterman, 2010). 
The exchanges require the functionality of rules and regulations as well as 
distribution channels. As such, trade routes were created, which stretched 
from the Atlantic coast of present-day Mauritania, The Gambia and Senegal 
(Tekrur Empire) to Hausa land in Nigeria, southwards to present day Guinea 
and Ivory Coast in addition to the trans-Saharan trade routes that stretched 
to present-day Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt (Davidson, 1985). 
Additional routes, such as rivers, linked villages, and towns (Lugard, 1964 
and Meagher, 1997; Thornton, 1998; Conrad, 2010 and Hopkins, 2014). 
Furthermore, the Empires established rules and regulations that governed 
regional and international trade (Conrad, 2010 and Hopkins, 2014). 
These Empires were also called successor Empires because they emerged 
from one another (Levtzion, 1971). These successions provided evolution 
toward standardization of regional trade institutions as new Empires 
inherited and improved the previous systems. For example, the Mali Empire 
adopted the import and export taxes from Ghana while also absorbing 
Ghana (Munson, 1980 and Davidson, 1985). Hence, there was a gradual 
move towards common trade taxes as the Empires enlarged. Furthermore, 
the kings in the Mali Empire recognized that, in order to promote trade, there 
must be security and certainty in trade transactions (Conrad, 2010). As a 
first step, the Mali Empire made peace with other kingdoms through 
consensus (Davidson, 1985; Levitt, 2015; Asante and Leadbitter Jr, 2016). 
The ‘Mande charter’ was of importance in the evolution of common 
institutions in the Mali Empire and in subsequent Empires (Levitt, 2015; 
Asante and Leadbitter Jr, 2016). The ‘Mande charter’, brought clans and 
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small kingdoms together in order to codify how they should be governed 
(Levitt, 2015; Asante and Leadbitter Jr, 2016). Since clans and kingdoms 
existed mainly on an ethnic basis at the time, the expansion of Empires 
arose from consensus, trust and cooperation, although warfare was also 
used to annex in some places (Conrad, 2010). The clans and small 
kingdoms agreed to be ruled by one king in order to maintain overall peace, 
to protect trade routes and to harmonize trade rules. Ibn Battuta and Al-
Bakri cited by Davidson (1985) and Waines (2010) suggested that the 
harmony of trade rules in different parts of the Empires provided security 
and certainty for traders. Furthermore, Ahmad Ibn al-Yaqubi cited by 
Conrad (2010) narrated that the kings had smaller kings under their 
authority which point to the likelihood of common rules governing the 
Empires. Ibn Kathir also narrated that ‘Mansa Musa’ had an estimated 24 
kings under his authority. Conrad (2010) argued that the strength of the 
Empires was based on the control of regional and international trade which 
suggests the unlikelihood of the divergence of regional trade institutions. 
Nunn (2007) and Hopkins (2014) argued that the expansion of trade led to 
large towns and the formation of states (Empires), gradually leading to an 
economic unity of West Africa. These sources suggest that regional trade 
institutions were gradually standardized as Empires enlarged. This was 
likely from an economic point of view since the divergence of trade 
institutions in the same town or Empire would have pushed traders to 
markets with more efficient institutions. In their absence, places with less 
efficient trade institutions would have adjusted in order to remain 
competitive. Furthermore, a number of papers highlighted that small 
kingdom were annexed by larger kingdoms in the process of forming these 
Empires (Conrad, 2010). Hence, the divergence of regional trade 
institutions would have been unlikely in these Empires since annexed 
kingdoms were likely to comply with their conquerors (Barry, 1998; Conrad, 
2010).  
The historical changes toward standardized regional trade institutions 
should be expected since these Empires were significant trading entities 
that derived their strength from the exchange of many commodities such as 
32 
 
gold and salt (Polanyi et al, 1957; Rodney, 1981; Davidson, 1985; Reece, 
2005 and Waines, 2010). Other goods traded within West Africa included 
textiles, kola nuts, ivory, copper, food and live animals (Johnson, 1970; 
Lovejoy, 1974; Munson, 1980; Conrad, 2010 and Hopkins, 2014). Although, 
the trading quantities were unknown, there is evidence that intra-West 
African trade was extensive, where cowrie shells, gold, copper, manillas and 
cloth acted as common currencies to facilitate trade in the region 
(Adomakoh, 1962; Johnson, 1970; McPhee, 1971; Lovejoy, 1974; Austen, 
1987; Manning, 1988; Naanen, 1993; Ogundiran, 2000; Nawaz, 2001; 
Nunn, 2007; Lydon, 2009; Odunbaku, 2012 and Hopkins, 2014).  
The evolution of these Empires and the security for traders suggested the 
presence of standardized trade rules and regulations such as a system to 
protect trade routes through the army and royal officials, courts to settle 
trade disputes, banking and letters of credit to ease payments, common 
currencies and common trade taxes were all established to facilitate and 
protect trade (Bovill, 1933; Polanyi et al, 1957; Johnson, 1970; Levtzion, 
1971; Munson, 1980; Rodney, 1981; Reece, 2005 and Waines, 2010). 
These trade institutions were of particular importance in the Empires and 
their practices could be relevant in facilitating trade in West Africa today. 
Furthermore, reflecting on these regional trade institutions could address 
some of the recurrent institutional failures which add to trade costs within 
ECOWAS today. For example, the trade, customs and free movement of 
persons (TACFEMP) as well as the legal and judicial affairs committee are 
important sub-committees of the ECOWAS parliament. In addition to other 
duties, the TACFEMP committee is responsible for developing legal rules 
regarding the establishment of the economic and monetary union (article 55 
of the 1993 revised treaty), which was scheduled for 2008. Furthermore, the 
committee considers the regulation of customs procedures, payments and 
other trade-related rules as stipulated in Chapter VIII, as well as supporting 
the coordination of the judiciaries on trade-related disputes (ECOWAS 
Parliament, 2014). In the Empirehood, the King had representatives in each 
kingdom whose role was to monitor rules and regulations (Polanyi et al, 
1957; Davidson, 1985, Reece, 2005 and Hopkins, 2014). 
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A number of papers highlighted the presence of common currencies during 
the Empires of Western Sudan such as cowrie shells, copper and manillas, 
cloth, gold and iron rods (Hopkins, 2014; Johnson, 1970 and Naanen, 
1993). For example, the Ghana King levied one Dinar of Gold mithqal for 
each donkey loaded full of goods entering the Empire and two Dinars for 
leaving the Empire, regardless of point of entry or exit (Davidson, 1985 and 
Conrad, 2010). Such levies are equivalent to import and export tariffs in 
modern international trade language. It suggests that gold mithqal acted as 
a common currency and common trade taxes in the Ghana Empire. If other 
currencies existed at the same time, it was likely that they were convertible.  
Indeed, Conrad (2010) argued that as early as the 13th century, West 
Africans preferred cowries as a medium of exchange. This argument is 
corroborated by a number of papers. Johnson (1970) narrated that gold and 
cowries were the most commonly used currencies in West Africa. Hopkins 
(2014) noted that cowries were used extensively, and other currencies were 
used only where cowries could not penetrate. Furthermore, Ogundiran 
(2000) and Odunbaku (2012) also highlighted that the cowrie shells were 
used in all West African states in the pre-colonial and colonial era. 
Corroboration of the extensive level of intra-West African trade with the 
extensive use of cowries suggests that they acted as a common currency 
or at least were convertible to other currencies.  Hence, cowries evolved to 
replace other media of exchange as the Empires expanded. The cowrie was 
fixed in value against other goods and currencies outside West Africa in 
order to generate certainty of wealth value (Johnson, 1970 and Hopkins, 
2014). Therefore, the extensive use of cowries as a medium of exchange 
shows that it was accepted as a common currency and was convertible with 
other lesser used currencies. In contrast, ECOWAS is characterized by 
eight currencies which are not directly convertible (Sy, 2014). This shows 
the extent to which the Empires had a more standardized currency 
management system than the current situation in ECOWAS. 
The evolution in the enforcement of contracts during the Empires of Western 
Sudan suggests that they were gradually standardized. This is corroborated 
by several events. First, the existing literature suggests that intra-West 
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African trade was extensive (Thornton, 1998; Stiansen and Guyer, 1999 and 
Hopkins, 2014). Secondly, Conrad (2010) narrated that ‘Mansa Musa’ had 
about 24 minor kings under his control during the Mali Empire. Since the 
Songhai Empire was larger, it was likely that more minor kings were under 
the authority of one king. Third, there were royal courts in each province 
assigned to settle all kinds of disputes including trade (Waines, 2010). 
Fourth, Waines (2010) highlighted the presence of interlocutors between 
parties engaged in trade and in royal courts as witnesses in the Mali Empire. 
For example, Ibn Battuta cited in Waines (2010) bought a slave girl for 25 
gold mithqals but the owner later wanted to revoke the deal. However, the 
interlocutor was consulted which resulted in Ibn Battuta being compensated 
with another slave girl. Fifth, the provinces had representatives in the 
Empires, while the kings also sent representatives to these areas, where 
their role was to convey and monitor any agreements.  These events 
suggest that the provinces benefitted from trade to the extent that they 
agreed to be ruled by a central authority that would harmonize trade and 
maintain overall peace (Davidson, 1985). This reinforces our earlier 
discussion, that it is unlikely that there were divergent contract enforcement 
rules in the Empires. These representatives and interlocutors ensured that 
contracts were enforced. ECOWAS could reflect on its historical past 
regarding the enforcement of contracts during the Empirehood era. 
The Empires of Western Sudan also protected trade routes from corruption 
through the royal armies. As trade expanded in the early days of the 
Empires of Western Sudan, there were reports of caravans being attacked 
along the trade routes in some parts of the empires (Davidson, 1985; Barry, 
1998 and Conrad, 2010).  As a result, royal armies were assigned to patrol 
trade routes in order to protect them. Again, the earliest narrations by Ibn 
Battuta suggest that there was security in the Empires for traders. Trade 
taxes were used to fund the royal armies’ patrols (Conrad, 2010). Hence, 
the leaders in these Empires were pragmatic in resolving issues which 
hindered trade flows. This was made easy by a commitment to be governed 
by a central authority. 
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 This type of political commitment, whereby countries form a federation or 
similar, is needed in the context of ECOWAS in order to achieve deeper 
economic integration. Furthermore, the Western Sudan era highlights a 
number of observations regarding the determinants of institutional quality 
such as the need to maintain peace as a requirement to expand trade as 
well as the certainty of trade rules. Al-Bakri cited by Davidson (1985) and 
Conrad (2010) about the harmony of trade rules in different parts of the 
Empires provides interesting evidence. Ibn Battuta further described that 
lost goods would be returned, which epitomized the effectiveness of these 
trade institutions since the implications for non-compliance were clearly 
defined which included being exiled (Waines, 2010). Royal courts were 
usually attended by large crowds during which citizens submitted 
complaints and legal disputes and judgments were made openly, which was 
culturally humiliating (Conrad, 2010). According to Ibn Battuta, the 
compliance rates across these Empires were high because the social and 
cultural norms valued sincerity and integrity in all forms of interactions 
(Waines, 2010). Societal norms determine the extent to which institutional 
rules are adhered to, where existing empirical findings have supported their 
importance in determining institutional quality (North, 1991; Rodrik and 
Subramanian, 2004; Rodrik, 2007 and Alonso and Garcimartin, 2013). In 
the context of ECOWAS, trade institutions would be expected to emanate 
from societal norms.  
This analysis explains that regional trade institutions in the Empires of 
Western Sudan were developed and standardized relative to the current 
situation in West Africa. Societal norms such as the Mande charter provided 
trust that ultimately led to cooperation and the ability to trade. This has been 
corroborated by commentaries from Al-Bakri and Ibn Battuta’s narratives 
about the efficiency of trade in the Empires (Thornton, 1998; Stiansen and 
Guyer, 1999; Conrad, 2010 and Hopkins, 2014). This was not surprising 
because the Empires grew out of the trade. Hence, it was likely that more 
resources were allocated to improving trade institutions. Institutions that 
facilitated a trade such as the common currency, standardized trade rules 
such as common trade taxes, protection of trade routes through the royal 
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armies and dispute settlements through royal courts were arguably more 
standardized and efficient than the current trade institutions in the ECOWAS 
region. In order to achieve regional development through regional 
integration and trade, strong institutions must set common rules 
(Omorogbe, 1993; Englebert, 2000; Aryeetey, 2001 and Assane et al, 
2014). As such, ECOWAS can learn lessons from the Empirehood period, 
in terms of improving the quality of regional trade institutions as a 
prerequisite to successful regional integration and facilitation of trade. 
However, the last major Empire in West Africa, Songhai, collapsed around 
1650, creating a power vacuum and internal conflicts that resulted in inward-
looking kingdoms. This marked another turning point in the development of 
trade institutions in West Africa. The review of the literature suggests that 
we could depart from the current conventional assertion that colonialism 
directly interrupted the natural development of institutions in SSA. We argue 
that such claims are debatable with regard to regional trade institutions 
since internal conflicts led to antagonism and lack of cooperation among 
kingdoms that had existed before the Atlantic slave trade and colonial rule 
and acted as a vacuum that was exploited by European traders and 
colonialist. What we can establish is that regional trade institutions evolved 
to be standardized before the Songhai Empire collapsed. Furthermore, the 
colonial era also created some regional trade institutions that shall be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
3.2 The Atlantic slave trade and colonialism (1650 to 1960s) 
In the previous section, we established that the Empires of Western Sudan 
evolved to standardize regional trade institutions. Nonetheless, the collapse 
of the Songhai Empire led to inward looking kingdoms which in part, 
weakened the process of regional integration. This period marked the 
beginning of the Atlantic slave trade and later colonialism. Therefore, the 
aim of this section is to examine the extent to which resemblance of 
standardized regional trade institutions in the past existed during this period. 
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The Atlantic slave trade and subsequent colonialism also played an 
important role in defining the history of West Africa and SSA today (Heldring 
and Robinson, 2013 and Hillbom, 2014). The conventional wisdom in the 
existing literature is that the slave trade and colonialism directly interrupted 
the natural development of institutions in SSA and in part contributed to its 
current underdevelopment (Rodney, 1981; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Nunn, 
2008 and Heldring and Robinson, 2013). However, we argue that the slave 
trade and colonial era did encompass some institutions which could have 
been vital in promoting regional trade today such as common currencies, 
single administration, contract enforcement through the chiefs and a 
common education system, although they may not have been specifically 
intended to do so. 
The colonial era saw a shift from local administrative systems to the 
adoption of international administrative systems, while British colonies also 
experienced indirect rule. Furthermore, the importance of various trade 
routes changed. During the Empirehood, Europeans and Asians particularly 
benefitted from the trans-Saharan trade since there was limited sea travel 
to the West African coast. For example, significant proportions of the gold 
that Europeans used to make coins originated from West Africa via the 
trans-Saharan trade routes (Lydon, 2009 and International Slavery 
Museum, 2015). However, expansion of sea travel brought West Africans 
into more contact with European traders along the coast partly contributing 
to the decline of the trans-Saharan trade (Barry, 1998; Thornton, 1998; 
Austen, 2010; Conrad, 2010 and Lovejoy, 2012). 
Hitherto it was North Africans who were the middlemen. However, 
occasional internal conflicts within West Africa meant that Europeans could 
not trade securely, and they gradually began to accompany their vessels 
with armies. This is corroborated by Milgrom et al (1990) and Grief (1992) 
who argue that during the 13th to 16th-century European merchants 
demanded that their governments should help to protect international trade 
routes. In the previous section, we highlighted the possibility that the 
standardized regional trade institutions may not have continued after the 
collapse of the Songhai Empire. This view assumes that internal power 
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conflicts in West Africa partly broke the Songhai Empire and led to smaller 
inward-looking kingdoms. However, this claim has been contested by 
Johnson (1970); Davidson (1985); Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon 
(2011). 
The extension of European trade with the Americas and the need for 
productive workers in the plantations partly led to the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade (Austin, 2008). There are conflicting estimates as to the number of 
slaves that were transported across the Atlantic Ocean. The focus of this 
section is to highlight that West African contacts with Europeans initially 
began with trade in goods and humans then subsequently led to a colonial 
rule, which shaped institutions in the region (Acemoglu et al, 2001 and 
Heldring and Robinson, 2013). Rodney (1981), Kingsley (1899); Nunn 
(2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) are of the view that the slave 
trade and colonialism interrupted institutional development in West Africa. 
They assert that it created antagonism among communities that had hitherto 
lived together peacefully due to their trade links. However, there were 
internal conflicts in the Songhai Empire, which contributed to its collapse 
around 1650. Therefore, although we cannot entirely dismiss the claim that 
colonialism might have aggravated any future attempt to unite West Africa 
under an Empire, it is debatable that the institutional development 
experienced during the Empirehood would have continued. What can be 
established is that the regional trade institutions during the Empirehood 
were more standardized and effective relative to the current regional trade 
institutions in West Africa, mainly because the Empires were ruled akin to a 
federal administration especially after the ‘Mande charter’ (Levitt, 2015; 
Asante and Leadbitter Jr, 2016). 
Furthermore, institutions existed during the slave trade that continued 
during colonialism such as the use of cowries as a medium of exchange, 
single administration and the use of chiefs to enforce contracts (Polanyi et 
al, 1957 and Apoh, 2008). For example, Europeans vessels set out from 
their ports to the West African coast where they exchanged goods for 
slaves. These slaves were later transported to the Americas where they 
farmed goods such as sugar, coffee, tobacco, rice and later cotton, which 
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were then transported to Europe. There is a consensus in the existing 
literature that the European traders cooperated with agents and kingdoms 
in West Africa that facilitated the slave trade (Polanyi et al, 1957; Barry, 
1998; Green, 2011 and Lovejoy, 2012). The structure of these agents’ 
transactions has not been fully researched. However, Polanyi et al (1957) 
and Green (2011) argued that small kingdoms had security agreements 
where they paid each other customs duties in return for easy passage of 
captured slaves, which was synonymous to common rules that protected 
trade routes. We argue that these agreements and cooperation may be 
considered as a mechanism to harmonize trading rules and regulations in 
West Africa although these rules were geared towards an inhumane 
international trade rather than intra-kingdom trade in goods. 
However, lessons can be drawn from these events. For example, the 
harmonization of trade institutions at the regional level requires funding to 
function effectively. During the Empirehood and slave trade, these rules 
were enforced by royal armies and funded from customs duties and 
production taxes (Polanyi et al, 1957 and Davidson, 1985). Therefore, 
allocating a percentage of trade taxes specifically for the ECOWAS trade 
facilitation scheme is one method of funding and maintaining the 
effectiveness of some regional trade institutions. In addition, the cooperation 
of some kingdoms for easy passage of slaves indicated the presence of 
rules governing such inhumane trade. Reneging on arrangements resulted 
in a war between kingdoms. For example, the kingdom of Dahomey and 
Whydah cooperated in the transport of slaves by protecting routes in 
exchange for payment of customs duties. However, Dahomey seized 
Whydah in 1727 in order to take full control of trade routes after Whydah 
refused to pay duties to Dahomey (Polanyi et al, 1957). 
Therefore, we wish to assert that West Africans have to some extent a 
history of cooperating in the establishment of trade institutions, which could 
be modified to facilitate the goods trade in the current era. The incentives 
for such cooperation were financial. As a result, the harmonization of 
regional trade institutions in ECOWAS today could depend on the extent to 
which gains are perceived by member states. Such gains are likely to 
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emanate from the level of trade flows. An increase in trade flows will partly 
require the protection of traders from uncertainty and corruption such as 
bribe payments at border controls and illegal checkpoints which add to trade 
costs (Cissokho et al, 2012). It will also require enforcement of the 
ECOWAS customs union arrangements by punishing perpetuators through 
the courts. 
As the slave trade gradually faded, Europeans began to colonize the region. 
The advent of colonialism had two facets in terms of the development of 
trade institutions. The first was the domestic administration system that 
included regional trade rules in the commercialization of commodity trade 
(Adomakoh, 1962; Stiansen and Guyer, 1999 and Hopkins, 2014), and the 
second was the administration of international trade. According to Richards 
et al (2010) and Hopkins (2014) Europeans were interested in two-way 
trade between Europe and West Africa, where West Africa provided raw 
materials for manufactured goods. As a result, the trade facilitating 
institutions were mainly geared toward international trade rather than 
regional trade. For example, a rail line in French West Africa from Bamako 
to Dakar linked the interior to the coastal area in order to transport raw 
materials to the ports of Senegal which reduced transport costs (Austen, 
2010 and Hopkins, 2014). This rail line did not follow the traditional trade 
routes that existed previously; hence it was of little use for intra-West African 
trade at the time. As a result, there was little attention paid to the 
improvement of regional trade institutions during this period.  This has built 
up the consensus in the existing literature that colonialism led to the 
production structure shifting to serve international trade rather than regional 
trade. 
Nonetheless, during the colonial era, some institutions were created such 
as common currencies, single administration and education system and 
contract enforcement rules which could be useful in promoting trade and 
cultural harmony in West Africa today. Furthermore, they generated 
cooperation beyond national borders and partly formed the basis for the 
creation of WAEMU in 1994 and WAMZ in 2000 as separate organizations 
within ECOWAS. We are aware of the shared institutions across British and 
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French colonies. The four British colonies of Nigeria, The Gambia, Ghana 
and Sierra Leone including Liberia6 at some point shared: 
• ‘The British West African Shilling (BWAS)’ as a common currency under 
the control of the West African Currency Board (WACB), first inaugurated in 
1912 (Adomakoh, 1962; Hopkins, 1970; Carland, 1990; Hopkins, 2014 and 
Cuhaj, 2015)7 and, 
• The West African Examination Council (WAEC). 
 
The BWAS was directly convertible to the British pound upon request by 
European traders in the colonies. This was synonymous to the convertible 
common currencies we discussed earlier during the Empirehood. 
Furthermore, BWAS signaled a historical change toward a monetarized 
currency which was an improvement and more convenient for those 
engaged in international trade than the cowries used in the Empirehood and 
the early parts of colonialism (Hopkins, 2014 and Herbst, 2014). However, 
the colonial administrations and European traders did not encourage the 
BWAS to be used for regional trade. Its use as a medium of exchange to 
expand regional trade was conditional on a favourable balance of payments 
in the colonies (Hopkins, 1970; Hopkins, 2014 and Herbst, 2014). Therefore, 
the colonial currencies were intended to promote international trade rather 
than regional trade. On the positive side, the BWAS resulted in the removal 
of exchange rate costs and led to the reduction of barter exchange 
(Hopkins, 1970; Ogundiran, 2000; Waines, 2010; Odunbaku, 2012 and 
Hopkins, 2014). The colonial administrations and European traders were 
keen to reduce barter for goods destined to the international markets by 
accepting BWAS for goods purchased during the latter part of colonialism 
(Hopkins, 2014). Given the extent of unofficial trade in the region today 
(Meagher, 1997 and Golub and Mbaye, 2009), maintaining the BWAS would 
have eliminated exchange rate conversion costs, expanded regional trade 
and raised the income of traders. This is corroborated by Sy (2014) who 
                                                          
6 Liberia adopted the British West African Shilling (BWAS) until 1943 
7 The WACB replaced the Bank of British West Africa which was established in 1894 by British 
merchants and had branches in all the British colonies including Monrovia (in Liberia) (Hopkins, 
2014) 
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cited SWIFT8, who stated that 50% of intra-African trade financial 
settlements are conducted with banks outside the continent, which adds to 
transaction costs and serves as a disincentive for trade and investment in 
the region. 
It can also be argued that the BWAS and CFA Franc gradually replaced the 
cowrie shells, gold, cloth, an iron rods and copper as a common currency in 
the later part of colonialism. This was enforced by the colonial administration 
favoring tax and other commodity payment in colonial currency rather than 
in kind or cowries (Nunn, 2007). Furthermore, although colonialism was 
engulfed by forced labor that was mainly compensated in kind (Gupta, 1981; 
Fall, 2002 and Osborn, 2003); the colonial currencies were later encouraged 
for payment of labor and other domestic agricultural products (Fall, 2002). 
Fall (2002) argued that the use of the colonial currencies was intended to 
enable French West Africans to pay their taxes to the colonial governments 
and to purchase imports. This payment system continued today in the form 
of direct and indirect taxes. The Empirehood also had an integrated tax 
system as we discussed in the earlier section. Nonetheless, Johnson 
(1970); Ogundiran, 2000 and Odunbaku (2012) argued that the cowrie 
shells continued to be used as a medium of exchange during the colonial 
period despite the colonialists’ attempt to eliminate their use. The role of 
WAEC is to ensure common practices in the education of the British 
colonies in West Africa including Liberia (Nicol, 1971).  WAEC ensured 
cooperation through the establishment of a common education system in 
the British colonies which had the potential to generate common standards 
and cultural diffusion (Agbodeka, 2002). For example, some of the 
committee members that administer WAEC are nominated government of 
member countries while other members are nominated by school teachers 
and members of higher education institutions (Nicol, 1971). This could make 
standardization of regional trade institutions less challenging and help 
inform citizens about their rights under the ECOWAS trade liberalization 
scheme. 
                                                          
8 SWIFT- Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
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In the French colonies, similar institutions were established. France 
administered its West African colonies as the Federation of French West 
Africa from around 1895 to 1960 when the colonies gained their 
independence except for Guinea in 1958 (Renninger, 1979 and Klein, 
1998).  The federation had a single currency (CFA)9, common education 
system and single administrative system (Huillery, 2006). Some features of 
these institutions such as the CFA and monetary policy still exist today in 
the form of the WAEMU (Chafer, 2002). The maintenance of these 
institutions is attributed to several factors which shall be discussed later. 
In the early days after independence, some institutions were created 
beyond colonial affiliations. It is also difficult to prevent communities from 
interacting in economic and social matters due to the artificial borders of the 
colonial legacy. To some extent, these issues and institutions formed the 
basis for the creation of ECOWAS. An example of such an institution was 
the establishment of the West African Groundnut Council (WAGC) of 
Senegal, The Gambia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Burkina Faso in 1964. This 
cooperation was intended to facilitate the accumulation of products, such as 
groundnuts, for overseas markets (Renninger, 1979 and Mays, 2015). The 
process of accumulating groundnuts from various parts of the region was 
probably facilitated by the existence of common regional trade rules and 
cooperation. However, little research has been conducted into how such 
cooperation and institutions could have been maintained and expanded in 
order to promote regional trade. 
Apart from the WAEC, the other institutions in the British colonies were 
abandoned after independence. WAEC ensured greater cooperation 
between the former British colonies in West Africa that could have to serve 
as a platform for cooperation in other sectors. The former French colonies 
maintained the single currency and recognized the desirability of 
maintaining at least some of the institutions due to several factors. First, 
France ruled its colonies in a more rigid, centralized way with some element 
                                                          
9 CFA (French colonies of Africa and later French community of Africa) and the FCFA (Franc of the French 
Community of Africa) were both used in the colonial period. The CFA was used until 1958 when it became FCFA. 
Note that the CFA was used in both France and the colonies until 1945 when a separate CFA Franc was issued 
for the colonies in West Africa (Hopkins, 2014). 
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of assimilation which made cooperation after independence desirable 
(Huillery, 2006 and Hopkins, 2014). A second and more recent argument 
suggests that France desired to maintain closer ties with its former colonies 
since an estimated 50% to 65% of WAEMU members’ net external assets 
must be deposited with the French treasury while the West African CFA 
franc is pegged to the euro (Sene, 2014 and Koulibaly, 2014). However, 
enthusiasm to maintain the institutions of the colonial powers gradually 
eroded (Renninger, 1979). For example, Guinea opted out of the CFA and 
is now more aligned with the WAMZ of the English-speaking countries. 
Richards and Nwanna (2010) argued that the British and French created 
market policies and institutions that were non-integrative at the regional 
level, which contributed to the slow pace of regional integration. In contrast, 
the French wanted to maintain closer ties with their former colonies. 
However, as we highlighted previously, the colonial powers did create 
institutions that provided the platforms for cooperation. For example, these 
platforms have proved important as the Anglophone countries aspire to 
reinvent the common currency while ECOWAS intends to achieve a political 
union in the long run. 
Furthermore, the extent to which contracts were enforced and disputes 
settled during colonialism was not entirely dissimilar from practices during 
the Empirehood. Nunn (2007) highlighted that labor contracts signed 
between Europeans and locals could not be broken without punishment.  
Furthermore, Carland (1990) highlighted that the colonial administration 
used local chiefs to communicate to the people. For example, the chiefs 
were used to communicate the value of the colonial currency to the locals 
and how they should avoid exploitation (Carland, 1990 and Apoh, 2008). 
These chiefs were synonymous to the representatives in each province 
during the Empirehood. Therefore, regional trade institutions during the 
Empirehood and colonial era were not entirely dissimilar. However, the 
protection of trade routes was more standardized and enforced during the 
Empirehood than the colonial period. For example, bandits and robbers 
attacked trade routes in order to loot goods during the colonial period since 
their influence on trade was gradually replaced by European traders 
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(Carland, 1990 and Conrad, 2010). In contrast, the Empirehood protected 
traders from bandits and robbers. 
The discussion in the previous two sections shows that the common 
currencies evolved into two monetarized currencies in West Africa during 
the colonial era - the BWAS and the CFA franc, which was an improvement 
from the Empirehood in terms of the number of currencies. Furthermore, 
there was a move to make the cowries non-convertible to the colonial 
currencies in order to gradually replace them, while the colonial currencies 
were convertible with foreign currencies (Hogendorn and Johnson, 1986 
and Apoh, 2001). Nonetheless, the cowries and other pre-colonial 
currencies were also convertible to each other during the Empirehood 
(Hogendorn and Johnson, 1986; Muller, 1985; Conrad, 2010 and Hopkins, 
2014). While the contract enforcement system was similar in the 
Empirehood and colonial era, the protection of trade routes was more 
organized through the royal armies in the Empirehood relative to the colonial 
era. Furthermore, the Empirehood and colonial era had a single 
administration system akin to a federal system which made it easier to 
established common trade institutions. It shows that there was a little 
divergence in the standardization of some regional trade institutions during 
the Empirehood and colonial era. This raises the issue of what has 
remained of some facets of regional trade institutions in West Africa today 
and its implication for the ECOWAS deep integration goal? 
 
3.3 West Africa after independence and ECOWAS in 1975 onwards 
We demonstrated in the previous two sections that some standardized 
regional trade institutions existed in the Empirehood and colonial era. By 
1975, all the 16 West African states at the time were self-governed. This 
marked another turning point in the evolution of regional trade institutions 
as nations choose self-rule rather than maintaining the administrative 
structures of the past. Therefore, maintaining the standardized regional 
trade institutions of the past would have required greater cooperation and 
coordination. The aim of this section is to discuss what has happened to 
regional trade institutions in West Africa post-independence and the extent 
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to which the creation of ECOWAS and its associated institutions could 
further the development of standardized regional trade institutions. There 
are specific ECOWAS institutions which are of particular importance in this 
regard.  
The history of ECOWAS has three turning points. The first is the 1975 Lagos 
treaty which established ECOWAS. The second is the revised 1993 treaty 
which shifted ECOWAS to an accelerated cooperation and integration. The 
third is in 2004 when ECOWAS and the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU or UEMOA) signed an agreement to coordinate 
and harmonize their operations in preparation for a monetary union (Daboh, 
2010 and Adamu et al, 2010). Before these turning points, some events 
occurred in West Africa which motivated the creation of ECOWAS. We shall 
discuss these events first and then the turning points in detail. 
 
3.3.0 Events leading to the creation of ECOWAS 
As was discussed in chapter one, almost every country is part of one or 
more regional trading agreements which required the codification of 
common institutions in order to realize the full potential of integration (Gupta 
and Yang, 2007 and WTO Report, 2014). Geda et al (2007) argued that the 
success of RTAs depends on the growth of trade hence their formation is 
motivated by trade although Laird (2002) and WTO Report (2014) claim that 
security and other political factors are becoming increasingly important in 
the formation of RTAs. 
West African states gained their independence between 1957 and 1974, 
except for Liberia, which was never colonized. Why did it take that long to 
form ECOWAS given that the colonies and the Empirehood were governed 
akin to a federal administration? A number of events could be attributed to 
the formation of ECOWAS in 1975. Four events are particularly important 
although not exclusive in the existing literature (Lavergne, 1997 and Orsini 
et al, 1994). 
First, many leaders that led Africa to independence advocated a united 
Africa through Pan-Africanism in order to break away from the colonial past 
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(UNECA Report, 1969). However, the inward-nationalistic behavior of some 
countries did not help improve living standards.   Renninger (1979) 
highlighted that most African countries assumed at the time that self- 
determination, and self-reliance through political and economic 
independence could only be achieved through self-rule. Nonetheless, given 
the small economic sizes of most West African states, Orsini et al (2004) 
and Lavergne (1997) argued that the desire for cooperation was inevitable. 
Furthermore, cooperation does not mean integration. Therefore, it was 
gradually realized that some form of integration or maintaining and 
strengthening some of the common institutions in the previous eras could 
have accelerated an integration process. 
Second, the European powers that had given West African countries their 
independence in the 1960s also wanted to maintain ties in order to continue 
their access to the raw materials and to strengthen trade with their former 
colonies. As a result, the Lome convention was negotiated and signed on 
the 28th of February 1975 by 9 EU (then EEC members) and 46 developing 
countries including former colonies in Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
nations (Stevens et al, 1999). This was known as the ACP-EU convention 
(Secretary –General Council of the European Communities).  Mouradian 
(1998) argued that; “The first Lomé Convention, signed in 1975, arose out 
of Europe’s wish to guarantee itself regular supplies of raw materials and to 
maintain its privileged position in its overseas markets. It also derived in part 
from a sense of responsibility arising out of its colonial past”. 
The objective of the Lome convention was to establish economic 
cooperation and development through trade links. The Lome agreement 
allows ACP nations free access to European markets without reciprocity10.  
As Mouradian (1998) further expressed, Europeans were aware that the 
finished products that the ACP raw materials had produced in Europe would 
be exported back to ACP countries since the institutional frameworks were 
already put in place during the colonial days. Therefore, Europe had 
incentives to help West Africa organize a regional body that would enable 
                                                          
10 Non-reciprocity is also accepted by the WTO under the general system of preferences (GSP). 
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them to negotiate a unified treaty rather than with individual states. On the 
part of the ACP countries, regional integration was meant to reduce 
exploitation and increase their bargaining power to negotiate future 
agreements on their terms as well as to influence changes to the 
international economic system, which they perceived to discriminate against 
them (Renninger, 1979). Hence, there were mutual benefits for a regional 
body to be formed. 
Third, many Intergovernmental groupings between countries existed in 
West Africa with the aim of cooperating in economic activities especially in 
trade and joint investment initiatives. In addition to the West African 
Groundnut Council mentioned earlier, other intergovernmental groupings 
include the Lake Chad Basin Commission of 1964 that included Nigeria, 
Chad, Niger and Cameroon; the Mano River Union of Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone of 1973; the West African Monetary Union in 1973 of Benin, 
Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Burkina Faso (Bundu, 1997 and 
Iyoha, 2005); and the Economic Community of West Africa (ECWA), 
established on the 4th of May 1967 in Accra by 1211 West African countries 
with the help of the UNECA in order to help accelerate industrialization (UN 
Treaty series v595. p287). However, the ECWA did not function due to a lot 
of political changes in the form of coups d’ etats during this period in West 
Africa (about 20 coups in 8 countries) and the Biafra war in Nigeria (Page 
et al, 2001). Therefore, West African states recognized the importance of 
regional integration and ECOWAS was formed in 1975 with the signing of 
the Lagos treaty with the aim of achieving customs union status by 200012. 
 
3.3.1 ECOWAS 1975 and 1993 treaty and their aims 
The aim of this section is to discuss the ECOWAS treaties in order to 
evaluate the extent to which some associated institutions could facilitate the 
standardization of regional trade institutions. This is important because 
                                                          
11 The 12 countries were Benin, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone and Togo.   
12 Article 12 of the 1975 treaty mentioned 1990 for customs union. Article 35 of the 1993 treaty mentioned 
2000. ECOWAS also aim to achieve an economic union in the future although no time frame given. 
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treaties determine the basis for the coordination of regional policies which 
is vital for the standardisation of regional trade institutions. The treaty that 
established ECOWAS came into force on the 20th of June 1975 when the 
required 7 signatories was met (Aryeetey, 2001). The 1993 treaty is a 
revised version of the 1975 treaty. Both treaties set out the aims of 
ECOWAS and how they are going to be achieved in stages. Article 2 in 
chapter 1 of the 1975 treaty stated that the aims of ECOWAS are to promote 
co-operation and development in all fields for the purposes of raising the 
standard of living of its people, maintaining economic stability and 
contributing to the progress and development of the African continent 
(United Nation Treaty Series, V1010, p.20). Article 12 of the 1975 treaty also 
called for the establishment of a customs union by 1990 with a common 
external tariff. Other aims such as the harmonization of trade, agricultural 
and monetary policy did not have a specific time frame and were left to the 
council of ministers to decide. 
Interestingly, some of the institutions that ECOWAS aims to harmonize were 
common to a number of present-day countries during the Empirehood and 
colonial period. Therefore, the challenge for ECOWAS like many other 
RTAs is how to achieve an economic union in tandem with political unity 
given the successes we discussed during the Empirehood and to some 
extent the colonial era in standardizing some regional trade institutions. 
Nonetheless, the rhetoric of the 1975 treaty was mainly of cooperation 
rather than integration. Furthermore, ECOWAS was faced with some 
economic and political challenges which made it difficult to attain the 
intended aims and objectives in the 1980s that is summarised in Table 3.1. 
It has been argued in some papers that the 1975 treaty was over-ambitious 
since the leaders did not cost how to achieve these aims and had multiple 
overlapping commitments (Geda and Kebret, 2002; Masson and Pattillo 
2004 and Richard et al, 2010). Similarly, the 1980s-economic crisis and the 
increasing national debts contributed to the slow success of ECOWAS. 
Some countries resorted to protectionist measures by maintaining high tariff 
levels as well as not paying their dues to the ECOWAS (Orsini, 1994; 
Bundu, 1997 and Lavergene, 1997). ECOWAS members like many other 
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Sub-Saharan African countries depend on trade taxes as a source of total 
government revenue which ranged from 55% in Benin to 10.4% in Ghana 
during the 1970s (Renninger, 1979). This trend has not eased in recent 
years. In 2011, 17% of Ghana’s total government revenue emanated from 
trade taxes. For Benin, it was 23%; Cote D’Ivoire 39% and Senegal 12% in 
2012 (World Development Indicators, 2015). Furthermore, Bundu (1997) 
found that per capita income growth fell from 1.5% in the 1960s to 0.7% in 
the 1970s and declined to -1.2% in the 1980s. As such, ECOWAS was 
economically constrained in achieving a common external tariff (CET) by 
1990 because it lacked alternative sources of revenue to cater for the loss 
of revenue arising from lower tariffs. Table 3.1 shows the aims and timeline 
for achievement in the 1975 ECOWAS treaty.
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Table 3.1 Aims and timeline of the 1975 ECOWAS treaty 
Aims Expected time of Attainment Actual time of Attainment Reasons for success or failure 
Elimination of customs duties and other 
charges to importation and exportation of 
goods 
1990 and then 2000 FTA achieved in 2004 although ROO limits the 
number of qualified goods 
Failures due to over-dependent on trade 
taxes. More diversified domestic taxes needed 
to mitigate it 
The abolition of quantitative and administrative 
restrictions on trade among the member 
states 
1990 and then 2000 FTA achieved in 2004 Over dependent on trade taxes 
The establishment of a common customs tariff 
and a common commercial policy towards 
third countries 
1990, then 2000 and then 2011 On-going. 
Common CET achieved in 2015 
Difficulty to gather resources to invest in the 
administration of the CET. Also, benefits are 
very diverse thus some nations could resist 
The abolition of the obstacles to the free 
movement of persons, services, and capital 
1994- period of 15 years from 1979 when the 
protocol was signed 
Free movement of persons has been achieved 
at different periods up to 90 days 
Success is due to ease of implementation. 
Also, many traditional and inter-state ethnic 
settlements exist. This makes it difficult or 
impossible to monitor cross border 
settlements and movements specially in the 
porous borders of West Africa 
The harmonization of agricultural policies and 
the promotion of common projects in the 
member states notably in the fields of 
marketing, research, and agro-industrial 
enterprises; 
No timeline set. However, ECOWAS common 
agricultural policy (ECOWAP) established in 
2005. 
On-going ECOWAP has been established although its 
success is still early to say. However, a lot of 
resources are needed to implement ECOWAP 
initiatives 
The harmonization of the economic and 
industrial policies of the member states and 
the elimination of disparities in the level of 
development of member states 
No timeline set. UEMOA established in 1994 
while WAMZ in 2000 
On-going Very small industrial base and economic size 
and initial levels of development make 
elimination of disparities difficult. Again, a lot 
of resources needed to reduce disparities. 
The harmonization of the monetary policies of 
the member states 
No timeline set UEMOA and WAMZ have on-going 
convergence and harmonization of monetary 
and fiscal policy with no specific attainable 
timeline. 
Constraint by the lack of resources arising 
from failures by members to pay annual dues. 
The establishment of a Fund for Co-operation, 
compensation, and Development 
Trade, customs, immigration, monetary and 
payment commission was set up in 1975 
Established in the 1975 treaty although 
compensation payments are lagging. Actual 
protocol signed in 2002 
Compensation started in 2004 although 
payments are lagging. Commission does not 
have the finance to pay 
  Source: See article 2 for the aims and article 12 for the timeline in the 1975 treaty. See UNECA April 2009 report on the status of integration in Africa. 
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Similarly, the achievements of ECOWAS and the expected gains from trade 
up to 1990 have been negligible since neither the common external tariff nor 
the customs union status was achieved (Omorogobe, 1993; Teunissen, 1996; 
Omorogbe, 2000; Kufor, 2000; Aryeetey, 2001; Jones, 2002 and Richards et 
al, 2010). We have discussed some of the economic difficulties the region was 
facing in the 1980s, including the low GDP growth and the heavy dependence 
on trade taxes as a source of government revenue. Deme (1995) using panel 
data from 1975 to 1991 found that the coming of ECOWAS has increased intra-
ECOWAS trade contrary to Meagher (1997) and Hanink and Owusu (1998) 
who suggested that intra-ECOWAS trade would have increased regardless of 
ECOWAS due to the informal historical trade relations. It is not clear the extent 
to which the increase in intra-ECOWAS trade was due to demand for goods or 
improvements in the trade facilitation at the time. 
Nonetheless, the failures to attain some of the objectives of ECOWAS 
necessitated a change of emphasis from cooperation to integration. This led 
to a revised treaty to be signed on the 24th of July 1993 (Keane et al, 2010 and 
Dijk, 2011). The revised 1993 treaty went a step further with the aim to 
establish an economic union by emphasizing integration through the 
improvement of political cooperation (Dijk, 2011). Therefore, it was realized 
that economic integration could not be sustained without political unity. To 
achieve economic union status, the 1993 treaty addressed issues on 
harmonization of trade and economic policy, establishing research on 
monetary and financial development, establishing a common currency and 
identifying the steps and institutions needed to accelerate integration 
(www.africa-union.org, ECOWAS Profile and Ogunfolu, 2009).  Other issues 
that were addressed in the 1993 revised treaty included security and conflict 
prevention matters, governance and protection of the environment, which are 
now being administered by special technical commissions (Ogunfolu, 2009). 
Therefore, the 1993 treaty prioritized integration rather than cooperation. 
Many resemblances exist between the 1993 and 1975 treaty. However, the 
1993 treaty was significant since it empowered the executive secretariat to 
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play a greater role in the integration process. The executive secretariat has 
now been transformed into the ECOWAS commission since 2007 with even 
greater powers and enforcement mechanisms. It is responsible for the day-to-
day running of ECOWAS although the authority of the heads of states and 
governments is the highest decision maker followed by the council of ministers.  
As such, one of the fundamental challenges of ECOWAS is how to ensure 
agreements are properly implemented within the region (Ekpe, 2015). The 
political willingness to give up some sovereignty in exchange for common 
regional trade institutions could help improve the effective implementation of 
agreements. As we discussed in the previous two sections, the Empirehood 
was a successful trading period because the constituent parts were governed 
akin to a federal system which made the enforcement of common institutions 
feasible. In the absence of a central authority, other forms of cooperation 
including joint border customs and patrol of trade routes could minimize 
recurrent regional trade institutional challenges faced by cross-border traders 
including unnecessary road blocks and bribes payments that add to trade 
costs and uncertainty (Orsini et al, 1994; Gupta and Yang, 2007; Daboh, 2010; 
Hertzenberg, 2011; Brenton, 2012 and Cissokho et al, 2012). 
Furthermore, we argue that the 1993 treaty created associated institutions 
which could facilitate the standardization of regional trade institutions. We shall 
discuss this in more detail in section 3.3.4. Notwithstanding, the slow pace of 
cooperation led to two developments which required some analysis because it 
characterized the process of integration and the development of regional trade 
institutions in ECOWAS after the 1993 revised treaty. That is the strengthening 
of WAEMU and the creation of WAMZ which has implication for the future role 
of ECOWAS. 
3.3.2 ECOWAS, WAMZ and WAEMU debates and contradictions 
In the previous section, we established that the ECOWAS treaties created 
associated institutions which could facilitate the standardization of regional 
trade institutions. It was felt that integration in the whole of ECOWAS is difficult 
because of some differences in governance inherited from the colonial era. 
Therefore, two monetary zones were created within ECOWAS. Seven French-
speaking countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal 
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and Togo established the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) on the 10th of January 1994 in Senegal, with the aim of promoting 
economic integration for countries sharing the single currency ‘CFA’ through 
the harmonization of fiscal and monetary policy (Debrun et al, 2005; Fielding 
et al, 2005 and Koussoube et al, 2011). Guinea-Bissau, which was a 
Portuguese colony, joined WAEMU on the 2nd of May 1997 as the eighth 
member. WAEMU is already a customs union with a common currency, 
Central Bank and a common external tariff (CET) (Debrun et al, 2005; Fielding 
et al, 2005; Koussoube et al, 2011 and Alagidede, Coleman and Cuestas, 
2012). The first two institutions were inherited from the colonial era while the 
CET was introduced in 2000 (Goretti and Weisfeld, 2008). WAEMU has been 
hailed as the most successful regional grouping in Africa. It has an average 
CET of 12% within the 0-20% range (five bands) (Babatunde, 2006 and 
Oyejide, 2004). Furthermore, WAEMU, which maintained some of its 
institutions such as the common currency after colonial rule, is more integrated 
as well as a higher percentage of intra-ECOWAS trade. For example, intra-
WAEMU exports were 16% and 15% of their total world exports in 1995 and 
2013 while intra-ECOWAS exports were 10% and 9% in the same period 
(UNCTADSTAT). 
The success of WAEMU resulted in the 1999 ECOWAS summit in Lome 
(Togo), the proposed establishment of a second monetary zone in order to 
fast- track the integration process (Shams, 2003; Ajayi, 2005; Tsangarides and 
Qureshi, 2008; www.wami.imao.org and Alagidede, Coleman and Cuestas, 
2012). The West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) was formed in 2000 on this 
basis by The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Guinea Conakry. 
Subsequently, Liberia joined in 2010 as the 6th member (Odularu, 2009 and 
Boom, 2010). The aim of WAMZ like WAEMU is to promote economic 
integration through the harmonization of fiscal and monetary policy, particularly 
to introduce a single currency called ‘ECO’ and a single Central Bank (Shams, 
2003; Ajayi, 2005; Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2008 and www.wami.imao.org). 
WAMZ members are characterized by separate currencies and central banks 
although the four British colonies and Liberia at some point had a common 
currency and central bank during the colonial era. 
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The introduction of the single currency is conditional on the convergence of 
certain macroeconomic indicators such as single digit inflation, fiscal deficit of 
no more than 4% of GDP and a stable exchange rate. However, the date for 
the launching of the ‘ECO’ has shifted many times because the convergence 
criteria have not been met by some countries. In order to facilitate the 
alignment of WAMZ and WAEMU, ECOWAS established the West African 
Monetary Agency (WAMA) in 2000 to prepare for the ECOWAS economic and 
monetary union (Alagidede, Coleman and Cuestas, 2012). Therefore, 
ECOWAS members recognized the importance of common and quality 
regional institutions as a prerequisite to expanding regional trade and 
development. 
Figure 3.2 shows the composition of WAMZ and WAEMU countries within 
ECOWAS. Cape Verde is the only country which does not belong to either sub-
group although they intend to join once the two sub-groups merge in the future. 
Figure 3.2 Composition of WAMZ and WAEMU members within ECOWAS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors Compilation 
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The results of empirical research into the feasibility of merging WAMZ and 
WAEMU and the expected benefits are mixed. Masson and Pattillo (2004) 
used a gravity model simulation and found that the alignment of WAMZ and 
WAEMU members is undesirable unless Nigeria implements effective fiscal 
discipline. Masson and Pottillo (2004) found that, if Nigeria can implement 
some fundamental economic changes, ECOWAS is bound to benefit. 
Babatunde (2006) has highlighted that Nigeria is making efforts to 
implement some of the issues raised by other members. Furthermore, 
Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008) using data from 1995 to 2004 found that 
the proposed WAMZ and subsequent merger with WAEMU are undesirable 
unless some economic indicators exhibit convergence between ECOWAS 
members. Aryeetey (1996 p.28) and Shams (2003) argued that WAEMU 
and WAMZ seem to be distinct entities counteracting each other’s influence 
due to French influence on WAEMU. In contrast, Jones (2002) and Shams 
(2003) argued that ECOWAS does exhibit convergence characteristics 
although at the lower end (slow). Both findings highlight that the proposed 
ECOWAS monetary union is conditional on the convergence of their 
economic policies and a commitment to political unity or at least political 
cooperation in fiscal policies. 
The failure to merge WAMZ with WAEMU will have deeper implications for 
ECOWAS. It will determine the extent to which ECOWAS influences 
decisions in the region. It will also determine the extent to which deep 
integration can be attained, as stipulated in the 1993 revised treaty. 
Furthermore, the failure to merge WAMZ with WAEMU will determine the 
extent to which the quality of regional trade institutional arrangements is 
effectively implemented. Given the extra cost of ECOWAS cross-border 
trade associated with weakness in trade institutions, the intra-ECOWAS 
trade could stagnate or contract in the future without integration or greater 
cooperation. 
Therefore, the existence of WAMZ and WAEMU poses opportunities and 
challenges for ECOWAS in terms of whether it could lead to convergence 
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or divergence of regional institutions. The West African Journal of Monetary 
and Economic Integration (WAJMEI) under the auspices of the West African 
Monetary Institute conducts research on various aspects of economic, 
social and infrastructure development that could guide ECOWAS 
integration policy (Daboh, 2010 and Adamu et al, 2010). There should be 
no contradiction between WAMZ and WAEMU although the alignment 
process has been slow mainly due to lack of fulfillment of obligations by 
member states (Uexkull, 2012). The general perception of ECOWAS 
members is that monetary union will be beneficial. This is reflected by the 
commitment of all members since 2000 to introduce 0.5% tax on imports to 
ECOWAS, called the community levy, with revenues used to fund 
development in the region. Nonetheless, the success of ECOWAS 
integration could start with the effective implementation of some aspects of 
the ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme (ETLS). 
 
3.3.3 ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme (ETLS) 
We discussed in the previous section that the existence of WAMZ and 
WAEMU poses opportunities and challenges for ECOWAS because it could 
determine the extent to which regional trade institutions converge or 
diverge. Furthermore, ECOWAS is faced with additional challenges of 
negotiating other trade liberalization schemes. One is within its member 
states and the other is with the EU through the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) and the African Union (Walkenhorst, 2006 and Milner, 
Morrissey and Zgovu, 2009). The motivation for trade liberalization has a 
long-standing theoretical underpinning within trade theory. Removing 
barriers to trade makes firms more efficient through competition, hence, the 
overall economy is bound to benefit from such efficiencies due to lower cost 
of production over time and eventually lower prices for consumers. The 
theories of trade liberalization will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
four. 
Trade liberalization schemes face a lot of challenges for many developing 
countries including ECOWAS members. Indeed, Milner, Morrissey and 
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Zgovu (2009) argued that discussion about trade liberalization in SSA also 
means discussions about reforming the domestic tax systems. About 33% 
of ECOWAS member’s government revenues are drawn from trade taxes 
on average (World Development Indicators). This figure had dropped to 
19% by 2012 (World Development Indicators). With the exception of 
Nigeria, the maximum tariff rate for other ECOWAS members on average 
(MFN applied, simple average) was less than 20% (WITS Website). 
However, there is potential to increase tax revenues from tariffs if a 
maximum 20% is applied through a CET although this would imply higher 
prices of imports for consumers. Similarly, a higher tariff than the WTO 
bound rate can pose legal and compensation challenges from non-
ECOWAS members. Diouf (2012) argued that only two ECOWAS members 
have a bound tariff of more than 35% in agricultural products. This means 
that the other ECOWAS members will not honor the multilateral 
commitments with the WTO if the maximum tariff is higher at 35%. There 
are several options available for ECOWAS such as a waiver from the WTO 
or adjusting other tariff bands. 
Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent the ETLS leads to fiscal 
challenges. If the elimination of intra-ECOWAS tariffs results in 
proportionately higher trade flows, then the expected revenue losses can 
be minimized or eliminated through ad-valorem taxes and income taxes 
(Walkenhorst, 2006 and Milner, Morrissey and Zgovu, 2009). Most of the 
empirical papers argued that the failure of the ETLS in the past emanated 
from the anticipated revenue losses, which have made many countries 
reluctant to reduce tariffs, and the subsequent lack of the expected 
compensation scheme (Badiane, 1997 and Aryeetey, 2001). However, 
Goretti and Weisfeld (2008) argued that official tariff revenues from intra-
ECOWAS trade averaged 0.1% of their GDP hence the revenue losses 
should be minimal. Another challenge with ETLS is whether individual 
members are ready to give up national trade policies in exchange for 
consolidated regional trade policies. 
The divergence in tariff bands in the region required tariff alignment between 
WAMZ and WAEMU in preparation for ECOWAS CET. It was felt that 
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Nigeria should make substantial efforts to align its tariff rates with that of 
WAEMU since, without Nigeria leading, WAMZ would find it difficult to align 
with WAEMU (Babatunde, 2006). 
Hence, the ETLS was launched on the 1st of January 1990 as enshrined in 
article 54 of the 1975 treaty (ECOWAS 1993 treaty and Aryeetey, 2001). 
The aim of the ETLS was to achieve customs union status in 2008 and 
subsequent monetary union by 2015 (AfDB, 2011). The ETLS asked for the 
removal of all tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) within 15 years of its 
launch (by 2005) and the launch of CET by 2008. The process of launching 
the ECOWAS CET has been bumpy and slow. WAMZ members decided to 
pursue the existing WAEMU CET bands of 0%, 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% for 
a variety of products (Gupta and Yang, 2007; Daboh, 2010; Brenton et al, 
2012 and Alohan, 2015). Nigeria wanted a 50% band levied on some 
agricultural products although it had to settle for a reduced 35% band (Diouf, 
2012). Consumers would have to pay an additional 15% on such products 
entering ECOWAS unless Nigeria can supply them sufficiently at a low price 
or subsidize them through the ECOWAS compensation scheme. However, 
other ECOWAS members could potentially raise additional tariff revenue 
from the 35% band provided they meet the WTO requirements. 
Nonetheless, the process ended with the launch of the ECOWAS CET in 
2015 and made one aspect of the ETLS a success as envisaged in article 
54. Furthermore, the CET is an important development in the merger of 
WAMZ and WAEMU (ECOWAS, 2015; African Research Bulletin, 2015 and 
Norbrook et al, 2015). 
It is too soon to assess the effectiveness of the ECOWAS CET but there is 
little indication of the mechanisms whereby ECOWAS will ensure that cross-
border traders do not incur extra costs. Recent experience indicates that 
extra trading costs are not likely to decline unless ECOWAS takes a number 
of additional measures. Without the increase and expansion of trade, it is 
difficult to foresee how ECOWAS will meet other integration goals since 
trade is the single most important stimulus to any successful deeper 
integration scheme. Trade expansion would require improving the quality of 
regional trade institutions and standardization. 
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Another aspect of the ETLS as envisaged in article 54 is the elimination of 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) which is expected to take longer. NTBs are 
increasingly being studied as barriers to trade (Keane et al, 2010; Brenton 
et al, 2012 and WTO Report, 2012). One aspect of NTB which has been the 
focus of discussion in this thesis is the quality of regional trade institutions 
which adds to trade costs. It is expected that ECOWAS could improve them 
in order to reduce trade costs. 
Keyser (2012) and Brenton et al (2012) found that cross-border traders 
within ECOWAS pay an estimated US$100 on average per trip in bribes 
mainly at border points and unofficial road blocks. Cissokho et al (2012) also 
surveyed truckers between the Dakar-Bissau and Dakar-Mali corridors and 
found that truckers pay an estimated US$129 in bribes per trip of 666 
kilometers. Research has found that reduction in transport cost of 10% of 
agricultural products at the farm gate could lead to four percent increase in 
production and real income of farmers as well as 8% fall in food prices 
(USAID, 2011 and Brenton, 2012). Furthermore, traders in SSA face more 
constraints due to costly documentations, poor standards and border 
controls than anywhere in the world (Hertzenberg, 2011; Brenton et al, 2012 
and Rugwabiza, 2012).  Long delays and unnecessary paperwork at border 
points also add an estimated US$0.04-0.10 per ton kilometer for long 
distance road transport within West Africa in contrast to US$0.03-0.04 per 
ton kilometer in OECD countries (Brenton et al, 2012). These unexpected 
costs were discussed by the ECOWAS president in an interview with the 
multimedia ECOWAS communication network on the 28th of May 2015 to 
mark ECOWAS 40-year anniversary (Multimedia ECOWAS 
communication, 2015). They signal the presence of regional trade 
institutional failures which could be addressed by reflecting on historical 
good practices and some of the current institutions in the ECOWAS. 
Regarding the EPA, trade liberalization is expected to have a much bigger 
fiscal impact given that most ECOWAS trade flows are with the EU. Indeed, 
Busse and Grossmann (2004) estimated that ECOWAS members will lose 
about 20% of government revenue because of the proposed EPA 
agreement to reduce tariffs. However, the EU has pledged a compensation 
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fund and aid for trade mechanism. Milner, Morrissey and Zgovu (2009) also 
alluded to the significant revenue losses and adjustment costs of the EPA 
for ACP countries, especially in employment. Furthermore, the drop in the 
revenue from trade taxes has been accompanied by a higher tariff bands in 
the ECOWAS CET. Nevertheless, Goretti and Weisfeld (2008) argued that 
the EPA would bring political momentum in ECOWAS in order to address 
the regional NTBs that have in part inhibited intra-ECOWAS trade. 
Nonetheless, these overlapping liberalization schemes are likely to prolong 
the effective implementation of all. 
Therefore, our discussion in this section suggests that the launch of the CET 
is an important milestone although it is too soon to assess its effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, the NTB did not improve as expected within the ETLS. We 
argue that some ECOWAS institutions could facilitate the improvement and 
harmonization of some NTBs. We shall discuss this in the next section. 
 
3.3.4 Current institutions of ECOWAS and the quality of regional trade 
institutions 
The aim of this section is to discuss current institutions of ECOWAS and the 
extent to which some of these institutions could facilitate the standardization 
of regional trade institutions. ECOWAS has gone through a lot of 
transformation since the revised treaty of 1993 and the subsequent 
formation of WAEMU and WAMZ in 1994 and 2000 respectively. The 
institutions that are responsible for the day-to-day running of ECOWAS 
have also been transformed. Currently, ECOWAS has seven main 
institutions and a host of technical agencies that govern its activities 
(www.comm.ecowas.int) namely; 
❖ The authority of heads of states 
❖ The council of Ministers 
❖ The commission which was the Executive secretariat in the 1993 treaty 
and has now got more powers 
❖ the community parliament 
❖ the community court of justice and 
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❖ ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) which was the 
fund for cooperation, compensation, and development (or the ECOWAS 
Fund). 
❖ Other Technical Agencies includes; 
• West African Health organization 
• West African monetary agency 
• West African monetary institute 
• ECOWAS youth and sports development center 
• ECOWAS gender development center 
• Water resources coordination unit 
• ECOWAS BROWN Card 
• The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and 
Terrorism Financing in West Africa (GIABA) 
• The West African Power Pool 
 
These seven institutions are an amalgamation of wider institutions which 
had been streamlined in order to reduce overlaps and improve the 
effectiveness of policy implementation (www.ecowas.int). Each of these 
institutions is assigned specific functions aimed at accelerating the 
integration process. The model resembles the European Union operational 
structure. Some institutions can play a greater role in easing some of the 
urgent and recurrent challenges faced by cross-border traders including 
non-convertibility of currencies, bribes payments at border points and long 
delays which point to regional trade institutional failures. 
We argue that there are four institutions in ECOWAS which are vital in the 
integration process and the harmonization of regional trade institutions 
namely; the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), EBID, the community 
court of justice and the ECOWAS parliament. While WAMA and EBID could 
facilitate the launch of a common currency and a central bank or at least 
enable the convertibility of currencies, the court of justice and ECOWAS 
parliament could  address the extra costs incurred by cross-border trader’s 
due to the weakness of regulatory quality of cross-border trade, poor 
monitoring and protection of trade routes, weak enforcement and 
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punishment mechanism (weak rule of law) for those who break ECOWAS 
protocols and lack of sensitization of traders regarding their rights under the 
ECOWAS customs union. Therefore, ECOWAS needs to operate beyond 
the office, beyond paper agreements and announcements by extending its 
operations at the border points in order to improve the effective 
implementation of trade rules and regulations.  We shall discuss these four 
institutions in more detail. 
WAMA is working towards the creation of an ECOWAS single currency and 
central bank. It is currently the ECOWAS clearing house that manages trade 
and financial transactions through the clearing and payments system of the 
central banks of ECOWAS members. The launch of an ECOWAS wide 
common currency can minimize transaction costs, although it is not a 
sufficient condition to stimulate intra-ECOWAS trade. Nonetheless, the non-
convertibility of ECOWAS currencies outside the formal banking system has 
made a trade and financial transactions difficult (Cincin-Sain and Marshall, 
1983). Hence, a common currency and central bank could be desirable 
(Meagher, 1997). It is not clear when the single currency and the central 
bank is going to be launch. Nonetheless, the evolution of a common 
currency shows drawbacks relative to the colonial and Empirehood era. The 
colonial era encompassed two currencies while the Empirehood used the 
cowrie extensively as a common currency. Furthermore, other mediums of 
exchange were convertible at the time (Hogendorn and Johnson, 1986; 
Conrad, 2010 and Hopkins, 2014). 
EBID was formerly called the ECOWAS Fund in the 1975 treaty 
((www.ecowas.int). It was established as a regional holding company in 
1999 and started operating in 2003 (Ogunfolu, 2009 and EBID, 2014). Being 
a holding company means it can hold shares in other companies and can 
issue shares which give the bank access to wider sources of finance. EBID 
initially has two subsidiaries namely the Regional Development Fund and 
Regional Investment Bank. The Regional Development Fund was assigned 
to finance infrastructure developments including trade facilitation as stated 
in article 2.2e and 2.2f of the ECOWAS treaty. The Regional Investment 
Bank serves as the ECOWAS Bank and it is hoped that it will eventually 
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become the main central bank once WAMZ and WAEMU are merged. 
However, the two subsidiaries were remerged to reduce costs and overlap 
on the 14th June 2006 (EBID, 2014). The merger of EBID and WAMA could 
further save costs since their role seems to overlap. Therefore, EBID has 
the potential to fund the harmonization of regional trade institutions and to 
fund the effective implementation of common institutional arrangements. 
Efforts are being made to construct Joint Border Posts (JBP) such as 
Noepe-akanu between Ghana and Togo; Seme-Krake between Nigeria and 
Benin and Elubo-Noe between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire and the trans-
Gambian transport corridor between the Gambia and Senegal (ECOWAS 
Infrastructure, 2015). It is hoped that these JBPs will reduce border crossing 
times by 3 hours, as well as speed up pre-clearance of trucks by information 
and equipment sharing (ECOWAS Infrastructure, 2015). Table 3.2 shows 
some major institutional developments in the region.
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Table 3.2 Major Developments in West Africa after 1993 revised treaty 
Source: Authors Compilation. Note: Based on these institutions, it seems that ECOWAS is more focused on achieving a single currency and Central Bank as 
a prerequisite to accelerate integration in other sectors. The challenge for ECOWAS is whether monetary policy alone can help increase economic activity that 
is able to generate more trade and employment for a population that is still detached from the formal economy and access to finance.
Institutions Year Formed Aims Achievements 
WAEMU –West African Economic 
and the Monetary Union 
    1994 Deep integration Free Trade Area (FTA), Central Bank 
and single currency- the CFA 
WAMA- West African Monetary 
Agency 
     1996 Establish clearing house to ease 
trade and financial transactions, 
common currency ‘ECO’ and central 
bank 
In progress but some nations have 
got common clearing house policies 
WAMI- West African Monetary 
Institute 
2000 Prepare to establish Central Bank 
and ECO through convergence 
Working progress to align exchange 
rates of non-WAEMU members 
excluding Cape Verde with WAEMU 
WAMZ- West African Monetary Zone 2000 Convergence of economic policy and 
exchange rate 
In progress. The aim is to harmonize 
monetary policy of non-WAEMU 
members to prepare for the single 
currency and central bank. 
EBID- ECOWAS Bank for 
Investment and Development 
1999 started operation in 2003 Promote and implement 
infrastructure development 
On-going and does finance some 
projects. Main investment focuses on 
telecommunication. 
ECOWAS Common Industrial Policy 2010 Increase share of intra-ECOWAS 
trade to 40% by 2030 with solid 
industrial structure 
In progress. EBID is funding some 
projects to improve manufacturing 
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The ECOWAS parliament is delegated to facilitate the integration 
process with the support of the community court of justice. The trade, 
customs and free movement of persons (TACFEMP) as well as the legal 
and judicial affairs committee are important sub-committees of the 
ECOWAS parliament. In addition to other duties, the TACFEMP 
committee is responsible for developing legal rules regarding the 
establishment of the economic and monetary union (article 55 of the 1993 
revised treaty), which was scheduled for 2008. Furthermore, the 
committee considers the regulation of customs procedures, payments 
and other trade-related rules as stipulated in Chapter VIII, as well as 
supporting the coordination of the judiciaries through the community 
court of justice, on trade-related disputes (ECOWAS Parliament, 2014). 
Therefore, the two institutions have the potential to implement systems 
that protect trade routes, enforce the ECOWAS protocols and to sensitize 
citizens. 
In terms of the protection of trade routes from unofficial roadblocks and 
bribe payments, the Empirehood had armies that patrolled trade routes 
that were funded from trade and production taxes. This was consolidated 
by common rules applied to settle trade disputes in which the royal courts 
would hold those who harassed traders to account. ECOWAS can also 
fund security personnel to patrol trade routes, possibly through the 
individual national armies through common rules emanating from the 
ECOWAS parliament. In the short run, ECOWAS needs to station 
representatives at border points, whose role would be to monitor the 
ECOWAS customs union protocols. The World Bank has similar 
arrangements with many SSA countries, where they have operational 
staff representing them in various government sectors in order to manage 
their lending and to minimize corruption (The World Bank Group, 2012). 
In the Empirehood, the King had representatives in each kingdom whose 
role was to monitor rules and regulations. 
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The enforcement and punishment mechanisms could be strengthened in 
order to punish those who harass traders at border points and unofficial 
roadblocks. ECOWAS members could adhere to common rules (rule of 
law) on the kinds of punishment and who should incur the legal costs and 
the court of justice can play an active role. This is important because if 
the cost to traders of taking legal action is higher than paying bribes, there 
is no incentive to take such legal action. Hence, ECOWAS should take 
the costs away from traders in order to motivate them to report their 
grievances. Additional measures such as improved pay for customs 
officials and other security agencies can reduce the motivation for taking 
bribes. 
The sensitising of cross-border traders regarding their rights under the 
ECOWAS customs union can improve regulation and implementation of 
cross-border trade. The single education system inherited from the 
colonial era could be improved to stimulate a common mindset. People 
can only exercise their rights if they know what they are. Research has 
found that education does determine institutional quality (Mocan, 2008; 
Acemoglu et al, 2005 and Alonso et al, 2013). The citizen’s forum held in 
Burkina Faso in July 2014 is a step in the right direction (Multimedia 
ECOWAS Communication, 2015). However, the media can play a 
greater role in sensitizing citizens about their rights. This will require 
ECOWAS initiatives to increase the visibility of ECOWAS in all the media 
outlets in the region. In addition, ECOWAS could organize regional wide 
workshops and training schemes for customs officials and all 
stakeholders in cross-border trade. The workshops could cover the 
ECOWAS protocols and the binding legal implications for breaches. This 
will require a database where all or at least the majority of cross-border 
traders can register. Ojide (2010) has found that ECOWAS citizens are 
less sensitized about their rights and the benefits of integration relative 
to other regions and that this has contributed to the poor implementation 
of protocols. 
Therefore, our evaluation and findings suggest that some regional trade 
institutions have gone backward from their historical level. It should be 
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noted that WTO rules such as article 24 entail provisions that allow free 
movement of goods and services and through RTAs such as ECOWAS. 
Moreover, ECOWAS also has provisions for free movement of goods and 
people. However, there is insufficient implementation and monitoring of 
these protocols that has contributed to the extra costs associated with 
ECOWAS cross border trade (Keyser et al, 2012). Table 3.3 summarizes 
the evolution of these selected institutions. The Empirehood and colonial 
era experienced common regional trade institutions relative to the current 
situation in West Africa. Hence, we can establish that some facets of 
these institutions were abandoned after independence especially among 
the English-speaking countries. 
Table 3.3 Development of selected regional trade institutions in West Africa 
Institutions Empirehood Colonialism Post-
independence 
 West Africa English French English French 
Common currency Y Y Y N Y 
Standardized trade rules Y Y Y N N 
Protected trade routes Y N N N N 
Royal Courts  Y N N N N 
Single administration Y N Y N N 
Source: Authors compilation. Note: Y=yes, the institution exists; N=no, institution did not 
exist 
 
Measures geared toward improving the quality of regional trade 
institutions, especially regulation of cross-border trade through 
enforcement of protocols, protection of trade routes, a common currency 
and sensitization of citizens could be prioritized if ECOWAS is to expand 
trade flows. Indeed, Efobi and Osabuohien (2011) recently found that 
improving the quality of trade institutions in tandem with infrastructural 
development will promote intra-SSA trade. In the long run, ECOWAS could 
align all its policies and pursue a federal style administration if there is a 
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desire to maintain regional peace and security with the goal of improving 
the standard of living of its citizens through economic development 
stimulated by trade and investment. 
 
3.4 Chapter summary 
The aim of this chapter was in two-fold. The first was to describe the 
evolution of regional trade institutions from the Empires of Western Sudan 
to the present day in order to reflect and to identify what has remained of 
them. The second was to discuss what has happened to regional trade 
institutions in West Africa post-independence and the extent to which the 
creation of ECOWAS and its associated institutions could further 
strengthen the development and standardized regional trade institutions. 
We argue that a holistic evaluation of the extent to which regional trade 
institutions evolved is lacking in the existing literature relating to West 
Africa. We found that regional trade institutions were more standardized 
across West Africa before the current countries gained their 
independence, including a common currency, enforcement of protocols 
through royal courts and chiefs, protection of trade routes from corruption 
and a federal style administration. Societal norms and political 
consensuses such as the ‘Mande charter’ and the coming of Islam created 
a discipline that provided confidence in the ability to trade, which was 
facilitated by common regional trade institutions. The colonial era also 
established common institutions which could have been vital in promoting 
regional trade and that these regional trade institutions were not entirely 
dissimilar to those of the Empirehood. 
Historical changes in governance resulted in the loss of some facets of 
these well-functioning regional trade institutions. Therefore, the 
development of regional trade institutions experienced drawbacks after 
many ECOWAS countries gained their independence, although historical 
reflection could provide important guidance for policy makers currently 
involved in deepening the integration of the ECOWAS. 
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Furthermore, we argue that the unexpected trade costs at border points 
and unofficial roadblocks are still ongoing and signaled the failure of four 
regional trade institutions. We argue that WAMA and EBID could facilitate 
the launch of the common currency and central bank or at least facilitate 
the convertibility of currencies, while the ECOWAS parliament and the 
community court of justice could implement common rules and systems in 
order to protect trade routes, enforcement of ECOWAS protocols and 
sensitization of traders. This must be accompanied by the willingness to 
punish those who harass traders, where officers must also be given 
incentives in order to reduce the opportunity to take bribes. ECOWAS 
could also make use of media outlets in order to sensitize its citizens of 
their rights. 
The current priorities in ECOWAS focus on aligning the WAMZ and the 
WAEMU, with the goal of launching a common currency and a central 
bank. This is reflected in the skewness of research papers looking at the 
feasibility of a monetary union. Although a common currency may be 
welcome news, it will not address other recurrent challenges faced by 
cross-border traders regarding bribe payments at border points and 
unofficial road blocks. The ECOWAS president has acknowledged little 
progress in this area. ECOWAS members have signed the protocols on 
the free movements of persons and goods; hence traders should not incur 
any uncertainty of trading costs. Furthermore, the ECOWAS CET came 
into force in January 2015 and should further eliminate costs. The launch 
of the CET was conditional on Nigeria making efforts to align its high tariff 
level with that of other ECOWAS members. Therefore, there is hope that 
Nigeria could continue to address some concerns of the other ECOWAS 
members. 
Furthermore, ECOWAS has the potential to expand intra-regional trade if 
the improvement of regional trade institutions is prioritized.  This would 
require personnel to patrol trade routes as well as ECOWAS staff at border 
points in order to monitor the implementation of protocols, in the same way, 
that royal armies patrolled trade routes during the Empirehood and royal 
officials in each province monitored arrangements. A federal style 
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administration could be the sustainable long-term approach to a 
successful integration scheme, although this would require a political 
commitment to give up sovereignty at the national level. 
This chapter argues that historical context can provide policy makers 
with confidence that the current regional trade institutional barriers to 
trade can be addressed in order to improve the quality and effective 
implementation of regional trade institutions. This could help to 
accelerate the integration process in order to realize the full potential 
of regional trade. In the next two chapters, we will discuss the 
conjunction of factors which could determine these institutional failures 
and drawbacks from a theoretical and modeling perspective in order 
to strengthen our policy implication. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Intra-regional trade flows: the experience of the 
ECOWAS integration scheme 
 
4.0 Introduction 
Regional integration involves a group of countries liberalizing their markets 
for trade and other economic activities (Laird, 2002; Biswaro, 2012 and 
WTO report, 2012). In Africa, every country belongs to one or more 
regional trading agreement (RTA) (Gupta and Yang, 2007; Babatunde and 
Odularu, 2012 and Mengistu, 2015). However, drivers of regional 
integration and a deeper understanding of the pattern of trade as well as 
what causes successes in regional trade between developing nations have 
not been fully researched. That is, the quest for regional integration might 
be regional specific such as the extent to which political and cultural factors 
outweigh economic factors (Wunderlich, 2007). To improve our 
understanding of the drivers of RTAs in developing countries, it is useful 
to have an in-depth assessment of an integration scheme such as 
ECOWAS as a case study.  
Trade within developing countries has increased in the past decade, which 
suggests that further liberalization could be beneficial. For example, intra-
developing countries trade as a percentage of their total trade rose from 
40% in 1995 to 59% in 2014 at a time when trade barriers are being 
reduced. However, there are regional variations in intra-developing 
countries trade as shown in Table 4.1 below (UNCTADSTAT, 2016 and 
Lombaerde-De et al, 2008). 
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Table 4.1 Intra-regional trade as a percentage of their total trade (X+M) 
Region/ Year 1995 2014 % Change 
Africa 12 15 25 
Asia 40 54 35 
Americas 
(developing) 
20 18 -10 
Europe 70 65 -7 
West Africa 10 10 0 
Southern Africa 9 15 67 
   Source: Authors Compilation: Data from UNCTADSTAT. 
For example, intra-West African trade stalled at 10% on average, while 
intra-Southern Africa trade rose proportionately by 67% (WTO Report, 
2012; UNECA Report, 2012 and UNCTADSTAT, 2016). As such, the 
distribution of intra-developing countries trade is uneven (Qureshi, 1996). 
Only few countries and products accounted for most intra-developing 
countries trade that may have implications for the success of integration 
schemes due to issues relating to political commitments, income distribution 
and output and employment losses (Qureshi, 1996; Stiglitz, 2002 and 
Rugwabiza, 2012). 
Furthermore, Table 4.1 also shows that the share of intra-regional trade in 
some developing regions is low. This has generated some debate about the 
extent to which regional integration schemes among developing nations 
(south-south) alone is beneficial or not (Bhagwati, and Panagariya, 1996; 
Venables, 2003; Dunn and Mutti, 2005 and Gupta, 2008). Some papers 
argued that RTAs which entail deeper integration schemes could 
experience significantly higher gains from trade because they lower trade 
costs and provide a stable trading and monetary system which national 
governments alone may fail to achieve (Dunn and Mutti, 2005; Evans et al, 
2006; WTO Report, 2011 and Lejárraga and Shepherd, 2013). Other papers 
argue that deeper integration between north-south could potentially be more 
beneficial because the south could learn best-practices from the north 
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(Winters, 1996; Schiff and Winters, 2003 and WTO Report, 2011). However, 
deeper integration requires common rules, although this could put pressure 
on the economies of some developing nation’s whose level of integration 
and development may require divergent policies. Nevertheless, some 
papers highlighted that intra-developing countries’ trade was rising strongly 
through unilateral and multilateral liberalization before some of the 
agreements were made (Global Economic Prospect Report, 2005). As such, 
the type of integration countries should pursue and with which groups of 
countries is of importance to many stakeholders? 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is three-folds. The first is to discuss the 
theoretical arguments that underpin the motivation for the formation of 
ECOWAS. This will enable us to locate ECOWAS in the context of global 
and regional trade. The second is to assess the degree of intra-ECOWAS 
trade and trade with the rest of the world by product categories. This will 
enable us to identify the successes of ECOWAS as well as to assess which 
product categories are driving trade flows. The third aim is to measure the 
ECOWAS trade potential using some trade indicators in order to assess the 
extent to which this potential is exploited. Furthermore, estimating 
ECOWAS trade potential could reveal the extent to which their model of 
integration is influenced by trade theory. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.1 looks at the basis for 
regional integration and trade from a theoretical perspective while section 
4.2 assesses the contextual literature. Section 4.3 examines ECOWAS 
trade patterns. Section 4.4 measures ECOWAS trade potential utilizing the 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and trade complementarity indices 
(TCI). Section 4.5 looks at some indicators in ECOWAS, which could shed 
light on the extent to which some product categories could stimulate 
regional trade, especially in the primary sector. Section 4.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
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4.1 Theoretical framework 
This section analyses the theories underlying trade and regional integration 
schemes in order to assess the extent to which they explain trade patterns, 
especially in West Africa. It is generally agreed among economists that no 
country could produce all the goods and services as well as possess all the 
inputs needed in modern production processes (WTO Report, 2008). 
Furthermore, consumers are increasingly demanding a variety of products 
that could be relatively more expensive when produced at home. These 
have accentuated the need for trade. What determines trade, the pattern it 
takes, and which products are traded could depend on the expected gains 
from trade, production potential, and consumer choice. 
The premise of the expected gains from trade hinges on the assumption 
that world prices are divergent from domestic prices in autarky with two 
possible outcomes (Dunn and Mutti, 2005; Nielsen and Zouhon-Bi, 2007; 
WTO Report, 2008; Schumacher, 2012 and Cissokho et al, 2012). First, if 
world prices are lower than domestic prices for some products, countries 
could utilize less of their domestic resources (income) by importing from 
efficient countries. Furthermore, it allows those countries to reallocate 
resources in their efficient sectors which would naturally lead to 
specialization of production and competitiveness while inefficient sectors 
are crowded-out by imports. However, resource reallocation could lead to a 
shift in production structures and migration which may not be politically 
popular. The second likely outcome is that when domestic prices are lower 
than world prices for some products, countries could benefit by exporting to 
the world market in order to increase their growth and employment 
prospects (WTO Report, 2008). As such, free trade ensures allocative and 
accumulative efficiencies (Dijk, 2011). Furthermore, the proponents of free 
trade argue that small economies which cannot influence world prices might 
benefit more from free trade than restricted trade because consumers would 
have access to cheaper products with better quality and varieties while 
producers have access to larger markets (WTO Report, 2008 and 
Schumacher, 2012). Therefore, global free trade should be the first best 
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option. In the absence of global free trade, small economies could form a 
regional integration scheme as a second-best option in order to minimize 
the problems associated with small economic size (Oduro and Aryeetey, 
1996; African Union Report, 2012 and EDA Report, 2013). 
This section will demonstrate how the traditional trade theories of 
comparative advantage and the new trade theories of economies of scale 
explain the basis for trade. We will particularly look at mercantilism, the 
Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) models and new trade theory. 
 
4.1.0 The traditional trade theories 
Mercantilists’ trade theories assumed that a nation could increase its wealth 
by exploiting its trade potential. The key aspect of mercantilism is that the 
gains from trade can be exploited if countries promote their export sectors 
more than the import sectors through protectionist measures (Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 2009; Schumacher, 2012 and Feenstra et al, 2012). Therefore, 
under mercantilism, domestic consumers could pay a higher relative price 
for products and domestic producers could experience the inefficient use of 
resources, although the government could receive revenue from import 
taxes. Some aspects of import substitute industrialization (ISI) pursued by 
many developing nations in the 1950s to1980s were partly mercantilist and 
inward-looking (Sachs and Williamson, 1985 and Lombaerde De, 
Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2008 and WTO Report, 2008). Furthermore, 
mercantilism contributed to the development of trade policy instruments 
which resulted in the modern tariff and non-tariff barriers (Dunn and Mutti, 
2005). Moreover, we demonstrated in chapter three that the Empires of 
Western Sudan also had tariffs. It has been argued that trade barriers are 
intended to protect employment, promote industrialization and increase 
export potential as well as revenue generation (Tanzi and Zee, 2000; Ekpo, 
2004 and Walkenhorst, 2006). However, mercantilism could also lead to 
retaliation by trading partners, which may have negative economic 
consequences. As such, it does not offer a strong basis for free trade, 
although trade barriers could improve our understanding of some of the 
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dynamics driving free trade. The inward-looking nature of mercantilism 
necessitated the search for alternative trade theories (Bjornskov, 2005; 
Salvatore, 2013). 
These alternative trade theories hinge on the principle of absolute and 
comparative advantage which asserts that a nation could increase its wealth 
and reduce poverty without protectionist measures (Bjornskov, 2005 and 
Leyaro and Morrissey, 2010 and Schumacher, 2012). Absolute advantage 
refers to the ability to produce products more efficiently compared to other 
countries/firms. It occurs when absolute production costs fall in the whole 
economy or firm, which will show up as higher real income (Acharya, 2008 
and Sen, 2010). However, it does not offer the only costs basis for trade. 
Although it is unlikely, a country could have an absolute advantage in the 
production of most of the tradeable products which leaves the other trade 
partners with few products to trade with. This scenario is likely to motivate 
protectionist measures when some trade partners fear the economic 
consequences of trade being skewed toward few countries. Furthermore, 
although it is plausible for production costs to fall as output rises in the whole 
economy, absolute advantage does not tell us a number of resources 
allocated to the production of each product. An understanding of inputs 
required in sectoral production could reveal which sectors are more cost 
efficient and the extent to which resource reallocation and specialisation 
could lead to production surplus and export.  
The theory of comparative advantage known as the Ricardian model that 
was later developed into the Heckscher-Ohlin model extended absolute 
advantage by looking at relative cost rather than absolute costs that 
attempts to explain the concept of resource allocation as a basis for trade. 
Comparative advantage postulates that countries could benefit from trade 
even in the presence of absolute advantage if there are differences in the 
opportunity costs of production (Deardorff, 1998 and Sen, 2010). That is if 
they could specialize in producing products which could be produced at the 
lowest opportunity costs (Husted et al, 2013; Bjornskov, 2005; Salvatore, 
2013; Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009 and Feenstra et al, 2012). Forgoing few 
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inputs in order to produce more of another product will generate costs 
savings and efficiencies that will make the product more price competitive. 
Opportunity cost is an important aspect of comparative advantage and in 
economics because it determines choices between alternatives (WTO 
Report, 2008). Two comparisons need to be made in order to understand 
comparative advantage as a basis for trade. The first is the opportunity cost 
of production within a country. Second is the opportunity cost of producing 
similar products between potential trading partner’s (Acharya, 2008 and 
Beaudreau, 2013). Both should lead to resource reallocation through 
specialization which leads to efficiencies in production. Furthermore, 
differences in opportunity costs occur due to differences in factor prices. 
Therefore, opportunity costs could determine the extent to which countries 
pursue a global free trade or become part of a regional integration scheme. 
Comparative advantage did not make a clear distinction on that choice. 
Therefore, computing the comparative advantage of countries could shed 
light on the extent to which trade liberalization could be mutually beneficial 
regardless of geographic proximity. A detailed assessment of factors which 
determine comparative advantage will further shed light on the pattern of 
resource reallocation. 
The Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models made different assumptions 
about the sources of comparative advantage. While the Ricardian model 
assumes that comparative advantage emanates from differences in the 
efficiency and productivity of labour, the Heckscher-Ohlin model assumes 
that comparative advantage emanates from differences in factor 
endowments including labour, capital, land and other resources (Salvatore, 
2013). 
Therefore, comparative advantage raises several issues regarding trade 
patterns. First, countries with identical factor endowments would be 
expected to trade less among themselves. The proponents of north-south 
trade liberalization argue that many southern countries have similar factor 
endowments which make it less plausible to trade among themselves. 
Secondly, factor endowments could fluctuate over time, which implies that 
comparative advantage could change. For example, improvements in the 
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use of fertilizer and other technologies in the agriculture sector could 
improve yields per hectare which will lower average costs and lead to 
economies of scale. Improvements in yields coupled with a reduction in 
costs of production could attract greater demand for products in the global 
or regional markets. Furthermore, improvement in human capital through 
higher education and skills as well as capital investments in some selected 
sectors such as infrastructure and the institutional framework could improve 
comparative advantage. Third, comparative advantage could lead to the 
development of new products or markets if some sectors of the economy 
are under exploited. Therefore, while comparative advantage may be due 
to current endowments, countries could create their comparative advantage 
in some sectors with the right policies. 
In summary, our discussion of the traditional trade theory highlights that the 
concept of comparative advantage is plausible in determining the basis for 
trade. The Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models made different 
assumptions about the sources of comparative advantage. The Ricardian 
model assumes that it is differences in labour productivity, which determine 
comparative advantage while the Heckscher-Ohlin model assumes that it is 
differences in resource endowments. Both are plausible because trade 
patterns are based on differences in the opportunity costs of production.  
However, comparative advantage implies that countries with similar 
economic structures and opportunity costs of production may trade less 
among themselves. Therefore, it is befitting to compute the revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) of countries in order to assess the extent to 
which trade liberalization is desirable. Furthermore, it is plausible to assess 
factors which determine comparative advantage and trade barriers in order 
to understand the dynamics driving trade patterns. In this thesis, we will use 
ECOWAS as a case study. Furthermore, comparative advantage does not 
capture the extent to which production complementarities could lead to 
greater trade in semi-processed products (Beaudreau, 2013). This has led 
to the development of new trade theories in the last three decades. 
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4.1.1 The new trade theory (NTT) 
The failure of the traditional trade theory to explain the pattern of trade 
between countries with similar economic structures led to the search for new 
theories. The new trade theories (NTT) extended the concept of 
comparative advantage by assuming that the modern pattern of trade 
exhibits imperfect markets with differentiated products (Krugman, 1979 and 
WTO Report, 2008). Furthermore, production is characterized by increasing 
returns to scale (more output per unit of input), greater consumer choices 
and production complementarity (Melitz, 2003 and Krugman and Obstfeld, 
2009). Hence, the new trade theory did not discard specialization. Rather, 
it assumes that specialization is achieved through intra-industry trade 
influenced by production complementarity and product differentiation which 
lead to economies of scale. Therefore, we need to discuss the conditions 
and dimension under which the new trade theory explains the basis for trade 
and trade patterns. 
The first condition pertains to the degree of production complementarity. 
When some firms within the same industry can specialize in the production 
of some components of a whole based on differences in opportunity costs, 
the average cost will fall which leads to increasing returns to scale. Thus, 
free trade could enhance production complementarity where firms could 
exploit increasing returns to scale beyond their national borders. Beaudreau 
(2013) described this type of trade as exploiting the vertical comparative 
advantage. However, what is interesting to note is that production 
complementarities or vertical comparative advantage would require the 
existence of a significant manufacturing sector. Indeed, the WTO Report 
(2008) summarized several papers which found that complementarities are 
mainly prevalent in the manufacturing sectors and in developed nations. 
Therefore, the feasibility of production complementarities in developing 
countries would require improvements in processing and manufacturing 
(Iyoha, 2005; McIntyre, 2005; Donge et al, 2012 and Shinyekwa, and 
Othieno, 2013). The second condition relates to access to new markets by 
firms. New markets could lead to more demand for products which 
consequently lead to more production. The spread of costs to a larger output 
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lowers the average cost which brings increasing returns to scale (WTO 
Report, 2008). This occurs because firms can use their proceeds to invest 
in new technology or an economy-wide fall in average cost leads to the use 
of fewer inputs. Access to new markets would require better market 
information and lowering of trade barriers. Furthermore, NTT assumes that 
firms could exploit economies of scale in imperfect markets where early 
entrant firms dominate the market and prevent new entrants and 
competition. 
Although NTT is plausible in explaining trade patterns and the basis for 
trade through economies of scale, it poses some challenges for some 
developing nations especially those with a low manufacturing base. Firms 
from developed nations could crowd-out firms in developing nations when 
imperfect market conditions prevent them from entering the global market. 
Hence, developing nations could use the infant industry argument to 
introduce trade barriers contrary to the spirit of global trade liberalization. 
Similar arguments could be made to justify the formation of RTAs in order 
to exploit regional competitiveness. However, the infant industry argument 
could be minimized if multinational firms expand their operations in 
developing nations through foreign direct investment (FDI). This would 
require developing countries to improve their institutional framework and 
ease of doing business. 
Nevertheless, the relevance of the NTT in explaining modern patterns of 
trade among countries with similar technology and resource endowments 
cannot be underestimated. The key aspect of NTT as a basis for trade is 
that countries with similar economic structures can still trade with each other 
in the presence of production complementarities and imperfect markets. 
This is achieved through intra-industry trade. Furthermore, consumer 
demand for branded products could lead to improvement in packaging and 
product differentiation which has the potential to increase trade. Table 4.2 
summarizes the trade theories. However, global free trade is facing 
increasing challenges from RTAs. As a result, research has also focused 
on looking at the basis for the formation of RTAs from a theoretical 
perspective and its implication for global free trade. 
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Table 4.2 Summary of trade theories 
Source: Authors' summary with reference from Melitz (2003); Krugman and Obstfeld (2009) and Feenstra et al (2012).
Trade theories Basis for Trade 
assumptions 
Main Targets Types of products 
traded 
Economies of 
scale 
Factors of 
production 
Absolute Advantage 
(18th C) 
Absolute 
advantage 
determines trade 
Interindustry trade Homogenous 
productivity across 
firms 
Increasing returns 
to scale 
2 nations 
2 goods 
1factor 
Immobile 
factors 
Ricardian Theory 
(18th&19th C) 
Comparative 
advantage 
determines trade 
Interindustry trade Homogenous 
productivity across 
firms 
Constant return to 
scale 
2 nations 
2 goods 
1 factor 
Immobile 
factors 
Heckscher-Ohlin Theory 
(19th&20th C) 
Differences in 
resource 
endowments 
Interindustry trade Homogenous 
productivity 
Constant return to 
scale 
2 nations 
2 goods 
2 factors 
Immobile 
factors 
New Trade Theory (the 
1980s) 
Production 
complementarity 
Intra-industry trade Homogenous 
productivity 
Increasing returns 
to scale 
2nations, 
many factors 
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4.1.2 Regional integration  
RTAs involve a group of countries liberalizing their markets for trade and 
other economic motives (Whalley, 1998; Laird, 2002 and WTO report, 
2012). However, it goes beyond trade liberalization alone. It entails security 
and political dimensions as well as attempts to influence multilateral trade 
negotiations through collective bargaining (Laird, 2002; Wunderlich, 2007 
and WTO Report, 2011). A UNECA Report (2012) surveyed the motivations 
for the forming RTAs in Africa. The findings suggested that the motives vary 
from 39% economic, 31% political to 16% geographic, 8% cultural and 6% 
historical. Furthermore, it could be argued that the current wave of regional 
integration schemes is a direct response to the failure of global free trade to 
provide the expected gains from trade. RTAs are generally considered as 
second-best options in the absence of global free and fair trade (Baldwin, 
1993 and Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996). 
As a result, the effect of RTAs in part depends on the extent to which they 
lead to trade creation or diversion between member states (Viner, 1950; 
Venables, 1999 and Dunn and Mutti, 2005). There are two aspects of trade 
creation namely; production and consumption effects. Production effects 
occur when, as a result of the RTA, production shifts from high-cost 
domestic producers and the rest of the world to low-cost trading partners. 
Trade complementarity index is a useful measure of the extent to which the 
export of country A is matched by imports of partner B in the same product 
category. Consumption effects occur when, as a result of the RTA, 
consumption increases due to lower prices of imports. In contrast, trade 
diversion occurs when production and consumption shift from the low-cost 
rest of the world suppliers to a high-cost partner due to a preferential 
reduction in trade barriers (Venables, 1999). 
However, the theory of RTAs gives no guidance as to which group of 
countries should form an RTA. This has generated some debate in the 
existing literature. Some papers argue that north-south integration schemes 
are more plausible because of differences in their comparative advantage 
and could lead to upward convergence of income (Cernat, 2001; Schiff and 
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Winters, 2003; Venables, 1999 and Lee and Park, 2007). Other papers 
highlighted that south-south integration is not plausible due to little or no 
production complementarities, production skewed toward international 
trade, low manufacturing base and other resource constraints (Aryeetey, 
2001; Shams, 2003; De Groot et al, 2003; Geda and Kebret, 2007; Gupta 
and Yang, 2007 Subramanian and Matthijs, 2007; Turkson, 2010; Alagidede 
et al, 2012 and UNECA Report, 2013). Some papers point to the view that 
south-south integration schemes could be plausible if certain policy 
measures are put in place. For example, research has shown that 
increasing production of foodstuffs could create trade in the ECOWAS 
region since food imports tend to be relatively expensive (Cincin-Sain and 
Marshall, 1983; Blein et al, 2008; Hertzenberg, 2011; Diop, 2012; UNECA 
Report, 2012; Brenton et al, 2012; Cissokho et al, 2012). 
Furthermore, RTAs which allow free factor movements could shift 
production in some sectors which could put pressure on some economies. 
The existing literature points to the view that factor movement brings 
competition and specialization which lead to price and income convergence 
(Samuelson, 1948; Ben-David, 1996; Mountfort, 1998; Ranjan, 2003 and 
Zhang, 2006). However, the convergence of income and price could lead to 
permanent shifts in the economic structures of some RTA members with 
profound economic consequences. For example, NAFTA resulted in corn 
prices falling by 48% in Mexico from 1996 to match the other members’ corn 
prices. However, it subsequently led to permanent unemployment of an 
estimated two million people by 2007 (Weisbrot et al, 2014). Therefore, the 
success of an integration scheme may not only hinge on trade creation but 
also on compensation mechanisms for potential losers (Stiglitz, 2013). 
Nonetheless, RTAs can be strengthened by additional considerations. The 
earliest motivations for these additional considerations can be partly 
attributed to Adam Smith’s wealth of nations in which he wrote; “First, every 
individual endeavour to employ his capital as near home as he can, and 
consequently as much as he can in the support of domestic industry, 
provided always that he can thereby obtain the ordinary, or not a great deal 
less than the ordinary profits of stock” (Smith, 1776 p. 362). Additionally, 
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Adam Smith highlighted that the closeness between Britain and Ireland 
makes it easy and cheaper to transport cattle by sea. His assertion points 
to two implications for modern RTAs. First, countries in the same region 
could gain more wealth by liberalizing their markets with the potential to 
attract investment within those countries. Secondly, proximity could be 
associated with lower transaction costs and hence a greater demand for 
goods. Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) highlighted that if the marginal cost 
of imports from neighbouring countries or members of an RTA is lower, then 
such countries have incentives to eliminate trade barriers with mutual 
benefits. The importing nation pays a lower price while the exporting nation 
gains more revenue from increased exports. 
In summary, countries choose to liberalize their markets because there may 
be mutual gains from trade on the basis of differences in comparative 
advantage and potential economies of scale. Trade theories gave guidance 
that global free trade is the first best option. In the absence of global free 
trade, RTAs are the second-best option. However, the effects of RTAs on 
trade gave no guidelines as to which groups of countries should form an 
RTA.  On this basis, computing the RCA and TCI of member states relative 
to each other and relative to the rest of the world could determine the 
plausibility of RTAs or at least inform policy on what could be done in order 
to exploit gains from trade (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009 and UNECA 
Report, 2012). Furthermore, assessing some trade indicators could deepen 
our understanding of the drivers of liberalization. Table 4.3 summarizes how 
trade theories could be measured and some indicators that determine the 
extent to which these theories are applied. For example, the RCA could be 
used to measure the traditional trade theories of comparative advantage 
while endowments and trade barriers are indicators that characterized 
comparative advantage. 
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 Table 4.3 Measurement and basic indicators in understanding trade theory 
Trade Theories Measure and how to 
identify trade theories 
Basic Indicators 
Mercantilism Trade policy Trade barriers 
Comparative 
Advantage 
RCA and trade policy 
Labor, capital and land 
endowments and trade 
barriers 
New Trade Theories 
TCI, trade policy 
Production 
complementarity and 
trade barriers 
Source: Authors Compilation 
 
4.2 Contextual literature review 
The goal of any RTA is to create trade among its members, although there 
are other factors which could play a part (Laird, 2002 and WTO Report, 
2008). There is an extensive literature on the effects of RTAs on trade. The 
WTO report (2008) summarized several papers about the gains from trade 
around the world. The results were mixed and, in some cases, gains from 
trade depended on the degree of integration. 
From a historical perspective, world merchandise trade as a percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP) rose from 4.6% in 1870 to 30% in 2014 (WTO 
Report, 2015). The increase in global trade has corresponded with trade 
liberalization through the GATT/WTO multilateral trade negotiations as well 
as a reduction in trade costs due to improvements in communication, 
transportation, energy, the creation of new tradeable products and rising 
incomes. The latter part of this period also corresponded with increased 
WTO membership from 23 in 1948 to 162 in 2015 (Bayoumi, 2011; WTO 
Report, 2014, p. 7; WTO Facts and Figures). However, in the past few 
decades, countries are increasing forming RTAs which challenge the 
multilateral trading system (Stiglitz, 2013). Furthermore, the surge in RTAs 
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could be due to the failure of the multilateral trade negotiations and the low 
share of global trade among some developing countries, especially those in 
Africa (Trofimov, 2012 and UNECA Report, 2013). 
In 2014, Africa’s share of world merchandise export was 3.3%, even though 
it is the second most populous continent in the world (UNCTADSTAT). 
Table 4.4 below shows the share of intra-regional exports as a percentage 
of total exports for selected RTAs. It shows that regional exports in 1995 
has been higher than in 2014 for some regions. 
Table 4.4 Intra-regional exports by RTA (%)  
 1995 2000 2005 2008 2010 2012 2014 
EU28 66 68 68 67 65 62 63 
NAFTA 46 56 56 49 49 49 50 
APEC 72 73 71 65 67 68 68 
MERCOSUR 19 18 12 14 15 13 13 
ASEAN 25 23 25 25 25 26 25 
Africa 12 9 9 10 14 14 16 
ECOWAS 10 9 10 10 8 8 9 
Source: Authors Compilation: Data from UNCTADSTAT: 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx. Note EU28 (European 
Union); NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement); APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation); MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market); ASEAN (Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations) and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). 
 
Furthermore, Table 4.4 shows that Africa and ECOWAS regional trade as a 
proportion of their total trade has been historically lower compared with other 
RTAs. A large body of research relating to trade in Africa attributed high tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to trade as impediments to intra-African trade (Ernest, 
1976; Deme, 1995; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Shams, 2003; De Groot et al, 
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2003; Oxfam, 2004; Turkson, 2010; Geda and Kebret, 2007; Alagidede et al, 
2012; Aryeetey, 2001; Lavergne, 1997; Longo and Sekkat, 2004; Masson 
and Pattillo, 2001 and Gupta and Yang, 2007). 
Nonetheless, the decreasing trend in intra-regional trade has not prevented 
a surge in RTAs or the strengthening of old ones. This has raised a number 
of questions among trade economists about the desirability of RTAs relative 
to global free trade.  Therefore, this section assesses the pattern of 
multilateral and regional trade in order to determine the extent to which RTAs 
have been beneficial. 
 
4.2.0 Pattern of world trade 
As discussed earlier, many developing countries in Africa, Asia, and South 
America were once colonized (Acemoglu et al, 2001). As such, it has been 
argued that their production structures were skewed toward serving the 
international markets rather than regional markets thus shaping their 
comparative advantage (UNECA Report, 2013). Indeed, developing 
countries have been supplying raw materials for manufacturing in the 
developed nations for many decades (Mouradian, 1998). However, FDI is 
also becoming the basis for the interaction between developed and 
developing nations where developed nation’s firms establish operations in 
the developing world (World Investment Report, 2015). Nonetheless, world 
trade has shifted from agriculture to manufacturing in the last century. For 
example, agriculture accounted for 62.5% of world trade in 1913 while 
manufacturing accounted for 65% of world trade in 2013 and the developed 
nations contributed more than fifty percent of manufacturing trade (WTO 
Report, 2013). Similarly, the developing economies share of world exports 
was 24% in 1990 compared with 76% for developed and transition economies 
(UNCTADSTAT). However, it appears that developing countries are catching 
up with the developed nations in their share of world exports. In 2015, 
developing economies share of world exports rose to 44%, while that of 
developed and transition economies declined to 55% (UNCTADSTAT). 
However, there are regional variations among developing nations as well as 
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factors which may account for the catching up. Table 4.5 shows developing 
economies share in world exports. 
Table 4.5 Developing economies share in World exports 
 
1980 1990 2000 2010 2015 
Africa 6 3 2 3 2 
America 5 4 6 6 6 
Asia 18 17 24 33 37 
Source: Authors Compilation: Data from UNCTADSTAT 
Clearly, the increase in the developing nations share in world exports is due 
to successes made in the Asian continent. Several indicators have been 
identified in the existing literature about the factors that contributes to the 
economic and export performance of Asia. They include macroeconomic 
and political stability, innovation, and foreign direct investment, prioritizing 
development policy in important sectors, trade liberalization and 
diversification of the economy (WTO Committee on Trade and 
Development, 1996; Bayoumi, 2011; Rugwabiza, 2012; Donge Van et al, 
2012; Henley et al, 2012 and World Investment Report, 2015). Furthermore, 
Asia has been able to develop its agro-industry, which has added value to 
the economy and has diversified into manufacturing (Donge Van et al, 
2012). 
The direction of FDI provides an indication of the extent to which some 
regions have progressed in meeting some of the indicators mentioned 
above. Figure 4.1 shows FDI inflows by region. 
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Figure 4.1 Foreign direct investment inflows by region (US$ billions)  
Source: World Investment Report, 2015 
 
Developing Asia attracted the highest FDI inflows with a positive trend 
relative to other regions of the world. The WTO Committee on Trade and 
Development (1996) and Bayoum (2011) argued that there is a direct 
correlation between FDI, growth in manufacturing and export performance. 
Uexkull (2012) also argued that most FDI is channeled to export-oriented 
firms. The pattern of FDI into Asia has also taken the form of offshoring as 
well as outsourcing, which has partly resulted in export diversification in 
manufacturing (Donge Van et al, 2012). The attraction of Asia can also be 
attributed to several factors, including its high relative labor productivity 
(Faux, 2003 and World Wage Report, 2013). The productivity of labor is an 
important source of comparative advantage. 
In summary, the pattern of world trade has shifted from agriculture to 
manufacturing in the last century with developed nations dominant. 
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Similarly, developing nations’ share of world trade and intra-developing 
economies trade as a percentage of their total trade also rose although 
there are regional variations with Africa lagging. Hence, developing 
economies could increase their share of world and regional trade if new 
products are introduced to serve regional markets or certain policy 
measures are put in place such as reducing the non-tariff barriers. However, 
as we noted earlier, most of the growth in trade in the developing economies 
is due to the performance of Asia. Asia’s ability to implement policies which 
led to improvement in macroeconomic stability, trade liberalization, labor 
productivity and innovation has attracted FDI and diversified their 
economies and their export sectors. Therefore, a comparative study 
between Asia and other developing regions like Africa could provide useful 
policy implications especially the extent to which manufacturing could be 
exploited. 
 
4.2.1 Africa’s trade pattern 
Africa is home to 15% of the world’s seven billion people and contributed 
2.8% of the global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 (UNCTADSTAT, 
2016). Furthermore, Africa’s share of world trade was 3.1%, while intra-
African exports and imports as a share of their total trade were 16% and 
15% in 2014 respectively (WTO International Trade Statistics, 2014 and 
UNCTADSTAT, 2016). Similarly, Africa depends on a narrow range of 
primary products for exports. For example, 66% of the continent’s exports 
in 2010 were mining and fuels in contrast to Asia, which has a diversified 
export sector (Rugwabiza, 2012 and Badiane et al, 2013). This has been 
reflected by differences in the export diversification index for Southeast Asia 
at 0.155 while that of Sub-Saharan Africa was 0.402 in 200513 (Donge Van 
et al, 2012). Furthermore, the share of SSA agriculture as a percentage of 
GDP shows a moderate increase in the 1980s and early 1990s, which is 
partly attributed to increasing in land use rather than productivity (Blein et 
al, 2008 and Nin-Pratt et al, 2011). While Southeast Asia’s agriculture as a 
                                                          
13 A higher value means the export sector is less diversified. 
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percentage of GDP was 16% in 1980 and that of SSA 24%, Donge Van et 
al (2012) argued that the two regions took divergent path as shown in figure 
4.2 below. The manufacturing sector as a percentage of GDP shows that of 
SSA fell to 8%, while that of Southeast Asia rose to 28% in the periods 
shown in figure 4.2 (Donge et al, 2012). 
    Figure 4.2 Comparing composition of GDP for SSA and Southeast Asia  
Source: Donge Van et al, 2012 
However, more recent data show that SSA agriculture as a percentage of 
GDP fell from 20% in 2007 to 17% in 2014 while that of Southeast Asia and 
the Pacific remained stable (World Development Indicators). Manufacturing 
as a percentage of GDP also remained stable in SSA from 10% in 2006 to 
11% in 2014 (World Development Indicators). Furthermore, Southeast 
Asia’s manufacturing as a percentage of GDP is higher than that of SSA 
which raises a number of policy issues for SSA to reflect upon. First, the 
region is not exploiting its export potential despite the shift in global trade 
toward manufacturing (Henley, 2007 and Economic Development in Africa 
(EDA) report, 2013). Second, the level of production in the region is 
relatively low which has resulted in import dependence (Hertzenberg, 2011). 
Third, SSA lost its comparative advantage in some sectors when China 
joined the WTO in 2001. The World Employment Report (2004) argued that 
developing countries are increasingly competing among themselves in 
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labour-intensive manufacturing to the same markets. As a result, SSA which 
has not been able to expand its manufacturing rapidly is likely to face 
tougher competition from other developing regions for the same markets.  
Furthermore, WTO (1996) also found a direct correlation between growth in 
manufacturing and growth in export performance in Asia. Therefore, the low 
share of African trade in the world should be expected given its low 
manufacturing base. 
Furthermore, Figure 4.3 shows the downward trend in Africa’s trade share 
with the rest of the world from the 1980s and early 2000 before it started 
improving thereafter although it was relatively low compared with figures in 
the 1980s. Despite these recent improvements, Africa’s trade share in the 
world is low. In addition to low export diversification, Africa has not been 
able to attract FDI at the levels of other developing regions like Asia 
(UNECA Report, 2012 and World Investment Report, 2015). 
Figure 4.3 African’s trade share with the World  
Source: Authors Compilation; Data from UNCTADSTAT 
Indeed, Africa’s foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are among the 
lowest in the world and fell moderately from US$56 billion in 2012 to US$54 
billion in 2014. Moreover, 47.4% of FDI in Africa went to only five 
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economies14 in 2014 which shows the difficulty in attracting foreign capital 
(World Investment Report, 2015). Asia’s success in exports has been 
largely attributed to the inflow of foreign capital (Henley, 2007; Henley and 
Donge Van, 2012). 
Other papers have found a direct correlation between open economies and 
growth in GDP and trade (Sachs and Warner, 1997; Inter- American 
Development Bank, 2000; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004 and Dijk, 2011). 
They argued that open economies tend to attract competition and enjoy 
better institutional quality. Therefore, Africa’s trade pattern with the world 
could not be higher given the region’s relatively high tariff and non-tariff 
barriers as well as their un-competitiveness compared to other regions in 
selected export products (UNECA Report, 2012). We will seek to compute 
the comparative advantage of selected products for ECOWAS in order to 
support this argument. 
Turning to intra-African trade, a mixed pattern is visible among the many 
RTAs in the continent. Hertzenberg (2011) highlighted that the low share of 
intra-African trade is mainly due to supply constraints; that is, Africa is not 
producing enough to satisfy domestic and international markets. Figure 4.4 
shows intra-African trade as a share of their total trade by RTA, which is low 
compared with other RTAs in Europe, Asia, and North America. COMESA 
and SADC were able to increase their intra-regional trade as a percentage 
of their total trade. However, the other RTAs in SSA experienced a decline 
or stable intra-regional trade. This suggests the presence of some barriers 
to trade expansion in the region. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 These five economies are South Africa (5.7bn); Congo (5.5bn); Mozambique (4.9bn); Egypt (4.8bn) 
and Nigeria (4.7bn). 
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Figure 4.4 Intra-African trade by regional integration scheme (share %) 
Source: Authors Compilation; Data from UNCTADSTAT. 
Although tariff barriers have generally come down around the world, 
including Africa, RTAs in Africa face additional challenges in the areas of 
non-tariff barriers to trade (Page, 2005; Chang, 2010; Keane et al, 2010). 
These non-tariff barriers take different forms such as quotas, safety 
standards, and other administrative measures. The non-tariff barriers could 
also take the form of poor transport and communication infrastructure, non-
complementarity of production, non-convertible currencies and lack of 
political will (Deme, 1995; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Lavergne, 1997; 
Aryeetey, 2001; Masson and Pattillo, 2001; Shams, 2003; De Groot et al, 
2003; Longo and Sekkat, 2004; Gupta and Yang, 2007; Geda and Kebret, 
2007; Turkson, 2010; Alagidede et al, 2012; Assane et al, 2014; Sy, 2014 
and Mengistu, 2015). 
Therefore, Africa is faced with the issue of whether to promote regional 
integration more than global free trade. Rugwabiza (2012) argued that 
Africa’s future growth lies in its ability to expand and diversify its export as 
well as increase intra-African trade. Rugwabiza (2012) and UNECA Report 
(2013) further argued that the low share of intra-African trade could be 
attributed to the production structures created during colonialism that serves 
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international markets rather than domestic markets. This claim would imply 
that intra-African trade could increase if the production structure is 
diversified. However, the colonialism claim about Africa’s poor performance 
is becoming difficult to maintain given the trade performance of former 
colonies in Asia. Henley (2012) and Donge Van et al (2012) argued that 
most of Asia was in similar or poorer economic position than Africa. 
Therefore, there are other underlying factors which have made Africa 
unique in terms of its low share of trade with the rest of the world and within 
the continent. We have identified some of these factors earlier such as 
macroeconomic and political instability and high tariff barriers. However, 
Africa is improving on these indicators. 
Other non-tariff barriers to trade could be investigated further in order to 
have an in-depth understanding of the dynamics driving intra-African trade. 
The hidden costs of cross-border trade, which has had little research 
attention could be significant. Leyaro and Morrissey (2010) attributed the 
minimal trade effect on growth to the presence of natural barriers to trade 
and over dependence on primary product trade. Similarly, Brenton (2012) 
found that a South African supermarket ‘Shoprite Pty Ltd’ spends an 
estimated $20,000 a week on arranging unnecessary import permits in 
order to distribute its goods15 to stores in Zambia alone due to corruption.  
Furthermore, the cost of importing and exporting in Africa is relatively 
expensive (Leyaro and Morrissey, 2010 and Rugwabiza, 2012). Table 4.6 
shows the relative costs of shipping a container in Africa and South-East 
Asia. It costs an estimated US$900 to export a container from South-East 
Asia to the world in comparison to US$2000 from Africa. It makes Africa 
less competitive relative to Southeast Asia. Hertzenberg (2011) also 
estimated that a car shipped from Japan to Abidjan costs US$1500 
including insurance while it costs US$5000 from Adidas Ababa to Abidjan. 
 
 
                                                          
15 Goods such as meat, milk and plant crops. 
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Table 4.6 Costs of a container shipment (Africa and Southeast Asia (US$) 
 
Importing Exporting 
Africa 2500 2000 
South East Asia 935 900 
Source: Rugwabiza, 2012. 
Governments and businesses face additional challenges to trade in SSA.  
SSA government's dependence on trade taxes is estimated at 11% higher 
than the world average at 5% in 2014 (Tanzi and Zee, 2000 and World 
Development Indicators, 2016). Furthermore, Figure 4.5 below shows that 
it is harder on average to do business in SSA than in other regions of the 
world. 
   Figure 4.5 Challenges faced by governments and business 
Source: Authors Compilation; Data from World Development Indicators Database 
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Therefore, although the basis for trade from a theoretical perspective could 
motivate trade liberalization and regional integration, Africa is faced with 
high tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, which distort its trade potentials 
and contribute to its low share in global trade and to lower intra-African 
trade. The tariff barriers have generally come down due to the formation of 
RTAs and the multilateral negotiations through the WTO. However, the 
range of non-tariff barriers would be tougher to eliminate. Among the non-
tariff barriers, the quality of regional trade institutions has had little attention 
in the existing literature. Most of the research focuses on the role of 
institutions in facilitating trade. Little research has been done on the 
determinants of trade institutional quality.  Therefore, the main aim of this 
thesis is to assess the effectiveness and determinants of trade facilitation 
institutions using ECOWAS as a case study. 
 
4.3 ECOWAS trade pattern 
Our discussion in the previous section shows that intra-African trade, 
including ECOWAS is low due to the presence of high tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. The aim of this section is to provide a detailed assessment of intra-
ECOWAS trade and with other trade partners by product category. This will 
precede our next section which measures ECOWAS trade potential in order 
to demonstrate the extent to which it matches its trade pattern. 
Since its formation in 1975, intra-ECOWAS trade rose from US$890 million 
to $28 billion in 2014 in nominal terms as shown in figure 4.6 (IMF DOTS16, 
2016). 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics 
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Figure 4.6 Intra-ECOWAS trade in current US$ 
Source: IMF Direction of trade statistics (Link) 
 
However, the share of intra-ECOWAS trade as a proportion of total trade 
depicts an initially rising and subsequent flat pattern from 1990 as shown in 
Figure 4.7.  In 1975, intra-ECOWAS trade was 4% of total trade in 
comparison to 10% in 2014 (UNCTADSTAT). The increase in intra-
ECOWAS trade since 1975 could be partly attributed to tariff reduction 
through ECOWAS liberalization although there is no consensus on this 
(Aryeetey, 2001; Ogunfolu, 2009; Golub et al, 2009 and Cissokho et al, 
2012). Nonetheless, ECOWAS intends to increase intra-ECOWAS trade to 
40% by 2030 with a solid industrial structure. 
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Figure 4.7 Intra- ECOWAS trade as proportion of total trade (%) 
Source: Authors Compilation. Data from UNCTADSTAT 
 
Some papers argue that intra-ECOWAS trade would have increased at its 
current levels regardless of ECOWAS due to the reduction in trade barriers 
through unilateral and multilateral negotiations while the 40% ambition may 
not be attainable by 2030 (Meagher, 1997). Nonetheless, the low share of 
intra-ECOWAS trade as a share of their total trade means there is a 
potential trade gap (gap between actual and potential trade). This trade gap 
could be due to several factors. It is argued that unrecorded intra-ECOWAS 
trade and low production levels, especially in the agricultural sector, could 
play a part (Deme, 1995; Meagher, 1997; Golub et al, 2009 and Senghor, 
2009). Meagher (1997) estimated unrecorded trade in the range of 30 to 
50% of official trade and it is mainly channelled through the pre-colonial 
trade routes. On this basis, the low share of official intra-ECOWAS trade is 
a consequence of poor recording of trade statistics. Furthermore, this 
argument also implies that the constraints faced by cross-border traders 
should be a matter of research interest in order to inform policy. Indeed, 
Omorogbe (1993) and UNECA (2012) highlighted that the implementation 
of the ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme is low, and that no country has 
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fully implemented it so far. This point to certain procedural failures which 
could be synonymous with weak institutions. 
In contrast, it is also argued that the current level of intra-ECOWAS trade is 
expected due to the structures of the economies as well as the stickiness of 
their trade barriers (Sachs and Warner, 1997; Shams, 2003; De Groot et al, 
2003; Turkson, 2010; Geda and Kebret, 2007; Alagidede et al, 2012; 
Aryeetey, 2001; Lavergne, 1997; Longo and Sekkat, 2004; Masson and 
Pattillo, 2001; Gupta and Yang, 2007; Blein et al, 2008; and Nin-Pratt et al, 
2011). Furthermore, trade theories predict that ECOWAS would trade less 
among themselves since they tend to produce similar products with a weak 
manufacturing sector and weak production complementarities. Hence, the 
low share of intra-ECOWAS trade could suggest that south-south 
integration schemes are less beneficial (Venables; 1999; Schiff and 
Winters, 2003 and Lee and Park, 2007). Therefore, an in-depth assessment 
of intra-ECOWAS trade with its trading partners would improve our 
understanding of trade patterns in the region in order to inform policy. 
 
4.3.0 Data and measurement of ECOWAS trade pattern 
Our analysis will be based on data from the standard international trade 
classification (SITC 1) of products adopted from UN COMTRADE. SITC 1 
classification consists of a long-time series from 1962 which enables us to 
compute ECOWAS trade patterns and whether ECOWAS created trade 
since 1975. We will look at all the 10 product categories in SITC 1. These 
products include; 
• Food and live animals 
• Beverages and tobacco 
• Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuels, lubricants, and 
related materials 
• Animals and vegetable oils and fats 
• Chemicals 
• Manufactured goods 
• Mineral fuels 
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• Machinery and transport equipment 
• Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary and 
• Commodity- firearms, coin, ammunition, zoo animals etc. 
 
The computation of ECOWAS trade involves measuring the share of trade 
with selected trade partners over time in equation 4.1 and each product 
imported and exported as a proportion of total ECOWAS import and export 
of that product category in equation 4.1a; 
SHARE = {
[vi]
[Vj]
} ∗ 100                                                                  (4.1) 
SHARE = {
[vi,k]
[Vj,k]
} ∗ 100                                                                (4.1a) 
Where; 
vi = value of import or export for region  i 
Vj = total import or export of ECOWAS with rest of the World 
vi,k = import or export for region i of product k   
v𝑗,𝑘 = total ECOWAS import or export  of product k with the  rest of the world   
Therefore, each row in the tables represents the share of ECOWAS trade 
with its partners as a proportion of total ECOWAS trade with the WORLD or 
as a proportion of total for that product category. Table 4.7 contain 
ECOWAS trade with selected trade partners over time as per equation 4.1. 
Table 4.8 contain ECOWAS trade by product category as a proportion of 
total ECOWAS as per equation 4.1a.  For example, food and live animal’s 
exports are total ECOWAS food and live animal exports to the world and 
the share that goes to ECOWAS, EU27, OECD and China only. The values 
may not necessarily sum up to 100% since only ECOWAS’s main trading 
partners are considered. 
 
4.3.1 ECOWAS trade pattern by product category 
This section looks at the ECOWAS trade pattern by product category. We 
will specifically look at the ECOWAS net trade share in the world, intra-
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ECOWAS trade as a proportion of its world trade and ECOWAS trade as a 
proportion of GDP and which countries are driving ECOWAS trade and their 
consequences. 
From 2000 to 2010, ECOWAS contribution to world trade was low at 0.5% 
on average (EDA Report, 2013). Existing papers generally look at the 
ECOWAS trade share with the world, including intra-ECOWAS trade data. 
I believe that ECOWAS net trade (total ECOWAS trade to the world minus 
intra-ECOWAS trade) with the world is a better indicator of its global share. 
It could inform policy on the extent to which regional markets are exploited 
while maintaining international markets.  Figure 4.8 shows that ECOWAS 
crude materials and mineral exports contributed 1% or more but less than 
3% of total world exports of this product category. Similarly, ECOWAS food 
and live animals contributed 1% or more but less than 1.5% of total world 
imports of this product. In essence, the ECOWAS region trade share with 
the world is low and it is confined to a narrow range of products which is 
consistent with previous findings. 
Figure 4.8 ECOWAS net trade with the world by product category (%) 
2013 
Source: Authors Calculations; Data from WITS. Notes: Net trade is total ECOWAS trade 
with the world minus total intra-ECOWAS trade. The share is computed as a proportion of 
total world trade for each product category. These figures did not include Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone as data were not available for intra-ECOWAS trade. 
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The narrowness of the range of products traded by ECOWAS with the rest 
of the world is consistent with the general pattern in Africa (Rugwabiza, 
2012 and Mwanza, 2015). An estimated 66% to 73% of ECOWAS exports 
to the world are minerals and fuel related products (Rugwabiza, 2012 and 
Fundira, 2015). Furthermore, Figure 4.8 shows that ECOWAS has a net 
trade deficit with the world in all the product categories except crude 
materials and minerals, which could be due to its resource endowments in 
these two sectors. The low share of net ECOWAS trade with the world and 
its trade deficit in most traded products raises a number of questions about 
what could be done in order to improve its trade share. Moreover, it raises 
the desirability of its integration scheme in expanding trade in the region. 
An in-depth assessment of intra-ECOWAS trade by product category could 
shed light on the extent to which it could exploit regional markets through 
deeper integration while maintaining its international markets. We can 
compute intra-ECOWAS trade as a proportion of its total world trade for 
each product and intra-ECOWAS trade by product as a proportion of its total 
world trade. The former gives an indication of how big a product is in total 
ECOWAS trade of that particular product while the latter gives an indication 
of the share of a product in total ECOWAS trade.  Table 4.7 and 4.8 provide 
these results. Table 4.7 shows that ECOWAS exports and imports more to 
(from) the EU27 and OECD as a share of their total exports and imports 
than any other trade partner. Nonetheless, ECOWAS exports and imports 
to and from the OECD has been declining while China and India are 
increasing their trade share with ECOWAS. In contrast, intra-ECOWAS 
trade share in its total trade has been floating within a 7% to 11% margin 
from 1996 to 2014. This computation is consistent with previous findings 
that intra-ECOWAS trade is low (Deme, 1995; Meagher, 1997; Golub et al, 
2009 and Senghor, 2009). Hence, the time series data in Table 4.7 
demonstrates that intra-ECOWAS trade is not rising enough in order to 
motivate demand for deeper integration.  
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Table 4.7 ECOWAS trade by destination as a proportion of their total world X 
or M  
  EXPORTS IMPORTS 
Year 
                                    
ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
                                    
ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 10.52 45.99 76.00 0.21 11.25 48.69 64.07 2.68 
1997 12.77 37.83 70.95 0.16 10.78 47.25 63.86 4.64 
1998 15.51 39.09 66.52 0.40 9.37 49.52 64.23 3.11 
1999 11.64 29.56 60.24 0.85 11.31 48.42 65.79 3.44 
2000 9.03 27.30 67.04 0.55 15.79 45.71 60.89 3.82 
2001 9.58 30.14 64.93 0.66 13.46 44.87 60.68 4.98 
2002 11.69 29.72 59.18 0.45 12.50 41.14 58.61 5.75 
2003 9.75 29.60 65.10 0.95 11.48 38.27 55.57 5.83 
2006 9.31 25.63 72.15 0.45 9.93 38.43 57.23 10.39 
2007 8.73 23.87 66.73 1.55 9.81 37.27 55.08 11.81 
2008 10.74 24.67 64.10 0.53 12.44 31.51 46.72 11.75 
2009 10.45 27.35 53.23 1.41 6.42 28.44 41.07 14.93 
2010 6.54 24.40 59.62 1.68 7.94 26.03 46.46 14.62 
2011 9.05 29.63 55.22 2.00 7.23 27.12 49.93 13.71 
2012 7.40 35.99 55.91 5.50 10.43 27.10 44.92 16.02 
2013 10.75 40.87 54.21 1.84 10.15 31.19 45.28 17.19 
2014 8.45 39.60 51.26 1.90 9.20 33.22 48.14 16.82 
Source: Authors computation. Data from the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS). X= 
exports and M=imports. Note: The data is total ECOWAS exports or imports as a proportion 
of ECOWAS world exports and imports. For example, in 1996, 10.52% of total ECOWAS 
exports went to ECOWAS while 76% of total ECOWAS exports went to the OECD. Likewise, 
the share of intra-ECOWAS imports as a proportion of its world total imports was 11.25% in 
1996 while 64.07% of its total imports originated from the OECD. 
 
A further assessment of the products driving ECOWAS regional and 
international trade is presented in Table 4.8 and 4.14. Table 4.8 measures 
ECOWAS trade share as a proportion of its total product level rather than total 
for all products. It shows that 9.9% of total ECOWAS exports of food and live 
animal went to ECOWAS members while 3.5% was imported from ECOWAS. 
This demonstrates that ECOWAS import more from the international markets 
that drives its import share down. Furthermore, 70% of beverage and tobacco 
exports as a proportion of total ECOWAS exports of beverage and tobacco 
went to ECOWAS while 22% imported from ECOWAS in 2014. However, 
compared with total ECOWAS exports and imports of all products, beverages 
and tobacco constituted 0.4% and 2.5% respectively in 2013. The other 
products also show a similar pattern in terms of the proportional share in each 
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product total being relatively higher than its share in total ECOWAS trade with 
the world. There may be several reasons for this. 
There may be an outlier product whose share in intra-ECOWAS trade is low 
but constituted the majority of ECOWAS exports or imports. Indeed, mineral 
fuels constituted 74.6% of total ECOWAS exports to the world while only 6.6% 
of it is exported to ECOWAS as a proportion of its total. Furthermore, the trade 
imbalances could be due to weak data collection methods and coordination 
within ECOWAS. For example, while Benin exported US$2. 4 million of food 
and live animals to Cote D’Ivoire in 2014, Cote D’Ivoire imported US$2.7 
million of food and live animals from Benin in 2014 (World Integrated Trade 
Solutions, WITS, 2016).
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Table 4. 8 ECOWAS trade share as a proportion of each products total with selected partners 
  EXPORTS IMPORTS 
Destination ECOWAS EU27 OECD ECOWAS EU27 OECD 
Product categories 1996 2014 1996 2014 1996 2014 1996 2014 1996 2014 1996 2014 
Food and live animals 6.0 9.9 74.9 51.1 83.5 67.6 3.8 3.5 39.6 27.8 53.0 45.9 
Beverages and tobacco 54.1 70.3 32.3 1.1 30.0 1.4 4.4 22.4 77.8 44.0 86.2 49.5 
Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 21.4 3.7 41.7 33.0 50.5 51.4 18.3 8.3 36.6 26.4 65.7 51.5 
Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 8.2 6.6 38.3 38.1 81.9 49.6 58.6 32.6 17.1 51.4 20.2 54.7 
Animals and vegetable oils and fats 23.8 67.7 73.1 15.9 75.7 18.6 16.5 22.0 41.2 4.7 61.1 12.3 
Chemicals 33.2 67.7 9.5 8.3 13.9 9.1 5.7 3.2 59.5 31.7 69.9 45.4 
Manufactured goods 14.6 29.7 65.5 42.0 68.8 50.5 5.9 4.7 56.7 24.4 66.4 40.5 
Machinery and transport equipment 21.4 9.2 33.6 55.8 58.0 59.2 0.4 0.9 56.5 30.9 84.7 53.0 
Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 30.7 18.3 46.6 58.9 54.1 70.7 2.8 3.4 58.9 25.4 71.3 33.8 
Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 31.0 6.8 46.0 71.8 52.4 84.9 1.8 2.2 64.4 36.9 77.3 45.5 
Source: Authors Calculation; Data from WITS. Note: The computation represents imports and exports by product as a proportion of total imports 
and exports for that particular product category only for ECOWAS. Eg, 6% food and life animal’s exports in 1996 show that ECOWAS exported 
only 6% from its members as a proportion of its food and live animal exports.   
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Nonetheless, the narrowness of the range of products traded by ECOWAS 
members would require diversification of production and exports. A number of 
papers argued that ECOWAS trade has potential if production is expanded into 
new products as well as the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade (USAID, 
2011; Hertzenberg, 2011; Diop, 2012; Uexkull, 2012; UNECA Report, 2012; 
Brenton, 2012 and Olayiwola and Ola-David, 2013). Blein et al (2008); Nin-
Pratt et al, (2011) and Brenton et al (2012) are of the view that the poor 
performance of ECOWAS, in general, may be due to its lack of comparative 
advantage in a number of products. As such, consumers would prefer low cost 
foreign to the high cost domestic products from ECOWAS. However, Diop 
(2012) and UNECA report (2012) argued that foodstuffs from foreign markets 
are relatively more expensive than those produced within ECOWAS. Hence, it 
could be that ECOWAS consumer’s preferences for foreign goods are 
relatively higher than their preferences for domestic goods irrespective of cost. 
As a result, intra-ECOWAS trade as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP) could determine the extent to which consumer preferences are shifting 
from foreign to domestic products. It could also determine the extent to which 
member states prioritize ECOWAS deep integration ambitions by negotiating 
to remove trade barriers in order to maximize domestic growth and 
employment. Table 4.9 shows intra-ECOWAS trade as percentage of GDP for 
each country. Apart from Liberia, the share of regional trade in each country’s 
GDP has been fluctuating with no clear trend. The share is relatively lower than 
in other RTAs such as the EU (UNECA report, 2012). Nigeria’s regional trade 
as a percentage of GDP is among the lowest in the region despite being the 
largest economy in the region in contrast to big economies in other RTAs such 
as Germany in the European Union and the USA in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The low share of Nigeria’s trade to GDP with 
ECOWAS could be due to differences in demand preferences or that the other 
economies are too small to supply the Nigerian market. Moreover, only few 
products accounts for the majority of intra-ECOWAS trade by product 
category. For example, 78% of total Nigerian exports to ECOWAS were 
mineral fuels while 90% of total Cote d'Ivoire imports from ECOWAS were 
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mineral fuels in 2014.  Hence, the share of intra-ECOWAS trade to GDP ought 
to be greater if the region is to accelerate the integration process as well as 
diversify beyond narrow product ranges. 
Table 4.9 Regional trade as percentage of GDP in ECOWAS 
Source: Authors Calculation: intra-ECOWAS trade data from the World 
Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS). GDP from the world development 
indicators in (constant 2010 US$). The GDP data were adjusted into 1000s of 
US$ in order to align it with the trade data. The Guinea Bissau data presented 
is for 2003, 2004 and 2005 as the other years were not available. Hence, the 
percentage change for Guinea Bissau is for 2003 and 2005 while that of Sierra 
Leone is for 2000 and 2015. 
 
Countries/Year 1996 2000 2007 2013 2015 
% 
change 
2000-
2015 
Benin 2.12 2.55 6.15 7.01 5.91 178.44 
Burkina Faso 7.75 5.22 7.30 12.04 7.34 -5.21 
Cape Verde 1.47 0.29 0.53 0.45 0.37 -75.04 
Cote D'Ivoire 4.75 7.50 16.45 13.14 9.81 106.74 
The Gambia 6.98 5.33 4.73 10.16 9.37 34.17 
Ghana 1.35 3.64 4.17 4.33 3.42 154.03 
Guinea 4.57 2.73 1.79 1.77 4.58 0.19 
Guinea Bissau  - 1.57 2.72 6.67  - 324.05 
Liberia  -  -  -  -  - -  
Mali 10.89 7.90 12.33 16.45 13.74 26.24 
Niger 9.27 5.71 6.05 11.70 6.82 -26.42 
Nigeria 0.54 0.92 1.01 1.65 0.85 59.02 
Senegal 4.41 5.67 11.01 13.52 10.08 128.36 
Sierra Leone -  2.82  -  - 15.86 462.89 
Togo 7.67 4.88 10.67 19.13 9.08 18.41 
ECOWAS 
trade as a % 
of GDP 
5.15 4.05 6.53 10.02 7.48   
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Nonetheless, Nigeria’s share in intra-ECOWAS trade as a percentage of total 
ECOWAS trade is the largest, followed by Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, and Senegal 
as shown in Figure 4.9. Indeed, Nigeria constituted 46% of imports and 42% 
of exports within the region. Diop (2012) and Mwanza (2015) have found 
identical results using ECOWAS dataset in 2011. 
Figure 4.9 Intra-ECOWAS trade by country- % in 2013 
Source: Authors Calculations. Data from WITS 
 
Furthermore, Nigeria, Cote D I’voire, Ghana and Senegal constituted 85% of 
ECOWAS GDP (constant 2005 US$) in 2013 as shown in Figure 4.10. Big 
economies tend to dominate trade in many RTAs around the world (Brülhart 
and Thorpe, 2001 and Senghor, 2009). 
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Figure 4. 10 GDP of ECOWAS members (Share in 2013) 
Source: Authors Compilation: Data from World Development Indicators  
The dominance of these four countries poses opportunities and threats to the 
ECOWAS deep integration scheme. The opportunities may arise because big 
economies could attract imports from small economies provided the 
comparative advantage of member states or complementarities could be 
exploited. Gonzalez and Velez (1995) have noted that trade between USA and 
Mexico is characterized by production complementarity especially among 
small and medium size firms which has led to growth and employment in both 
countries. Furthermore, Mexico has received FDI from the USA, especially in 
the establishment of ‘Maquiladora17’ in Northern Mexico, which created many 
jobs (Nadal, 2000). However, the similarities in the economic structures of 
ECOWAS members make regional FDI flows challenging. Ojide (2010) noted 
that the fear to be dominated by Nigeria among some nations has led to slow 
integration in addition to high trade barriers imposed by Nigeria. Therefore, the 
                                                          
17 Maquiladora are firms established in foreign markets specifically aimed at supplying their home 
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extent to which big economies like Nigeria attract imports from other members 
or attract production complementarities could define the success of regional 
trade. 
In summary, we established that intra-ECOWAS trade has been rising as a 
percentage of its total trade and as a percentage of GDP from 1975. We also 
demonstrated that the ECOWAS share of global trade is less than 1%, while 
intra-ECOWAS trade as a share of its total trade averaged 10% in the last 
decade. Furthermore, the range of products traded by ECOWAS is narrow. An 
estimated 66% to 74% of ECOWAS exports to the world are minerals and fuel 
related products (Rugwabiza, 2012; Fundira, 2015 and author’s calculation). 
Therefore, ECOWAS is faced with the dual challenge in terms of how to 
increase its trade share in the global and regional markets. 
From a theoretical point of view, some papers argue that the current level of 
ECOWAS trade is expected since they may not have a comparative advantage 
in a number of products (Brenton, 2012). However, other papers noted that 
ECOWAS and SSA have comparative advantage in agriculture and foodstuff 
production (Iyoha, 2005; Senghor, 2009; Uexkull, 2012; Diop, 2012 and EDA 
report, 2012). Therefore, ECOWAS could exploit its trade potential by 
increasing production in a range of products especially in agro-industry in the 
short run although it would require exploiting differences in the comparative 
advantage of member states or initiation of some form of production 
complementarity in order to make agro-industry more competitive. Henley et 
al (2012) noted that Asia’s export performance was partly due to investment in 
agro-industry in the short run. Dijk (2011) also noted that the low quality of 
goods produced in SSA usually makes them less competitive in global 
markets. 
Furthermore, some papers highlighted that the high costs of trade in the region 
(tariff and non-tariff barriers) prevent incentives for investors and traders in the 
ECOWAS region. Although tariff rates have generally come down, intra-SSA 
traders pay an estimated 8.7% tariff compared with 2.5% for SSA traders with 
the global markets (UNECA report, 2012). The non-tariff barriers pose even 
greater challenges to ECOWAS trade. For example, exporting a container 
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within SSA costs an estimated US$1878. 8 while in East Asia, it is US$902 
and US$1229. 9 in Latin America (Dijk, 2011). Williams et al (2006) found that 
it costs between US$7300 to US$9100 to transport 35 cattle in a truck in most 
of the Sahelian corridor of ECOWAS due to the poor transport and information 
and communication network in addition to the bribes paid to customs officials 
at border points.  Furthermore, Diop (2012); Cissokho et al (2012) and Keyser 
(2012) found that intra-ECOWAS traders pay a lot of bribes estimated between 
US$100 to US$129 per trip. Similarly, intra-ECOWAS trade barriers in 
agriculture are higher than other product categories (Fundira, 2015). 
Beyond looking at regional trade barriers, Iyoha (2005) argued that an 
estimated 1.5% of OECD GDP is spent on subsidizing the agricultural sector 
in addition to high tariff and standards imposed on imported agricultural goods. 
Hence, OECD can produce surplus agricultural goods at lower distorted-costs 
which make their exports relatively cheaper in Africa. 
Therefore, although ECOWAS has potential to diversify production in a range 
of products in its trade share, there may still be trade barriers which could 
prevent trade expansion. In the next section, we assess ECOWAS trade 
potential before evaluating factors which determine trade barriers in the 
chapter five. 
 
4.4 Measuring ECOWAS trade potential 
The previous sections assessed ECOWAS trade and we established that it is 
low. It was also highlighted in the existing literature that ECOWAS has potential 
to expand intra and extra-ECOWAS trade, especially in the agricultural sector 
while reducing the non-tariff barriers could further enhance this potential. 
Although there are many indices which measure trade potential, this section 
focuses on two commonly used indices - revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA) and trade complementarity indices (TCI) in order to inform policy. We 
will measure ECOWAS RCA and TCI relative to each other and relative to the 
rest of the world. 
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4.4.0 Measuring ECOWAS comparative advantage by sector 
RCA measures a country or region’s export potential and competitiveness 
(Siggel, 2006). It was proposed by Balassa (1965) to determine whether the 
trade pattern of countries was consistent with the traditional trade theory of 
comparative advantage. Over time, alternative versions of Balassa’s RCA 
index have been proposed (Vollrath, 1991 and Utkulu and Seymen, 2004). 
Hence, differences in the values of RCA in the existing literature can be 
attributed to differences in the type of equation and dataset used. RCA has 
many advantages. It can indicate whether a country can extend and expand 
its export potential if it has a comparative advantage. It can also generate 
important information about potential for trade with new partners if time series 
RCA are computed. However, RCA is static since it measures the stock of 
trade in a specific period. In addition, economic conditions at home and abroad 
or changes in trade policy can influence RCA values (Siggel, 2006). 
Furthermore, RCA does not capture the extent to which government policies 
such as subsidies could distort the relative costs advantages of trade partners. 
Reexport trade also pose challenges for ECOWAS regarding the extent to 
which some trade data is distorted due to statistical duplication.  
Nonetheless, a number of papers suggested that ECOWAS members produce 
similar products; hence less trade should be expected between them unless 
intra-industry trade is involved. But this does not tell us whether there are 
differences in their RCA which could stimulate regional trade. As such, 
computing RCA is a good starting point in highlighting export potential. The 
simple RCA equation adopted from Utkulu and Seyman (2004) and widely 
used in research is depicted in equation 4.2; 
RCAi = [(
Xi,k
Xi,t
)] / [(
Xj,k
Xj,t
)]                                                                          (4.2) 
Where 
RCA= Revealed comparative advantage of country or region i 
Xi,k = Country or region i’s exports of commodity k 
tiX , = Country or region i’s total exports 
Xj,k =Country or region j’s exports of commodity k 
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Xj,t = Country or region j’s total exports 
t = time yearly 
 
A value greater than 1 indicates a comparative advantage while a value less 
than 1 indicates comparative disadvantage. We use equation 4.2 to estimate 
intra-ECOWAS RCA by product category relative to each other and relative to 
the rest of the world. This is justified since many of the research papers on 
West Africa estimates the RCA of the region in relation to its external partners. 
Their findings suggest that the low levels of intra-ECOWAS trade and trade 
deficit can be explained by its lack of comparative advantage in a number of 
products. While this is useful in explaining the export pattern of the region with 
the rest of the world, it offers little policy implications for intra-ECOWAS trade. 
Furthermore, existing literature points to the view that similarities in production 
are not a sufficient condition in explaining the low share of intra-ECOWAS 
trade. Non-tariff barriers could be important too, while the new trade theories 
of economies of scale and production complementarities could be exploited. 
 
Therefore, there is a research gap on intra-ECOWAS RCA estimates whose 
findings could provide better policy implications for the ECOWAS integration 
scheme. Indeed, Sanguinetti, Siedschlag, and Martincus (2010) found that 
recent estimates of intra-MERCOSUR RCA reshaped its manufacturing and 
the subsequent increase in intra-MERCOSUR manufacturing trade. Venables 
(2003) also argued that specialization can occur because of regional 
comparative advantage rather than a global comparative advantage. Uexkull 
(2012) highlighted that intra-ECOWAS comparative advantage is different from 
the ECOWAS comparative advantage with another regions/world. However, 
Uexkull (2012) only measured the intensity of exports in increasing 
employment in the region. Table 4.10 shows the RCA of ECOWAS relative to 
the rest of the world by product categories. 
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Table 4.10 ECOWAS RCA by product relative to the rest of the world  
Product/year 1996 2000 2005 2010 2013 2014 
Food and live animals 2.5 1.5 6.3 1.5 1.5 1.1 
Beverages and tobacco 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.4 
Crude materials, inedible except 
fuels; mineral fuel 3.6 1.6 5.7 1.2 1.7 1.0 
Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 8.1 7.8 1.4 5.0 4.2 4.9 
Animals and vegetable oils and fats 1.3 1.2 2.8 0.5 0.9 0.5 
Chemicals 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Manufactured goods 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 
Machinery and transport equipment 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Miscellaneous- furniture and 
sanitary 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, 
coin etc. 0.1 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Source: Authors' calculation. Data from WITS. 
 
The results in Table 4.10 are interesting in the sense that they conform to 
previous findings that ECOWAS has RCA in a number of agricultural products 
including food and live animals, crude materials and minerals. Furthermore, 
ECOWAS also has potential to gain RCA in beverages and tobacco and 
animals and vegetable oils and fats (Deme, 1995; Keane et al, 2010; Uexkull, 
2012; Diop, 2012; Brenton, 2012 and Fundira, 2015). However, as shown in 
Figure 4.8, ECOWAS share in global trade is less than 1%, which raises a 
number of questions about the extent to which traditional trade theory explains 
trade patterns as well as why ECOWAS performs poorly in exporting goods for 
which it has a comparative advantage. Iyoha (2005) is of the view that 
subsidies by other regions like the OECD could have distorted ECOWAS’s 
comparative advantage in some products. This argument could be plausible. 
However, ECOWAS is a net importer of some of these products. In 2013, the 
ECOWAS trade deficit in food and live animals was US$2. 5billion which could 
not be explained by traditional trade theory (Authors' calculation, Appendix 
4A.6). Nonetheless, the trade surplus in crude materials was US$5billion and 
for minerals were US$69billion in 2013, which could be explained by traditional 
trade theory. Although ECOWAS trades in a narrow range of products, it 
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should perform better in food and live animal trade. However, as noted earlier, 
ECOWAS traders faced high trade barriers which could distort their 
performance in this category (Iyoha, 2005; Diop, 2012; Henley et al, 2012 and 
Fundira, 2015). We will be assessing some of the factors which account for 
high trade barriers in ECOWAS in the later chapters. 
 
Furthermore, existing papers have also noted that the future of growth and 
employment creation in Africa, including ECOWAS countries lies with their 
ability to promote regional trade (UNECA report, 2012; Rugwabiza, 2012; EDA 
Report, 2013 and Fundira, 2015). To exploit mutual gains from regional trade, 
it is plausible to compute intra-ECOWAS RCA by product in order to determine 
the extent to which regional specialization could be enhanced. Table 4.11 
shows intra-ECOWAS RCA by product for each country. 
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Table 4.11 Intra-ECOWAS RCA by product category and country 
Source: Authors' calculation. Note: F&A=Food and live animals; B&T= Beverages and Tobacco. (Link) 
 
 
Food & 
live 
animals 
Beverages 
& tobacco 
Manufactures 
Animals & 
vegetables 
oils and 
fats 
Mineral Chemicals 
Crude 
Materials 
Machinery Miscellaneous 
Benin 3.56 0.40 2.73 7.96 0.00 0.43 2.80 0.79 0.18 
Burkina 
Faso 1.85 0.29 1.66 0.52 0.71 0.39 12.37 0.62 0.18 
Cape 
Verde 7.52 7.26 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.76 
Cote 
D'Ivoire 0.68 0.63 0.47 1.92 0.67 0.89 0.58 2.61 0.85 
Gambia, 7.02 2.90 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.37 0.00 0.34 
Ghana 0.79 0.00 3.00 1.33 0.06 4.78 2.91 0.57 1.36 
Niger 1.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.93 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.03 
Nigeria 0.72 1.37 0.22 0.01 1.70 0.26 0.09 0.09 1.07 
Senegal 3.54 1.68 2.93 0.15 0.31 1.17 1.84 0.34 0.57 
Togo 0.59 2.49 4.41 3.85 0.03 1.78 1.40 0.17 2.98 
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The differences in comparative advantage between ECOWAS members are 
visible from Table 4.11. Data were not available for Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali and Sierra Leone in 2013. However, previous papers have identified the 
comparative advantage of these countries with the rest of the world (Ellis and 
Morgan, 1984; Iyoha, 2005; Hanink and Owusu, 1998; Goretti and Weisfeld, 
2008 and Keane et al, 2010). Barry (1998) and Adjao (2011) found that Mali 
has a comparative advantage in rice production while Ellis and Morgan (1984) 
found that Liberia has RCA in chemicals and fuels while Sierra Leone has RCA 
in manufacturing. Hence, ECOWAS could exploit differences in RCA by 
pursuing a regional specialization in production and distribution strategy. 
The smaller economies of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Niger and the 
Gambia could specialize in the production of food and live animals while Niger 
and Nigeria specialize in mineral production. Furthermore, Cote d’Ivoire could 
specialize in machinery production while Ghana, Senegal, and Togo specialize 
in manufacturing. Table 4.12 summarizes the comparative advantage of 
ECOWAS countries by product. From a theoretical point of view, allocation of 
production based on RCA should lead to efficiency of production, which could 
enhance growth and employment as well as make some products more 
competitive in the global markets. 
Table 4.12 ECOWAS countries with RCA by-product in 2013 
Food and Live Animals 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The 
Gambia, Niger, and Senegal 
Beverages and Tobacco 
Cape Verde, The Gambia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Togo 
Manufacturing 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal, 
Togo 
Animal and Vegetable Oil and Fats Benin, Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo 
Mineral fuels, lubricants & related 
materials Niger and Nigeria 
Chemicals Ghana, Senegal, and Togo 
Crude Materials, inedible except 
fuels 
Benin, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Senegal and Togo 
Machinery and Transport equipment Cote D'Ivoire, 
Miscellaneous- Furniture and 
Sanitary etc Cape Verde, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo 
 Source: Authors Compilation (Link) 
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However, it should be noted that allocation of production among sovereign 
countries could be difficult without political will. Nonetheless, Okolo (1989) long 
ago argued that intra-ECOWAS trade can only increase if domestic goods are 
relatively cheaper than foreign goods since they tend to produce similar 
products. Hence, we should not expect much from intra-ECOWAS trade given 
its lack of comparative advantage in a number of products. Hertzenberg (2011) 
is of the view that Africa is not producing enough to meet domestic demand. 
Hence, utilizing under-utilized sectors could increase its trade potential in a 
number of products. Agro-industry could be a first step toward industrialization. 
4.4.1 Measuring ECOWAS trade complementarity index (TCI) 
The trade complementarity index measures the potential and prospects for 
intra-regional trade by demonstrating the extent to which the export of country 
(A) for a particular product matches or complements imports of a partner (B) 
for that particular product (Musila, 2005; Goretti and Weisfeld, 2008 and Keane 
et al, 2010). Intuitively, it is the relationship between partner A’s export to the 
world with partner B’s imports from the world in the same product category. It 
is a good measure of intra-regional trade prospects since if partner A exports 
a lot of product k to the world while partner B also imports a lot of product k 
from the world, then A can benefit from forming a trade agreement with B.  
There are many versions of TCI although the final results are identical. In this 
section, we adopt Goretti and Weisfeld (2008) and the WITS user manual 
equation (WITS user manual, 2013 p. 19) since that is where our data come 
from. Symbolically, TCI is computed as in equation 4.3; 
  TCI = 100 ∗ (1 − {(
mj,k
Mj
) − (
xi,k
Xi
)})                                    (4.3)  
Where 
TCI = Trade complementarity index of a country  
mj,k = Partner j import of product k  
Mj = Total import of partner j  
xi,k =export of product k from reporter country or region (ECOWAS) i   
Xi =Total export of reporter country or region (ECOWAS) i  
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The higher the TCI score and closer to 100 or more, the higher the scope for 
trade expansion between trading partners or complements one another 
production (Martijn and Tsangarides, 2006 and Keane et al, 2010). In this 
section, we assess the TCI for each ECOWAS country by product in relation 
to one another. Two measures of TCI will be made. The first measure will treat 
ECOWAS as importer and each member as exporter. The second measure 
will treat ECOWAS as exporter and each member an importer. The aim of the 
two measures is to establish the extent to which each member has potential to 
export to the rest of ECOWAS and ECOWAS has the potential to absorb 
imports from each member. TCI results should be interpreted cautiously just 
like RCA results. TCI ignores the impact of transaction and transportation costs 
on bilateral trade flows.  The size differences of the trading partners could also 
bias the results (WITS user manual, 2013). For example, if product k share in 
country i total exports is low and product k share in the imports of a partner 
country is low, converting the difference into percentage will generate a large 
figure that suggests potential for trade expansion. The discussions in chapter 
three demonstrated that ECOWAS trade share relative to each other and with 
the rest of the world is low due to high trade costs and weakness in trade 
facilitation institutions. Moreover, many ECOWAS countries are characterised 
by reexport trade that distorts the true value of trade. For example, the Gambia 
does not produce oil although data suggested that it exported US$5000 worth 
of mineral fuels to the world all of which went to Guinea Bissau in 2002. 
Therefore, high TCI scores are useful from a policy point of view although 
caveats that the presence of high trade barriers could constraint trade flows. 
Nonetheless, the scores do give an indication of trade potential conditional on 
further investigation to establish the transmission mechanism. 
Results about the ECOWAS TCI in the existing literature are mixed. Some 
papers noted that the absence of production complementarity in the ECOWAS 
region makes intra-ECOWAS trade less feasible than north-south trade 
(Aryeetey, 2001; Sako, 2006; Chete, 2009 and Eggoh and Acclassato, 2013 
and Acclassato, 2013). In contrast, the presence of production 
complementarity between ECOWAS members was found by other papers 
(Hanink and Owusu, 1998; Goretti and Weisfeld, 2008 and Keane et al, 2010). 
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Differences in TCI estimates may be due to the use of different data sets. 
Hence, our estimate of TCI will complement previous findings. The data are 
based on SITC 1 since it is the only classification that is consistently used by 
all ECOWAS members and has a longer time series. Table 4.13 shows the 
TCI results for 11 ECOWAS members by product. We compute the extent to 
which an ECOWAS member’s export is matched by demand from ECOWAS 
and the extent to which an ECOWAS member’s import are matched by 
ECOWAS exports for each product category. 
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Table 4.13 ECOWAS members trade complementarity index by product (2013) 
Country imports as base and ECOWAS as exporter 
Country/Products 
Food and live 
animals 
Animal and Veg fats 
and oil 
Beverages 
and tobacco 
Chemicals Crude materials Machinery Manufactures 
Minerals fuels and 
lubricants 
Miscellaneous 
Benin 65 97 100 95 97 81 87 91 98 
Burkina Faso 92 99 99 87 99 76 85 79 96 
Cape Verde 74 98 97 95 99 85 86 84 93 
Cote D'Ivoire 89 100 99 91 99 65 92 79 98 
Gambia, The 70 95 99 97 99 85 90 81 95 
Ghana 86 99 99 88 99 62 83 101 94 
Guinea 83 99 98 92 99 81 89 74 95 
Niger 75 97 97 91 96 75 85 100 96 
Nigeria 88 100 97 89 97 72 87 85 98 
Senegal 81 98 99 91 98 82 90 75 97 
Togo 90 98 99 84 99 82 80 83 96 
The country exports as a base and ECOWAS imports 
Benin 92 103 98 89 98 72 92 81 97 
Burkina Faso 90 99 98 89 103 72 91 90 97 
Cape Verde 85 99 98 89 98 70 86 81 96 
Cote D'Ivoire 87 101 98 91 98 84 88 91 98 
Gambia, The 87 0 98 88 98 70 86 0 96 
Ghana 86 99 98 94 98 71 91 81 97 
Guinea 86 99 98 89 98 71 86 81 99 
Niger 88 99 98 89 98 70 87 112 96 
Nigeria 85 99 98 89 98 70 86 85 97 
Senegal 100 99 100 93 99 71 99 87 98 
Togo 89 105 102 98 99 71 115 81 106 
Source: Authors' calculation. 
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The results in Table 4.13 partly confirm the RCA findings that ECOWAS 
members have potential to expand intra-regional exports for selected products. 
Furthermore, our findings are consistent with others that ECOWAS countries 
could complement each other’s production (Hanink and Owusu, 1998; Musila, 
2005; Goretti and Weisfeld, 2008 and Keane et al, 2010 and Adjao, 2011). The 
table shows that each country could be an exporter and importer or 
complement each other production in the region. The artificial borders 
demonstrate that it is possible to be an exporter and importer of the same 
product within ECOWAS. For example, some large towns and cities are closer 
to producers from neighbouring countries than some of their own producers. 
Hence, high transportation costs associated with distance attracts imports from 
a near neighbour (Keyser et al, 2012). 
 
In summary, the computed RCA and TCI show potential for the ECOWAS 
integration scheme if a number of measures are taken to allocate production 
on the basis of RCA while exploiting TCI. However, intra-ECOWAS trade has 
been historically low which raises a number of policy challenges and the extent 
to which their model of integration is driven by trade theories. In 2014, mineral 
fuels accounted for 79.4% of total ECOWAS exports and only 5.2% of it was 
intra-ECOWAS exports. Other products such as food and live animals, crude 
materials and animal and vegetable oils and fats also account for a small share 
in total ECOWAS exports and intra-ECOWAS exports as shown in table 4.14 
below. Nonetheless, ECOWAS does have RCA in these mention product 
categories relative to the rest of the world while the TCI demonstrated that it is 
feasible to expand regional trade in the region. Therefore, using RCA and TCI 
could be a weak measure of trade potential if other stimulus of trade such as 
institutional quality is ignored. Balassa (1965) argued that the success of 
integration could depend on the economic sizes which stimulates demand, 
production levels and the removal of trade barriers. Hertzenberg (2011) also 
found that Africa production levels are very low while regional trade costs are 
relatively high. Therefore, although ECOWAS has RCA in selected products 
such as mineral fuels, food and live animals and crude materials and the 
potential to expand regional trade as demonstrated by the TCI, there are many 
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challenges to overcome, including the cost associated with cross border trade 
and small economic sizes. Hence, ECOWAS should prioritise removing the 
high cost associated with cross border trade through various measures. Part 
of this was discussed in chapter three and will do so in chapter six. 
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Table 4.14 Share of each product in total ECOWAS exports 
   % Distribution %share to ECOWAS 
  1996 2000 2011 2013 2014 1996 2000 2011 2013 2014 
Food and live animals 18.4 8.0 7.2 9.3 7.0 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.7 
Beverages and tobacco 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Crude materials, inedible except 
fuels; mineral fuel 13.4 4.9 7.9 7.0 4.0 2.9 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, 
coal 61.8 82.5 79.1 74.6 79.4 5.1 5.5 5.7 4.9 5.2 
Animals and vegetable oils and 
fats 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Chemicals 1.8 1.0 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.5 
Manufactured goods 2.8 1.9 2.1 2.9 2.5 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.7 
Machinery and transport 
equipment 0.5 0.4 1.3 2.9 3.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.6 0.3 
Miscellaneous- furniture and 
sanitary 0.4 0.7 0.5 1.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: Authors Calculation. The data measures the share of each product in total ECOWAS exports to the world in the first five (5) 
column 1996 to 2014. The last five columns look at the share of intra-ECOWAS export by product as a proportion of total ECOWAS 
export to the world. Eg. 1996, 18.4% of total ECOWAS export was food and live animal and only 1.1% was intra-ECOWAS.
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Furthermore, ECOWAS could exploit production complementarity in order to 
expand production especially in sectors that are still underutilised. We look at 
some of these indicators in the next section in order to assess the extent to 
which they could complement ECOWAS trade potential. 
 
4.5 ECOWAS population, economic and land size 
We demonstrated in the previous sections that although ECOWAS has 
potential to expand regional trade by exploiting regional RCA and production 
complementarity, the share of intra-ECOWAS trade in its total trade is low. This 
suggests that there are fundamental issues which prevent ECOWAS from 
exploiting its trade potential. Several approaches could be used to assess the 
extent to which these issues affect ECOWAS trade potential such as the 
gravity model of international trade or a descriptive content analysis. The 
gravity model allows the inclusion of several variables that measures the 
degree of relationship between some variables and trade flows. Furthermore, 
the gravity model is a good measure of trade theory. However, our focus in 
this thesis is to assess the factors which determine barriers to intra-ECOWAS 
trade with specific reference to institutional quality that has not been sufficiently 
investigated. Several papers have estimated determinants of bilateral trade 
flows (Deardoff, 1998; Aryeetey, 2001; Shams, 2003; Fafchamps, 2004; 
Anderson and Wincoop, 2004; Djankov et al, 2010; Rodrik, 2007; Turkson, 
2010; Stefanadis, 2010; Sousa, 2012; Salvatici, 2013 and Assane et al, 2014). 
The aim of this section is to discuss how key variables in the gravity model 
such as population, economic size and distance (trade costs) could contribute 
to intra-ECOWAS trade expansion. 
The population of ECOWAS grew from 118.4 million in 1975 to 345.7 million 
in 2015 as depicted in figure 4.1118 (UNCTADSTAT and Bonnal, 2007). This 
makes ECOWAS the 7th most populous RTA in the world and it is projected to 
                                                          
18 Note; the 1975 population excluded Cape Verde but included Mauritania. The 2015 figure included 
Cape Verde and excluded Mauritania since Mauritania left in 2000. 
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be the 4th most populous by 2050 if current population growth trends continue 
(UNCTADSTAT). However, the population varies among ECOWAS members.  
Figure 4.11 Population of ECOWAS (1975- 2015) 
Source: UNCTADSTAT 
 
Table 4.15 shows that Nigeria accounts for over half of the total ECOWAS 
population and is projected to continue to do so in the future. The population 
could provide opportunities and threats to RTAs. A number of papers argue 
that higher population could stimulate greater demand for goods and services 
consequently leading to more growth and trade, especially if the population is 
active in a market economy (Teunissen, 1996; Adjao, 2011; Nin-Pratt et al, 
2011 and Africa Report, 2015). Hence, the formation of RTAs allows producers 
to exploit access to a larger market while consumers also access a variety of 
goods and services. Intra-African RTA trade has increased with population 
growth. For example, the population of ECOWAS grew 192% between 1975 
and 2015 while intra-ECOWAS trade grew 200% in the same period (Authors' 
calculation; UNCTADSTAT data). Other papers argue that the correlation 
between population and regional trade depends on the convergence of 
demand preferences between trading partners. That is if production of goods 
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and services in country ‘A’ is not matched by huge demand from country ‘B’, 
population growth in country ‘B’ may not have significant trade effects for 
country ‘A’ (Linder, 1961 and Ruffin, 1988). 
Table 4.15 Country population as proportion of total ECOWAS population (%) 
Country/ years 1975 2015 2030 2050 
Benin 2.76 3.15 3.04 2.74 
Burkina Faso 5.20 5.18 5.21 5.07 
Cape Verde 0.26 0.15 0.11 0.08 
Côte D'Ivoire 5.58 6.16 5.73 5.25 
The Gambia 0.44 0.57 0.60 0.60 
Ghana 8.30 7.81 6.91 5.66 
Guinea 3.67 3.57 3.40 3.03 
Guinea-Bissau 0.66 0.52 0.48 0.43 
Liberia 1.38 1.30 1.25 1.16 
Mali 5.23 4.70 5.10 5.60 
Niger 4.28 5.57 6.77 8.61 
Nigeria 53.68 53.09 53.55 54.59 
Senegal 4.14 4.33 4.29 4.08 
Sierra Leone 2.38 1.83 1.58 1.28 
Togo 2.04 2.07 1.96 1.80 
TTL-ECOWAS 118.41 345.70 509.98 806.63 
Source: UNCTADSTAT: Percentage calculated by Author. Note 2030 and 
2050 are projections. 
 
Our TCI estimates suggest that ECOWAS could exploit the size of its 
population in order to stimulate trade by pulling them into the formal economy, 
especially in the big economies like Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and 
Senegal. 
However, the skewness of population, production, and trade towards big 
countries could have macroeconomic implications for small economies. 
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Indeed, global evidence suggests that big economies perform better in RTAs. 
Negative macroeconomic implications in small nations could create dislike for 
ECOWAS, which has the potential to lead to future regional conflict if the 
citizenry put the blame on their governments. Given the history of ECOWAS 
as a conflict prone region, these macroeconomic implications could be 
prioritized before a fully- fledged integration scheme. Indeed, Stiglitz (2013) 
argued that there will always be winners and losers in any RTA. As such, how 
to compensate losers must be established. The ECOWAS fund could facilitate 
compensation, although Ekpe (2015) argued that the implementation of 
compensation has not been successful. In the absence of compensation, 
ECOWAS could endeavor to allocate production on the basis of comparative 
advantage in order to widen the gains from trade. Krugman and Obstfeld 
(2009) proposed similar strategies for the lesser economies in the European 
Union. Our measure of RCA and TCI suggest the feasibility of allocating 
production within ECOWAS. 
Furthermore, economic size could stimulate trade if the increase in per capita 
income corresponds to increase in the demand preference for regionally 
produced goods. Indeed, economic theory and the gravity model of trade 
postulates the importance of income in determining trade. Therefore, 
differences in the economic sizes of ECOWAS members could determine their 
export and import potential. Figure 4.12 shows the GDP of ECOWAS members 
in 2014. Nigeria accounted for an estimated 73% of ECOWAS GDP followed 
by Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire, Senegal and Burkina Faso. The big economies may 
need to demand more imports from other ECOWAS members in order to boost 
production and trade. In the absence of that, smaller economies could receive 
compensation for economic loss due to ECOWAS integration. 
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Figure 4.12 ECOWAS GDP by Country in 2014 
Source: Authors Compilation: Data from UNCTADSTAT 
Furthermore, boosting regional trade may require narrowing the gap between 
actual production and potential production, especially in the agriculture sector 
in the short run since agriculture contributes to an estimated 60% of 
employment and 35% of GDP on average in West Africa (Senghor, 2009 and 
World Development Indicators, 2016). Prioritizing agriculture would require 
expansion of production and productivity and could define success in 
ECOWAS (Blein et al, 2008; Cissokho et al, 2012 and Jalloh et al, 2013). 
Furthermore, our estimates suggest that ECOWAS has RCA in the production 
of agricultural goods relative to the rest of the world. 
The land area of the 15-member states of ECOWAS offers potential for 
agricultural production and complementarity. The land area is approximately 
5,032,970 km. sq or (1,943,241 sq. miles) which is 17% of Africa’s total land 
area (World Development Indicators, 2016). The average land used for 
agricultural purposes for all ECOWAS members in 2012 was about 50% of the 
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total arable land area which is equivalent to 125,824,85519 hectares (World 
Development Indicators, 2016). 
However, for countries where data are available, the percentage of land that 
is under irrigation is low in the ECOWAS region. In 2004, Cape Verde 
agricultural land under irrigation was only 4.7%, while that of Ghana was 0.19% 
in 2010; Senegal 0.73% in 2006 and Niger 0.22% in 2011 (World Development 
Indicators, 2016). Hence, mechanized farming or the green revolution has not 
taken off rapidly in West Africa, and it could contribute to more production and 
poverty reduction (Dillon, 2011 and Tucker, 2016). Similarly, the Diamma and 
Manantali dam constructed at a cost of US$700 million in 1987 had the 
potential to irrigate about 430000 hectares in parts of Mauritania, Mali and 
Senegal but only 118000 are being utilized (ECA Report, 2000). In SSA, only 
4% of agricultural land is irrigated compared with 29% in East and South-East 
Asia and 41% in South Asia (Senghor, 2009 and Dijk, 2011). The excessive 
reliance on rain water alone is not sufficient to trigger agricultural production 
and productivity that can increase harvests. Indeed, it is difficult if not 
impossible to integrate hungry people. 
Figure 4.13 depicts changes in the percentage of land used for agriculture in 
individual ECOWAS member states since 1975. It shows that land use for 
agriculture has steadily increased in all the countries. However, the expected 
yields have not increased significantly. For example, yields in values from 1990 
to 2013 for about 100 agricultural products grew by 0.72% annually on 
average. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) highlighted that West 
Africa can improve yields if certain measures are taken such as an increase in 
the use of fertilizers. 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 1 sq. mile=259 hectares; 1,943,241 sq.m=251,649,710 hectares. Therefore,  251,649,710 hectares
2
=  125,824,855   
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Figure 4.13 Changes in Agricultural Land usage from 1975-2012 in 
ECOWAS 
 
Data Source: Authors Compilation. Data from World Development Indicators 
Database. Note: Agricultural land is the share of land that is arable and under 
permanent crops such as fruit trees and use for pastures. So, it excludes forest and 
land used for wood and timber. 
 
Nonetheless, an increase in the use of land for agriculture is attributed to 
several factors such as population increase and decline in crop yields due to 
soil infertility (Nin-Pratt et al, 2011; Hertzenberg, 2011 and ECOWAS Sector 
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directly related to increase in consumption within ECOWAS or increase in 
demand for ECOWAS agricultural goods in the rest of the world. Instead, rising 
population and low yields accounted for the increase in land under cultivation. 
Therefore, there is a need to improve productivity in order to enhance food 
security and fight hunger. 
To sum up, ECOWAS has the potential to be a successful regional integration 
scheme. It has a rising population and economy, which could stimulate 
demand for goods and services. Furthermore, it could increase crop yields by 
increasing the use of arable land, irrigation as well as fertilizers. Such 
measures have the potential to increase agricultural production and 
productivity, which could increase intra-ECOWAS trade given its RCA in 
agriculture. 
 
4.6 Chapter summary and conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to assess the degree of intra-ECOWAS trade and 
its trade potential as well as the dynamics driving regional integration. Our 
assessment generally shows that intra-ECOWAS trade is low relative to each 
other and relative to the rest of the world. However, the low share of intra-
ECOWAS trade is similar to trade in other RTAs in the developing world 
especially those in Africa. As such, the debate continues as to the extent to 
which south-south integration schemes are better than north-south integration 
schemes. Arguments in favor of north-south integration noted that the south 
could learn best practices from the north (Winters, 1996 and WTO Report, 
2011). Furthermore, many RTAs in the developing world, especially in Africa, 
tend to produce similar products mainly in the primary sectors which are 
vulnerable to price shocks (UNECA report, 2012 and EDA report, 2013). 
Hence, north-south integration is more desirable (Venables, 2003). 
Nevertheless, our analysis shows that intra-ECOWAS trade in similar products 
exists and demonstrates the dynamics of regional trade beyond the simple law 
of comparative advantage. For example, Benin exported US$ 179 thousand of 
food and live animals to Senegal while it imported US$ 920 thousand food and 
live animals from Senegal. Similarly, intra-ECOWAS trade in similar goods is 
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mainly channelled through the pre-colonial trade routes which transcend the 
current national borders (Meagher, 1997 and Nin-Pratt, 2011). As a result, 
ECOWAS could further strengthen regional trade by formalizing the pre-
colonial trade by addressing some of the challenges faced by cross-border 
traders using these routes (Blein et al, 2008 and Diop, 2012). 
Furthermore, several papers demonstrated that ECOWAS has RCA in the 
production of agricultural goods and is likely to continue to do so (Hanink and 
Owusu, 1998; Iyoha, 2005; Acharya, 2008; Groetti and Weisfeld, 2008 and 
Ojide, 2010). Our estimates of ECOWAS RCA and TCI are consistent with 
these findings. That is, production could be allocated on the basis of RCA while 
also exploiting production complementarities. Henley et al (2012) and Donge 
Van et al (2012) noted that Africa could learn from the performance of Asia by 
developing its agro-industry. This is particularly plausible since evidence has 
shown that Africa, including ECOWAS members has RCA in agriculture. In 
addition, our discussion also demonstrated that ECOWAS could exploit its 
rising population, economic size, and arable land in order to increase trade by 
increasing production and productivity, especially in the agriculture sector. It 
was shown that the ECOWAS trade deficit in food and live animals was US$2. 
5billion in 2013 despite evidence showing that food imports are relatively more 
expensive than domestic goods. Furthermore, we also demonstrated that 
ECOWAS does have RCA in food and live animal production which is not fully 
exploited. The excessive dependence on rain fed crops alone is not sufficient 
to spur high production and productivity. Hence, ECOWAS could seek to 
increase land under irrigation. 
However, intra-ECOWAS trade is faced with several challenges which would 
need to be improved in tandem with exploiting its RCA and TCI potential. 
These challenges are mainly around the presence of high tariff and non- tariff 
barriers to trade. For example, a UNECA Report (2012) highlighted that intra- 
African exporters pay an average tariff rate of 8.7% compared with 2.5% for 
those that export goods outside Africa. Furthermore, it was noted that the 
production structure in the region is skewed toward international trade 
(Hertzenberg, 2011 and Dijk, 2011). 
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The non-tariff barriers pose extra challenges to intra-ECOWAS trade although 
it has not been fully researched and understood. The presence of weak 
production complementarities, low production base; poor transport and 
communication networks and the relative preference for foreign goods within 
ECOWAS are a few examples of non-tariff barriers (Aryeetey, 2001; Sako, 
2006 and Eggoh and Acclassato, 2013 and Acclassato, 2013). 
However, the non-tariff barriers which pose the greatest challenge to intra-
ECOWAS trade are the presence of institutional failures in the form of bribe 
payments at border points and checkpoints. Brenton (2012) and Cissokho et 
al (2012) estimated these bribes payments between US$100 and US$129 per 
trip in ECOWAS cross-border trade. This adds to trade costs and serves as a 
disincentive to intra-ECOWAS trade relative to ECOWAS trade with the rest of 
the world. Therefore, it could be argued that the low share of intra-ECOWAS 
trade is a consequence of several factors including high tariff and non-tariff 
barriers which could be improved through deep integration. Tariff barriers are 
less difficult to remove relative to non-tariff barriers to trade. Nonetheless, the 
recurrent bribe payments at border points and other checkpoints despite the 
customs union status of ECOWAS demonstrate institutional and 
implementation failures. 
Indeed, the ECOWAS president in an interview with the multimedia ECOWAS 
communication network on the 28th of May 2015 to mark ECOWAS 40-year 
anniversary noted that bribe payments at border points and checkpoints is a 
problem in ECOWAS despite all the protocols being signed to allow free 
movements of goods and people (Multimedia ECOWAS communication, 
2015). Therefore, my aim in the subsequent chapters is to assess the 
conjunction of factors which could determine regional institutional quality in 
order to inform policy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Determinants of the quality of institutions and the 
process of convergence in the ECOWAS region  
5.0 Introduction and background 
Research has shown that the number of regional trading agreements 
(RTAs) have increased across the world, especially among developing 
countries to promote regional trade and investment and in the long term 
attain economic and political union status (McLenaghan et al, 1982; Laird, 
2002; Borrmann and Busse, 2007; WTO Report, 2014; African Research 
Bulletin, 2015). This has raised the issue of whether south-south integration 
schemes are more desirable than north-south (Venables, 2003; Shiff and 
Winters, 2003 and WTO Report, 2011). However, the increase in the 
number of RTAs or the strengthening of old ones could in part, be attributed 
to the failure of the multilateral trading system to attract the expected gains 
from trade especially among developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). 
Thus, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) revised 
its 1975 treaty in 1993 to accelerate their deep integration goal and to 
increase regional trade (Ernest, 1976; Yansane, 1977; Aryeetey, 2001; 
Dada, 2013 and UNECA Report, 2013). The preamble in the revised 1993 
treaty stated the strengthening of existing institutions and the creation of 
new institutions that would accelerate the integration process. Nonetheless, 
intra-ECOWAS trade as a share of their total trade stalled at 10% on 
average in the last two and a half decades despite the potential to increase 
their regional trade share (UNCTADSTAT, 2016). Moreover, this has raised 
issues as to the underlying factors that prevented ECOWAS from exploiting 
its trade potential despite all the protocols on free movement of goods and 
people being signed (ECOWAS Parliament, 2014 and Multimedia 
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ECOWAS Communication, 2015). Some of the factors were discussed in 
the previous chapters. We highlighted in chapter three and four that 
progress has been made in launching the common external tariff (CET) in 
January 2015 and that there have been security interventions in some 
countries that have been able to maintain relative peace in the region. 
Hence, official tariff barriers to trade have been eliminated and made 
ECOWAS a customs union while security is less of an issue now. 
Nonetheless, the non-tariff barriers have been difficult to eliminate and could 
be a source of the low level of intra-ECOWAS trade, including poor transport 
and communication networks, weak financial system, non-convertibility of 
ECOWAS currencies and weakness in other trade facilitation institutions 
(Ajayi, 2005 and Sy, 2014). We argue that the quality of institutions is among 
the non-tariff barriers that pose the greatest challenge to intra-ECOWAS 
trade because they are not easily visible and amenable. Indeed, we 
demonstrated in the previous chapters that ECOWAS cross-border trade 
costs, additional US$100 to US$129 per trip in bribe payment at border 
points and unofficial checkpoints that point to weak institutions (inability to 
monitor and implement the ECOWAS protocols) (Cissokho et al, 2012 and 
Keyser, 2012). Furthermore, about 50% of intra-African trade financial 
settlements are conducted with banks outside the continent which point to 
weak financial institutions in the region (Sy, 2014). Hence, the other 50% of 
intra-African trade financial settlements are likely to be cash transactions. 
This makes it even more important to improve the quality of institutions in 
order to remove the additional costs associated with ECOWAS cross-border 
trade given that quality institutions have been found to promote trade. 
Improving the quality of institutions requires identifying the underlying 
factors that determine institutional quality in tandem with efforts for 
convergence.  Moreover, convergence could minimize information search 
costs and facilitate the effective implementation of the ECOWAS protocols 
on free movement of goods and people. However, empirical research into 
the determinants of institutional quality is limited due to several factors that 
have resulted in the use of diverse methodological approaches. 
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Some papers argue that institutions are complex and are difficult to define 
and measure (Hodgson, 1998; Chang, 2010; Alexander, 2010 and Albouy, 
2012). Furthermore, these papers argue that rules cannot be quantified 
because their application could be contextual. Hodgson (1998) argued that 
the introduction of mathematical economics made institutional economics 
redundant because its complexities cannot be captured in a single 
mathematical equation. Therefore, research related to the determinants of 
institutional quality is best explained by describing the nature of the 
relationship. Some of these papers highlighted that models face 
endogeneity issues20 (Straub, 2000 and Alonso and MartinGarcia, 2013). 
As a result, it is argued that estimates tend to measure policy effectiveness 
rather than institutional quality (Chang, 2010). 
Nonetheless, that has not prevented the use of econometric approaches to 
measure the conjunction of factors that determine the quality of institutions 
(Straub, 2000; Islam and Montenegro, 2001; Borner et al, 2004; Kaufmann 
et al, 2010; Alonso et al, 2013; Javed, 2013 Berggren and Bjørnskov, 2013). 
These papers assume that the institutional quality indices are perception of 
agents during their interaction with a particular set of institutions. Hence, 
they should be treated as proxies that give an indication of the extent to 
which stakeholders feel about the quality of institutions. Therefore, 
measurement shouldn’t be an issue. Moreover, the use of statistical 
approaches has a more direct magnitude to inform policy if the estimates 
are subjected to robust checks.  
Koremenos et al (2001) argued that the descriptive approach to research 
should be treated as a first step to a more sophisticated statistical approach. 
Acemoglu et al (2001) complemented this view that research related 
institutions should take one step at a time to develop theory, models and 
estimation. The theoretical development of the determinants of institutional 
quality has been established within institutional economics (Javed, 2013 
and Alonso et al, 2013). Nonetheless, the link between institutional theory, 
model and estimation has not been established yet, mainly due to the issue 
                                                          
20 Endogeneity could arise due to specification issues, multicollinearity, reverse causality and omitted 
variable bias. 
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of endogeneity. Furthermore, research in this area is also limited in the 
context of RTAs and non-existence in the ECOWAS region. 
This chapter aims to contribute to the existing discussion about the 
conjunction of factors that determine institutional quality and the process of 
convergence with exclusive focus on ECOWAS dataset. The specific focus 
on ECOWAS dataset offers a new case study that has not been explored in 
previous research. Furthermore, the focus on ECOWAS could inform 
ECOWAS policymakers on how to improve the quality of institutions and the 
process of convergence, given that they are a recurrent failure in the region 
(Boettke and Fink, 2011; Helble et al, 2012; Lejarraga and Shepherd, 2013; 
Salvatici, 2013 and Assane et al, 2014).  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. We will first discuss conceptual 
theories of institutions in section 5.1 as the basis to inform our methodology. 
Section 5.2 will discuss existing literature about the determinants of 
institutional quality and convergence. Section 5.3 will discuss the 
methodology, including the basis for our modelling and estimation method. 
This was discussed in part, in chapter two. Section 5.4 discusses the 
variables that are going to be used to estimate the model while section 5.5 
analyses the results. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. The basis of this 
chapter hinges on the proposition that weakness in the quality of institutions 
levies high costs to ECOWAS cross-border trade that could be understood 
better if the conjunction of factors that determine institutional quality are 
estimated while also examining the process of convergence. 
 
5.1 Conceptual theories of institutions 
We mentioned in section 5.0 that the theoretical development of the 
determinants of institutional quality has been established within institutional 
theories. The aim of this section is to explain the institutional theories in 
order to underpin our research question in the context of RTAs. Institutional 
theories have two dimensions. The first dimension predicts that institutions 
are vital in economic transactions because they create certainty, coordinate 
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market activities and lower transaction costs (Kasper and Streit, 1998; 
Rodrik, 2007; Furubotn and Richter, 2010; Turkson, 2012 and Alonso and 
Garcimartin, 2013). Hence, weakness in the quality of institutions or 
differences in institutional qualities leads to a contraction of economic 
transactions including trade flows. Therefore, there is a positive relationship 
between good institutions and trade expansion. 
A gravity model or a computable general equilibrium model is used to 
estimate trade flows as a function of institutional quality and other variables 
(De Groot, 2003 and Turkson, 2012). Their findings support the view that 
institutions matter in all forms of transactions, including trade flows (De 
Groot, 2003 and Lejarraga and Shepherd, 2013). Similar studies within 
ECOWAS also found a positive relationship between institutional quality and 
intra-ECOWAS trade (Shams, 2003; Ajayi, 2005; Zannou, 2010; Cissokho 
et al, 2012; Brenton et al, 2012 and Assane et al, 2014). Related studies in 
this area also investigate how trade leads to convergence of income and 
prices, which can also be applied in the context of institutions. Their findings 
support the convergence of income and prices for trading partners 
(Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Ben-David, 1996 and Zhang, 2006). 
Nonetheless, this first dimension ignores an important aspect of the 
discussions about institutions that could be vital to inform policy. 
The second-dimension attempts to consider this limitation by theorising the 
origins of institutions or the determinants of their quality. We are mainly 
interested in the latter dimension about the determinants of institutional 
quality from a theoretical perspective. Distinctions are usually made 
between political and economic institutions (North, 1990; Maki et al, 1993; 
Treisman, 2000; Borner et al, 2004 and Aoki, 2007). Political institutions are 
derived from societal norms and belief system while economic institutions 
are determined by the repeated interaction of rational agents (Powelson, 
1972; North, 1990; Hodgson, 2006 and Furubotn and Richter, 2008). 
Therefore, attempts to improve the quality of political institutions require 
altering the norms and beliefs of a society while improving economic 
institutions requires cooperation by rational agents to do so. Given that 
norms and beliefs could suffer from change resistance (Maseland, 2008 and 
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Shirley, 2008), there must be a need to alter them with a view of improving 
the quality of institutions. This implies that institutions could not be imposed; 
rather, they evolve over time based on the need to continue to do so. 
Moreover, political institutions are assumed to shape economic institutions 
because they contain formal rules and enforcement properties that can 
provide certainty and coordinate economic activities (North, 1990). 
Therefore, the quality of economic institutions is conditional on the quality 
of political institutions and the repeated interaction of agents. Hence, 
economic institutions are more easily amenable to meet new forms of 
interactions than political institutions. Indeed, references will be made in 
section 5.3.2 that demand for better trade institutions by traders led to their 
improvement in ancient Europe (Milgrom et al, 1990; Grief et al, 1992 and 
Pugh and Trefler, 2012). 
There are four institutional theories associated with the determinants of 
institutional quality, namely; the neoclassical view, new institutional 
economics (NIE), institutional political economy (IPE) and path dependent 
theory. Neoclassical economic theories are popular in the economics 
discourse. The neoclassical view on institutions is similar to the 
conventional neoclassical postulate that the pursuit of individual self-interest 
through competition leads to optimal outcomes that allocate resources 
efficiently (North, 1990; Hodgson, 1998 and Fafchamps, 2004).The 
neoclassical view postulates that if agents agree to rules during exchanges, 
these rules would be optimal outcomes called institutions and would be 
subjected to changes only if exogenous shocks occur (Boland, 1979 and La 
Porta, 1999). For example, changes in relative prices could signal to rational 
agents that new forms of institutional arrangements are needed to satisfy 
future transactions (North, 1990 and Javed, 2013). Therefore, a proposition 
of the neoclassical theory of institutions, assumes that the quality of 
institutions is determined by the repeated interaction of agents that lead to 
the emergence of institutions and could be subjected to changes if agents 
alter their interactions due to demand for new forms of institutional 
arrangements. Moreover, the key aspect of the neoclassical view that is 
useful for modelling purposes is that exchanges of goods and services by 
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agents determine the type and quality of institutions. Hence, neoclassical 
theory implies that institutions are optimal outcomes once they are created 
and that the problem lies with the absence of institutions (La Porta, 1999). 
Therefore, estimates should focus on the origins of institutions rather than 
determinants of institutional quality since they are treated as optimal 
outcomes once they exist. 
The view that interaction of rational agents leads to optimal outcomes has 
been criticised. Simon (1987) argued that the optimal outcome proposition 
implies that institutional constraints does not exist. As such, nothing could 
be done to improve institutional quality if we assume that interactions 
generate rational outcomes (La Porta et al, 1999). Musole (2009) has further 
criticised the neoclassical view of institutions. He argued that if institutions 
represent rational outcomes through repeated interactions of agents, then 
economies that are performing badly would either develop or emulate 
economies with better institutions; in which case emulation, would 
effectively lead to the convergence of institutions across the globe. 
However, global evidence shows differences in the quality of institutions in 
space and time and across nations and regions (Straub, 2000 and Musole, 
2009). Our discussion in chapter three also found differences in the quality 
of institutions over time in the ECOWAS region. Hence, interaction of agents 
alone does not necessarily lead to optimal institutional quality. This is 
justified because not all agents possess perfect information during 
interactions in order to make rational decisions that maximises their utility. 
Nonetheless, the proposition that repeated interaction of agents determine 
institutions is useful from a modelling point of view since it clarifies the 
direction of causality at least in the initial stages. 
The NIE does not deviate from the neoclassical view of institutions. It also 
postulates that repeated interaction of agents lead to the emergence of 
norms that could ultimately determine the quality of institutions. 
Nonetheless, the NIE assume that the interaction of agents is conducted 
from a cooperative and mutual behavior rather than from an individual 
competitive behavior of the neoclassical view (Aoki, 2007; Furubotn and 
Richter, 2008; Furubotn and Richter, 2010; Gamberoni, 2010 and Alonso et 
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al, 2013). This view assumes that competitive behaviour could not result to 
common rules that would be acceptable to all agents. Furthermore, the NIE 
assume that the rules or institutional framework derives from agent’s 
interactions may not necessarily be optimal, although they could be the best 
rules of the game given the constraints imposed on agent’s due to lack of 
perfect information (North, 1990; Knaack et al, 2007; Musole, 2009 and 
Castellano et al, 2012). In the context of RTAs, NIE proposition suggests 
that trade could determine institutional quality if regional production is 
sufficient to increase regional demand and subsequently better institutions. 
Therefore, the neoclassical view and the NIE are identical in terms of their 
assumptions that repeated interactions of agents in socioeconomic affairs 
determine the quality of institutions. Nonetheless, the NIE assume that the 
interaction is conducted through cooperative behaviour while the 
neoclassical view assumes a competitive behaviour. In the context of RTAs, 
interaction of countries would be associated with cooperative behaviour. 
These interactions manifets themselves through trade, investment and 
other economic and political activities. Therefore, the NIE and the 
neoclassical view implicitly assume that the quality of institutions is 
determined unidirectionally through the interaction of agents. This makes 
modelling and estimation relatively predictable because it recognises the 
difficulty to eliminate endogeneity entirely. Diebold (2007) argued that 
estimations should be interpreted as the independent variables containing 
useful information in explaining the dependent variable rather than the 
establishment of the direction of causality. 
The unidirectional assumption of NIE has been criticised for not addressing 
the endogeneity issue (Castellano et al, 2012 and Alonso et al, 2013). 
Zhang (2006) has also criticised trade theories for not addressing 
endogeneity issues when estimating the convergence of income and price 
for trade partners. Similarly, the NIE has ignored the vital role of the state 
especially in the negotiation and enforcement of protocols that could be 
treated as common institutions within RTAs (Raiser et al, 2001). Institutional 
political economy (IPE) extends this debate by integrating the role of the 
state in determining the quality of institutions. 
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The IPE also assume that interaction of agents determines the quality of 
institutions. Nonetheless, IPE emphasizes the role of the state in deciding 
the type and quality of institutions since they control power that enforces 
and implement the institutional arrangements. Therefore, IPE mainly 
address how political institutions are determined and the extent to which 
they structure economic transactions. The IPE postulates that agents lobby 
governments to improve institutions and how much the government 
integrates each agent’s interest determine the quality of institutions. 
Therefore, the power structure between lobbyist and the government could 
determine the design and quality of institutions that has the potential to 
discriminate or tolerate the needs of every stakeholder. Furthermore, the 
IPE also assume that while interactions shape and determine the quality of 
institutions, institutions also shape and determine interactions because they 
coordinate interactions (Aoki, 2007; Zweynert, 2009 and Castellano et al, 
2012). Therefore, there is bidirectional causality. From a modelling point of 
view, bidirectional causality can be difficult to estimate since many 
regression equations assume one-way causality (Banerjee et al, 2003; 
Baltagi, 2005 and Wooldridge, 2013). Therefore, modelling determinants of 
institutional quality within the IPE requires establishing what comes first in 
the famous chicken and egg debate. This will be discussed further. 
Another dimension about the determinants of institutional quality is the path 
dependent theory. The theory postulates that the quality of current 
institutions is explained by their past behaviour and the past behaviour of 
other variables (Acemoglu et al, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003 and Nunn, 
2008). Hence, if institutions were weak in the past, it is likely that they will 
continue to do so except if exogenous shocks occur to change the direction 
of causality. Like the neoclassical view, changes in these shocks could lead 
to demand for better institutions in the future. In the context of RTAs, the 
demand for common and quality institutions is conditional on increased 
interaction of countries that motivate such demand.  
The path dependent theory of institutions also assume that institutions are 
determined by societal norms and beliefs system. As a result, they are 
viewed as static processes which do not change over time. Countries would 
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have to adjust their norms in order to improve the quality of their institutions. 
The path dependence theory has many implications. First, if societal norms 
determine institutional quality, would it be possible to emulate norms 
elsewhere in order to improve institutional quality? The answer to this is that 
institutions cannot be imposed directly; they should evolve through changes 
in societal ways of doing things. Second, societies that are resistant to 
change are likely to exhibit weak institutions today if their institutions were 
weak in the past. Third, based on our assessment in chapter three, the 
quality of institutions in West Africa should be less fragmented today given 
the extent of their standardisation in the past while the exogenous shock 
that took place during colonialism could be associated with the drawbacks 
in the development and standardization of the quality of institutions in the 
region (Acemoglu et al, 2001 and Nunn, 2008).  
The path dependent theory fits well in studies related to the determinants of 
institutional quality since we expect past institutions to contain memory in 
explaining current institutions. 
In Summary, a common feature of these theories is that interaction of 
economic agents determines the extent to which agents demand better 
institutions that coordinates future transactions, provides certainty and 
minimizes costs of future transactions. Hence, lesser interactions lead to 
less demand for better institutions. This could be modelled where the quality 
of current institutions is determined by the interaction of countries and the 
past behaviour of institutions. The use of panel data ensures that these 
interactions are captured in a single model. The folk theorem established 
that if agents or countries interact over an extended period (repeated) of 
time, it will generate norms that leads to cooperation (Koremenos et al, 
2001, p. 787).   This is particularly useful from a modelling point of view 
because it gives an indication of the direction of causality. Nonetheless, 
institutional theory is not clear about the selection of relevant variables for 
modelling purposes. It is left to the researcher to decide which set of 
variables are relevant in determining the type of institutions of interest 
(Chang, 2010). Nonetheless, several papers, use openness and the level 
of development as important determinants of institutional quality (Straub, 
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2000; Rosendorff and Milner, 2001; Shepherd and Lejarraga, 2013; Alonso 
et al, 2013 and Kuncic, 2014). 
Since the aim of this thesis is to investigate the determinants of the quality 
of institutions in the ECOWAS, it could be expected that the export structure 
and the level of development could be relevant in generating demand for 
good institutions in the region.  
5.2 Contextual literature review 
5.2.0 Introduction 
As we discussed in chapter one, the main aim of this thesis is to examine 
the conjunction of factors that determine the quality of institutions and the 
process of convergence of institutions in the ECOWAS region. Therefore, it 
is plausible to review the existing literature related2 to determine what has 
been done and to inform the methodological approaches in this chapter. 
 
Literature about the determinants of institutional quality takes a descriptive 
or empirical approach to research. We argued in chapter two that the 
descriptive approach should be treated as a first step toward a sophisticated 
statistical approach. We highlighted that the empirical approach is limited 
due to the endogeneity issue which has made modelling and estimation 
difficult. This will be explored in more detail in section 5.2.2. The 
convergence literature has received some attention in the trade theories 
where the convergence of price and income for trade partners have been 
tested with mixed results. This was discussed in chapter four. However, 
literature about the extent to which the quality of institutions could converge 
for trade partners is limited. We argue that the convergence concept could 
be applied to institutions in the context of RTAs because the success of 
RTAs could depend on it.   
 
As discussed in chapter two, the literature is quite scattered in terms of 
scope, hence we will review relevant literature and then contextualise it to 
the ECOWAS region. Section 5.2.1 will discuss the literature on 
convergence and the determinants of institutional quality in section 5.2.2. 
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The convergence models and literature find their roots within the growth and 
trade theories argument that trade leads to factor price equalisation as 
discussed in chapter four (Ruffin, 1988 and Zhang, 2006); hence, different 
versions of autoregressive models have been used either with panel or time 
series data to test whether trading partners exhibit convergence of price and 
income (Ranjan, 2003 and Zhang, 2006). We want to modify and extend 
this argument to determine the extent to which institutional quality 
convergence occurs for trading partners using the ECOWAS dataset as a 
new case study. The literature about the determinants of institutional quality 
find their root within the institutional economic theory argument that 
socioeconomic, political and cultural factors determine institutional quality 
(Islam and Montenegro, 2002 and Alonso et al, 2013); hence, different 
versions of methods of least square are used mainly with panel data to 
estimate such relationships. 
 
Therefore, this chapter could focus on whether being a member of 
ECOWAS leads to convergence of institutions or identify the conjunction of 
factors that determine the quality of institutions in the region or a 
combination of the two. Our aim is to look at both since they are 
complementary.  
 
5.2.1 Literature on Convergence 
The convergence literature finds its root in trade and growth theories. It is 
assumed that liberalised economies will, over time, exhibit income and price 
convergence of the traded commodities due to labour and other factor 
movements which will lead to spillover effects and price parity (Samuelson, 
1948; Ben-David, 1996; Mountfort, 1998; Ranjan, 2003 and Zhang, 2006). 
Linder (1961) highlighted that the closer countries are in their demand 
preferences, the greater their volume of bilateral trade. This implies that the 
convergence of demand preferences for trading partners or those within an 
RTA is going to increase intra-industry and intra-regional trade. This is due 
to the trade theories assumption that countries are likely to produce goods 
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that are demanded domestically while surplus arising from efficiency of 
production is exported. Ruffin (1988) further argued that factor price 
equalisation can eventually lead to income equalisation; implying that 
international trade causes convergence of prices and incomes. Empirical 
findings relating to many trading partners have been mixed. However, the 
assumptions of the convergence nexus are not dissimilar to the NIE and the 
folk theorem assumption that repeated interactions of countries or agents 
could lead to the emergence of norms that could transform into common 
institutions. Therefore, although models of the convergence nexus are 
explained within the context of price and income, the principle can be 
extended to capture convergence of institutions within an RTA. 
 
Indeed, Helble et al (2009) and Helble et al (2012) looked at how institutional 
quality differences impacts trade flows between nations. Helble et al (2012) 
found that $11.7million of aid directed to trade policy and regulatory quality 
reforms (institutions) leads to $818million increase in global trade using a 
gravity model. Similarly, institutional quality differences within RTAs on 
average lead to an estimated 30% less trade between pairs of countries 
than those with similar institutions. These findings suggest that common 
institutions are desirable as they promote trade. However, they did not look 
at what determines institutional quality differences or what leads to the 
convergence of institutions within an RTA. In ECOWAS, it has been found 
that bribes and delays at border points (weak regulatory quality) add to trade 
costs, uncertainty and coordination failures (Golub et al, 2009; Brenton et 
al, 2012 and Cissokho et al, 2012). These trade costs could be minimised if 
ECOWAS improved the implementation of their protocols since they 
represent the convergence of rules. 
Lejarraga and Shepherd (2013) also argued that RTAs with deeper 
mechanisms for enhancing transparency commitments are more trade 
promoting than those with shallow commitments. Each transparency 
commitment negotiated leads to an estimated 1% increase in bilateral trade 
flows and the willingness to adhere to transparent norms is influenced by 
the export structure of nations and by domestic institutional quality. 
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Lejarraga and Shepherd’s (2013) findings are synonymous to saying that 
common institutions within an RTA are desirable because they lead to more 
regional trade since they reduce uncertainty as well as lower transaction 
costs. Their findings are quite revealing and useful in the sense that RTAs 
should aspire for deeper integration through convergence as espoused by 
Lee and Park (2007). In their paper, Lejarraga and Shepherd (2013) further 
argued that relative differences in per capita incomes, culture and language 
and the degree of domestic democracy and governance influence 
institutional quality convergence within RTAs. They used a Probit and 
gravity model to estimate the extent to which transparency commitments of 
countries i and j is a function of the factors discussed in the previous 
sentence. However, Lejarraga and Shepherd (2013) did not test for 
endogeneity (reverse causality) and autocorrelation.  
The convergence literature is quite diverse in the modelling field although 
the Granger causality and cointegration test have been used (Zhang, 2006). 
Ben-David (1996) investigated whether countries whose imports are more 
than 4% from a trading partner exhibited income convergence over time. He 
used a simple autoregressive model (Augmented-Dickey-Fuller model) 
where he found that it is openness that leads to convergence rather than 
the volume of trade. The model is specified thus; 
(Yi,t −  Yi,t) =  ∅ (Yi,t−1 −  Yi,t−1) + εi,t                                         (5. 1) 
Where; 
t = time in years 
Yi,t is log of per capita income of country i at time t, 
Yi,t is average income of the sample  and 
Yi,t−1 and  Yi,t−1 are the lags of the series  
The proposition is that a value of  ∅ < 1, implies convergence among trading 
partners while a value greater than 1 implies divergence. Ben-David’s 
(1996) findings support the view that income convergence takes place 
among groups of countries that open their markets to international trade. 
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We can apply an institutional quality data set to equation 5.1 in order to 
estimate if the quality of institutions converge over time assuming no 
autocorrelation. In addition, equation 5.1 is also useful in capturing a path 
dependence relationship that is relevant in the context of ECOWAS. 
Zhang (2006) has furthered the trade and convergence relationship debate 
by investigating how trade within the EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, and WORLD 
leads to income convergence using a Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM). The aim of the paper was to look at the extent to which trade 
reduces income inequality among trade partners. The Gini index (income 
inequality) was used as the dependent variable and intra-region trade as a 
percentage of GDP was used as the independent variable from 1960 to 
2003. As we highlighted earlier, the expectation of such estimation is that 
factor movements, particularly of labour, would push wages upwards or 
downwards between trading partners which will over time lead to 
equalisation. In the absence of that, consumers would tend to purchase 
imports if they are relatively cheaper than domestic goods. Domestic 
producers would then be forced to amend their prices to match import 
prices. These arguments were discussed in chapter four from trade theories 
point of view. These arguments assume that consumers and workers have 
time to search prices in many locations which is not always likely. 
Nonetheless, using VECM hinges on nonstationary data in which case 
Granger-causality cannot be used to test the direction of causality. 
Symbolically, Zhang (2006) equation is specified in 5.2; 
∆ginit = C1 + αcectt−1 + ∑ β1i ∆ginit−1 
n−1
i=1 + ∑ γ1i ∆tradet−1 
n−1
i=1 + ε1t   (5.2) 
Where; 
∆ginit =  change in income inequality or first difference, 
C1 = constant, 
t = time in years 
ect, =  is a vector of residuals from OLS. long − run equilibrium relationships 
αc =  reflect the speed of adjustment of gini to long − run equilibrium and 
β1i  and γ1i measures how changes in past gini and trade affect current gini 
152 
 
The findings from Eq 5.2 support the view that free trade between EU 
members leads to income convergence in the long run and that the direction 
of causality is bilateral which is consistent with the IPE. Like equation 5.1, 
equation 5.2 can also be used to estimate how institutions would converge 
over time based on their past behaviour and past behaviour of trade. 
In the context of ECOWAS, Jones (2002) found that ECOWAS countries 
per capita income has been converging at a rate of 1.7%. This means that 
every year, the gap between per capita incomes in ECOWAS narrows by 
about 1.7%. However, it is not clear whether it is the income of the poorest 
countries that is rising faster than the rich countries or are the rich countries’ 
economies growing slower than the others in the region. 
In summary, the review of the convergence literature suggest that it could 
be extended to estimate the extent to which the quality of institutions within 
an RTA exhibit convergence especially for RTAs aspiring for deep 
integration. This is plausible because deep integration could not be attained 
and sustain without common institutions. Therefore, we intend to apply the 
Ben-David (1996) model to estimate the process of convergence of 
institutional quality using the ECOWAS dataset as a new case study. 
 
5.2.2 Literature on the determinants of institutional quality 
The existing literature about the determinants of institutional quality finds its 
roots in the standard economic theories which NIE and IPE have attempted 
to accommodate within institutional economics. The basic premise of these 
theories is that institutions originates from societal norms while repeated 
interactions of agents could lead to new forms of institutional arrangements. 
Therefore, the outcome of repeated interactions could be treated as the best 
possible rules although not necessarily optimal. This is a fundamental 
departure from the neoclassical theory of rational optimality.  
Few papers attempted to examine determinants of institutional quality in the 
context of an RTA and non-existence in the context of ECOWAS. Borner et 
al (2004) highlighted that research into the determinants of institutional 
quality is just beginning with no well-established theory and model. Shirley 
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(2008) and Maseland (2008) further argued the lack of a clear theory and 
model within institutional economics is due to the diversity in societal belief 
systems and difficulty to predict determinants of institutional quality in 
societies hostile to change. As a result, the research approaches take two 
dimensions. 
The first approach describes origins of institutions by justifying a case 
where, socioeconomic, historical, political and cultural factors are assumed 
to influence institutional quality without any model specification and 
estimation (North, 1990; Koremenos et al, 2001; Subramanian, 2001; Bloch 
and Tang, 2004; Rodrik, 2007; Moyo, 2009; Moss et al, 2009; Boettke and 
Fink, 2011; Maseland, 2011; Chang, 2011 and Castellano et al, 2012). 
Others used comparative political economic studies to assess how 
institutional quality manifests itself based on country differences and agent’s 
interest (Musole, 2009; Aoki, 2009 and Rothstein, Persson and Sjostedt, 
2010). Their argument is that the composite values of institutional quality 
are subjective, as discussed in chapter two. In addition, they argued that it 
is impossible to capture and identify all the conjunction of factors which 
determine institutional quality in a single equation. Therefore, describing the 
nature of relationship is appropriate. 
The second approach attempts to specify models where, institutional quality 
is assumed to be a function of socioeconomic, historical, political and 
cultural factors. However, such models lack clear theoretical underpinnings 
and direct links with estimation methods due to endogeneity issues. The 
least square method or probability models are used where instrumental 
variables or lag are proxies to correct endogeneity (Straub, 2000; Treisman, 
2000; Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Islam et al, 2002; Brunetti and Weder, 
2003; Borner et al, 2004; Herger et al, 2008; Mocan, 2008; Siba, 2008; 
Kandil, 2009; Javed, 2013 Berggren and Bjørnskov, 2013; and Alonso and 
GarciaMartin, 2013). Although the endogeneity issue has made it difficult to 
model determinants of institutional quality with a clear theoretical 
underpinning and estimation method, existing papers in the second 
approach have use econometrics to estimate determinants of institutional 
quality using least square methods. 
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Raiser et al (2001) looked at factors that determine institutional quality using 
time series and cross section data from 1995 to 1999 for 25 nations in 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans. They used a combination of structural 
equation models and autoregressive models with the recognition that no 
single model can adequately capture factors assumed to influence 
institutional quality. They used latent variables as proxies to resolve 
endogeneity and subsequently Generalised Least Square (GLS) to estimate 
the degree of relationship. They tested whether liberalisation, privatisation, 
shift in trading partners, path dependence, finance and state capacity 
impact on institutional quality. They found that 10% increase in public 
expenditure to GDP ratio (proxy for state capacity) leads to 0.02% 
improvement in institutional quality. Similarly, 20% increase in exports leads 
to 0.03% improvement in institutional quality. Raiser et al’s (2001) findings 
are useful in the selection of relevant variables for ECOWAS and the 
theoretical exposition in section 5.1 because they demonstrated that export 
pattern and state capacity can determine institutional quality. 
Structural equation models (SEM) are sometimes referred to as 
simultaneous equation models, causal analysis modelling, path analysis or 
covariance structure analysis (Ullman and Bentler, 2012). Ullman and 
Bentler (2012) argued that SEM models allow multidimensional complex 
relationships and the presence of endogeneity to be analysed. Herger et al 
(2008) and Rodrik et al (2004) have used structural equations in their 
papers. Herger et al (2004) argued that while institutional quality (INS) is 
determined by financial development (FIN), trade (TRD), culture (CUL), 
geography (GEO) and history (HIS), institutional quality also determines 
these factors within the IPE framework.  This is expressed as; 
α11FIN + α12INS + α13TRD + β11CUL = c1 +  ϵ1                            (5.3) 
α22INS + α23TRD + β21CUL + β22GEO + β23HIS = c2 + ϵ2             (5.4) 
α31FIN + α32INS + α33TRD + β32GEO = c3 + ϵ3                            (5.5) 
  
Where [CUL, GEO and HIS] are assumed exogenous variables while [FIN, 
INS, TRD] are assumed endogenous.  𝑐1,  𝑐2 and 𝑐3 are intercepts while 
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𝜖1, 𝜖2 and 𝜖3 are the disturbance terms.  Hox and Bechger (1998) argued 
that SEM can estimate parameters while simultaneously assessing the fit of 
the model. As a result, it is ideal for research where data are likely to suffer 
from endogeneity. Therefore, one needs to run all 3 equations 
simultaneously (5.3; 5.4 and 5.5) with a function; 
γ′A + z′B = c′ + ϵ′                                                                          (5.6) 
Where 
𝛾′ is 1x 3 vector of the endogenous variables [FIN, INS, TRD] and 𝑧′ is 1x3 
vector of exogenous variables [GEO, HIS, CUL]. However, one problem 
with SEM, according to Herger et al (2008), is that some of the parameters 
from a regression cannot be retrieved.  As such OLS and 2SLS are used 
where instrumental variables are identified as proxies to correct for 
endogeneity. Thus, the link between eq 5.3 to 5.6 has not been made clear 
regarding the use of appropriate estimation method. Indeed, this is one of 
the fundamental arguments by Chang (2010) that it is difficult or impossible 
to model determinants of institutional quality since it is difficult to capture the 
complexity of factors in a single model as well as to determine the 
appropriate direction of causality. Similarly, the SEM lacks a coherent 
estimation method since it relies on OLS or 2SLS (Wooldridge, 2013). 
Therefore, we cannot use the SEM in the empirical research that I intend to 
do since some of the parameters might be lost. Furthermore, SEM is 
indifferent from least square method of estimation given that the process 
ends up using the least square methods (Gujarati and Porter, 2009 and 
Wooldridge, 2013). 
As such, Herger et al (2008) used 2SLS and found that the level of 
development, language, colonial history, common law, religion, ethnic 
diversity, and latitude all impact on the quality of contract institutions using 
cross-country data. However, the fundamental criticism of using instruments 
is whether the instruments are a good proxy for the variable and whether 
they have strong estimation power (Chang, 2010; Shepherd, 2010 and 
Albouy, 2012). Therefore, other options could be explored in order to 
emerge with strong estimation power.  
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To further draw on the variables used in the existing literature, the rational 
choice and incentive structure models assume that the quality of institutions 
is based on utility maximisation subject to constraints imposed on 
individuals or countries (Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Mocan, 2008 and 
Furubotn and Richter, 2010). That is, each country has a target institutional 
quality that it wants to attain subject to its domestic constraints and the 
constraints from its partners.  Hence, economic benefits serve as an 
important stimulus in improving the quality of institutions (Hadfield, 2008 and 
Alonso et al, 2013). The benefits can be measured by the repeated of 
interaction of countries in the areas of economic, cultural and political 
factors. However, most research about the determinants of institutional 
quality describes the nature of the relationship rather than specifying a 
model (Koremenos, et al, 2001; Aoki, 2007 and Musole, 2009). Some 
papers have specified models without estimation (Rosendorff and Milner, 
2001 and Levechenko, 2012). 
Papers that have estimated determinants of institutional quality resort to the 
use of instrumental variables method without any strong link between 
theory, model and estimation (Straub, 2000; Islam and Montenegro, 2002, 
Borner, 2004 and Alonso et al, 2013). For example, Easterly and Levine 
(2003), Siba (2008), Mocan (2008) and Kandil (2009) used OLS to estimate 
institutional quality. They argued that endogeneity cannot be removed 
entirely in research related to the determinants of institutional quality. As 
such, all we do is to find out how useful some variables are in explaining 
institutional quality. Their findings support the view that socioeconomic, 
historical and cultural factors influence institutional quality. Diebold (2007) 
argued that the term causality is used to save space; hence we should be 
saying that independent variables contain useful information in predicting 
dependent variables rather than the establishment of causality. 
Hodgson (2006) discussed how institutions that facilitate trade depend on 
domestic socioeconomic and political factors and those of their trading 
partners. That is, each country has a target institutional quality which is 
determined by its domestic constraints and the quality of the institutions of 
its trading partners. Hodgson (2006) argued that since institutions structure 
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social interactions, their functional form and quality must emanate from the 
perceived benefits of repeated interactions.  This argument is consistent 
with oligopoly theory where individual firms make quantity and pricing 
decisions by taking account of their competitor’s decisions. However, 
Hodgson (2006) did not specify a mathematical model. Consistent with 
other findings, Hodgson (2006) argued that repeated societal interactions 
influence institutions. Therefore, there is unanimity in the research field that 
repeated societal interactions (economic, political or social) contain useful 
information in explaining the quality of institutions before they in turn 
structure human behaviour (Jaccard and Jacoby, 2012). The folk theorem 
highlighted that these interactions must be repeated several times before 
they constitute institutions or generate motivations to improve them. 
Another line of argument within institutional economics looks at how history 
influences current institutions. Acemoglu et al (2001, 2005) and Nunn 
(2007) argued theoretically that past institutions contain memory in 
explaining current institutional quality. This is useful in the context of 
ECOWAS since 14 of the 15-member states were colonised by France, 
Britain, and Portugal. Acemoglu et al (2001; 2005) used European mortality 
rates in former colonies as a measure of past institutions to test how they 
influence current institutions.  
The justification for using mortality rate as proxy for past institution by 
Acemoglu et al (2001) was that they might be uncorrelated with the error 
term. However, it has been shown that first difference can eliminate or 
reduce correlation (Gujarati, 2006 and Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Alonso et 
al (2013) has also used lag to measure determinants of institutional quality 
with the argument that they are less correlated with the current error term. 
Whichever way, Acemoglu et al (2001) found that variation in the quality of 
current institutions in former colonies can be explained by the pattern of 
European settlements (past institutions). These are very important findings 
for several reasons. 
First, it assumed that Europeans institutions have been superior in historical 
times; hence poor institutions are visible in places where they did not settle, 
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which Chang (2011) has criticised giving China as an example. Secondly, 
our discussion in chapter three demonstrated that West Africa had 
standardised trade institutions before the collapse of the Songhai Empire 
and subsequent colonialism (Rodney, 1981 and Brenton et al, 2012). Nunn 
(2007) has also argued that Africa had high production and institutional 
development before the slave trade and colonialism. However, due to the 
extractive process during the colonial period, Africa was trapped into a low 
development level which persists today. Nonetheless, the argument 
demonstrates that modelling determinants of institutional quality is feasible 
as a function of current or lag variables and past institutional quality. 
Rosendorff and Milner (2001) also described determinants of bilateral trade 
barriers. However, their propositions were mainly abstract, and no data and 
estimation were advanced. The paper is identical to Hodgson’s (2006) 
paper on how domestic institutions are determined in an open economy. 
They used a cooperative oligopoly theory to model how bilateral trade 
barriers are determined between trading partner i and j.  The model argued 
that bilateral trade barriers of partner i depend on domestic consumer 
surplus (CS) corresponding to the trade barrier t, producer surplus (PS) and 
government domestic tariff revenue (M), corresponding to the trade barriers. 
That is, the utility government gets from its domestic trade barrier t and that 
of the foreign trade barrier t∗ depends on home CS, PS and M. We should 
expect CS to increase as trade barriers fall since this can lower import and 
domestic product prices. Government tariff revenue can fall, increase or 
remain constant depending on the elasticity of imports to a change in trade 
barriers. Domestic PS can fall if imports lower the price of domestic goods 
or it can increase if the partner also lowers its trade barrier which leads to 
increased exports for the partner. Therefore, governments will optimise 
trade barrier as a function of CS, PS and M.  
Rosendorff and Milner (2001) argued that in a political economic 
perspective, governments want to maximise CS, PS, and M because they 
want re-election, which is funded through donations from businesses, as 
well as the ability to raise revenue for public goods provision. They argued 
that each country gives weight to the benefits arising from the bilateral trade 
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barriers. Each country has the incentive to cooperate with the other if the 
average benefits are greater than or equal to the individual benefits.  If the 
cost of reneging is higher, then the equilibrium IQ through cooperation will 
hold until some exogenous shocks occur. However, the problem with 
specifying such a utility function, as we discussed earlier, is that we are 
assuming that each country can freely choose their level of trade barrier 
optimally. The NIE argument is that, although this explanation can hold, it 
does not necessarily generate an optimal outcome. Furthermore, the model 
was not estimated by Rosendorff and Milner (2001) although it is a step to 
further understand how trade barriers could be determined as a function of 
domestic benefits and constraints from partner countries. 
Similarly, the notion that consumer and producer surplus and tariff revenue 
influence the extent to which countries are willing to set trade barriers is 
useful in the context of ECOWAS given the heavy dependence on trade 
taxes as a source of revenue (Tanzi and Zee, 2000; Ekpo, 2004 and 
Walkenhorst, 2006).  
Specific literature on what determines institutional quality and convergence 
in ECOWAS is limited. As far as I am aware, no research exists pertaining 
to how economic factors determine the quality of institutions in ECOWAS; 
although, Straub (2000), Alonso et al (2013); Islam and Montenegro (2002) 
and Siba (2008) have considered determinants of institutional quality using 
countries from different continents that also included some ECOWAS 
members. However, Chang (2010) has criticised the use of cross-country 
data in regressions relating to what determines institutional quality since it 
cannot inform policy specifics for a particular region or country. Therefore, 
using exclusive ECOWAS dataset can extract useful policy implications for 
the region deep integration scheme. 
In summary, the literature review demonstrates that we could use trade 
theories to estimate the process of convergence of institutional quality in 
ECOWAS. Similarly, it demonstrates that the quality of institutions is a 
function of domestic socioeconomic factors, past institutional quality and the 
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quality of institutions of its partner. Table 5.1 below summarises the 
literature we reviewed in this section.
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Table 5.1 Summary determinants of institutional quality  
Source: Authors Compilation. ✓- statistically significant and ●- not significant: WLS- Weighted Least Square; Corre- Correlation, OLS- Ordinary Least Square; 2SLS- two stage 
least   square; IV-instrumental variable; world- cross country inter-continental coverage (not necessarily the whole world). 
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Engerman and Sokoloff (1994)  Describe 
 1500-
1997 
 Americas   ✓     ✓       ✓                     
  
La Porta (1999)  OLS 1970-98 World ✓  ✓ ✓     ✓   ✓                         
Straub (2000)  OLS/WLS 1980-98 World    ●         ✓ ✓     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓          ✓  ✓ 
Easterly & Levine (2003 OLS   1960-95 World ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓         ✓                   
Acemoglu et al (2005) OLS 1985-95  World     ✓ ✓       ✓               ✓         
Islam et al (2002) 2SLS/OLS 1984-97   World   ●   ●     ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓     ✓             
Subramanian et al (2003)  Describe none   World           ✓   ✓           ✓             
Alonso et al (2013) IV  1989-06  World   ● ●     ✓   ✓ ✓   ●      ●   ✓   ✓     
Mocan (2008) OLS  1997-03  World               ✓               ✓         
Borner et al (2004)  OLS 1986-99   World ✓           ✓ ✓ ✓         ✓  ✓           
Herger et al (2008) 2SLS  1965-04  World ✓ ✓ ✓     ✓               ✓             
Rodrik et al (2004)   2SLS  1950-02  World           ✓   ✓           ✓             
Rijckeghem et al (2001) OLS  1982-95  World   ●         ✓ ✓       ✓       ✓     ✓   
Brunetti et al (2003) OLS/2SLS   1994-98  World   ✓         ✓ ✓         ✓ ✓ ✓           
Bloch and Tang (2004) Describe  1984-02 World               ✓   ✓       ✓             
Chong  et al (2000) OLS/corre  1982-91  World     ✓  ✓        ✓               ✓         
Kandil (2009) OLS/ corre  1970-05  MENA               ✓   ✓       ✓             
Siba (2008) OLS  1980-03  SSA   ● ●     ✓ ✓                   ✓       
 Rodrik (2007) Describe  None  World            ✓   ✓           ✓             
Moss et al (2006)  Describe none  SSA                                  √ √     
 Keane et al (2010) Describe  1990-09 SSA                           ✓             
 Levechenko (2012) OLS 1970-99  World ✓  ● ✓         ✓           ✓   ✓         
 Moyo (2009) Describe  none SSA                                 ✓       
 Triesman (1998) WLS/ OLS 1980-98  World ✓  ✓ ✓         ✓      ✓     ✓  ✓         ✓ 
Berggren et al (2013)       ✓   ●         ✓           ✓             
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5.3 Methodological approaches 
5.3.0 Introduction 
We highlighted in section 5.1 that institutional theories predict that repeated 
interaction of agents determines the quality of economic institutions. How 
institutions are measured, the direction of causality and the extent to which 
a given methodological approach is more appropriate to analyse the nature 
of the relationship has been a matter of debate in the existing literature 
(Straub, 2000; Kaufmann et al, 2010; Chang, 2010; Maseland, 2011; 
Albouy, 2012; Alonso et al, 2013 and Vogit, 2013). Therefore, the aim of this 
section is to discuss the methodological approaches in the existing literature 
in order to inform our own approach.  
Research related to the determinants of institutional quality takes a positivist 
(quantitative) or interpretivist (qualitative) perspectives (Aoki, 2007 and 
Creswell, 2009). The interpretivist perspective argues that research 
involved developing subjective meanings of one’s experiences of the world 
(Creswell, 2009). Therefore, the researcher’s subjective perception could 
not be separated from the research. Hence, generalizations could be 
subjected to bias outcomes. Some papers argue that the descriptive 
approach to research related to the determinants of institutional quality is 
plausible given that institutional quality indices are computed from 
subjective survey data that could be bias to changes in economic and 
political situations (Castellano et al, 2012). This approach has been used in 
the existing literature and they have provided valuable insights into the type 
of variables that could be relevant in estimation (North, 1990; Maki et al, 
1993; Hodgson, 1998; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2003; Rodrik, 2007; 
Chang, 2010; Albouy, 2012; Castellano et al, 2012 and Vogit, 2013). 
Nonetheless, some papers argue that the descriptive approach in this area 
of research should be treated as a first step toward a positivist perspective 
(Koremenos et al, 2001 and Acemoglu et al, 2001). Therefore, the positivist 
(quantitative) view is increasing its presence in this area of research. The 
positivist perspective postulates that social phenomenon could be captured 
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better and trusted if our observations are measured in order to find causal 
relationships (Crewsell, 2009 and Saunders et al, 2012). Hence, the role of 
the researcher is to observe and interpret the observed and that the 
researcher should be separated from the research. This proposition 
naturally implies that the positivist perspective prefers the use of quantitative 
method of research. Hence, models should be derived in order to provide 
estimates that could be interpreted. Thus, the positivist perspective is 
aligned with the conceptual approach to modelling. Nonetheless, the 
quantitative approach to research about the determinants of institutional 
quality is ongoing with no strong link between modelling and institutional 
theory mainly due to the issue of endogeneity. We cited Acemoglu et al 
(2001) and Koremenos et al (2001) earlier that research in this area should 
start with building theory first, followed by models and subsequently 
estimation. The theories of institutions have been established in the existing 
literature although the link to models and estimation is limited due to 
endogeneity. 
We argue that endogeneity could not be eliminated entirely in research 
related to institutions although it could be minimized by identifying 
appropriate proxies or include lag of the dependent variable as an 
independent variable. Some papers proposed the use of initial values as 
proxy for the lag (Straub, 2000; Islam and Montenegro, 2002; Kandil, 2009 
and Alonso et al, 2013). 
The structure of the section is as follows. First, a review of the existing 
modelling and estimation methods in section 5.3.1. Section 5.3.2 will 
discuss the conceptual model specification about the determinants of 
institutional quality. In section 5.3.3 we will discuss the estimation method 
that is going to be used while section 5.4 will discuss the variables that are 
going to be used to estimate the model. 
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5.3.1 Review of models and estimation techniques 
As we highlighted earlier, research related to the determinants of 
institutional quality used either a descriptive or statistical approach. The 
descriptive approach assumes that socioeconomic, political and cultural 
factors determine the rules that govern how things are done (North, 1990). 
The justification for using this approach is that it is difficult if not impossible 
to capture the complexities of the determinants of institutional quality in a 
single equation. Furthermore, institutional quality cannot be measured 
quantitatively because they are applied contextually nor are they easily 
amendable. Therefore, what we should do is to identify patterns where the 
quality of institutions is associated with changes in socioeconomic factors 
(Subramanian et al, 2003; Bloch and Tang, 2004; Moss et al, 2006 and 
Rodrik, 2007). Nonetheless, research in this area is increasing skewing 
toward estimation. 
However, the estimation approach suffers from three issues that pose 
difficulty, namely; the lack of models underpinned by institutional theories, 
lack of consensus about appropriate estimation method and the extent to 
which the direction of causality is explained. Indeed, Chang (2010) argued 
that research in this area usually collapses in the modelling stage mainly 
due to the difficulty in identifying all the mechanisms on how institutions 
works and how to address endogeneity issue. Chang (2010) concluded that 
estimates tend to measure policy effectiveness rather than institutional 
quality. Furthermore, papers that used the statistical approach usually 
describe the expected nature of relationships from a theoretical perspective 
and then use the method of least squares for estimation. This process does 
not justify the direction of causality.  
Other papers that modelled determinants of institutional quality did not 
estimate them, although it is a step toward finding an appropriate estimation 
method (Rosendorff and Milner, 2001 and Hodgson, 2006). Their view is 
identical to the descriptive approach that recognises the difficulty to 
establish the direction of causality. Another issue with the statistical 
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approach is the lack of consensus in the use of an appropriate estimation 
method.  Apart from the descriptive approach, several techniques have 
been used, including correlation test, ordinary least square (OLS), weighted 
least square (WLS) and two-stage least square (2SLS) as demonstrated in 
table 5.1 above. The correlation test approach recognises the difficulty to 
establish causality in research related to the determinants of institutional 
quality. Correlation tests the degree of association between two variables 
(Chong et al, 2000 and Kandil, 2009).  
We argue that correlation could be used in tandem with estimation 
techniques in order to further our understanding of the determinants of 
institutional quality using OLS, WLS or 2SLS (Chong et al, 2000 and Kandil, 
2009). Some papers used two estimation techniques with a view to 
determine the robustness of their results within the least square method 
(Straub, 2000; Treisman, 1998; Islam et al, 2002; Brunetti and Weder, 
2003). Other papers use three to four averages in order to establish 
robustness of results within the least square estimation technique. The 
premise of the least square estimates is to minimize the residual sum of 
square (RSS) (Gujarati, 2006; Gujarati and Porter, 2009 and Wooldridge, 
2013). That is, 
RSSki,t = ∑ eki,t
2K
k=1
                                                                (5.7) 
                                                                             
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒;   
RSS = RSS of variable k of country i at time t and    
k =  1 … , K number of residuals from the variables of country i at t periods  
Equation 5.7 states that RSS is equal to the summation of the squared 
residuals 𝑒𝑖𝑡
2  –the difference between actual and predicted values of the 
dependent variable. Small residuals whose values are closer to zero imply 
goodness of our model and validity of the independent variables in 
determining the quality of institutions. 
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The general form of a panel OLS is represented in equation 5.8 below, 
IQi,t =  b0  + b1Econk,it + ek,it                                                     (5.8) 
Where; 
IQi,t =  institutional quality indices of country i   at time t , 
Econki,t =  vectors of k variables of country i, 
eki,t     = the error term 
Since IQ and Econ are known, the partial derivative finds values of b0 and b1 
that minimises RSS. The larger the coefficients, the smaller RSS will be. 
The partial derivative of an OLS regression implies that we want to know 
the impact of a change in one independent variable on the dependent 
variable by holding all the other independent variables constant. This allows 
us to identify which variable significantly determine IQ relative to the others. 
However, there are fundamental assumptions that should be satisfied 
before OLS could be used. First, if we cannot hold all the other variables 
constant in order to determine the rate of change of institutional quality 
brought about by a change in one of the independent variables, then 5.8 
suffers from multicollinearity that make our estimates inconsistent and 
unreliable. Nonetheless, research related to the determinants of institutional 
quality does not consider the importance of multicollinearity because they 
assume that most of the variables are already endogenous. Therefore, their 
main emphasis is to consider the degree of autocorrelation (Gujarati, 2006 
and Wooldridge, 2013). OLS assume that the variance of the error term 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑘𝑖,𝑡  ) = 𝛼
2 is constant for all k of i and the average value of the error 
term(eki,t) = 0. If this is not satisfied, then simple OLS could not be used. 
Research related to the determinants of institutional quality could not 
capture all the conjunctions of factors that determine institutional quality in 
a single equation with parsimony (Chang, 2010 and Vogit, 2013). Therefore, 
the assumption that the error term is zero could not hold which implies the 
presence of endogeneity. 
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Similarly, the quality of institutions may not be the same across countries. 
There could be an outlier country whose contribution to the error term could 
be greater or smaller. This means that the weight of each observation is not 
identical, thus skewing the error estimate toward the outlier. Since the outlier 
is not clustered around the mean of the other observations, our predictions 
would be difficult to rely upon. Therefore, OLS alone could not be used. As 
a result, many papers transform the data in order to use WLS or 2SLS 
(Straub, 2000 and Islam and Montenegro, 2002). 
WLS and its associated generalized least squares (GLS) transform data 
where the independent variables are heteroskedastic (when the error term 
is non- constant) and then apply OLS to the transformed data. If the variance 
of the error term is known𝜎2, then we use weighted least squares. The 
process involved minimizing the weighted sums of square rather than the 
RSS. However, WLS does not correct endogeneity that has made research 
in this area difficult to model and estimate. As a result, some papers used 
2SLS. 
As the name implies, 2SLS involved two steps of estimation. The first stage 
involved looking for an instrumental variable as a proxy for the independent 
variable that is not correlated with the error term but correlated with the 
variable for which endogeneity is identified. There are several ways of 
identifying suitable instrumental variable. Kandil (2009) ran regression 
twice. First, ran a regression to generate proxy for the independent variable 
in question by using its lagged and then use the predicted estimate in place 
of the original figure to run the second regression with OLS. The intuition, 
according to Kandil (2009) is that lagged variables are unlikely to be 
correlated with the error term. Alonso et al (2013) also used lagged 
independent variable as proxies because it is assumed that they are 
uncorrelated with the error term. The other method is to choose an 
instrument for the variable assumed to be endogenous. The challenge is to 
find a suitable instrument as it must satisfy certain conditions. First, the 
instrument must not be correlated with the dependent or the disturbance 
term but correlated with the independent variable. Second, the instrument 
must only influence the dependent variable through the independent 
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variable assumed to be exogenous (Islam and Montenegro, 2002; Brunetti 
et al, 2003; Gujarati, 2006; Herger et al, 2008 and Wooldridge, 2013). 
Acemoglu et al (2001) used European mortality rates in former colonies as 
a proxy for past institutional quality in their paper that estimated 
determinants of current institutional quality. However, the fundamental 
criticism of using instruments is whether the instruments are a good proxy 
for the variable and whether they have strong estimation power (Chang, 
2010; Shepherd, 2010 and Albouy, 2012). 
Based on the institutional theories discussed earlier, repeated interactions 
of agents lead to the emergence of norms that could constitute institutional 
quality. Therefore, both past and current behaviour contain useful 
information in explaining the current quality of institutions and models 
should capture this relationship. Hence, endogeneity could never be 
removed entirely in this area of research. As such, we need to justify a 
model base on what the researcher intends to achieve. 
 
5.3.2 Conceptual model specification 
We highlighted in section 5.1 that institutional theories predict that the 
quality of institutions is determined by repeated interaction of agents and 
the capacity of the state to enforce agreements. Interaction is measured 
through exchanges and cooperation. We could apply a similar argument in 
the context of RTAs where the repeated interactions of countries through 
bilateral trade and other factors determine the quality of institutions. 
Furthermore, we argue that repeated interaction of countries motivates the 
demand for better institutions in order to smooth future transactions within 
an RTA. Several events were cited in the existing literature that repeated 
interactions provides motivation to create and improve trade facilitation 
institutions (Milgrom et al, 1990 and Grief et al, 1992). These assumptions 
could be used to justify and guide our modelling and inform the direction of 
causality. 
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Assumption 1 
The quality of institutions exists when they are demanded by stakeholders. 
In the literature, we provide examples where repeated interaction led to the 
creation and improvements of trade facilitation institutions such as; 
a) The champagne fairs of the 12th and 13th centuries in the UK, which 
created merchant courts to facilitate trade and settle trade disputes (Milgrom 
et al, 1990), 
 
b) European medieval merchants demanded their governments to protect 
trade routes between Europe and other regions which represents the 
regulation of cross-border trade (Grief et al, 1992) and 
 
c) Trade and other economic exchanges helped create institutions in 
ancient Venice- 800-1350 which facilitated trade (Puga and Trefler, 2012). 
 
Therefore, if such events hold, then repeated interactions determine the 
quality of institutions unidirectionally before they in turn influence future 
interactions. Gujarati and Porter (2009) lamented that time does not go 
backward. As such, if event ‘A’ happened before ‘B’, it is likely that ‘A’ 
causes ‘B’ either over time or instantaneously. Hurwicz (1996) cited by Aoki 
(2007) also lamented on the difficulty or impossibility of designing rules 
(institutions) prior to playing the game although these statements can be 
subjective. For example, the rational expectation theory assumes that 
instantaneous influences could occur if agents adjust their future 
expectations to be realized in the present period. Nonetheless, this is 
unlikely in the context of institutional quality since institutions are sticky. 
Therefore, we could justifiably establish that repeated interactions of 
countries provide stimulus and demand to improve the quality of institutions 
in the context of RTAs, including a common currency, common procedures 
to enforce contracts and regulation of cross-border trade. It wouldn’t make 
economic sense to improve institutions across countries without any 
interaction given the cost associated with altering each country’s institutions 
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to meet regional requirements. Hence, a causal chain can be described in 
equation 5.9 and 5.10 where; 
Econt1  → IQt2  → Econt3 → IQt4 → Econtn                                  (5.9) 
Or equivalently 
IQt2 = f(Econt1 )                                                                         (5.10) 
Where; 
 
Econt1represent exchanges in the first and subsequently in the 3rd and n period 
  IQt2 is institutional quality after the exchanges and subsequently in IQt4.   
 
Equation 5.10 states that current institutional quality (IQ) is determined by 
past behaviour of the variables assumed to influence it. This clarifies the 
direction of causality at least in the initial stages.  
The notion of causality has been extensively debated as to whether it is ever 
possible to demonstrate that changes in one or more variables causes 
changes in another variable (Bunge, 1961; Hume, 1975, Shadish et al, 2002 
and Cartwright, 2007). Diebold (2007) argued that the term causality is used 
to save space; hence we should be saying that independent variables 
contain useful information in predicting dependent variables. Therefore, 
research into the determinants of institutional quality could minimize 
endogeneity as best as possible but could not be eliminated entirely. 
Indeed, Easterly and Levine (2003) argued that we cannot remove 
endogeneity entirely in this area of research. All we do is to find out how 
useful some variables are in explaining institutional quality.  
Endogeneity itself has two dimensions. First, when some independent 
variables are correlated with the error term, then our regression equation 
suffers from omitted variable bias (Shepherd, 2013; Jaccard and Jacoby, 
2012 and Wooldridge, 2013). Second, endogeneity takes the form in Eq. 
5.11 where Econ caused IQ; IQ also causes Econ which is referred to as 
reverse causality or simultaneity (Shepherd, 2010 and Wooldridge, 2013). 
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𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛                                    𝐼𝑄                                                       (5.11) 
 
While omitted variable bias can be corrected by adding the relevant 
variables once they are identified, reverse causality is more difficult to 
correct because it is difficult to predict the exact direction of causality. The 
Granger causality has been used to test bidirectional causality. But this is 
limited to a test rather than an estimation. 
Therefore, the key to assumption one in the context of RTAs is that past 
behaviour of IQ could be used as an independent variable to estimate how 
past behaviour influence current institutional quality. It is assumed that lag 
IQ would capture all past interactions. Some papers used initial values 
instead of lags with the assumption that lags are weak instruments 
especially when they are sticky (Alonso et al, 2013).  
 
Assumption 2 
The second assumption argues that countries are the main negotiators and 
enforcers of regional agreements, including the setting up of institutions that 
are binding in an RTA. Hence, we do not consider individual traders and 
investors in our model as specified by Levechenko (2012). Instead, it is 
assumed that the individual government’s desire to improve quality of 
institutions depend on the extent to which traders and investors lobby 
governments to do so. Therefore, the capacity of the state is important in 
models that seek to explain the determinants of institutional quality (Raiser 
et al, 2001 and Alonso et al, 2013). 
With these assumptions, we are now ready to specify a model underpinned 
by institutional theories in the context of RTAs using ECOWAS as a new 
case study. 
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5.3.2.0 Model specification 
A recap of the basis of the theoretical discussions and the assumption we 
made in section 5.3.2 suggest that the quality of institutions of country i is a 
function of its k indicators and the past behaviour of IQ in a closed economy. 
Symbolically, this is represented in equation 5.12 below; 
IQi,t = f(∑ Econki,t + IQi,t−p)
K
k=1                                                         (5.12) 
Where 
IQi,t =  institutional quality indices of country i   at time t , 
Econki,t =  is vector of k variables of country i at time t 
k = 1, … , K number of variables 
p = number of lags 
 
Equation 5.12 states that ‘Econ’ of country i contain useful information in 
predicting institutional quality (IQ) (Musole, 2009; Buitelaar and Needham, 
2007 and Berggren and Bjornskov, 2012). Furthermore, past IQ also contain 
useful information in predicting current IQ (Acemoglu et al, 2001; Easterly 
and Levine, 2003 and Nunn, 2008). We note here that IPE also assume that 
institutions are determined first before they in turn facilitate future 
exchanges (Zweynert, 2009 and Castellano et al, 2012). Hence, 5.12 hold 
for both NIE and IPE and that past IQ gives it a path dependent nature 
(Javed, 2013). 
 
In an open economy, country i interacts with other partners we called j. 
Partner j’s IQ is also determined by its domestic Econ and the past value of 
their IQ in the same way as i which is represented in equation 5.13 below. 
  IQj,t = f(∑ Econkj,t + IQj,t−p)
K
k=1                                              (5.13) 
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Since past IQ is determined by past Econ, then past IQ would partially 
capture the extent to which past Econ indicators influences current IQ via 
past IQ. Therefore, including past IQ as a dependent variable captures the 
historical determinants of institutional quality.   
In the context of RTAs like ECOWAS aspiring to standardise their 
institutions, the quality of each country’s institution is assumed to be a 
function of its domestic factors, past IQ and the quality of institution of its 
partners.  
Therefore, the basic model specified in equation 5.14 depict that the quality 
of institutions (IQ) of country i is determined by current k indicators, its past 
IQ and the IQ of its partners j countries. The inclusion of partner j’s IQ as 
independent variable means that it serves as pull factor for i. That is, 
improvement in partner j’s IQ would stimulate i to improve its IQ. Moreover, 
equation 5.14 also represents the extent to which best practices could be 
learn from one another.  Symbolically;  
IQi,t = f (Econki,t + IQi,t−p + IQj,t)                                                   (5.14) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒;  
IQi,t =  institutional quality indices of country i   at time t , 
Econi,t =  is vector of k variables of country i at time t 
p = number of lags and  
IQj,t = IQ of partner countries  
In the context of ECOWAS with 15 countries, partner j could be a 
parameter for each country or V-i representing the rest of ECOWAS IQ of 
partner ‘j’. Alternatively, the average value of V-i could be used to 
represent partner j IQ. Since the sum of the value of IQ of V-i should be 
greater that each individual ECOWAS member, we take the sum of V-i as 
partner j IQ. Equation 5.14 is reasonable to assume in the context of an 
RTA aspiring to standardise their institutions because it generates some 
degree of interdependence between nations. 
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Equation 5.14 is only an identity model. Hence, it will be transform into an 
econometric model to allow estimation. This will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
5.3.3 Estimation method 
The main aim of this section is to justify how to estimate equation 5.14 and 
to specify the convergence model. As we highlighted in section 5.3.1, 
method of least squares is the main estimation technique used in this area 
of research mainly with cross-sectional data. Instrumental variables through 
2SLS is used to minimise endogeneity. Lags of IQ or initial values of IQ has 
been used as instruments or as independent variable. The assumption is 
that using appropriate instruments or lag IQ could minimise endogeneity. 
ECOWAS consists of 15-member states and the IQ data span from 1996 to 
2015. This means that our data is treated as a panel data.  
There are two strands of estimating panel data. The first strand recognized 
heterogeneity, serial correlation and heteroscedasticity of the data which is 
corrected first before least square is applied for estimation (Washington et 
al, 2003; Baltagi, 2005; Gujarati, 2006 and Reyna, 2007). The second 
strand used time series methods by worrying about nonstationarity, 
cointegration and spurious regression which is tested and corrected before 
the use of the autoregressive method of estimation (Baltagi, 2005). 
The inclusion of lagged independent variables suggests the feasibility to use 
vector-autoregressive (VAR) model conditional on stationary and 
uncorrelated panel data. Furthermore, VAR models are ideal to estimate a 
short-run process. Nonetheless, VAR have not been used in this area of 
research because it is mainly concerned with estimating the extent to which 
unexpected changes in policy such as monetary policy lead to shocks in the 
economy (Sims, 1980). Therefore, we could omit some variables that may 
be relevant in determining the quality of institutions in ECOWAS such as 
colonial heritage and belonging to a monetary zone dummy. 
Therefore, the feasible option is to use the other strand in panel data by 
worrying about autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The least square 
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method is complicated by the inclusion of lagged IQ as an independent 
variable since it is likely to be correlated with the error term (Baltagi, 2005; 
Greene, 2008 and Wooldridge, 2013). An alternative approach is to include 
language dummies to capture lagged IQ in the context of West Africa or use 
initial value of IQ (1996 IQ for all the years). Nonetheless, the inclusion of 
lagged IQ as an independent variable could be exogenous (basic 
assumption of least squares) if the data is stationary (Heij et al, 2004; 
Diebold, 2007 and Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Moreover, our basic model 
assumes that the inclusion of IQ as an independent variable is plausible 
because past IQ could contain memory in explaining current IQ especially 
if the rate of change is sticky. Therefore, we would test autocorrelation and 
stationarity of our dataset in order to allow convergence test and to estimate 
determinants of institutional quality. However, the time span of the dataset 
is small to effect strong unit root test. Therefore, although stationarity test 
will be conducted, caveats that it might be weak due to the small-time span. 
Furthermore, the small-time span of the dataset means it impossible to 
deduce a strong conclusion in the unit root for individual ECOWAS 
members. 
5.3.3.0 Estimation method- determinants of institutional quality 
Equation 5.14 is restated in equation 5.15 below; 
IQi,t = β0 +  β1Econki,t + β2IQi,t−p + β3IQj,t + εi,t                           (5.15) 
Where; 
IQi,t =  institutional quality indices of country i   at time t , 
Econi,t =  is vector of k variables of country i at time t 
IQj,t = IQ of partner countries (V-i partner countries in ECOWAS) 
V= Total number of ECOWAS countries.  
β′s = parameters or coefficients  
p = number of lags and  
εi,t = error term  
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Equation 5.15 contain an error term εi,t and beta β parameters which 
transformed it into an econometric model that could be estimated. The error 
term captures all the unobservable factors or omitted variables in the model 
(Heij et al, 2004; Gujarati and Porter, 2009 and Wooldridge, 2013). The β′s 
are usually the main interest of a researcher because it measures the extent 
to which an independent variable contain useful information in explaining 
the dependent variable by holding all the other independent variables 
constant. 
Equation 5.15 exhibits some characteristics that could make the use of least 
square difficult without further qualifications. First, the equation could suffer 
from autocorrelation. Autocorrelation can manifest itself in many ways. First, 
if Econ is correlated with the error term, then they suffer from omitted 
variable bias. In this case, we can add the relevant variables or create a 
latent variable to correct or minimize the omitted variable bias (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009 and Wooldridge, 2013). However, it is difficult if not impossible 
to eliminate omitted variable bias in research relating to the determinants of 
institutional quality with parsimony since there are so many factors 
(observable and unobservable) that can be considered. Control variables 
have been proposed in the existing literature to capture variables that are 
not directly included in the estimation models if they are present in all the 
observed panels (Rose, 2005; Reyna, 2007; Greene, 2008 and Javed, 
2013). 
The basic assumption of least square estimates is no autocorrelation, which 
is represented in equation 5.16 below. Therefore, we need to test it in order 
to correct it. 
corr (Econi, εi) = 0                                                                    (5.16) 
 
Secondly, autocorrelation occurs if the error term of one country is 
correlated with that of another, we say that spatial correlation (correlation in 
space) exists (Baltagi, 2005 and Wooldridge, 2013). That is, we want 
equation 5.17 to hold so that no spatial correlation exists. 
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corr (εi, εj) = 0    i ≠ j                                                                 (5.17) 
 
Spatial correlation is more prevalent in time series than in panel data and it 
can be difficult to correct (Wooldridge, 2002 and Wooldridge, 2013). 
Nonetheless, it could exist in panel data if the observations are not 
independent. In such cases, it would be difficult to ascertain the extent to 
which the error of i or j influences institutional quality. In ECOWAS, it is likely 
that factors that are not economic such as political cooperation can 
influence institutions in which case 5.17 does not hold. Third, and perhaps 
the most important aspect of autocorrelation that has made empirical 
research in institutional economics difficult is endogeneity (reverse 
causality) (Shepherd, 2010). Endogeneity arises through bidirectional 
means where ‘IQ’ determines Econ; Econ also determines ‘IQ’ (Borner et 
al, 2004; Chang, 2010; Shepherd, 2010; Wooldridge, 2013 and Alonso et 
al, 2013). Symbolically, if; 
IQi,t = ∑ Econki,t + εi,t 
K
k=1
                                                              (5.18)  
And 
∑ Econki,t = IQi,t + εi,t 
K
k=1
                                                              (5.19)  
 
Then, current Econ depend on IQ; Econ must be influenced by shocks to 
IQ, which means that Econ is correlated with ε. Regressions generally 
assume no autocorrelation in any model specification either in space or 
time. Therefore, we should perform panel autocorrelation tests to make the 
necessary data transformation. 
One solution to endogeneity per Engel and Granger (1987) is to use lags of 
the variables in a multiple equation model where autoregressive models 
such as VAR estimation technique is used. However, as we highlighted 
earlier, VAR models are not ideal in the presence of dummies. 
Nonetheless, the inclusion of lagged IQ means we cannot assume strict 
exogeneity in the model although it captures the path dependent 
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characteristics of current IQ. Some papers have proposed solutions to this. 
Some papers suggested the use of proxies of lagged IQ as an instrument 
provided it influences IQ only through its lag (Acemoglu et al, 2001 and 
Kandil, 2009). Other papers used the initial values of IQ (IQi0) as an 
independent variable instead of lagged IQ.  By contrast, a time variable 
could be created that captures whether IQ would have changed regardless 
of the observed variables in the model. Acemoglu et al (2001) used 
European mortality rates as a proxy for lagged IQ. For ECOWAS, a 
language dummy could also be used as proxy for lag IQ because of the 
regions Empirehood and colonial history that may contain memory in 
explaining current institutional quality. Our aim is to test for stationarity and 
then make the necessary transformation in order to enable us to use OLS. 
Endogeneity cannot be removed entirely in estimating determinants of 
institutional quality. Therefore, we are only estimating the extent to which 
some variables contain useful memory in explaining current IQ. 
Furthermore, additional variables such a dummy for the 1993 revised 
ECOWAS treaty and belonging to a West African monetary zone could also 
be relevant. Therefore, the main equation that we intend to estimate is an 
extended version of 5.15 specified in 5.20 below.  
IQi,t = β0 + β1Econki,t + β2IQi0 + β3IQj,t + β4Wki,t + εi,t                 (5.20)  
Where; 
IQi,t =  institutional quality indices of country i   at time t , 
Econki,t =  is vector of k variables of country i at time t  
IQi0 =  the initial value of IQ which is 1996 values for each country   
IQj,t = IQ of partner countries (V − i partner countries in ECOWAS)  
V =  Total number of ECOWAS countries.   
β′s = parameters or coefficients  
εi,t = error term  
Wki,t = dummies such as belonging to WAMZ or WAEMU and language  
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The intention is to estimate 5.20 first. We will then drop the independent 
IQ’s and replace them with language dummy as proxy for past IQ. We will 
first test panel autocorrelation and stationarity before estimating equation 
5.20. 
5.3.3.1 Estimation method- process of convergence 
The thesis will also examine the extent to which the quality of institutions 
exhibits convergence in the ECOWAS region.  This is plausible because 
ECOWAS aims to establish common regional institutions in the quest for 
economic and political union. Moreover, we expect regional institutions to 
be common in the RTA if they are going to promote regional cooperation, 
integration and development through trade expansion (Fafchamps, 2004 
and Helble, 2012 and Lejarraga and Shepherd, 2013). As we highlighted in 
chapter two, we argue that we could extend the convergence of income and 
price within trade theory to test the process of convergence of institutions. 
Ben-David (1996) offered a simple convergence test of income and price for 
trade partners that we adopt, and it is represented in equation 5.21. 
(IQi,t −  IQi,t) =  ∅ (IQi,t−1 −  IQi,t−1) + εi,t                                  (5.21) 
Where 
t = time in years 
IQi,t is log of the institutional quality, 
IQi,t is average institutional quality of the sample  and 
IQi,t−1 is the lag of the log institutional quality indices 
IQi,t−1 is the average of the lag 
The half-life convergence rate adopted by Ben-David (1996) is given in 
(eq.5.22); 
half life convergence =
ln(0.5)
l n(∅)
                                                      (5.22)  
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The half-life convergence measures the number of years (half-life) it takes 
before the differences in IQ are halved. We highlighted earlier that OLS 
could give efficient estimates if the data is stationary (Sims, 1980; Gujarati 
and Porter, 2009 and Wooldridge, 2013). A value ∅<1 in equation 5.21 
implies convergence among trading partners while a value greater than 1 
implies divergence. As highlighted earlier, convergence test requires data 
to be stationary. Nonetheless, the small sample size means that the 
stationary test may not have strong estimation power although the Levin–
Lin–Chu panel unit root test could cater for small panels and small-time 
periods (Baltagi, 2005). However, a 30-year time span is recommended 
(Baltagi, 2005 and Stata Manual Guide, 2013). Nonetheless, we will perform 
a panel unit root test and for individual countries. 
In summary, equation 5.20 and 5.21 are the focus of interest to be 
estimated. The main proposition in equation 5.20 is that the quality of 
institutions is a function of some k Econ indicators, its past IQ, the IQ of its 
regional trade partners and control variables such as belonging to a 
monetary zone. We will drop the independent IQ and replace it with a 
language dummy since they can both represent the same thing. Equation 
5.21 test the process of convergence of institutional quality in the ECOWAS 
region by measuring the extent to which the variance of IQ could be 
explained by its past variance. In the next section, we look in more detail 
the data that is going to be used to estimate the two equations. 
5.4 Variables and Data 
5.4.0 Introduction 
So far, we derived a model in section 5.2.2 and then discussed the method 
that is going to be used to estimate the model in section 5.3.3. The aim of 
this section is to discuss and justify the variables that are going to be used 
to estimate the determinants of institutional quality and the process of 
convergence. We will also discuss how some of these variables are 
computed and how to deal with missing values and the process of shifting 
or rescaling variables. We will first discuss the independent variables 
followed by a discussion of the institutional quality indices (dependent 
variables).  As we highlighted in section 5.2, more than twenty variables 
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have been used in estimating the determinants of institutional quality. This 
raises two issues about estimation. Using all the twenty variables brings less 
parsimony which consumes the degree of freedom. A higher degree of 
freedom (n-1) implies that we are less likely to reject a null hypothesis. In 
contrast, excluding relevant variables leads to omitted variable bias. One 
way of accommodating the two issues is to include variables that are 
supported by the institutional theories we discussed and are also relevant 
in the context of ECOWAS. 
Our theoretical discussion in section 5.1 suggested that countries could 
standardize and improve the quality of their institutions conditional on 
perceived economic benefits. These benefits are realized through trade, 
investment, and development. From the NIE point of view, trade, investment 
and development characterises repeated interaction between countries 
which ultimately lead to demand for better institutions in order to smooth 
future transactions.  Indeed, these three variables have been used 
consistently in the existing literature on the determinant of institutional 
quality (Islam and Montenegro, 2002; Fafchamps, 2004 and Borner et al, 
2004). Moreover, we also highlighted that the IPE predicts that state 
capacity is important in determining the quality of institutions because they 
are the enforcers of contracts (North, 1990; Raiser et al, 2001; Borner et al, 
2004, Siba, 2008 and Alonso et al, 2013). 
Therefore, we intend to use these four variables- trade, investment, 
development, and state capacity as the main independent variables, 
although trade could be argued to be the most important. There are other 
variables that could be important in the context of RTAs and ECOWAS such 
as the effect of the formation of the RTA on the quality of institutions, the 
effect of the current monetary zones and its colonial past. 
We will discuss each of these variables in more detail. 
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5.4.1 Development- The human development index (HDI) 
Existing research within institutional economics generally used GDP per 
capita as a proxy for the level of development. Related variables including 
education, health and population have been used as additional variables. 
Nonetheless, we could bring together these variables into a composite value 
that represents the level of development. The human development index 
(HDI) has been computed on this basis. The HDI is a composite index 
derived from the geometric mean of normalized indices from three 
dimensions, namely income per capita, life expectancy at birth (in years) 
and the level of education (mean years of schooling and expected years of 
schooling) (UNDP Human Development Report Technical Notes, 2013). So 
far, no papers have used the HDI as a proxy for the level of development 
despite its plausibility. 
The justification for using the HDI as a proxy for the level of development 
hinges on two aspects. First, it leads to parsimony because it brings 
together three indicators which have been found to be statistically significant 
in determining institutional quality (La Porta, 1999; Straub, 2000; Islam and 
Montenegro, 2002; Alonso et al, 2013 and Berggren et al, 2013). Secondly, 
development comes with better living standards, rising incomes and 
economic transactions which could lead to demand for more foreign goods 
(Islam and Montenegro, 2002; Moss, 2006 and Stefanadis, 2010). If 
regional trade is subjected to high trade costs, regional traders would 
demand their removal to remain competitive with foreign goods. Rodrik et 
al (2004) and Herger et al (2008) found that rising incomes improves 
institutional quality because it can promote cross-border investment, trade 
and competition. Therefore, the income dimension is plausible to use. 
The other dimensions of the HDI have also been used in determining 
institutional quality. For example, the life expectancy dimension is 
associated with longevity, good nutritional intake and less diseases (HDR, 
1990; Islam and Montenegro, 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003 and Rodrik, 
2007). Furthermore, a healthy population is more economically productive 
which feeds into greater economic transaction and subsequently, demand 
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for better institutions that remove uncertainty, lower transaction costs and 
coordinate future market transactions (Subramanian et al, 2000; Straub, 
2000; Acemoglu et al, 2005, and Siba, 2008). Easterly and Levine (2003) 
argued that people living in tropical hot weather are less economically 
productive due to diseases and germs which lowers demand for good 
institutions. Therefore, the life expectancy dimension measures geography 
and health status. Life expectancy at birth (in years) measures the average 
number of years a newborn infant would live (World Development Indicators 
Database, 2015). 
The educational dimension is also assumed to determine institutional quality 
because educated societies are likely to demand better institutions and are 
difficult to corrupt because they would know their rights under trade 
agreements (Straub, 2000 and Borner et al, 2004). In addition, a highly 
educated population would be able to foster and abide by consensual rules 
that govern society while demanding their rights under ECOWAS protocols. 
Therefore, using the HDI as a proxy for the level of development is more 
appealing than per capita income because it includes other dimensions that 
have been found to determine institutional quality. 
Nonetheless, the HDI indices are not comparable across years because the 
data used to compute them differ from one period to another (Human 
Development Report (HDR), 2009). Therefore, we derive our own 
composite HDI using the UNDP methodology (UNDP HDI Report, 2014). 
Differences in the use of variables mean we should consider data availability 
and to justify which set of variables we should use. Table 5.2 below shows 
the number of times each indicator has been used to compute the HDI since 
it was first launched in 1990. The life expectancy data have been used in all 
the years. It is readily available from the world development indicators 
database for all ECOWAS countries from 1996 to 2015. Hence, it does not 
provide difficulty in justifying its use. 
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Table 5.2 Number of time variables are used to compute the HDI 
Indicator 
Times used 
(years=1990-
2014 
Percentage 
used 
Life expectancy at Birth (years) 25 100 
GDP per capita (PPP US$) 20 80 
Adult literacy rate (+15 above) 20 80 
Gross enrolment ratio 15 60 
Mean years of schooling 10 40 
Expected years of schooling 5 20 
Source: Authors computation. The computation of the HDI started in 1990 
and it has been computed annually since then. 
With regards to the income and education dimension, several variables 
have been used. For example, the income dimension has used two sets of 
variables since 1990 namely, GDP per capita and GNI per capita with and 
without PPP. The GDP per capita is more readily available for all ECOWAS 
countries. Furthermore, it has been used 80% of the time as shown in Table 
5.2 above. Therefore, we use GDP per capita (PPP 2011 international $) as 
the income dimension. 
Table 5.2 also shows the number of times each education variable has been 
used to compute the HDI from 1990 to 2014. Although the adult literacy rate 
and gross enrolment ratio were used 80% and 60% of the time respectively, 
the mean years of schooling and the expected years of schooling data are 
more readily available for all ECOWAS countries. Furthermore, it is the most 
recent data set used to compute the HDI by the UNDP. Thus, the means 
years and expected years of schooling data set will be used to compute the 
educational dimension. However, the adult literacy rate and gross enrolment 
ratio were also used as a pilot to gauge whether the two HDI values would 
be identical. For most of the years, the HDI values were identical when the 
2005 and 2013 goalpost from the UNDP was used as a benchmark. 
Additionally, the mean years and expected years of schooling captures 
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literacy rates as well as enrollment rates. Mean years of total schooling, age 
25+ measures the average years of education completed among people 
over the age of 25 which is a good indicator of literacy rates. Expected years 
of schooling are the number of years a child of school entrance age is 
expected to spend at school, or university, including years spent on 
repetition. It is the sum of the age-specific enrolment ratios for primary, 
secondary, post-secondary, non-tertiary and tertiary education (World 
Development Indicators Database, 2015). Nonetheless, some years are 
missing from the education dataset that shall be discussed in section 5.4.8. 
 
5.4.2 Computation of the human development index (HDI) 
The methodology used to compute the HDI differed from one year to 
another. One common feature in all the methods is that a standard goalpost 
was used although the values differed. Furthermore, the initial computation 
in each of the three dimensions used equation 5.23 below; 
Dimension index =
Actual value −    minimum value
Maximum value −minimum value
                          (5.23) 
 
From 1990 to 2009, the simple arithmetic mean of the three dimensions was 
used to arrive at the final HDI. In 2010, the methodology slightly changed 
where the geometric mean of the three dimensions was multiplied to arrive 
at the final HDI. According to the 2010 Human Development Report (HDR) 
technical notes, the change in methodology has lowered the indices in 
general, although it has not made any significant difference in the overall 
global rankings of individual countries. Therefore, it was decided that the 
2013 UNDP methodology and goalpost will be used in this chapter since it 
is the most current approach. To further test if the two methods will generate 
identical HDI indices, the old methodology was also applied using the 2005 
goalpost. The 2013 methodology produced more identical indices with those 
computed by the UNDP. Table 5.3 shows the goalpost that was used in 
2013. 
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 Table 5.3 2013 Goalpost basis for computing the HDI index 
Source: The 2013 UNDP HDR Technical Notes 
The goalposts are based on observing the highest values recorded for an 
individual country in the world as a benchmark. For example, Table 5.3 
show that Qatar had the highest GDP per capita in 2013 while the USA 
recorded the highest expected years of schooling. We use Table 5.3 
goalpost to compute HDI for each ECOWAS member from 1996 to 2015. 
The process involves computing each dimension using equation 5.24 to 
5.28 to arrive at the final HDI index in equation 5.29 or 5.30 respectively. 
Income index                                        =
Ln (Actual GDP)−Ln(100)
Ln(127562)      −     Ln(100)
         (5.24) 
The life expectancy index                            =
Actual−20
83.6−     20
                    (5.25)  
Mean years of schooling (+25 years)  (A1) =
Actual−0
13.3−       0
                      (5.26) 
Expected years of schooling                (A2) =
Actual−0
18−         0
                      (5.27) 
Education index                                           =
√A1∗A2−0
0.971−0
                     (5.28) 
HDI index = 3√income ∗ life expectancy ∗ education                        (5.29) 
Or equivalently, 
HDI = { income ∗ life expectancy ∗ education} 0.3333                            (5.30) 
 
Indicator 
Maximu
m value 
Minimu
m value 
Country 
Observed
) 
Life expectancy at Birth (years) 83.6 20 Japan 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 
US$) 
127562 100 
Qatar 
Mean years of schooling 13.3 0 USA 
Expected years of schooling 18 0 USA 
Combined Education Index 0.971   
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5.4.3 Trade data 
As we highlighted in the previous sections, trade is an important determinant 
of institutional quality. The argument is that countries that open their 
markets to international trade attracts competition, investment as well as 
learn best practices from one another (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2003). 
Domestic firms that face competition from foreign firms will lobby their 
governments to develop better institutions to help minimize trade costs and 
to exploit their comparative advantage. At the RTA level, more trade leads 
to demand for better harmonized institutions since weak institutions levy 
high transaction costs, uncertainty and coordination failures (Islam and 
Montenegro, 2002; Fafchamps, 2004 and Borner et al, 2004). Indeed, our 
discussion in chapter three and four demonstrated that weakness in the 
quality of institutions levies high cost to ECOWAS cross-border trade. 
Nonetheless, there is no consensus on which set of trade data should be 
used. Some papers used openness which measures the extent to which a 
country trade with the rest of the world. Several measures of openness have 
been proposed in the existing literature. The sum of imports and exports as 
a percentage of GDP is the most commonly used measure of openness 
(Ades et al, 1999; Straub, 2000; Islam and Montenegro, 2002; Rodrik and 
Subramanian, 2003; Borner et al, 2004; Rodrik, 2007; Herger et al, 2008; 
Mocan, 2008; Berggren et al, 2013; Lejarraga and Shepherd, 2013 and 
Alonso et al, 2013). Dollar and Kraay (2002) difference trade/GDP ratio as 
an indicator of trade liberalization policy while Sachs and Warner (1997) 
defined a country as open if their; 
a) Average tariff rate is less than 40%, 
b) Non-tariff barriers cover less than 40% of trade goods, 
c) The country is not socialist, 
d) The government does not control exports through marketing boards, for 
example and 
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e) The black-market premium was less than 20% during the 1970s and 
1980s. The black-market premium is the exchange rate in the black market 
relative to the official rate. The smaller the value, the less exchange rate 
controls. 
However, openness, as it is commonly measured does not necessarily 
capture how regional institutions could be determined because openness, 
data by computation contains trade data that is not entirely composed of 
regional trade data. Thus, we proposed intra-ECOWAS trade as a 
percentage of GDP or bilateral trade flows (US$) since it is the most likely 
factor that can influence the development and convergence of institutions 
at the regional level (Yansane, 1977; Ellis and Mogan, 1984, Omorogbe, 
1993; Ogunkola, 1998, Iyoha, 2005; Spycher and Okike, 2006; Keane et al, 
2010; Zannou, 2010 and Assane et al, 2014).  The trade data comes from 
the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS). 
The method used to compute the openness and intra-ECOWAS trade as a 
percentage of GDP is the same and the only difference being the type of 
import and export data used. The method is expressed as thus; 
 
openness = {
(X+M)
GDP
} ∗ 100                                                               (5.31)         
intra − ECOWAS trade as % of GDP = {
(X+M)
GDP
} ∗ 100                         (5.32)       
Where; 
X is exports, 
M is imports and 
GDP is gross domestic product in constant 2010 US$  
 
5.4.4 State capacity data 
State capacity is fundamental in determining institutional quality since it 
defines states' ability and legitimacy to enforce rules and to manage 
different interest groups in society (Raiser et al, 2001; Borner et al, 2004, 
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Siba, 2008 and Alonso et al, 2013). State capacity is expected to be 
entrenched within the cultural norms of society and the political commitment 
of the state to strengthen its relations with its citizenry and partners (Borner 
et al, 2004). Therefore, state capacity captures both cultural and political 
determinants of institutions which as we highlighted earlier generates 
parsimony. 
In the context of ECOWAS, the authority of heads of states is the highest 
and final decision maker. Therefore, without their blessing, it will be difficult 
to set common regional trade rules and to facilitate the implementation of 
protocols. 
State capacity has been measured using different variables. Raiser et al 
(2001) used general government expenditure as a percentage of GDP as 
proxy while Borner et al (2004); Moss et al (2006) and Alonso et al (2013) 
used total government tax revenues. The argument from both authors is that 
government revenue provides resources for investment in quality 
institutions while simultaneously ensuring a social contract between the 
state and the people. Similarly, government revenue dictates its ability to 
spend. It can also dictate the extent to which the state can withstand internal 
and external shocks that might be detrimental to societal welfare. 
Both datasets are identical, and their percentage differences are minimal. 
Nonetheless, general government final expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
is the most readily available and covers a longer period that revenue as a 
percentage of GDP. Therefore, we use general government final 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP as a proxy for state capacity. The data 
come from the World development indicators database. 
 
5.4.5 Foreign direct investment (inflows) 
The three variables that were discussed in the previous sections; state 
capacity, trade and the level of development are assumed to be the most 
important determinants of institutional quality. Furthermore, we argue that 
FDI could also determine the quality of institutions using similar arguments 
with openness. That is, an increase in FDI inflows in various sectors is likely 
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to improve institutional quality, particularly contract enforcement and 
property rights institutions since investors would want to have legal 
guarantees for the protection of their assets. In addition, FDI creates 
employment and other goods which could improve the quality of life of 
citizens that could lead to demand for better services and institutions. For 
example, the high FDI in the oil and the housing sector in the Middle East 
helped improve the provision of infrastructure development, better 
regulation of the housing and financial market (Kandil, 2009). FDI can also 
lead to greater technological and information diffusion that can trigger 
learning best practices from other regions that could subsequently lead to 
convergence of regional trade institutions. 
FDI inflows have been used in several papers as an important determinant 
of institutional quality, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle 
East (Bloch and Tang, 2004; Herger et al, 2008; Kandil, 2009). Most papers 
used FDI net inflows both in value and as a percentage of GDP to estimate 
its impact on institutional quality (Bloch and Tang, 2004; Kandil, 2009 and 
Driffield and Jones, 2013). FDI outflows can also determine the quality of 
institutions and harmonization since they are more likely to capture intra-
regional FDI. However, FDI outflow data are limited in the ECOWAS region. 
Thus, we utilize FDI net inflows in value and as a percentage of GDP as our 
variables. The data are from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development database (UNCTADSTAT). 
FDI inflows comprise three components, namely; 
1. Equity capital, which is the foreign direct investor's purchase of shares 
of an enterprise in a country other than that of its residence, 
2. Reinvested earnings comprise the direct investor's share (in proportion 
to direct equity participation) of earnings not distributed as dividends by 
affiliates or earnings not remitted to the direct investor. Such retained profits 
by affiliates are reinvested and, 
3. Intra-company loans or intra-company debt transactions refer to short- 
and long-term borrowing and lending of funds between direct investors 
(parent enterprises) and affiliate enterprises. 
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Data on FDI flows are presented on a net basis (capital transactions' credits 
less debits between direct investors and their foreign affiliates). Net 
decreases in assets or net increases in liabilities are recorded as credits 
(with a positive sign), while net increases in assets or net decreases in 
liabilities are recorded as debits (with a negative sign). Hence, FDI flows 
with a negative sign indicate that at least one of the three components of 
FDI is negative and not offset by positive amounts of the remaining 
components. These are called reverse investment or disinvestment. The 
FDI data were in millions of current US$. Hence, we transformed the data 
into real FDI using equation 5.33 below to ensure it is measured in the same 
units with the other variables. 
Real FDI ={
current FDI
GDP Deflator
} ∗ 100                                                       (5.33) 
 
5.4.6 Other Variables 
We highlighted earlier that other variables could be important in determining 
the quality of institutions such as the effect of ECOWAS. Given that 
ECOWAS is polarized into two monetary zones, WAMZ and WAEMU, and 
colonial heritage, we will look at the extent to which belonging to different 
monetary zones and colonial heritage influence the quality of institutions. As 
specified in our model, the lag of IQ could be used to represent language 
dummy and colonial heritage dummy. The justification for using these 
variables is because could have effect on the extent to which ECOWAS 
achieve their deep integration goals. 
 
5.4.7 The Dependent variables (institutional quality indices) 
As discussed in chapter two, several institutional quality indices have been 
used in the existing literature to estimate the conjunction of factors which 
determine them. The sources of these institutional quality indices include; 
➢ World Economic Forum global enabling trade indices 
➢ Country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) of the World Bank 
➢ Doing Business of the World Bank and 
➢ The World Bank worldwide governance indicators 
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These indices are readily available and are computed using survey data 
where various stakeholders in society are asked about their perception of 
certain rules governing society. The responses from these participants are 
then indexed into a composite value as a proxy for the quality of an 
institution. The availability of data in each of these sources varies. For 
example, the global enabling trade indices are only available from 2008 to 
2014 which offers a small sample size relative to the world governance 
indicators whose data spans from 1996 to 2015. Additionally, the world 
governance indicators are the most comprehensive proxy for institutional 
quality because they include data from several hundred variables generated 
from 31 individual data sources for each country that included some aspects 
of the enabling trade indices and doing business indices (Kaufmann et al, 
2010 and Alonso et al, 2013). Therefore, we utilize the institutional quality 
indices from the worldwide governance indicators as proxies. Table 5.4 
provides four of the six institutional quality indices from the world 
governance indicators and their definition. The indices range from -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) presence of governance. 
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Table 5.4 Institutional quality indices (dependent variables) 
Institutional 
quality indices Definition 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. 
Regulatory 
quality 
Capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. 
Rule of law 
Capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society and the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Control of 
Corruption 
Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and 
private interests. 
  Sources: World Bank, World Governance Indicators 
The choice of these four indices assumes that they serve as a good proxy 
for regional institutional quality. Furthermore, they have been used in the 
existing literature as a proxy (Alonso et al, 2013). An extensive discussion 
of these indices was made in chapter two. 
However, most of the institutional quality indices are negative while 3 years 
are missing. How to deal with the missing data will be discuss in section 
5.4.8. The negative characteristics of the data demonstrate that it would be 
impossible to take their natural logarithm and interpret them in percentage 
terms. Moreover, transforming the data in the presence of nonstationarity 
that is useful to test convergence is difficult with negative numbers. 
Therefore, the institutional quality indices will be rescaled to transform them 
into positive values. 
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5.4.7.0 Rescaling and shifting the institutional quality (IQ) indices 
There are two ways of altering an existing dataset, namely shifting and 
rescaling. Shifting involves adding or subtracting the whole data by a 
constant while rescaling involves dividing or multiplying all the dataset with 
a constant (Trosset, 2001 and Gentle et al, 2004). A data could also be 
shifted first and then rescaled by adding the mean to each of the dataset 
and divide by the standard deviation. Shifting and rescaling could also take 
a process which involves; 
1. Finding the largest and smallest value of each IQ for each country 
2. The smallest value is then added to each of the data set 
3. The smallest value is then subtracted from the largest 
4. The final stage involves dividing process 2 by 3. 
 
Since the IQ dataset ranges between -2.5 and 2.5 and that the average 
values of ECOWAS IQ are in the negative range, a shift and then rescale 
will get the data as close to their true values as possible. Shifting and 
rescaling was tried first although some of the data still contained negative 
values which makes taking their natural logarithm impossible.  
Therefore, this thesis intends to use only shifting by adding 20 to all the IQ 
dataset. Moreover, Deaton (1997) and Wooldridge (2013) argue that in 
estimation methods, rescaling or shifting will make little difference to the 
coefficients since the data is altered by the same constant. Wooldridge 
(2013) suggested that all the variables used in the regression should be 
rescaled by the same constant factor. The mean of data that is shifted will 
change. However, all the measure of spread including the standard 
deviation and range remain the same since the data has been altered by 
the same constant. Hence, estimates are unlikely going to be distorted 
through shifting or rescaling (Deaton, 1997 and Wooldridge, 2013). 
Therefore, the IQ data is shifted by 20.  
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5.4.8 Dealing with missing data 
So far, we have discussed the variables that are going to be used to 
estimate our model. Nonetheless, the institutional quality indices and the 
educational dimension required to compute the HDI got missing years which 
should be corrected. For example, the institutional quality indices got 
missing data in 1997, 1999 and 2001. Similarly, the education data are 
generally collected every two to five years since education policies are not 
likely to change annually. (World Development Indicators Database). 
Missing data can arise due to several factors, including nonresponses, 
incomplete information to compute a composite variable or completely 
missing (Schafer, 1997). In situations where the data is missing due to 
incomplete information or nonresponses, ignoring that missing data can 
bias empirical results (Schafer, 1997; Royston, 2005; Enders, 2010 and 
Graham, 2012).  Therefore, we need to think about dealing with the missing 
years. 
Several procedures have been suggested in the existing literature about 
how to deal with missing data such as; deletion method, sample mean or 
mode substitution, interpolation, and extrapolation, using growth rates and 
multiple imputation (MI) method (Rubin, 1987; Schafer, 1997; Meijering, 
2002; Enders, 2010; Graham, 2012; STATA Manual Guide, 2013 and 
Ghysels and Miller, 2014)). All these procedures are similar since they 
attempt to predict the missing values from the existing data set which 
assumes that, the existing data set can indirectly provide us with 
approximate information about the missing values. Hence, their accuracy 
could be contested. 
Nonetheless, we proposed to use linear interpolation and extrapolation to 
compute the missing years. This is justified for several reasons. First, 
education policies do not change annually, while the years of schooling for 
all ECOWAS members have been consistently increasing since the early 
1990s due to their collaboration with the World Bank and UNESCO to meet 
goal two of the millennium development goals (Harmon, 2001; Cogneau et 
al, 2010; Dupraz, 2013; MDG Report, 2014 and World Development 
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Indicators Database). Secondly, Cogneau et al (2010) discovered that the 
West African integration efforts are stimulating a positive convergence of 
general welfare including literacy rates. Additionally, expenditure on 
education as a % of GDP has been gradually increasing in all ECOWAS 
countries (World Development Indicators Database, 2015). Therefore, the 
missing education data set is identical with the existing ones given that 
education policies do not change annually.  
By contrast, MI could be more efficient in computing the institutional quality 
indices since it exhibits certain characteristics such as being a restricted 
range between -2.5 and 2.5 (Kaufmann et al, 2010). Furthermore, Rubin 
(1987) and Raghunathan et al (2001) argued that multiple imputations are 
efficient if the data exhibits restricted range, if large amount of data is 
missing and if the data is expected to take linear or non-linear shape. 
However, graphical expression shows that the institutional quality indices 
for ECOWAS members did not fluctuate severely which suggest that the 
missing years were unlikely to diverge from the existing dataset. Moreover, 
only three years were missing. Therefore, we intend to use interpolation and 
extrapolation since MI is complex and unnecessary when the missing data 
is small. 
 
5.4.8.0 Interpolating and extrapolation method of filling missing values 
Linear interpolation and extrapolation is the process by which missing data 
yn  are predicted from two existing data points  y1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 y2 
Where; 
y1  < yn < y2 
Where, 
yn is the interpolated data (missing value), 
y1is the first or initial data point, 
y2is the second data point, 
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Hence, to compute yn, equation 5.34 is used 
𝑦𝑛 = 𝑦1 + {(𝑡𝑛 − 𝑡1)
𝑦2−𝑦1
𝑡2−𝑡1
 }                                                        (5.34)  
Source: Meijering, 2002; Lembcke, 2010 and STATA Manual Guide, 2013 
 
Where; 
tn = is the observed period corresponding to the missing value yn, 
t1 = is the observed period corresponding to y1 
t2 = is the observed period corresponding to y2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
t = in this case is in years 
y = is the values to be interpolated and extrapolated. 
 
Equation 5.34 has been used in several papers to fill in the missing values 
(Meijering, 2002; UNESCO Institute for Statistics; Xiao, 2006 and STATA 
Manual Guide, 2013). If the computed value on the right-hand side of 
equation 5.34 is positive, 𝑦𝑛 will always be greater than 𝑦1. Equation 5.34 is 
standard, and it is the method used in STATA and SPSS statistical software 
to interpolate and extrapolate missing data. Furthermore, the UNDP does 
use linear interpolation and extrapolation to compute the missing values for 
all the three dimensions21 when calculating the HDI (UNDP Technical 
Notes, 2013). 
Figure 5.1 below shows the trend in the expected years of schooling and 
the average years of schooling in Senegal from 1975 to 2011 which suggest 
minimal fluctuation in the years for which the data was missing. The 
education data for other ECOWAS members also exhibit similar trends. 
                                                          
21 The three dimensions are GDP per capita, life expectancy and education datasets. 
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Figure 5.1 Senegal education data  
Source: World Development Indicators Database: Figure computed from 
STATA 
Interestingly, STATA can interpolate and extrapolate missing values for 
which data was not available prior by using the two closest data points to 
compute the previous and future values using equation 5.34 above 
(Meijering, 2002; Lembcke, 2010 and STATA Manual Guide, 2013). To test 
the robustness of our interpolated and extrapolated values, a comparison 
was made by simulation. We omitted some years in the GDP per capita 
dataset and interpolated and extrapolated them. Thereafter, we used growth 
rates of GDP per capita to compute the simulated missing values which 
were then compared. The percentage (%) difference between these values 
was virtually zero. Therefore, we can argue that the method of filling the 
missing values in the education and institutional quality indices dataset is 
justified given the robust approach we took. 
Furthermore, a 3-year moving average is used to capture the extent to 
which the slow pace of change of IQ and the other economic variables could 
be captured within range of years. The three-year moving average could 
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minimise the bias of the missing data. Delgado et al (2012) used 3-year 
moving averages to estimate the determinants of national competitiveness 
in order to test robustness. They found that the 3-year moving average is 
robust suggesting that microeconomic and economic variables have a short 
and long-term impact on national competitiveness.  
In summary, the HDI, trade, state capacity, regional trade and FDI will be 
used as independent variables in addition to initial values of IQ and a 
monetary zone dummy. The language dummy will only be used to see if the 
results will be identical to the initial IQ. The rescaled IQ will be used as the 
independent variables. Several tests will be made including autocorrelation 
and stationarity in order to enable us to test convergence and estimate the 
determinants of institutional quality. In the next section, the results and 
analysis will be made. 
 
5.5 Results and Analysis 
5.5.0 Introduction 
The main theme of this thesis is to examine the quality of institutions in the 
ECOWAS region in order to inform policy about their deep integration goal. 
Our discussion in the previous chapters demonstrated that intra-ECOWAS 
trade is low due to several factors, including high trade costs associated 
with weakness in the quality of institutions. Moreover, we also demonstrated 
that the quality of some institutions in the Empirehood and colonial periods 
in West Africa was more standardized than the current situation in the 
region. We argued that some facets of regional institutions were abandoned 
after independence. Therefore, it is useful to examine the conjunction of 
factors that determine institutional quality today in order to inform policy. 
Furthermore, testing the process of convergence could further inform policy 
about the pace of deep integration. 
The aim of this section is to present the results and analysis about the 
process of convergence and determinants of institutional quality using 
exclusive ECOWAS dataset as a new case study. We will first present 
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summary statistics and simple Pearson correlation of the data set to 
visualize the nature of the relationship between IQ and Econ. We will then 
test for autocorrelation and stationarity in the data that enable us to test 
convergence and estimate determinants of institutional quality using panel 
fixed or random effect depending on the Hausman test.  
 
5.5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 5.5 below shows the summary statistics of the data for ECOWAS 
countries from 1996 to 2015. The summary is based on the raw data without 
any transformation. Table 5.5 shows 300 observations (nT) matrix where ‘n’ 
is the number of ECOWAS countries (15) and ‘T’ is the number of years 
(20) for the dataset. The standard deviation of the overall sample for each 
variable shows that the within sample variability is smaller than the between 
sample variability. That is, the variation in each variable across countries 
(between sample variability) is larger than variation within each country 
dataset. This implies the unlikelihood of an outlier that could skew 
estimations towards the outlier. However, the FDI inflows and as percentage 
of GDP is more variable relative to any of the other variables in the dataset 
given the large size of their standard deviation.  This is largely due to Nigeria 
and Ghana acting as outliers attracting an estimated US$4.7 billion and 
US$3.3 billion in 2014 respectively while the third biggest receiver of FDI in 
the region Cote d’ Ivoire received US$438 million (World Investment Report, 
2015 and UNCTADSTAT, 2016). 
The average HDI is 0.41 which is low relative to other regions of the world. 
The HDI standard deviation demonstrated that the variation in HDI across 
countries (between) is equal to the variation of a country overtime (within). 
Furthermore, intra-ECOWAS trade as a percentage of GDP (regtrade) 
averaged 6.841%, which suggest that regional trade is not a big component 
of regional GDP in the last two decades. The standard deviation also 
demonstrates small variability in regtrade between countries and within a 
country. As we highlighted in chapter four, ECOWAS aims to increase its 
trade share to 40% by 2030. Therefore, ECOWAS recognized the poor 
performance of regional trade flows and the importance of increasing it in 
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order to stimulate their deep integration goal. The small variability in the HDI 
and regtrade shows that the levels of development and trade of ECOWAS 
members are identical, hence they face similar development and trade 
policy challenges. This offers the need for greater cooperation and 
coordination of their economies. State capacity also shows little variability 
within a country and between ECOWAS members. Thus, these three 
variables demonstrate that they could be normally distributed.
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Table 5.5 Summary statistics of the nominal data 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
rule 
overall -0.725 0.607 -2.230 0.775 
between   0.580 -1.463 0.493 
within   0.231 -1.491 -0.108 
goveff 
overall -0.797 0.500 -1.982 0.393 
between   0.478 -1.514 0.123 
within   0.190 -1.265 0.036 
corrupt 
overall -0.634 0.480 -1.740 0.911 
between   0.425 -1.130 0.402 
within   0.249 -1.798 0.334 
regqual 
overall -0.633 0.438 -2.112 0.132 
between   0.404 -1.481 -0.117 
within   0.198 -1.264 -0.005 
hdi 
overall 0.412 0.085 0.228 0.648 
between   0.076 0.292 0.578 
within   0.043 0.291 0.495 
state 
overall 13.289 4.234 3.542 25.794 
between   3.668 8.537 21.626 
within   2.309 4.985 20.920 
fdig 
overall 5.266 10.002 0.012 85.963 
between   7.670 1.322 32.266 
within   6.705 -26.501 58.964 
fdit 
overall 512.043 1291.065 0.105 8914 
between   1057.980 11.670 4175 
within   786.546 -2486 5251 
regtrade 
overall 6.831 6.706 0.000 34.538 
between   4.744 0.000 13.522 
within   4.888 -6.304 28.934 
Observation 300 
Countries (n) 15 
Years (T) 20 
Source: Authors Compilation from STATA:  See Appendix 5A for the detailed data output. 
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The mean of the IQ indices is all negative, which demonstrated the extent 
to which institutions are weak in the region on average. The maximum IQ 
for corruption is 0.91 in Cape Verde in 2015 while the minimum is -1.74 in 
Liberia in 1996. The other IQ variables also shows more variability between 
ECOWAS members than within a country over time given the large size of 
the between standard deviation relative to the within standard deviation.  For 
regulatory quality (regqual), the maximum is 0.31 in Ghana in 2011 while 
the minimum is -2.11 in Liberia in 1998. Cape Verde on average acted as 
the outlier with positive IQ and closer to 1 relative to Liberia which lie in the 
other extreme with negative numbers and closer to the minimum value of -
2.5. Table 5.6 shows the range in the IQ values which suggests extreme 
values on both end of the tails. 
Table 5. 6 Range of Institutional quality indices in West Africa 
Indicator 
Control of 
Corruption 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Political 
Stability  
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule 
of 
Law 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Maximum 0.91 0.39 1.11 0.13 0.77 0.97 
Minimum -1.74 -1.98 -2.5 -2.11 -2.29 -1.83 
Country 
with 
Maximum 
Cape 
Verde 
2015 
Cape Verde 
1996 
Cape 
Verde 
2000 
Ghana 
2011 
Cape 
Verde 
1996 
Cape Verde 
2011 
Country 
with 
Minimum 
Liberia 
1996 Liberia 1998 
Liberia 
1996 
Liberia 
1998 
Liberia 
1996 Niger 1996 
Source: Authors computation. Data from World Governance Indicators 
Further investigation into the data using histogram depict the distribution of 
each of the IQ and other indicators. The visual histogram demonstrates that 
corruption, regulatory quality and rule of law are more normally distributed 
relative to the other IQ indices although they appear to contain some 
outliers. Most of the outliers that are skewed to the left are concentrated in 
Cape Verde while there are no systematic outliers skewed to the left. 
Nonetheless, the 90th percentile frequency is 9 observations for Cape Verde 
which is small relative to the overall observation of Cape Verde. Therefore, 
Cape Verde could be excluded from the regression in order to establish if 
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the results would be identical. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of two IQ 
indices. Cape Verde performance in controlling corruption and improving 
their other institutional quality indices could be largely attributed to their 
political stability relative to the other countries in ECOWAS. 
Figure 5. 2 The distribution of the IQ dataset 
 
    Source: Authors Depiction. See Appendix 5C for the rest of the figures. 
 
The other variables also demonstrate more normal distribution characteristics 
except for the FDI (as % of GDP) dataset which is heavily skewed to the left. 
This was shown in table 5.6 above. Nonetheless, the logarithm of FDI in 
1000US$ appear more normally distributed. Figure 5.3 shows the distribution 
of the HDI and state capacity which suggest some degree of normality.  
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Figure 5.3: HDI and State Capacity histogram 
 
Source: Authors Depiction. See Appendix 5C1 for more variables 
In summary, the descriptive statistics demonstrate that there is more 
variability between ECOWAS countries than variability of a country over time. 
This means more fluctuation in some of the dataset over time relative to 
variability between ECOWAS members. However, the histograms depict that 
between samples variability is more spread than the summary statistics 
suggests. Therefore, a further observation of the data using the kutosis and 
skewness will reveal the extent to which outliers (within sample variability) 
could pose potential problems in estimation. Kurtosis measures the 
skewness of a distribution around its mean. A large and greater than 3 
kurtosis demonstrates more spread and variability in the dataset. A kurtosis 
less than three demonstrate that the whole dataset is skewed around its 
mean hence, outliers pose no issues in statistical inference. Table 5.7 shows 
the results of the kurtosis test for the dataset. 
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Table 5.7 Kurtosis test results 
Indicator Kurtosis Indicators Kurtosis 
Control of Corruption 1.16  HDI 0.35 
Government Effectiveness -0.56 
State 
Capacity -0.13 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism -0.66 
FDI 
(1000sUS$) 0.56 
Regulatory Quality 0.44 Regtrade 1.83 
Rule of Law -0.27   
Voice and Accountability -0.73   
Source: Authors Depiction. See Appendix 5D and 5D1 for more detail 
 Clearly, Table 5.7 shows that the kurtosis are less than three for all the 
variables which demonstrate that the dataset is skewed around its mean. 
Hence, within sample variability or outliers are unlikely to pose bias in the 
estimation. Hence, the normality of the dataset in general means we could now 
test autocorrelation, stationarity, convergence and the determinants of 
institutional quality using panel data. This will be done in the next sections. 
 
5.5.2 Correlation Test 
Correlation measures the direction and strength of association between two 
variables rather than causality which is associated with regression. It is a good 
starting point to look at the degree of association between variables before 
establishing the direction of causality. While it is argued that correlation should 
be used when the nature of relationship is expected to be linear, normally 
distributed and continuous, it can still be useful in gauging some degree of 
relationship although our institutional quality indices are not continuous. In 
section 5.5.1, it was demonstrated that the data was normally distributed. 
Table 5.8 shows the correlation matrix derived from excel for the entire dataset. 
The correlation shows a mixed pattern of both positive and negative correlation 
as well as no correlation.  
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The institutional quality indices demonstrate positive correlation between 
them. This is useful because it enables us to decide whether to use all the IQ 
indices. The correlation between corruption and rule of law is 0.814 (0.8142), 
which means 66% of the variation of corruption is related to rule of law. 
Similarly, the correlation between regulatory quality and rule of law is 0.830 
(0.8302), which means 69% of the variation of regulatory quality is related to 
rule of law. Corruption and political stability is 0.612 (0.6122), which means 
37% of the variation of corruption is related to political stability. Government 
effectiveness demonstrate high correlation with the other IQ variables. 
Therefore, in consolidation to the summary statistics in section 5.5.1, we will 
use the five IQ variables in the autocorrelation, convergence and regression. 
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Table 5. 8: Correlation of regulatory quality with the independent variables 
  hdi state fdig fditt regtrade corrupt goveff political regqual rule  voice 
hdi 1            
state 0.091458 1           
estate 0.287705 -0.15132           
fdig 0.073551 -0.04474 1          
fdit 0.352195 -0.15888 0.025627          
fditt 0.352195 -0.15888 0.025627 1         
regtrade -0.06969 -0.03499 -0.15517 -0.15328 1        
exports  0.292943 -0.1413 -0.11669 0.730306 0.094977        
imports 0.063856 0.133269 -0.15184 0.118474 0.519338        
ecowas 0.248965 -0.05482 -0.14945 0.604472 0.279072        
corrupt 0.4027 0.514557 -0.09566 -0.12892 -0.24723 1       
goveff 0.432431 0.425371 -0.22613 -0.02298 -0.23264 0.799518 1      
political 0.242357 0.448011 -0.11887 -0.31698 0.014984 0.611569 0.637665 1     
regqual 0.31112 0.47748 -0.32469 0.013892 -0.04341 0.754245 0.832758 0.654935 1    
rule  0.416843 0.487068 -0.14697 -0.09015 -0.11712 0.814089 0.870375 0.790797 0.830083 1   
voice 0.453957 0.536087 -0.01057 -0.00282 -0.1415 0.692123 0.735539 0.637208 0.623881 0.766212 1 
Note: Authors Depiction from excel output
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The correlation between the HDI and state capacity and the institutional quality 
indices are positive and low. For example, only 16% of variation in HDI is 
related to corruption while state capacity with corruption is 27% variation. State 
capacity and regulatory quality is related by 23% while regulatory quality is 
related with HDI by 10%. Raiser et al (2001) found that a 10% increase in state 
capacity lead to 0.02% increase in institutional quality in Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans. This is consistent with existing research findings that as incomes 
and development improves, citizens will demand better institutions from their 
governments (Straub, 2000; Moss, 2006; Berggren et al, 2013 and Alonso et 
al, 2013). 
In contrast, the correlation between regional trade as % of GDP (regtrade) and 
FDI with the institutional quality indices is weak and sometimes no correlation. 
For example, the correlation between regtrade and political stability is positive 
but with 0% relationship. The other IQ variables show inverse relationship with 
regtrade and insignificant. 
In summary, the correlation matrix demonstrates that variation in the 
institutional quality indices are related to HDI and state capacity while FDI and 
regtrade seem to offer no statistically significant association with the 
institutional quality indices. This will be investigated further through estimation. 
Before that, we test for autocorrelation and stationarity. 
 
5.5.3 Testing Autocorrelation in panel data 
Autocorrelation exists when the independent variables are correlated with 
the error term. This was discussed in section 5.3. The presence of 
autocorrelation in panel data unbias the estimates. However, the standard 
errors get smaller with high R-square which makes statistical inference 
inefficient because the variances become large (Drukker, 2003; Reyna, 
2007 and Wooldridge, 2013). Furthermore, convergence test is conditional 
on no autocorrelation data. Hence, we need to test it before any estimation. 
The test involves obtaining residuals from a first difference regression. The 
210 
 
residuals are then regressed against the independent variables (Pasaran, 
2004 and Wooldridge, 2013). The Wooldridge panel autocorrelation test has 
been widely used in the literature because it is assumed less restrictive and 
it is also robust (Drukker, 2003 and Reyna, 2007). The statistical 
significance of the coefficients is tested under the null; 
H0=no first-order autocorrelation 
Ha=first-order autocorrelation 
By computation if; 
 IQi,t = β0 + β1Econki,t + β2IQi0 + β3IQj,t + β4Wki,t + εi,t                      (5.35)        
IQi,t − IQi,t−1 =  β1Econki,t − Econki,t−1 + β2IQj,t − IQj,t−1 + εi,t − εi,t−1 (5.36)   
∆IQi,t =  β1∆Econki,t + β2∆IQj,t + ∆εi,t                                                   (5.37)          
 
Hence, any time invariant variable such as language and belonging to 
WAMZ or WAEMU are removed once the first difference is performed. Once 
the residuals are obtained from 5.37, we then specify the Wooldridge test 
for autocorrelation in panel data using equation 5.38 below; 
e =  β2Econki,t + β2IQi0 + β3IQj,t + β4Wki,t                                          (5.38)                                                  
Failing to reject the null hypothesis implies that the data does not suffer from 
autocorrelation. We could then proceed in testing panel stationarity. 
Pasaran test for correlation also tests whether the residuals are correlated 
across countries (entities) using similar method to the Wooldridge test 
(Pasaran, 2004). It should be noted that differencing panel data require 
care. In STATA, setting the data as a panel would differentiate the data for 
each of the units without cross over to another country. 
The results from autocorrelation allows us to take two approaches to 
estimate panel data. STATA has robust commands that correct 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity once it is found. The other option is 
to correct it first before estimation.  
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Nonetheless, autocorrelation cannot be removed entirely in research 
related to the determinants of institutional quality. Easterly and Levine 
(2003) and Diebold (2007) highlight that all we do in regressions is to identify 
how useful some variables are in explaining institutional quality rather than 
establish causality.  
Several tests were conducted, and the data suggest autocorrelation in the 
panel data in the nominal and log form. Appendix 5F and 5G provides the 
Wooldridge test. We then used generalised least square to predict the 
residuals and used Wooldridge autocorrelation test on the residuals using 
equation 5.38. These results are presented in Table 5.9 below.  
Table 5.9 Wooldridge test for first-order autocorrelation in panel data 
Variable  F-statistics  P-Value 
Regulatory Quality  0.373  0.552 
Control of Corruption  0.058  0.813 
Rule of Law 0.480  0.501 
Political Stability 0.226  0.642 
Voice and Accountability 0.050  0.823 
    Source: Authors Compilation from STATA. See Appendix 5G 
Using generalised least square (GLS) or feasible generalised least square 
(FGLS) correct autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in panel data 
(Baltagi, 2005). We follow equation 5.35 to 5.38 using Xtregar command in 
STATA to check autocorrelation in the residuals (Baltagi, 2005 and 
Wooldridge, 2013). The results in Table 5.9 suggest no autocorrelation in 
the residuals. Therefore, we can proceed to test stationarity and 
convergence in the next section and then measure determinants of 
institutional quality. 
 
5.5.4 Testing stationarity and convergence 
As we highlighted earlier, convergence test requires the data to be 
stationary. A data is said to be stationary if the mean, variance, and 
autocorrelation do not vary over time (Burke, 2011 and Wooldridge, 2013). 
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With these qualifications, stationary data satisfy many of the Classical 
Linear Regression Model (CLRM) assumptions about the behavior of a 
dataset. Therefore, estimating a stationary data imply that we could directly 
attribute variation in the dependent variable to variation in the independent 
variables. Stationarity test is mainly associated with time series data. 
Nonetheless, models have been developed to test stationarity in panel data 
such as; Levin–Lin–Chu (LLC), Harris–Tzavalis (HT), Breitung, Im–
Pesaran–Shin (IPS), and Fisher-type tests (Baltagi, 2005 and STATA 
Manual Guide 13, 2013). These tests have as their null hypothesis that all 
the panels contain a Unit root (nonstationary). Hence, rejecting the null 
imply the presence of stationary data (Quah, 1993; Islam, 1995; Ben-David, 
1996; Levin et al, 2002 and Baltagi, 2005). The null in the Hadri -Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) test is that all the panels are trend stationary. Banerjee et al 
(2005) argued that the panel unit root test may reject the null when the time 
series aspects are nonstationary. Hence, a unit root test for each country 
(cross section) should be performed and then the panel data test to see if 
the results will be identical. Furthermore, panel Unit root test (stationarity) 
has been criticized for assuming cross-sectional independence (Baltagi, 
2005). Hence, a Unit root tests in the panel data and for each country will 
be performed to see if results are identical. The basic model for the panel 
unit root test is given in equation 5.39; 
∆IQit =  ∅i IQi,t−p + Zit 
′ γi + μit                                                        (5.39)  
Where; 
IQ = institutional quality or another variable, 
i = 1 country, 
t =  1, … , n  number of years, 
p = number of lags 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 
′ 𝛾𝑖 = panel specific means which are assumed to equal 1 and 1t with the trend 
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The null in equation 5.39 is H0: ∅i = 0 for all i against the alternative that 
Ha: ∅i < 0  for some or all i. Rejecting the null implies the presence of 
stationarity.  The key to equation 5.39 is the degree to which past values of 
a series contain useful information explaining its current behavior. If the 
coefficient gets smaller, it implies that its current value does not depend on 
time. Hence, the difference between the current values and their lags is 
temporary. 
The panel stationarity test requires that the data is strongly balanced. 
Therefore, the time span used to compute the unit root test is from 1996 to 
2015. As highlighted earlier, the small-time span means that the unit root 
test may not have strong estimation power. We use ECOWAS averages as 
a base which is the default for the unit root test in STATA (using the average 
of the sample as a base). Since the existing literature is inconclusive as to 
which test is the most appropriate, we utilise all the six tests. 
In general, the findings support the view that the quality of institutions is 
stationary and converging over time with and without cross section 
dependence in the Levin–Lin–Chu (LLC) and Harris–Tzavalis (HT) test. The 
other tests also suggest element of stationarity in the dataset except for the 
Hadri -Lagrange multiplier (LM) that suggest the data is nonstationarity. On 
the balance that the majority of the test suggest stationarity demonstrate 
consistency. We also performed unitroot test for each country. The results 
were much mixed relative to the panel results. Nonetheless, the LLC 
demonstrates stationarity for the majority of the countries while the other 
test demonstrates stationarity for selected number of countries. This is 
expected since, in recent years, ECOWAS has been building joint border 
posts to improve the regulation of cross-border trading and to reduce trade 
costs brought about by weakness in the quality of institutions. Furthermore, 
the coming into force of the ECOWAS CET in 2015 implies the adoption of 
common trade policies. Although it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the ECOWAS CET, its launch has the potential to reduce incentives to 
collect bribes by customs officials given the commonality of trade policies. 
Table 5.10 shows the results of the unitroot test. 
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Table 5.10 Unitroot test of selected institutional quality indices 
Type of Tests Variable normal Demean Demean/trend Trend Lags Trend/ lags Trend/demean/lags 
Levin-Lin-Chu 
regulatory 
-3.390 
(0.000)  
 -2.799 
(0.003) 
 -2.267 
(0.011) 
 -1.675 
(0.046) 
 -4.166 
(0.000) 
 4.834 
(1.000) 
 -2.833 
(0.002) 
corruption 
 -2.807 
(0.002) 
 -2.918 
(0.001) 
 -1.463 
(0.071) 
 -1.902 
 (0.028) 
 -3.520 
(0.000) 
 2.688 
(0.996) 
 -2.095 
(0.018) 
rule of law 
-2.909 
(0.001)  
 -2.873 
(0.002) 
 -2.103 
(0.017) 
 -2.218 
(0.013) 
 -2.735 
(0.003) 
 1.263 
(0.896) 
 -2.323 
(0.010) 
Harris–Tzavalis (HT 
regulatory 
-1.380 
(0.083)  
 -1.238 
(0.107) 
 -0.733 
(0.231) 
 -0.298  
(0.382)       
corruption 
 -1.661 
(0.048) 
 -1.529 
(0.063) 
 1.321 
(0.906) 
 1.128 
(0.870)       
rule of law 
 0.094 
(0.537) 
0.217 
(0.583)  
 2.199 
(0.986) 
 1.892 
(0.970)       
Im–Pesaran–Shin (IPS 
regulatory 
 -2.282 
(0.011) 
 -2.325 
(0.010) 
 -2.296 
(0.010) 
 -1.642 
(0.050) 
 -1.433 
(0.075) 
 0.556 
(0.711) 
 2.068 
(0.980) 
corruption 
 -2.148 
(0.015) 
-1.923 
(0.027)  
 -1.542 
(0.061) 
 -1.771 
(0.038) 
 -0.152 
(0.439) 
 0.901 
(0.816) 
 1.188 
(0.882) 
rule of law 
 -0.328 
(0.371) 
 -0.395 
(0.346) 
 -0.531 
(0.297) 
 -0.823 
(0.205) 
 -1.247 
(0.106) 
 0.917 
(0.820) 
 0.310 
(0.621) 
Fisher 
regulatory        
 3.610 
(0.000)  
 7.244 
(0.000) 
 2.334 
(0.009) 
corruption 
  
       
 1.076 
(0.140) 
 2.074 
(0.019) 
 -0.143 
(0.557) 
rule of law         
 1.056 
(0.145) 
 -2.106 
(0.982) 
 -0.301 
(0.618) 
Note: This test is based on the log of institutional quality indices. The figures in brackets are the corresponding p-values. See Appendix 5H for 
the detailed data.
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The key findings from these tests show that the data is stationary for most 
of the test in the panel and for some individual countries. This allows us to 
test convergence and other estimates. Nonetheless, the stationary test 
which also implied convergence does not depict how long it could take 
ECOWAS to attain full convergence of their institutions (Quah, 1993; Islam, 
1995; Ben-David, 1996; Levin et al, 2002 and voltage, 2005). This is more 
useful from a policy point of view rather than just stating that institutional 
quality exhibit convergence. Hence, we adopt Ben-David simple 
convergence equation which is restated blow in 5.40. 
(IQi,t −  IQi,t) =  ∅ (IQi,t−1 −  IQi,t−1) + εi,t                                     (5.40)        
The half-life convergence rate adopted by Ben-David (1996) is given by; 
Half life convergence =
ln(0.5)
ln (∅)
                                                          (5.41) 
It measures the number of years (half-life) it takes before the differences in 
IQ are halved. We highlighted in section 5.3 that using OLS could give 
efficient estimates if the data is stationary (Sims, 1980; Gujarati and Porter, 
2009 and Wooldridge, 2013). Therefore, we performed the Hausman test in 
order to decide whether to use fixed or random effect in panel data and 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects. The 
Hausman test involved running a regression for the fixed effect and stores 
the predicted values and then run another regression using random effect 
and store it. Then a Hausman test is performed with the null that the unique 
errors are uncorrelated with the regressors (Reyna, 2007). Rejecting the 
null implies the use of fixed effect. In the Breusch and Pagan test, the null 
hypothesis is that the variances across entities is zero or more specifically 
that there is no significant difference across units (no panel effect).  The 
results in the Hausman test suggest the use of fixed effect while Breusch 
and Pagan suggest random effect. The fixed effect results only marginally 
reduced the coefficients rather than change the statistical significance of the 
results. For example, the regulatory quality coefficient of the random effect 
is 0.946 and that of the fixed effect is 0.804. The same applies to the other 
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institutional quality indices. Similarly, the fixed effect regression omits the 
dummy variables which is relevant in understanding the extent to which they 
influence institutional quality. Therefore, we use the random effect. 
 Table 5.11 shows the results from a random effect (RE) and feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) methods. Table 5.12 presents the three-
year moving average results. The FGLS is used to correct 
heteroscedasticity.  
Given the divergent path of integration between WAMZ and WAEMU that 
was discussed in chapter three, we also estimated the half-life convergence 
by sub-regional groupings. This could provide useful policy implication on 
how ECOWAS could manage deep integration in the presence of 
overlapping sub-regional groupings. 
217 
 
Table 5.11 Random effect and FGLS convergence test in panel data 
Estimation RE FGLS Half-Life 
variable regqual corrupt rule political regqual corrupt rule political regqual corrupt rule political 
ECOWAS 
 0.946 
(0.000) 
 0.947 
(0.000) 
0.954 
(0.000)  
 0.937 
(0.000) 
0.946 
(0.000)  
 0.946 
(0.000) 
 0.954 
(0.000) 
 0.937 
(0.000)  12  13 15   11 
WAEMU 
0.953 
(0.000)  
 0.905 
(0.000) 
 0.945 
(0.000) 
 0.909 
(0.000) 
 0.953 
(0.000) 
 0.905 
(0.000) 
 0.945 
(0.000) 
 0.909 
(0.000)  14  7  12  7 
WAMZ 
 0.949 
(0.000) 
 0.944 
(0.000) 
 0.956 
(0.000) 
0.952 
(0.000)  
 0.949 
(0.000) 
 0.986 
(0.000) 
0.958 
(0.000)  
0.954 
(0.000)   13  12  15  14 
Note: p-values in parentheses.  WAMZ includes the 6 English speaking countries plus Guinea Conakry. WAEMU includes the 8 French-speaking countries plus Guinea-Bissau. 
Cape Verde is not part of WAMZ or WAEMU but part of ECOWAS. FGLS is feasible generalized least squares. See Appendix 5K 
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Table 5.12 Random effect and FGLS convergence test in panel data; 3 year moving average results 
Estimation RE FGLS Half-Life 
variable regqual corrupt rule political regqual corrupt rule political regqual corrupt rule political 
ECOWAS 
 0.949 
(0.000) 
 0.949 
(0.000) 
0.957 
(0.000)  
 0.949 
(0.000) 
0.964 
(0.000)  
 0.993 
(0.000) 
 0.965 
(0.000) 
 0.966 
(0.000)  13  13  15  13 
WAEMU 
0.817 
(0.000)  
 0.954 
(0.000) 
 0.951 
(0.000) 
 0.944 
(0.000) 
 0.924 
(0.000) 
 0.962 
(0.000) 
 0.954 
(0.000) 
 0.959 
(0.000)  4  15  14  12 
WAMZ 
 0.952 
(0.000) 
 0.918 
(0.000) 
 0.954 
(0.000) 
0.939 
(0.000)  
 0.961 
(0.000) 
 0.956 
(0.000) 
0.963 
(0.000)  
0.969 
(0.000)   14  8  15  11 
Note: p-values in parentheses.  WAMZ includes the 6 English speaking countries plus Guinea Conakry. WAEMU includes the 8 French-speaking countries plus Guinea-Bissau. 
Cape Verde is not part of WAMZ or WAEMU but part of ECOWAS. FGLS is feasible generalized least squares. See Appendix 5K 
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The results in Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 are based on the logarithm of the 
institutional quality indices. The key observation in both tables signify the 
importance of cooperation within ECOWAS as a prerequisite to accelerate 
integration rather than pursuing separate integration with the current 
monetary zones. Indeed, the half-life convergence for ECOWAS is smaller 
on average than the half-life convergence of WAMZ. Expectedly, WAEMU 
which has been a customs union with a single currency and central bank 
demonstrate lower half-life convergence than WAMZ and ECOWAS. Indeed, 
the half-life convergence within the sub-groupings in ECOWAS suggests a 
divergent path which raises the issue of whether it would be possible in the 
medium term to achieve full convergence of institutions without streamlining 
some of them. For example, the half-life convergence of the regulatory quality 
for WAMZ members is 13 years while rule of law is 15 years. That of 
ECOWAS and WAEMU is moderately lower that WAMZ. Jones (2002) and 
Shams (2003) found that ECOWAS exhibit convergence of price and income, 
although the process is slow which supports our findings in the context of 
institutions. This process could be made slow if the multiple sub-regional 
groupings pursuing similar aims with divergent path is minimised. 
Interestingly, ECOWAS’s vision 2020 aims to remove all barriers to cross-
border trade as well as to launch the single currency (ECO) and to 
harmonise other institutional framework. Furthermore, the ongoing 
construction of joint border posts and increased sensitization of traders 
could facilitate the standardization of institutions and may have contribute 
to a faster integration (Ojide, 2010). These figures suggest that the 
presence of sub-groupings in ECOWAS is slowing the integration process 
although they could eventually merge. Furthermore, these results are 
consistent with trade theories and with previous findings that trading 
partners could exhibit the convergence of income and prices (Ben-David, 
1996 and Zhang, 2006). Further studies also found that institutional quality 
difference between trading partners does reduce trade flows (Helble et al, 
2012 and Lejarraga and Shepherd, 2013).  
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Therefore, full convergence of institutions requires greater cooperation 
between WAMZ and WAEMU. However, given the differences in the rate of 
convergence among the sub-groupings, WAMZ and WAEMU could work 
together in tandem within ECOWAS to accelerate the convergence process 
rather that the separate monetary zones. The novelty would be that WAMZ 
streamline its activities to pursue an ECOWAS wide integration process by 
adopting the successes within WAEMU given the lower convergence rate 
within WAEMU. Therefore, some of the WAMZ countries which might 
benefit from adopting institutions from WAEMU such as the CFA could 
adopt it. However, this will probably require political decisions as well as 
WAEMU departing from using the French treasury to deposit part of their 
external reserves (Diop, 2014; Sene, 2014 and Koulibaly, 2014). Indeed, 
one of the contending issues about ECOWAS monetary integration lies in 
the extent to which WAEMU and WAMZ cooperate. Figures vary, but the 
AfricanGlobe (2012) found that 14 French colonies in SSA (8 of which are 
part of WAEMU) deposited an estimated US$400bn to the French Treasury 
since independence. It is unlikely that WAMZ members would accept this 
initiative. Therefore, although the ECOWAS vision 2020 aims to achieve 
convergence of its regional institutions and to introduce a single currency, 
there are underlying issues which they should resolve first including 
accelerating the convergence of regional institutions. Greater cooperation 
within the framework of ECOWAS or WAMZ gradually adopting WAEMU 
successes is the novelty rather than the separate momentary zones that 
seem to have similar aims with divergent path that slows the convergence 
and deep integration process.  
In the next section, we complement the convergence process by estimating 
the conjunction of factors that determine institutional quality in the ECOWAS 
region. 
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5.5.5 Determinants of institutional quality 
In the previous section, we tested convergence of institutions within 
ECOWAS and found support for the convergence nexus although at a slow 
pace. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that the rate of convergence 
could be accelerated if WAMZ and WAEMU work together within the 
ECOWAS framework or improve cooperation. 
The aim of this section is to go a step further and complement section 5.5.4 
by estimating the conjunction of factors that determine the quality of 
institutions in the region. The model we specified demonstrate that the 
quality of institutions is a function of economic indicators, past institutional 
quality, the quality of institutions of other ECOWAS members and belonging 
to a monetary zone (Straub, 2000; Borner et al, 2004; Kandil, 2009 and 
Alonso et al, 2013). We use initial values instead of lagged institutional 
quality to minimise endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2013 and Koenker, 2014). 
Panel data is used for the 15 ECOWAS countries from 1996 to 2015 and a 
random effect to run the regression and FGLS to correct heteroskedasticity. 
We also used a three-year moving average in order to test robustness of 
the results. 
The results are presented in Table 5.13 and Table 5.14 below. Table 5.14 
are the three-year moving average results. The results show strong support 
for initial values, the level of development and state capacity as important 
determinants of institutional quality in ECOWAS. Furthermore, the results 
also demonstrate that the presence of WAMZ and WAEMU in part 
negatively impact on the quality of institutions in the region. Regional trade 
does impact on institutional quality, but the relationship is mixed depending 
on the type of institution. We look at each of these results in more detail 
below. 
The initial value of all the institutional quality (log initial IQ) indices 
demonstrate that past IQ contain useful information in explaining current 
institutions. Nonetheless, percentage improvement in past IQ leads to less 
than one percentage improvement in current institutions. These findings are 
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consistent with previous findings that past IQ and colonial history contain 
memory in explaining current institutions (Acemoglu et al, 2001; Rodrik, 
2007 and Nunn, 2008). Acemoglu et al (2001) argued that about 50% of the 
variation in current institutions of former colonies could be explained by past 
institutions. These findings have some implication because it demonstrates 
that institutions are sticky and takes time to improve. Therefore, ECOWAS 
ability to improve their institutions in the future could in part depend on the 
extent to which they make efforts to improve them now. 
We also estimated the extent to which the IQ for the rest of ECOWAS 
members impact on individual countries IQ (Log IQ Ecowas (V-i)). The 
findings demonstrate that there is a pull factor and learning practices from 
each other when it comes to regulatory quality and voice and accountability. 
That is, regulatory quality and voice and accountability of the rest of 
ECOWAS positively impact on domestic regulatory quality and voice and 
accountability. This may not be surprising because ECOWAS members 
have moved away from the non-interference in a sovereign nation slogan in 
SSA by holding each other accountable in the quest for democratisation, 
regional peace and security. ECOWAS recognised the importance of 
stability in the development process while the region has been recording 
positive amount of growth in the last decade. 
Furthermore, the level of development (lhdi), state capacity (lstate) and FDI 
(lfdig) also demonstrate positive and statistically significant relationship with 
the quality of institutions in the region. For example, 10-percentage 
improvement in the HDI leads to 0.9% and 1.3% improvement in regulatory 
quality and voice and accountability respectively. This is consistent with 
previous findings that development improves institutional quality (La Porta, 
1999; Straub, 2000; Rijckeghem et al, 2001; Islam et al, 2002; Acemoglu et 
al, 2005; Mocan, 2008; Levechenko, 2012 and Alonso et al, 2013). 
Therefore, pursuing a regional development initiative is likely to generate 
fruitful results for the region’s integration than separate development 
initiatives by individual member states. A 10-percentage increase in state 
capacity leads to 0.15% and 0.11% improvement in the rule of law and 
political stability respectively. Raiser et al (2001) also found that 10% 
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improvement in state capacity leads to 0.02% improvement in institutional 
quality in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.  These findings have some 
implications for ECOWAS. First, the impact of these variables is limited and 
that huge improvement in HDI, state capacity and FDI would be needed in 
order to promote region wide initiative to standardise their institutions. 
Indeed, our discussion in section 5.3.2 demonstrate that demand for better 
institutions hinge on the extent to which there is greater interaction between 
agents. Therefore, sharing development initiatives could generate demand 
for better regional institutions. 
Similarly, regional trade expansion should stimulate demand for better 
institutions and their standardisation in the region. Some papers have found 
that openness contains useful information in explaining the quality of 
institutions (Straub, 2000; Koremonos, 2001; Rosendorff and Milner, 2001; 
Islam and Montenegro, 2002, Shams, 2003; Stefanadis, 2010 and 
Shepherd and Lejarraga, 2013). However, our findings show that regional 
trade as percentage of GDP (lregtrade) positively influence regulatory 
quality and rule of law but not the other institutional quality indices. That is, 
10% improvement in lregtrade leads to 0.025% and 0.02% improvement in 
regulatory quality and rule of law respectively.  
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Table 5.13 Determinants of institutional quality 
Estimation Regulatory quality Corruption Rule of Law Political Stability Voice and Accountability 
Variable RE FGLS RE FGLS  RE  FGLS  RE  FGLS  RE  FGLS 
Log Initial IQ 
0.339 
(0.000) 
0.339 
(0.000) 
0.316 
(0.000) 
0.316 
(0.000) 
0.361 
(0.000) 
0.361 
(0.000) 
0.222 
(0.000) 
0.222 
(0.000) 
0.423 
(0.000) 
0.423 
(0.000) 
Log IQ Ecowas (V-i) 
0.160  
(0.355) 
0.160  
(0.346) 
-1.564 
(0.000) 
-1.564 
(0.000) 
-0.986 
(0.000) 
-0.986 
(0.000) 
-4.780 
(0.000) 
-4.780 
(0.000) 
0.725 
(0.000) 
0.725 
(0.000) 
lhdi 
0.090 
(0.000) 
0.090  
(0.000) 
0.184 
(0.000) 
0.184 
(0.000) 
0.063 
(0.011) 
0.063 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.978) 
0.002 
(0.978) 
0.138 
(0.000) 
0.138 
(0.000) 
lstate 
0.004  
(0.066) 
0.004 
(0.061) 
0.081 
(0.000) 
0.081 
(0.000) 
0.015 
(0.000) 
0.015 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.099) 
0.002 
(0.722) 
0.002 
(0.717) 
lfdig 
0.003  
(0.000) 
0.003  
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.081) 
0.003 
(0.076) 
0.002 
(0.023) 
0.002 
(0.021) 
sqlhdi 
0.056 
(0.000) 
0.056 
(0.000) 
0.098 
(0.000) 
0.098 
(0.000) 
0.034 
(0.008) 
0.034 
(0.007) 
0.014 
(0.657) 
0.014 
(0.651) 
0.081 
(0.000) 
0.081 
(0.000) 
lgoveff 
0.545 
(0.000) 
0.545 
(0.000) 
0.442 
(0.000) 
0.442 
(0.000) 
0.476 
(0.000) 
0.476 
(0.000) 
0.452 
(0.000) 
0.452 
(0.000) 
0.634 
(0.000) 
0.634 
(0.000) 
lregtrade 
0.0025 
(0.000) 
0.0025 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.425) 
0.001 
(0.417) 
-0.000 
(0.423) 
-0.000 
(0.415) 
Zone 
-0.004 
 (0.056) 
-0.004  
(0.052) 
-0.002 
(0.143) 
-0.002 
(0.136) 
-0.004 
(0.035) 
-0.004 
(0.031) 
-0.004 
(0.469) 
-0.004 
(0.461) 
0.004 
(0.204) 
0.004 
(0.196) 
Wald Chi square 
934.40 
(0.000) 
969.00  
(0.000) 
1132.32 
(0.000) 
1180.70 
(0.000) 
1745.20 
(0.000) 
1809.84 
(0.000)  
453.18 
(0.000) 
469.96 
(0.000) 
804.56 
(0.000) 
834.36 
(0.000) 
    
Observation 280 280 280 280 280  280  280 280  280  280  
Source: Author Calculation from STATA: Note:log initial IQ is the initial value of IQ; log IQ Ecowas (V-i) rest of ECOWAS IQ; lhdi- HDI for each member; lstate- state capacity for each member; lfdig- 
FDI for each member; lregtrade- intra-ECOWAS trade as % of GDP for each member; Zone- belong to WAMZ=0 and WAEMU=1; lhdiecow- log of hdi multiplied by total intra-ECOWAS trade; hdiecow- 
hdi multiplied by ecowas trade. 
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Table 5.14 Determinants of institutional quality; 3 year moving average results 
Estimation Regulatory quality Corruption Rule of Law Political Stability 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Variable RE FGLS RE FGLS  RE  FGLS  RE  FGLS  RE  FGLS 
Log Initial IQ 
0.374 
 (0.000) 
0.374 
 (0.000) 
0.341 
(0.000) 
0.341 
(0.000) 
0.298 
(0.000) 
0.298 
(0.000) 
0.103 
(0.031) 
0.103 
(0.027) 
0.386 
(0.000) 
0.465 
(0.000) 
Log IQ Ecowas (V-i) 
0.041 
(0.808) 
0.041 
(0.804) 
-3.057 
(0.000) 
-5.057 
(0.000) 
-2.646 
(0.000) 
-2.646 
(0.000) 
-6.366 
(0.000) 
-6.366 
(0.000) 
0.827 
(0.000) 
0.492 
(0.047) 
lhdi 
0.092 
(0.000) 
0.092 
(0.000) 
0.133 
(0.000) 
0.133 
(0.000) 
0.083 
(0.000) 
0.083 
(0.000) 
-0.014 
(0.804) 
-0.014 
(0.800) 
0.066 
(0.054) 
0.162 
(0.000) 
lstate 
0.009 
(0.001) 
0.009 
 (0.001) 
0.063 
(0.027) 
0.063 
(0.024) 
0.013 
(0.000) 
0.014 
(0.000) 
0.069 
(0.367) 
0.069 
(0.356) 
0.002 
(0.669) 
0.001 
(0.891) 
lfdig 
0.003  
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.036) 
0.004 
(0.032) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.001) 
sqlhdi 
0.055 
(0.000) 
0.055 
(0.000) 
0.073 
(0.000) 
0.073 
(0.000) 
0.040 
(0.001) 
0.040 
(0.001) 
0.008 
(0.784) 
0.008 
(0.779) 
0.042 
(0.016) 
0.096 
(0.000) 
lgoveff 
0.501 
(0.000) 
0.501 
(0.000) 
0.367 
(0.000) 
0.367 
(0.000) 
0.417 
(0.000) 
0.413 
(0.000) 
0.526 
(0.000) 
0.526 
(0.000) 
0.746 
(0.000) 
0.547 
(0.000) 
lregtrade 
0.002 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.000) 
0.0007 
(0.565) 
0.0007 
(0.556) 
-0.000 
(0.947) 
0.000 
(0.620) 
Zone 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.042) 
0.003 
(0.037) 
-0.000 
(0.745) 
-0.000 
(0.691) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.644) 
-0.002 
(0.332) 
Wald Chi square 
1286.20 
(0.000) 
1339.56  
(0.000) 
1579.89 
(0.000) 
1648.12 
(0.000) 
2111.95 
(0.000)  
2256.81 
(0.000) 
550.90 
(0.000)  
576.15 
(0.000) 
430.42 
(0.000  
848.61 
(0.000) 
Observation 251 251 251 251 251 251  251 251  251 251 
Source: Author Calculation from STATA: Note:log initial IQ is the initial value of IQ; log IQ Ecowas (V-i) rest of ECOWAS IQ; lhdi- HDI for each member; lstate- state capacity for each member; lfdig- 
FDI for each member; lregtrade- intra-ECOWAS trade as % of GDP for each member; Zone- belong to WAMZ=0 and WAEMU=1; lhdiecow- log of hdi multiplied by total intra-ECOWAS trade; hdiecow- 
hdi multiplied by ecowas trade. 
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Our discussion in the previous chapters demonstrate that ECOWAS cross 
border trade cost about US$100 per trip in bribes despite all the protocols 
being signed on free movement of goods and people. This point to weak 
regulatory quality and lack of adherence to the rule of law. Moreover, we 
demonstrate that ECOWAS traders are not sensitised about their rights. 
Therefore, regional trade must increase to a level that stimulate demand to 
improve the quality of institutions in the region given the trade costs 
associated with weak institutions. 
Interesting belonging to WAMZ or WAEMU (zone22) generated mixed 
results. The zone coefficients show negative for all the IQ except voice and 
accountability in Table 5.13 while Table 5.14 shows that regulatory quality, 
rule of law and FGLS in voice and accountability are negative. The positive 
coefficients confirm our convergence results that WAEMU is more 
integrated that WAMZ in the ECOWAS region. That is, the negative 
coefficients demonstrate that WAMZ quality of institutions is lower 
compared with WAEMU. Therefore, WAMZ members could learn best 
practices from WAEMU. Moreover, WAMZ could streamline its operations 
and adopt an ECOWAS wide standardisation process than to emulate 
WAEMU in order to prepare for an ECOWAS wide integration. Furthermore, 
the zone coefficient is not surprising because existing papers have 
demonstrated that WAMZ and WAEMU seem to follow a divergent path 
although the official message is about cooperation (Aryeetey, 2001; 
Richards et al, 2010 and Javed, 2013).  
In summary, the estimates demonstrate that history, HDI, state capacity and 
FDI contain useful information in explaining the quality of institutions in 
ECOWAS while not so much regional trade as a percentage of GDP. 
Moreover, the zone coefficient demonstrates that WAEMU enjoy better 
institutional quality and standardisation compared to WAEMU. Therefore, 
                                                          
22 Note that 1 was designated for WAEMU and 0 WAMZ in the zone coefficients 
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these two zones should work in tandem within ECOWAS in order to 
accelerate the integration process. 
 
5.6 Summary and conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was twofold. First, to specify a model underpinned 
by institutional theories that could be estimated. The second aim was to 
estimate the conjunction of factors which determine institutional quality and 
to test the process of convergence. 
We argue that research into the determinants of institutional quality should 
be treated as a process where they exist due to demand. This enabled us 
to establish the direction of causality in the initial stages as underpinned by 
institutional theories. These theories demonstrate that institutions emanate 
from repeated interaction of agents that lead to the emergence of norms 
that could ultimately determine the quality of institutions. In this way, we 
demonstrate that in the context of an RTA like ECOWAS, the quality of 
institutions is a function of the degree of interaction of members. These 
interactions manifest themselves through trade, investment and other 
initiatives to share development. Although endogeneity could not be 
eliminated entirely in this area of research, our assumptions justified 
specifying a model where IQ is the dependent variable. We also argued that 
the history of West Africa could influence current institutions (Rodney, 1981; 
Acemoglu et al, 2001 and Nunn, 2008). Therefore, we use initial values to 
represent history of IQ and whether the presence of the two monetary zones 
impact on institutional quality. 
The main contribution to the existing literature is the exclusive use of 
ECOWAS dataset that have so far not been done in the existing literature 
particularly in the context of RTA. Furthermore, we specified a model 
underpinned by institutional theories and assumed the direction of 
calusality. The results are mixed as shown in Table 5.13 and 5.14. The key 
findings demonstrated that the cooperation of ECOWAS could accelerate 
the integration process and improve the quality of institutions. We found that 
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history (initial values) the level of development, the capacity of the state and 
FDI contain useful information in explaining the quality of institutions in the 
region. However, regional trade as a percentage of GDP only positively 
impact on regulatory quality and rule of law compared to the other IQ’s. 
Furthermore, the findings demonstrated that the presence of WAMZ and 
WAEMU negatively impact on the quality of institutional and that WAEMU 
enjoy better IQ relative to WAMZ. From a policy point of view, ECOWAS 
could prioritise strengthening development and democracy if they want to 
improve the quality of institutions in tandem with increase in production that 
has the potential to increase demand for regional products. Furthermore, 
the results show that ECOWAS has the potential to achieve convergence 
of institutions. However, the rate of convergence could accelerate if WAMZ 
and WAEMU members work in tandem within ECOWAS. It suggests that 
the presence of WAEMU and WAMZ as separate entities slows the 
convergence process. The convergence rate in WAEMU is lower than 
WAMZ. Therefore, WAMZ could adopt successes of WAEMU or let 
ECOWAS be the main driver of the integration process.  
Hence, the key findings are that ECOWAS should strengthen development 
and democracy in the short run to improve the quality institutions and the 
process of convergence. Furthermore, the success of the convergence 
process could depend on the extent to which WAMZ and WAEMU 
cooperate. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusions and policy implications 
6.0 Introduction 
This thesis examines the quality of institutions and the process of 
convergence in the ECOWAS region in order to deepen our understanding 
of institutions and to inform policy about their deep integration scheme. The 
thesis is divided into three research questions that addressed the issue. The 
motivation of the thesis emanated from the assertion in some papers that 
south-south integration schemes like that of ECOWAS are undesirable due 
to several factors including the production of similar goods and no 
production complementarities. (Cernat, 2001; Schiff and Winters, 2003; 
Venables, 2003 and Hertzenberg, 2011). Other factors that contribute to 
weak trade flows include high tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade (Milner, 
Morrissey and Zgovu, 2009; Leyaro and Morrissey, 2010 and Hertzenberg, 
2011) As a result, comparative advantage and economies of scale could not 
explain the basis for south-south trade since they tend to produce similar 
products and no production complementarities respectively. 
Nonetheless, the number of RTAs among developing nations (south-south) 
has increased or past ones strengtheneded in the last three decades. The 
WTO Report (2014 p. 7) estimated that the number of RTAs increased by 
372% (123 to 581) from 1948 to 1994. Therefore, it is desirable to study 
RTAs in developing nations because they are increasing, or old ones 
strengthened despite the arguments against their south-south integration.  
ECOWAS was formed in 1975 and a revised 1993 ECOWAS treaty was 
signed. The revised 1993 treaty created institutions such as WAMA and 
EBID with a view to accelerate regional integration and development, 
including maintaining peace and security in the region and to tackle climate 
change. Therefore, the increased number of RTAs among developing 
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nations like ECOWAS suggests that there is no consensus about the 
undesirability of south-south integration schemes. 
In 1990, ECOWAS became a free trade area (FTA) with the launch of the 
ECOWAS TLS (Omorogbe, 1993 and Aryeetey, 2001). The launch of the 
ECOWAS CET in 2015 made ECOWAS a customs union and marked a 
further step toward deeper integration. Hence, intra-ECOWAS trade 
shouldn’t incur extra costs associated with tariffs given that all protocols on 
free movement of goods and people have been signed. However, the non-
tariff barriers pose fundamental challenges to ECOWAS trade because they 
make the implementation of ECOWAS protocols difficult. We assert in this 
thesis that weakness in the quality of institutions is among the non-tariff 
barriers that pose the greatest challenge to ECOWAS trade because they 
add to trade costs, coordination failures and uncertainty. Furthermore, we 
assert that the undesirability of south-south integration schemes could in 
part, be attributed to weak institutions given its associated coordination 
failures, uncertainty and high trade costs. 
Therefore, the main goal of the thesis was to examine the conjunction of 
factors that determine the quality of institutions and the process of 
convergence in the ECOWAS region that has not been sufficiently done in 
the existing literature. Furthermore, identifying factors that drive institutional 
quality could inform policy about harmonisation of institutions in the region. 
As a first step, we argue that it is useful to examine the development and 
evolution of institutions in West Africa from a historical perspective starting 
from the Empires of Western Sudan to the present day. This will enable us 
to understand how the present institutions in West Africa came about and 
the historical changes that took place. This was the basis for the discussion 
in chapter three.  
Our examination in chapter three demonstrated that regional trade 
institutions, including, common currencies, common trade taxes and rules, 
protection of trade routes and single administration existed in the pre-
independence era in West Africa relative to the current situation. Moreover, 
although the trading quantities were unknown, intra-West African trade and 
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trade with the rest of the world through the trans-Saharan routes was 
extensive during the Empirehood era given that the Empires emerged 
through trade expansion (Hopkins, 2014). The colonial era also created 
common institutions such as single currency, standardise trade rules and 
single administration system that could have been useful for deep 
integration. Nonetheless, some of these institutions were abandoned after 
independence especially among the Anglophone and Portuguese countries. 
Therefore, the ECOWAS deep integration scheme could learn best 
practices from their historical past especially in the standardization of 
institutions. We assert that if south-south integration schemes are 
undesirable, then intra-ECOWAS trade should be lower than ECOWAS 
trade with the rest of the world.  
The second research question examines ECOWAS trade relative to each 
other and relative to the rest of the world. We examine ECOWAS trade by 
product category base on the SITC 1 product classification. Furthermore, 
we examine ECOWAS trade potential and some of the catalyst and 
impediments to regional trade. The key findings in the second research 
question demonstrated that intra-ECOWAS trade is low relative to each 
other and relative to the rest of the world. Moreover, the low share of 
ECOWAS trade could in part, be attributed to the non-tariff barriers 
especially weak regional trade institutions. Indeed, the examination in the 
first research question demonstrated that the pre-independence era that 
was characterized by more standardized regional trade institutions enjoyed 
high trade level relative to the present era that is characterized by weak 
regional trade institutions. Therefore, the quality of institutions could 
determine the extent to which RTAs are desirable. 
The third research question assumes that econometric examination of the 
conjunction of factors that determine the quality of institutions could shed 
light on what could be done to improve them. The econometric estimates 
found that the level of development, state capacity and foreign direct 
investment positively impact on institutional quality in the region. Moreover, 
the findings also demonstrate that history and the quality of institutions of 
trade partners in ECOWAS does impact on the quality of some institutions 
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especially regulatory quality and rule of law. We also find that the quality of 
institutions in the region exhibit convergence although at a slow pace. 
Furthermore, improving regional trade institutions and the success of the 
convergence process could depend on the extent to which WAMZ and 
WAEMU work together as one monetary zone rather than separate 
monetary zone. 
The process of integrating WAMZ and WAEMU and the extent to which 
ECOWAS can reflect on its historical good practices regarding regionalism 
could depend on the quality of regional policies and access to funding. Since 
individual chapters have summaries, this chapter will mainly discuss the 
findings and their policy implication for the ECOWAS. 
 
6.1 Findings and policy implications 
The thesis is divided into three research questions. The first research 
question focuses on the development of regional trade institutions in West 
Africa while the second research question examines ECOWAS trade and 
trade potentials and some of the factors that contribute to the low level of 
ECOWAS trade. The third research question focus on the econometric 
analysis of the determinants of the quality of institutions and the process of 
convergence. 
The discussions on the second research question demonstrated that 
ECOWAS trade is low. It was shown that the ECOWAS contribution to 
global trade was 0.5% on average from 2000 to 2010 (EDA Report, 2013) 
while intra-ECOWAS trade as a proportion of their total trade stalled at 10% 
on average from 1995 to 2015 (UNCTADSTAT, 2016). This trend is similar 
with other developing nations. Africa’s share of world trade was 3.1%, while 
intra-African trade as a share of their total trade was15.5% in 2014 (WTO, 
International Trade Statistics, 2014 and UNCTADSTAT, 2016). Moreover, 
ECOWAS depends on a narrow range of primary products for global 
exports. An estimated 66% to 74% of ECOWAS exports to the world are 
minerals and fuel related products in contrast with Asia, which has a 
diversified export sector (Rugwabiza, 2012; Badiane et al, 2013; Fundira, 
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2015 and Author’s calculation; Table 4.7). The traditional trade theories 
predict that ECOWAS should trade less among themselves since they 
produce similar products with a weak manufacturing sector and lacks 
production complementarities. Hence, the low share of intra-ECOWAS 
trade could suggest that south-south integration schemes are less 
beneficial. Therefore, from the perspective of traditional trade theories, the 
current level of ECOWAS trade should be expected. 
However, our RCA estimates demonstrated that ECOWAS has the potential 
to increase regional and international trade. For example, our estimates 
show that ECOWAS has RCA in food and live animal, mineral fuels, crude 
materials and animals and vegetable oils and fats in the world. Furthermore, 
the RCA of these product categories differs from one country to another. 
Our TCI estimates also suggest that ECOWAS members could trade among 
themselves by exploiting economies of scale through production 
complementarity. Therefore, ECOWAS member states could allocate 
production base on their individual comparative advantages and to exploit 
regional production complementarities. Moreover, the traditional trade 
theories would suggest that these three product categories should be 
relatively cheaper than their counterpart imports from the rest of the world. 
Nonetheless, our estimates demonstrated that ECOWAS trade deficit in 
food and live animals was US$2.5billion in 2013. Therefore, there may be 
other factors preventing ECOWAS from exploiting its RCA potential. 
In the absence of exploiting their comparative advantage, ECOWAS firms 
could exploit increasing returns to scale if the production complementarity 
beyond national borders is encouraged. Our TCI estimates show that this is 
feasible. The agro-industry could be particularly useful given that some 
ECOWAS countries have comparative advantage in the primary sector and 
could complement each other’s production beyond national borders. 
Furthermore, the region could expand manufacturing akin to what Asia did. 
The new trade theories have discussed the extent to which countries with 
similar economic structures like ECOWAS members could trade because of 
production complementarities. This initiative would require regional 
investment into processing and manufacturing. Investments require costing 
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and the identification of several sources of financing. For example, the 
Gambia imports an estimated 175,000 tons of rice per year on average 
outside ECOWAS (The Point, 2014). However, an estimated 50% of 
ECOWAS arable land is underutilised while irrigation has been neglected. 
Indeed, SSA land under irrigation is estimated at 4% of total land use for 
cultivation (Senghor, 2009 and Dijk, 2011). Therefore, the low share of intra-
ECOWAS trade could be associated with underproduction. 
Furthermore, the low share of intra-ECOWAS trade could also be attributed 
to several other factors including high tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Progress 
has been made in launching the ECOWAS CET in 2015 while WAEMU 
already had a single currency and a central bank. All the protocols on the 
free movement of goods and people have been signed. Therefore, there 
should be no extra costs associated with ECOWAS cross-border trade.  
However, ECOWAS cross-border trade still face extra costs in the form of 
non-tariff barriers. Some non-tariff barriers such as quotas have been 
removed. Other non-tariff barriers such as transportation and 
communication networks are gradually improving.  Nonetheless, research 
has found that ECOWAS cross-border trade costs additional US$100 to 
US$129 per trip in bribe payments at border points and unofficial roadblocks 
(Cissokho et al, 2012 and Keyser, 2012). Furthermore, about 50% of intra-
African trade financial settlements are conducted by banks outside the 
continent, which adds to transaction costs (Sy, 2014).  
This thesis asserts that these extra costs to ECOWAS cross-border trade is 
associated with weak institutions, including regulation of cross-border trade, 
protection of trade routes from corruption, enforcement of ECOWAS 
protocols and non-convertibility of ECOWAS currencies. Therefore, it is 
useful to examine the conjunction of factors that contributes to the 
weakness in the quality of institutions. 
Our examination demonstrated that regional trade institutions were more 
developed and standardized across West Africa before the current countries 
gained their independence.  Societal norms and political consensus, such 
as the ‘Mande charter’ and the coming of Islam created a discipline that 
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provided confidence in the ability to create common institutions. The 
Empires of Western Sudan established standardized regional trade 
institutions, including common currencies (cowries), protected trade routes 
through the royal armies and established courts to settle trade disputes and 
punishment mechanism. The effective functioning of the trade institutions 
was consolidated by the existence of a single administration. The lesser 
kings agreed to be ruled by a single administration in order to maintain 
overall peace and to coordinate the implementation of common institutions. 
The expansion of trade played an important role in stimulating the 
development of common regional trade institutions since it was perceived 
that divergence in the coordination of trade institutions could not maximize 
trade potential. Therefore, we could not directly associate the low share of 
intra-ECOWAS trade to weak pre-colonial institution.  
The colonial era also created common trade institutions, including common 
currencies and central banks, courts to settle disputes through the chiefs, 
standardize trade rules such as common external tariff and single 
administration system. The British colonies shared the British West African 
Shilling (BWAS) as their common currency while the West African Currency 
Board (WACB) acted as the central bank. The French colonies also shared 
the French Colonies of Africa (CFA) as their common currency with a single 
central bank. Therefore, the BWAS and CFA replaced the cowries as 
monetarized currencies, which signaled a historical change in the use of 
common currencies in West Africa, although they were intended to promote 
international trade rather than regional trade.  
Hence, regional trade institutions were not entirely weak in the pre-colonial 
and colonial era and that we could not directly associate them with the low 
share of intra-ECOWAS trade today. Historical changes in governance led 
to the loss of some facets of these regional trade institutions from the late 
1950s, when West Africans began to gain their independence. 
Nonetheless, ECOWAS has the potentials to reflect on historical good 
practices in order to accelerate the integration process and to exploit the full 
potential of regional trade. We demonstrated that reflecting on historical 
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good practices has the potential to remove four institutional failures that act 
as barriers to current regional trade, namely; the protection of trade routes 
from bribes and unofficial roadblocks, punishment of violators of ECOWAS 
protocols through the courts, sensitization of cross-border traders to their 
rights under the ECOWAS treaty and the establishment of a common 
currency or at least facilitate their convertibility. We argue that some 
ECOWAS institutions are vital in the integration process and the process of 
convergence of regional institutions, namely; the West African Monetary 
Agency (WAMA), ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID), 
the community court of justice and the ECOWAS parliament. While WAMA 
and EBID could facilitate the launch of a common currency and a central 
bank or at least ensure the convertibility of currencies, the court of justice 
and ECOWAS parliament could address the extra costs incurred by cross-
border traders through the implementation and enforcement of the 
ECOWAS customs union status. Moreover, EBID could also act as a bank 
that raise funds from several sources in order to meet the necessary 
investments that would strengthen the institutional framework, increase 
production with a view to accelerate the integration process. 
Furthermore, the implementation and enforcement of protocols could be 
done akin to what existed in the pre-independence era. For example, 
security personnel from individual member states could patrol trade routes 
in order to remove unofficial roadblocks in tandem with avenues for traders 
to report abuse of ECOWAS protocols. In addition, the training of customs 
officials at the border points on the ECOWAS protocols, and the legal 
implications for collecting bribes could be initiated. The Joint Border Posts 
(JBP) which are currently being constructed is a step in the right direction if 
it is done in tandem with joint training of customs officials. However, the JPB 
alone are not sufficient. Increase in customs official’s remuneration could 
remove the opportunity to take bribes. The ECOWAS commission could 
also station representatives at the border points in order to monitor the 
effective implementation of protocols and to report to the commission in 
order to draw lessons from the ongoing activities. During the Empires of 
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Western Sudan, the kings had representatives in each lesser kingdom that 
monitored the arrangements made. 
Furthermore, the West African enterprise network (WAEN) could be 
strengthened in order to help disseminate information to cross-border 
traders about their rights under the ECOWAS treaty. As of now, WAEN 
members are in 13 ECOWAS countries and are skewed towards creating 
opportunities for international trade rather than promoting regional trade. 
Similarly, its members are drawn from the formal business sector, while the 
main drivers of intra-ECOWAS trade are in the informal sector without direct 
business registration (Meagher, 2003 and Golub et al, 2009). Hence, an 
integrated regional market could help reduce information search costs and 
smoothen distribution channels that could lead to demand for better 
institutions. Brenton (2012) has found that increasing competition in regional 
trade, especially the distribution channels could reduce transportation costs 
by 50%, which could stimulate production, consumption, and minimize loss 
of foodstuffs. Therefore, the coordination failures and high costs associated 
with weak institutions could be addressed if ECOWAS can reflect on 
historical good practices. 
Furthermore, ECOWAS members have eight separate currencies. These 
eight currencies are non-convertible, although ECOWAS intends to launch 
a common currency by 2020 conditional on members meeting their 
convergence criteria. The convergence of WAMZ has been difficult to 
achieve because some of the criteria is unrealistic and unattainable. The 
idea that fiscal deficit to GDP should be less than or equal to 3% is based 
on the notion that some countries would be denied the ability to appreciate 
their currency in order to manage their debt or who should pay for their debt. 
This could be addressed by pulling all regional debt into one account 
although this will require political willingness. We argue that WAMA and 
EBID are in place to facilitate the launch of a common currency and central 
bank or at least enable the convertibility. The West African Unit of Account 
(WAUA) could act as a peg to determine the value of each currency. The 
WAUA is currently limited to a traveler’s check to facilitate trade and tourism 
and is convertible to all, the West African currencies (Ansa, 2014). However, 
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the travelers check is not widely used by cross-border traders. Furthermore, 
although WAMA could act as the clearing house, its functions are mainly 
limited between the central banks. ECOWAS could save costs and prevent 
overlaps by incorporating EBID and West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) 
into WAMA. 
The extent to which currencies promote trade requires convertibility or 
commonality. In the pre-independence era, a single central bank ensured 
that a single currency function effectively.  Moreover, the central banks 
issued currencies because they were governed by a single administration 
system. Therefore, ECOWAS could pursue similar objectives in order to 
make policy initiatives sustainable. Masson and Pattillo (2001) highlighted 
various options for monetary integration in ECOWAS including a common 
currency, single central bank, pegging their currencies to an external anchor 
or a basket of currencies. This would require political commitment to give 
up sovereignty. From an economic point of view, giving up sovereignty for 
a regional administration system could save costs from administrative 
overlaps. Indeed, there is consensus among some economists that deeper 
economic integration could not be sustained without a political union 
(Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009). 
Therefore, the key policy implication from the first two research questions 
demonstrated that the low share of ECOWAS trade can improve if 
ECOWAS can reflect on historical good practices. This would require 
political commitment to give up sovereignty for a regional administration 
system akin to what existed in the pre-independence era. Furthermore, 
some current ECOWAS institutions could be used to facilitate the 
harmonisation of institutions in order to strengthen the integration process. 
To further examine the importance of institutional quality in a deep 
integration process, we use econometric methods to analyze the 
conjunction of factors that determine the quality of institutions. Although this 
area of research lacks clear models underpinned by institutional theories, 
we made certain assumptions about the direction of causality. We assume 
that endogeneity could not be removed entirely in this area of research. 
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Therefore, an attempt should be made to justify the expected nature of 
relationship. Research has established that differences in the quality of 
institutions have accounted for differences in trade and development 
(Straub, 2000; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2003 and 
Rodrik, 2007). Nonetheless, the quality of institutions differs in space and 
time around the world which suggest no emulation taking place and 
divergence. Therefore, it is plausible to examine factors that determine 
institutional quality. Since economic institutions emanate from repeated 
interaction of agents, their quality should be determined by the extent to 
which repeated interaction leads to demand for better institutions in order to 
smoothen future interactions. 
Therefore, we argue that the quality of institutions within an RTA is a 
function of the level of development, the capacity of the state, investment, 
the past value of institutions and the quality of institutions of trade partners 
in a region. In the context of ECOWAS, the presence of two monetary zones 
is also expected to impact on the quality of institutions. We derived a model 
to capture this relationship. This was useful because if weak institutions 
have been found to add to trade costs, uncertainty and coordination failures, 
then examining the determinants of institutional quality could inform policy 
about how to improve them. Since deep integration also requires the 
harmonisation of institutions, we also tested the process of convergence of 
institutions using Ben-David’s (1996) model.  
The findings suggest that WAMZ and WAEMU must cooperate more within 
the framework of ECOWAS or act as one monetary zone in order to 
accelerate the integration and convergence process. Streamlining WAMZ 
and WAEMU could save costs of operation and raise funds for regional 
development. For example, the cost of pegging the CFA to the Euro through 
the French treasury could be channeled to WAMA if WAMA is strengthened 
as a depository bank and banker of the banks in the region. Indeed, Sene 
(2014) and Koulibaly (2014) highlighted that WAEMU must break away from 
the French treasury in order to promote growth and trade beyond their 
current levels. Moreover, our convergence test using Ben-David (1996) 
simple model suggests that the quality of institutions exhibit convergence 
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within ECOWAS although the process is slow, especially in the presence of 
separate monetary zones. From a policy point of view, we wanted to know 
how long it could take to achieve full convergence and some factors that 
could influence this process. We divided ECOWAS members into their 
existing monetary zones. Our findings were quite interesting and revealed 
some of the challenges faced by ECOWAS in terms of integration. Our tests 
demonstrated that the half-life convergence rate for ECOWAS members is 
lower although WAEMU had a lower rate in some institution. Therefore, 
greater cooperation between the two monetary zones is required. 
Furthermore, we found that development, state capacity, FDI and regional 
trade to some extent contain useful information in explaining the quality of 
institutions in ECOWAS. These findings are consistent with previous 
findings (La Porta, 1999; Straub, 2000; Rijckeghem et al, 2001; Islam et al, 
2002; Acemoglu et al, 2005; Mocan, 2008; Levechenko, 2012 and Alonso 
et al, 2013). Moreover, the history also contain memory in explaining current 
institutions which is consistent with previous findings (Rodney, 1981; 
Acemoglu et al, 2001 and Nunn, 2008). Furthermore, other ECOWAS 
members also act as pull factors in the improvement of institutions which 
demonstrate some degree of emulation and supports our convergence 
results.  
Therefore, our findings demonstrated that ECOWAS has the potential to 
increase regional trade and deepen their integration conditional on 
improving the quality of institutions. We argue that reflection on their 
historical past and strengthening development and democracy could give 
confidence that economic and political union is feasible given that it existed. 
This will require political commitment to do so.  
However, to attain economic and political union status requires investment 
in all fields including production, institutions and communications. We 
proposed several measures that could raise funds to help ECOWAS meet 
their objectives. Loans and grants from international institutions have been 
a conventional ways of financing projects in Africa given the continent’s 
inability to collect sufficient domestic taxes (Tanzi and Zee, 2000 and Ekpo, 
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2004). Moreover, aid for trade has been contributing to developing regional 
infrastructure that can increase trade (Helble, 2012). Nonetheless, regional 
initiatives such as increasing the community levy from 0.5% to 1% in the 
medium term could raise additional funds. The 0.5% community levies 
collected an estimated US$400 million in 2016 that amounts to 70% of the 
total levy they expected to collect (Vanguard, 2016). Therefore, a 1% 
community levy could generate an estimated US$550 million for investment 
in many sectors, although it could imply higher import prices in the short run. 
Nonetheless, Sachs (2005) highlighted that taxation is the price a society 
should pay for civilization. Therefore, to increase regional production and 
improve the quality of institutions could be addressed in part through 
financing from the community levy. 
In addition, ECOWAS could raise funds through community initiatives such 
as banquets and sports events to finance specific projects. These initiatives 
may be unconventional although they are inherent in many traditions in 
West Africa. The West African diaspora is also increasing its relevance in 
contributing to growth and poverty reduction. In 2014, West African’s 
diaspora remitted an estimated US$26 billion, which is more than the GDP 
of many ECOWAS countries (African Development Bank, 2015). A 0.5 
pence levy on every £100 remitted could have generate US$130 million for 
ECOWAS. This requires greater planning and coordination with money 
transfer agencies and trust building between ECOWAS and the West 
African Diasporas. Furthermore, ECOWAS could engage the diaspora 
through EBID to raise funds through bonds or through direct investments. 
These funds could be used for direct investment in communication, 
infrastructure, strengthening institutions and production. Goretti and 
Weisfeld (2008) found that unless ECOWAS increase their production of 
products that are of high domestic demand, regional trade will not exceed 
14% of total trade soon. Therefore, ECOWAS’s vision to expand regional 
trade to 40% by 2030 should be turned into reality through a regional 
strategic framework that includes costs of projects, establishment of clear 
sources of finance, setting timelines and mechanism to measure progress. 
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In summary, the main lessons from this thesis demonstrated that to increase 
intra-ECOWAS trade in part requires improving the quality of institutions and 
exploiting their RCA and TCI. Our discussions demonstrated that weak 
institutions add to trade cost, uncertainty and coordination failures. 
Therefore, the low share of intra-ECOWAS trade could in part, be attributed 
to weak institutions and low production. We argue that several measures 
could be used to improve the quality of institutions, the process of 
convergence and increase production. The key is to ensure that WAEMU 
and WAMZ act as one monetary zone while strengthening development and 
democracy. However, these measures require investment. We propose 
altering the community levy, exploiting domestic ways to raise revenue 
though banquets and raising bonds through EBID. The West African 
diaspora could contribute in the financing of the ECOWAS deep integration 
if the initiatives are put in place to do so.  
In the long term, improving the institutional framework and deepening 
integration requires a system of single administration or federation for 
sustenance and effective implementation. This will require political 
commitment from member states. Reflecting on historical good practices 
from the pre-independence era should demonstrate to ECOWAS that 
economic and political union is feasible given that it existed in the past in 
the region. Therefore, the undesirability of south-south integration schemes 
does not lie with the lack of production complementarities and the 
production of similar product ranges. Instead, it is the weakness in the 
quality of institutions that is associated with the undesirability of south-south 
integration. Therefore, improving the institutional framework at the regional 
level could enhance the desirability of RTAs in the developing world. 
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Appendix A:  The Raw Data 
Appendix A1: Institutional quality indices 
Countries Institutional quality Indices 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Benin Control of Corruption -0.93 -0.60 -0.49 -0.79 -0.57 -0.49 -0.97 -0.63 -0.49 -0.53 -0.67 -0.74 -0.64 -0.93 -0.84 -0.78 -0.61 
Benin Government Effectiveness -0.41 -0.27 -0.27 -0.38 -0.33 -0.36 -0.62 -0.57 -0.52 -0.45 -0.56 -0.58 -0.52 -0.51 -0.49 -0.46 -0.62 
Benin 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 0.96 0.66 0.72 0.74 0.66 0.26 0.45 0.51 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.26 0.04 0.00 
Benin Regulatory Quality -0.20 -0.17 -0.21 -0.44 -0.50 -0.48 -0.57 -0.42 -0.43 -0.49 -0.33 -0.32 -0.33 -0.38 -0.40 -0.56 -0.56 
Benin Rule of Law -0.19 -0.14 -0.27 -0.34 -0.52 -0.59 -0.59 -0.56 -0.55 -0.56 -0.67 -0.70 -0.71 -0.62 -0.62 -0.55 -0.58 
Benin Voice and Accountability 0.12 0.34 0.36 0.00 0.24 0.10 0.01 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.25 0.28 
Burkina 
Faso Control of Corruption 0.22 -0.24 -0.14 -0.02 -0.03 -0.15 -0.09 -0.32 -0.35 -0.32 -0.38 -0.39 -0.39 -0.51 -0.57 -0.53 -0.34 
Burkina 
Faso Government Effectiveness -1.02 -0.75 -0.62 -0.72 -0.62 -0.53 -0.59 -0.75 -0.74 -0.47 -0.58 -0.56 -0.54 -0.62 -0.66 -0.58 -0.59 
Burkina 
Faso 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism -0.41 -0.20 -0.01 -0.37 0.03 -0.11 -0.08 0.14 0.29 0.10 0.01 -0.15 -0.58 -0.59 -0.80 -0.80 -0.65 
Burkina 
Faso Regulatory Quality -0.25 -0.39 -0.12 -0.14 -0.35 -0.34 -0.42 -0.32 -0.25 -0.17 -0.09 -0.14 -0.16 -0.11 -0.17 -0.29 -0.36 
Burkina 
Faso Rule of Law -1.03 -0.85 -0.67 -0.68 -0.56 -0.56 -0.51 -0.41 -0.39 -0.34 -0.20 -0.18 -0.37 -0.42 -0.52 -0.54 -0.53 
Burkina 
Faso Voice and Accountability -0.73 -0.57 -0.36 -0.48 -0.33 -0.45 -0.46 -0.38 -0.34 -0.32 -0.32 -0.28 -0.31 -0.33 -0.29 -0.41 -0.19 
Cabo Verde Control of Corruption   -0.32 0.13 0.38 0.29 0.27 0.34 0.67 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.80 0.86 0.81 0.78 0.90 0.91 
Cabo Verde Government Effectiveness   0.35 0.30 -0.12 -0.10 -0.07 -0.23 0.12 0.35 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.15 
Cabo Verde 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 0.94 1.02 1.12 0.65 0.90 1.07 0.78 0.96 0.90 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.72 0.81 0.77 0.38 0.80 
Cabo Verde Regulatory Quality -0.58 -0.21 0.00 -0.29 -0.23 -0.34 -0.31 -0.20 -0.20 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.06 -0.10 -0.17 -0.26 
Cabo Verde Rule of Law 0.77 0.64 0.63 0.19 0.14 0.27 0.31 0.58 0.56 0.51 0.48 0.43 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.59 0.55 
Cabo Verde Voice and Accountability 0.91 0.91 0.73 0.66 0.67 0.70 0.49 0.75 0.84 0.93 0.88 0.89 0.97 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.95 
Cote 
d'Ivoire Control of Corruption 0.20 -0.30 -0.69 -0.82 -0.98 -1.22 -1.25 -1.20 -1.07 -1.09 -1.08 -1.14 -1.02 -0.84 -0.77 -0.41 -0.42 
Cote 
d'Ivoire Government Effectiveness -0.06 -0.21 -0.88 -0.94 -1.02 -1.27 -1.36 -1.20 -1.21 -1.21 -1.08 -1.26 -1.13 -1.08 -0.91 -0.81 -0.65 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 0.01 -0.26 -1.32 -1.99 -1.84 -2.16 -2.30 -1.89 -1.89 -1.82 -1.28 -1.56 -1.40 -1.26 -1.02 -1.02 -0.86 
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Cote 
d'Ivoire Regulatory Quality -0.48 -0.26 -0.54 -0.45 -0.82 -0.96 -0.96 -0.91 -0.84 -0.89 -0.95 -0.91 -0.86 -0.76 -0.73 -0.58 -0.52 
Cote 
d'Ivoire Rule of Law -0.82 -0.94 -1.19 -1.38 -1.46 -1.42 -1.53 -1.49 -1.49 -1.45 -1.26 -1.24 -1.29 -1.10 -0.93 -0.61 -0.62 
Cote 
d'Ivoire Voice and Accountability -0.64 -0.73 -1.10 -1.20 -1.25 -1.30 -1.36 -1.36 -1.28 -1.24 -1.11 -1.10 -1.13 -0.81 -0.78 -0.53 -0.44 
Gambia, 
The Control of Corruption -0.44 -0.53 -0.41 -0.44 -0.33 -0.59 -0.71 -0.74 -0.75 -0.75 -0.56 -0.56 -0.50 -0.63 -0.69 -0.68 -0.77 
Gambia, 
The Government Effectiveness -0.61 -0.48 -0.50 -0.67 -0.47 -0.50 -0.67 -0.69 -0.57 -0.72 -0.63 -0.66 -0.61 -0.50 -0.70 -0.64 -0.89 
Gambia, 
The 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 0.47 0.59 0.45 0.72 0.32 0.21 0.25 -0.02 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.15 0.01 
Gambia, 
The Regulatory Quality -0.95 -0.40 -0.28 -0.55 -0.46 -0.42 -0.51 -0.38 -0.35 -0.38 -0.32 -0.38 -0.27 -0.21 -0.35 -0.44 -0.49 
Gambia, 
The Rule of Law 0.10 0.04 -0.13 -0.29 0.16 -0.30 -0.28 -0.30 -0.24 -0.35 -0.44 -0.51 -0.51 -0.54 -0.60 -0.63 -0.66 
Gambia, 
The Voice and Accountability -1.32 -0.98 -1.14 -0.64 -0.38 -0.60 -0.97 -0.88 -0.88 -0.85 -1.01 -1.09 -1.22 -1.28 -1.24 -1.26 -1.48 
Ghana Control of Corruption -0.22 -0.17 -0.07 -0.29 -0.24 -0.22 -0.36 0.00 0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.09 -0.07 -0.22 -0.18 
Ghana Government Effectiveness -0.11 -0.14 0.02 -0.13 -0.19 -0.16 -0.16 0.13 0.11 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.10 -0.29 -0.26 
Ghana 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism -0.32 -0.24 -0.44 -0.25 -0.02 0.01 0.18 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.16 0.11 0.03 -0.13 0.03 
Ghana Regulatory Quality -0.38 -0.25 -0.10 -0.47 -0.28 -0.35 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 
Ghana Rule of Law -0.34 -0.44 0.09 -0.03 0.00 -0.15 -0.14 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.12 0.02 0.12 
Ghana Voice and Accountability -0.34 -0.36 -0.08 -0.06 0.28 0.15 0.24 0.37 0.46 0.38 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.41 0.42 0.47 0.51 
Guinea Control of Corruption -0.46 -0.73 -0.75 -0.52 -0.75 -0.84 -1.00 -1.07 -1.26 -1.16 -1.05 -1.19 -1.11 -1.06 -1.04 -1.07 -0.97 
Guinea Government Effectiveness -1.24 -0.80 -0.83 -0.95 -0.76 -0.88 -1.06 -1.32 -1.26 -1.19 -1.03 -1.13 -1.15 -1.26 -1.17 -1.24 -1.14 
Guinea 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism -1.23 -0.69 -2.03 -1.56 -0.84 -1.05 -1.18 -1.89 -2.37 -2.10 -2.09 -1.68 -1.39 -1.28 -1.22 -0.94 -0.45 
Guinea Regulatory Quality -0.71 -0.51 -0.60 -1.01 -0.98 -0.94 -1.05 -1.21 -1.23 -1.20 -1.13 -1.08 -1.00 -1.01 -0.99 -1.04 -0.86 
Guinea Rule of Law -1.51 -1.27 -1.42 -0.98 -1.11 -1.24 -1.35 -1.42 -1.47 -1.54 -1.54 -1.50 -1.47 -1.42 -1.40 -1.37 -1.17 
Guinea Voice and Accountability -1.35 -1.19 -1.18 -1.33 -1.22 -1.28 -1.14 -1.24 -1.40 -1.45 -1.30 -0.95 -0.94 -1.06 -1.06 -0.89 -0.89 
Guinea-
Bissau Control of Corruption -1.09 -1.14 -0.97 -0.85 -1.07 -1.14 -1.09 -0.98 -1.11 -1.08 -1.10 -1.06 -1.05 -1.22 -1.28 -1.51 -1.43 
Guinea-
Bissau Government Effectiveness -1.47 -1.31 -1.06 -1.15 -1.31 -1.49 -1.38 -1.13 -1.11 -1.06 -1.03 -1.04 -1.04 -1.23 -1.43 -1.60 -1.62 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism -1.72 -1.95 -0.50 -0.87 -0.53 -0.39 -0.57 -0.48 -0.44 -0.69 -0.65 -0.65 -0.73 -0.96 -0.89 -0.69 -0.44 
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Guinea-
Bissau Regulatory Quality -0.82 -1.33 -1.24 -1.02 -0.86 -1.08 -1.11 -0.94 -1.10 -1.21 -1.18 -1.14 -1.12 -1.22 -1.26 -1.19 -1.20 
Guinea-
Bissau Rule of Law -2.02 -2.07 -1.39 -1.20 -1.18 -1.18 -1.28 -1.27 -1.35 -1.42 -1.36 -1.35 -1.32 -1.51 -1.60 -1.35 -1.30 
Guinea-
Bissau Voice and Accountability -1.16 -1.14 -0.76 -0.75 -1.13 -0.85 -0.37 -0.70 -0.78 -0.80 -0.81 -0.90 -0.93 -1.39 -1.38 -0.93 -0.81 
Liberia Control of Corruption -1.74 -1.73 -1.37 -1.17 -1.22 -1.27 -1.15 -0.64 -0.33 -0.70 -0.56 -0.53 -0.62 -0.58 -0.68 -0.78 -0.61 
Liberia Government Effectiveness -1.87 -1.98 -1.84 -1.61 -1.51 -1.59 -1.46 -1.32 -1.25 -1.31 -1.24 -1.27 -1.24 -1.15 -1.36 -1.34 -1.37 
Liberia 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism -2.55 -1.84 -2.04 -2.28 -2.21 -1.41 -1.36 -1.31 -1.25 -1.28 -1.08 -0.46 -0.42 -0.48 -0.46 -0.60 -0.74 
Liberia Regulatory Quality -1.98 -2.11 -1.78 -1.74 -1.69 -1.88 -1.63 -1.48 -1.20 -1.34 -1.19 -1.05 -1.09 -1.04 -0.90 -0.85 -0.88 
Liberia Rule of Law -2.23 -2.11 -2.11 -1.86 -1.69 -1.71 -1.49 -1.00 -1.01 -1.18 -1.08 -1.01 -0.97 -0.91 -0.91 -0.85 -0.87 
Liberia Voice and Accountability -1.49 -1.02 -1.16 -1.38 -1.53 -1.31 -0.38 -0.23 -0.20 -0.25 -0.20 -0.26 -0.31 -0.35 -0.43 -0.31 -0.26 
Mali Control of Corruption -0.44 -0.63 -0.66 -0.53 -0.54 -0.50 -0.40 -0.41 -0.34 -0.45 -0.64 -0.65 -0.57 -0.79 -0.74 -0.72 -0.65 
Mali Government Effectiveness -1.21 -1.05 -0.87 -0.60 -0.60 -0.62 -0.69 -0.69 -0.73 -0.76 -0.79 -0.84 -0.79 -0.98 -0.88 -1.08 -0.91 
Mali 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 0.23 0.33 0.14 0.29 0.23 0.48 0.19 0.37 0.20 0.17 -0.08 -0.21 -0.68 -2.02 -1.70 -1.70 -1.66 
Mali Regulatory Quality -0.48 -0.23 -0.10 -0.46 -0.51 -0.46 -0.51 -0.44 -0.34 -0.39 -0.39 -0.48 -0.38 -0.41 -0.49 -0.59 -0.57 
Mali Rule of Law -0.53 -0.52 -0.46 -0.32 -0.03 -0.17 -0.14 -0.27 -0.17 -0.32 -0.35 -0.44 -0.50 -0.68 -0.75 -0.65 -0.76 
Mali Voice and Accountability -0.12 -0.17 -0.11 0.27 0.38 0.29 0.25 0.27 0.19 0.16 0.04 0.13 0.15 -0.53 -0.31 -0.20 -0.24 
Niger Control of Corruption -1.09 -1.03 -0.94 -1.07 -1.02 -0.85 -0.72 -0.86 -0.77 -0.75 -0.61 -0.67 -0.59 -0.62 -0.56 -0.63 -0.58 
Niger Government Effectiveness -1.24 -1.08 -1.08 -0.89 -0.75 -0.69 -0.79 -0.79 -0.79 -0.72 -0.66 -0.67 -0.63 -0.69 -0.73 -0.70 -0.61 
Niger 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism -0.11 -0.42 0.00 -0.25 0.01 -0.52 -0.48 -0.23 -0.46 -0.67 -1.16 -1.17 -0.87 -1.16 -1.32 -1.18 -0.98 
Niger Regulatory Quality -1.16 -0.69 -0.61 -0.71 -0.64 -0.58 -0.42 -0.49 -0.50 -0.42 -0.48 -0.51 -0.52 -0.60 -0.56 -0.71 -0.73 
Niger Rule of Law -1.00 -0.74 -0.93 -0.78 -0.66 -0.73 -0.80 -0.64 -0.65 -0.73 -0.52 -0.52 -0.39 -0.68 -0.70 -0.69 -0.61 
Niger Voice and Accountability -1.83 -1.61 -0.20 -0.28 -0.17 -0.18 -0.30 -0.38 -0.43 -0.50 -0.78 -0.67 -0.29 -0.33 -0.35 -0.24 -0.25 
Nigeria Control of Corruption -1.15 -1.07 -1.13 -1.33 -1.32 -1.30 -1.16 -1.07 -0.98 -0.81 -0.98 -1.00 -1.13 -1.15 -1.21 -1.27 -1.10 
Nigeria Government Effectiveness -0.98 -1.12 -0.96 -1.06 -0.96 -0.91 -0.88 -0.96 -1.04 -0.97 -1.20 -1.15 -1.08 -0.99 -0.99 -1.18 -0.95 
Nigeria 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism -1.17 -0.69 -1.52 -1.69 -1.65 -1.72 -1.65 -2.03 -2.01 -1.86 -1.95 -2.19 -1.94 -2.06 -2.08 -2.13 -2.07 
Nigeria Regulatory Quality -0.82 -0.93 -0.74 -1.23 -1.24 -1.32 -0.77 -0.89 -0.87 -0.78 -0.73 -0.71 -0.67 -0.71 -0.66 -0.81 -0.84 
Nigeria Rule of Law -1.26 -1.27 -1.10 -1.48 -1.52 -1.43 -1.36 -1.08 -1.06 -1.06 -1.16 -1.17 -1.22 -1.18 -1.15 -1.09 -1.04 
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Nigeria Voice and Accountability -1.66 -1.22 -0.58 -0.71 -0.64 -0.77 -0.84 -0.64 -0.79 -0.76 -0.87 -0.80 -0.75 -0.73 -0.73 -0.65 -0.44 
Senegal Control of Corruption -0.22 -0.20 -0.11 0.31 -0.14 -0.05 -0.03 -0.42 -0.54 -0.53 -0.53 -0.69 -0.53 -0.28 -0.25 0.02 0.03 
Senegal Government Effectiveness 0.02 -0.12 -0.12 0.02 -0.26 -0.18 -0.25 -0.32 -0.46 -0.13 -0.50 -0.56 -0.47 -0.46 -0.41 -0.39 -0.44 
Senegal 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism -0.72 -1.06 -0.70 -0.34 -0.29 -0.02 -0.22 -0.28 -0.25 -0.15 -0.20 -0.43 -0.30 -0.12 -0.06 -0.19 -0.17 
Senegal Regulatory Quality -0.21 -0.19 -0.13 -0.19 -0.23 -0.26 -0.26 -0.32 -0.34 -0.30 -0.29 -0.27 -0.21 -0.08 -0.05 -0.21 -0.18 
Senegal Rule of Law -0.23 -0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.24 -0.25 -0.29 -0.37 -0.40 -0.48 -0.31 -0.27 -0.11 -0.15 
Senegal Voice and Accountability 0.00 -0.12 0.08 0.33 0.26 0.18 0.03 0.01 -0.24 -0.28 -0.33 -0.32 -0.26 -0.03 0.03 0.27 0.25 
Sierra 
Leone Control of Corruption -0.77 -0.87 -0.91 -0.75 -0.91 -0.88 -1.09 -1.01 -0.90 -0.96 -0.94 -0.77 -0.83 -0.95 -0.90 -0.95 -0.78 
Sierra 
Leone Government Effectiveness -1.47 -1.46 -1.46 -1.51 -1.23 -1.10 -1.36 -1.14 -1.18 -1.18 -1.21 -1.21 -1.19 -1.21 -1.20 -1.22 -1.26 
Sierra 
Leone 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism -1.81 -2.27 -1.97 -0.86 -1.12 -0.44 -0.43 -0.26 -0.02 -0.21 -0.30 -0.24 -0.17 -0.28 -0.17 -0.13 -0.10 
Sierra 
Leone Regulatory Quality -1.62 -1.29 -1.38 -1.26 -1.14 -1.02 -1.08 -1.14 -1.07 -0.97 -0.78 -0.73 -0.70 -0.69 -0.70 -0.79 -0.87 
Sierra 
Leone Rule of Law -1.48 -1.19 -1.47 -1.33 -1.21 -1.17 -1.18 -1.02 -1.02 -0.96 -0.92 -0.96 -0.88 -0.86 -0.87 -0.93 -0.90 
Sierra 
Leone Voice and Accountability -0.69 -1.38 -1.57 -0.68 -0.37 -0.32 -0.52 -0.38 -0.25 -0.17 -0.26 -0.18 -0.23 -0.35 -0.37 -0.31 -0.30 
Togo Control of Corruption -0.76 -0.63 -0.66 -0.77 -0.90 -0.93 -0.79 -1.05 -1.00 -0.98 -1.03 -0.97 -1.00 -1.01 -1.04 -0.92 -0.71 
Togo Government Effectiveness -0.80 -0.98 -1.24 -1.37 -1.55 -1.60 -1.50 -1.56 -1.55 -1.51 -1.39 -1.39 -1.36 -1.31 -1.29 -1.25 -1.18 
Togo 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism -0.49 -0.72 -0.40 -0.05 -0.24 -0.33 -1.46 -0.55 -0.36 -0.18 -0.19 -0.20 -0.18 -0.41 -0.38 -0.18 -0.17 
Togo Regulatory Quality -0.40 -0.49 -0.66 -0.73 -0.70 -0.78 -0.84 -0.89 -0.94 -0.96 -0.86 -0.87 -1.00 -0.84 -0.92 -0.82 -0.82 
Togo Rule of Law -0.76 -0.76 -0.71 -0.79 -0.98 -1.13 -1.09 -0.97 -0.95 -0.84 -0.88 -0.91 -0.86 -0.93 -0.98 -0.87 -0.80 
Togo Voice and Accountability -1.09 -1.24 -1.22 -1.47 -1.25 -1.27 -1.28 -1.28 -1.16 -1.08 -1.04 -1.00 -0.95 -1.04 -0.96 -0.83 -0.75 
Source: World Bank World Governance Indicators 
Note: No observation was made in 1997, 1999 and 2001.  
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Appendix A2: Rescaled Institutional Quality Indices 
Note: 20 was added in all the dataset (N*T) institutional quality indices (IQ) in Appendix A1; where N is the number of countries and 
T is the number of years. This was done in order to make the figures from Appendix A1 positive. 
Appendix A3: Definition of the Institutional quality indices in appendix A1 and A2 
Indicator Name Long definition 
Control of Corruption: 
Estimate 
Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Estimate gives the 
country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 
to 2.5. 
Government Effectiveness: 
Estimate 
Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate 
indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
Political Stability and 
Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism: 
Estimate 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units 
of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
Regulatory Quality: Estimate 
Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate 
indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
Rule of Law: Estimate 
Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and 
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal 
distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
Voice and Accountability: 
Estimate 
Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Estimate gives 
the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -
2.5 to 2.5. 
Source: World Bank World Governance Indicators 
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Appendix A4: State Capacity 
Country 
Name Series Name 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Benin 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 13.51 13.21 13.12 12.19 12.07 12.04 11.60 13.09 13.00 13.44 14.44 14.27 15.39 16.87 16.85 16.39 16.66 16.51 15.32 17.02 
Burkina 
Faso 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 24.39 23.73 22.30 17.83 20.66 25.79 21.18 19.87 20.77 19.77 21.57 23.85 21.36 21.63 20.64 20.57 20.84 21.34 21.96 22.45 
Cabo 
Verde 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP)                       17.46 16.88 18.18 18.43 18.52 17.27 17.46 18.45   
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 10.46 15.05 13.72 13.84 14.35 13.61 12.98 14.80 14.90 14.43 13.59 13.34 12.67 12.64 12.18 11.25 14.67 12.74 12.33 14.34 
Gambia, 
The 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 11.44 11.27 9.99 10.34 11.23 11.37 9.92 8.75 8.08 7.07 6.33 7.24 9.73 10.46 10.03 10.65 9.57 9.57 10.73 10.08 
Ghana 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 12.04 12.36 10.32 10.84 10.17 9.72 9.87 11.53 12.17 15.31 11.30 11.56 11.24 11.73 10.36 16.64 20.89 19.92 17.98 19.16 
Guinea 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 7.47 7.39 6.81 6.96 7.08 7.35 8.19 8.18 6.95 6.99 8.11 6.76 8.74 11.33 15.03 10.55 9.52 9.68 9.06 8.60 
Guinea-
Bissau 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 6.56 7.02 9.28 10.78 18.57 14.63 14.38 16.49 14.18 14.61 14.58 15.12 11.88 15.48 15.22 13.08 12.43 11.70 13.02 10.89 
Liberia 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP)         7.53 6.73 3.54 4.30 10.88 11.20 9.35 13.61 18.33 15.76 14.24 15.19 15.45 19.15 16.67 16.86 
Mali 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 10.98 11.20 18.74 14.68 16.42 15.00 15.36 15.57 15.46 13.85 13.26 13.95 15.57 14.57 15.69 18.79 15.48 17.24 16.71 16.64 
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Niger 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 11.45 14.08 13.66 16.04 13.04 12.38 12.24 15.58 16.33 15.60 15.01 15.65 15.01 16.21 13.64 14.43 13.22 13.14 14.97 16.68 
Nigeria 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 10.02 13.00 13.97 6.98 8.34 8.21 6.71 5.15 6.73 6.81 6.86 10.18 11.64 12.96 8.71 8.49 8.20 7.16 6.46 5.94 
Senegal 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 13.84 13.42 12.78 13.33 12.79 12.61 13.27 13.00 13.46 13.30 13.65 14.18 13.46 14.28 14.81 15.54 15.32 15.59 16.58 16.45 
Sierra 
Leone 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 10.87 9.01 8.93 11.47 14.33 13.15 14.09 11.95 10.49 10.02 10.10 8.65 9.65 10.36 10.25 10.07 10.20 8.71 7.15 10.25 
Togo 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 12.02 10.30 10.86 9.73 10.45 10.01 8.42 10.32 10.33 11.49 11.43 9.18   11.14 9.05 9.57 12.90 15.50 14.22 15.90 
Source: World Development Indicators Database. Note: General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) is used 
here as proxy for state capacity. 
 
Appendix A5: Foreign Direct Investment Inflow (millions of current US$) 
  
          
Benin 
          
Burkina 
Faso 
          
Cabo 
Verde 
          
Côte 
d'Ivoire 
          
Gambia 
          
Ghana 
          
Guinea 
          
Guinea-
Bissau 
          
Liberia 
          
Mali 
          
Niger 
          
Nigeria 
          
Senegal 
          
Sierra 
Leone 
          
Togo 
1996 13.49 16.23 28.53 269.19 18.35 120.00 23.77 1.03 -132.13 43.40 2.35 2190.68 5.47 0.66 14.47 
1997 13.71 9.77 11.58 415.46 20.57 81.80 17.30 11.48 213.82 69.73 16.62 1642.47 176.81 1.80 18.50 
1998 32.71 4.41 8.76 760.10 23.70 167.40 17.85 4.41 190.31 8.87 -1.19 1210.11 60.34 0.10 19.49 
1999 39.26 7.93 61.13 235.35 49.48 243.70 63.45 0.73 256.26 2.18 0.28 1177.71 153.25 0.53 31.68 
2000 59.74 23.11 43.45 234.70 43.52 114.90 9.94 0.70 20.80 82.44 8.44 1309.67 62.94 38.88 41.47 
2001 43.86 6.27 12.68 272.68 35.48 89.30 1.68 0.40 8.30 121.73 22.90 1277.42 31.94 9.84 63.58 
2002 13.51 15.03 38.52 212.58 42.83 58.90 30.00 3.55 2.80 243.80 2.40 2040.18 78.05 10.41 53.36 
2003 44.73 29.12 33.50 165.39 10.70 110.02 82.80 3.49 372.22 132.26 11.47 2171.39 52.49 8.62 33.73 
2004 63.84 14.35 68.03 282.98 55.53 139.27 97.90 9.18 75.36 101.00 20.32 2127.09 77.03 61.15 59.36 
2005 53.04 34.15 81.55 311.92 53.65 144.97 105.00 8.00 82.81 223.80 30.29 4978.26 44.59 83.18 76.99 
2006 53.20 33.59 130.65 318.86 82.21 636.01 125.00 17.33 107.85 83.39 50.54 4897.81 220.32 58.77 77.34 
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2007 255.24 343.54 190.39 426.78 76.46 855.40 385.90 18.58 131.60 72.79 129.04 6086.73 297.43 96.58 49.16 
2008 169.84 105.77 209.22 446.15 70.10 1220.42 255.77 5.14 283.80 180.28 340.43 8248.64 397.63 57.62 23.88 
2009 134.29 100.90 174.31 377.13 39.44 2897.10 140.85 17.45 217.80 748.35 790.76 8649.53 320.03 110.85 48.53 
2010 176.80 34.62 158.82 338.94 37.12 2527.36 101.35 33.22 449.96 405.90 940.32 6098.96 266.11 238.44 85.83 
2011 161.09 143.66 154.69 301.58 36.07 3237.39 956.12 25.02 785.30 556.15 1065.79 8914.89 338.22 950.48 711.09 
2012 229.58 329.30 125.58 330.28 40.88 3293.43 606.47 6.62 984.60 397.87 841.28 7127.39 276.18 722.45 121.52 
2013 360.24 490.26 69.56 407.47 24.85 3226.33 133.96 19.64 1061.27 307.85 719.13 5608.45 311.28 429.68 183.55 
2014 405.20 355.93 180.26 438.77 35.10 3356.99 77.06 28.85 276.70 144.02 821.87 4693.83 402.56 403.91 53.95 
2015 149.70 231.81 115.74 494.21 10.59 3192.30 48.23 18.58 626.96 275.41 529.27 3064.17 409.00 263.00 257.76 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics database (Trains). 
Appendix A6: Trade Data by Country to the rest of ECOWAS 
Import and Export of each Country to ECOWAS (total 1000s US$) Import and Export of each Country to ECOWAS (total 1000s US$) 
Country Region Year Exports (X) Imports (M) TTL trade (X+M) Country Region Year Exports (X) Imports (M) TTL trade (X+M) 
Benin ECOWAS   1996 9473.27 73111.25 82584.53 Cape Verde ECOWAS   1996 64.49 8731.68 8796.17 
Benin ECOWAS   1997 5151.04 86772.65 91923.68 Cape Verde ECOWAS   1997 22.98 5255.99 5278.96 
Benin ECOWAS   1998 8354.87 124119.11 132473.98 Cape Verde ECOWAS   1998 43.53 4198.76 4242.29 
Benin ECOWAS   1999 21581.79 80804.28 102386.07 Cape Verde ECOWAS   1999 12.67 4064.56 4077.22 
Benin ECOWAS   2000 13648.75 107676.82 121325.57 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2000 71.32 2648.28 2719.59 
Benin ECOWAS   2001 20128.85 140772.23 160901.08 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2001 82.47 2997.22 3079.69 
Benin ECOWAS   2002 49865.91 166858.40 216724.31 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2002 144.48 4132.21 4276.69 
Benin ECOWAS   2003 33869.32 188567.40 222436.72 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2003 53.89 14485.39 14539.27 
Benin ECOWAS   2004 56136.91 222169.69 278306.60 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2004 116.05 7139.70 7255.75 
Benin ECOWAS   2005 54680.74 215342.51 270023.25 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2005 50.94 8089.81 8140.74 
Benin ECOWAS   2006 78105.82 245399.30 323505.11 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2006 859.50 5985.07 6844.57 
Benin ECOWAS   2007 90351.03 301047.22 391398.25 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2007 69.84 8164.61 8234.44 
Benin ECOWAS   2008 129672.06 272258.80 401930.87 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2008   12383.32 12383.32 
Benin ECOWAS   2009 210746.73 278420.58 489167.31 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2009 20.83 13330.66 13351.49 
Benin ECOWAS   2010 231443.14 328471.44 559914.57 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2010 166.31 10165.54 10331.85 
Benin ECOWAS   2011 59553.88 433079.74 492633.63 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2011 153.88 7070.48 7224.36 
Benin ECOWAS   2012 60466.84 463552.91 524019.75 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2012 92.91 9193.46 9286.37 
Benin ECOWAS   2013 88093.38 477410.41 565503.79 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2013 96.14 7876.81 7972.95 
Benin ECOWAS   2014 99777.83 431379.57 531157.40 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2014 27.44 5123.20 5150.64 
Benin ECOWAS   2015 134607.17 383131.23 517738.40 Cape Verde ECOWAS   2015 207.84 6386.39 6594.23 
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Burkina Faso ECOWAS   1996 156664.04 147772.39 304436.44 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   1996 392794.04 584309.88 977103.91 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   1997 42518.66 176204.92 218723.58 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   1997 841906.33 462302.62 1304208.95 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   1998 49541.11 189379.13 238920.24 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   1998 985302.62 365136.61 1350439.23 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   1999 78462.23 206534.23 284996.46 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   1999 903462.86 436190.04 1339652.90 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2000 44200.60 211959.22 256159.82 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2000 975737.25 696031.80 1671769.05 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2001 37451.76 151598.07 189049.83 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2001 899077.08 526076.43 1425153.50 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2002 36039.76 154918.89 190958.65 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2002 1249738.44 421231.68 1670970.11 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2003 278409.59 347582.17 625991.75 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2003 959006.98 570987.76 1529994.74 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2004 310724.75 424779.45 735504.20 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2004 1469164.63 1016520.72 2485685.35 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2005 243395.17 514191.35 757586.52 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2005 1804420.26 1511992.35 3316412.61 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2006     0.00 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2006 1917553.84 1699850.07 3617403.91 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2007 121815.41 425435.96 547251.37 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2007 2047145.69 1742735.18 3789880.87 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2008 108137.02 520223.51 628360.54 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2008 2543842.54 2491508.79 5035351.33 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2009 107606.08 479049.37 586655.45 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2009 2501490.23 1594082.22 4095572.46 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2010 116336.05 549115.42 665451.47 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2010 2554156.48 2178566.77 4732723.25 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2011 121818.41 625093.10 746911.51 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2011 2343242.71 1734898.80 4078141.51 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2012 173617.69 816723.29 990340.98 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2012 2777882.29 2800729.22 5578611.51 
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Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2013 274084.50 986515.40 1260599.90 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2013 4079193.57 3181827.79 7261021.36 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2014 458084.54 1819799.97 2277884.51 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2014 2692268.95 2649643.81 5341912.77 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2015 259042.94 573826.83 832869.78 
Cote 
d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2015 1672242.50 1670433.23 3342675.73 
 
Import and Export of each Country to ECOWAS (total 1000s US$) Import and Export of each Country to ECOWAS (total 1000s US$) 
Country Region Year Exports (X) Imports (M) TTL trade (X+M) Country Region Year 
Exports 
(X) Imports (M) TTL trade (X+M) 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   1996 2728.00 34721.49 37449.48 Guinea ECOWAS   1996 5146.28 138939.85 144086.14 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   1997 2213.02 44745.44 46958.46 Guinea ECOWAS   1997 7822.37 59121.49 66943.86 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   1998 1720.20 31070.34 32790.54 Guinea ECOWAS   1998 8648.28 50897.99 59546.27 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   1999 6577.85 13745.34 20323.19 Guinea ECOWAS   1999 4198.31 49707.77 53906.09 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2000 7743.51 27075.05 34818.56 Guinea ECOWAS   2000 2474.59 141658.46 144133.04 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2001 98.82 13918.47 14017.29 Guinea ECOWAS   2001 13921.29 89576.12 103497.41 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2002 205.34 13328.62 13533.96 Guinea ECOWAS   2002 3817.73 103988.40 107806.13 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2003 93.59 13296.53 13390.12 Guinea ECOWAS   2003     0.00 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2004 128.20 37207.38 37335.58 Guinea ECOWAS   2004 9338.58 193714.34 203052.92 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2005 2570.53 39800.30 42370.83 Guinea ECOWAS   2005 54711.15 261760.57 316471.72 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2006 3456.34 34124.78 37581.12 Guinea ECOWAS   2006 16295.29 178947.20 195242.49 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2007 2958.97 34625.47 37584.44 Guinea ECOWAS   2007 10793.03 68476.86 79269.89 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2008 1621.46 44939.10 46560.56 Guinea ECOWAS   2008 30401.96 63737.90 94139.86 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2009 3307.62 53110.94 56418.56 Guinea ECOWAS   2009     0.00 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2010 3815.24 66040.58 69855.82 Guinea ECOWAS   2010     0.00 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2011 647.19 90870.65 91517.84 Guinea ECOWAS   2011     0.00 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2012 508.19 125339.10 125847.29 Guinea ECOWAS   2012     0.00 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2013 272.01 102458.32 102730.33 Guinea ECOWAS   2013 36159.82 56493.87 92653.69 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2014 593.11 100800.25 101393.37 Guinea ECOWAS   2014 30252.32 71288.38 101540.70 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2015     0.00 Guinea ECOWAS   2015 93642.99 147059.82 240702.81 
Ghana ECOWAS   1996 92014.53 117102.16 209116.69 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   1996     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   1997 100628.92 371029.65 471658.57 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   1997     0.00 
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Ghana ECOWAS   1998 63068.02 218496.58 281564.60 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   1998     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   1999 181483.05 356997.67 538480.72 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   1999     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2000 142868.72 524411.35 667280.07 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2000     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2001 135949.62 577421.02 713370.63 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2001     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2002   468909.31 468909.31 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2002     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2003 135262.19 626765.34 762027.53 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2003 1167.13 9392.87 10560.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2004     0.00 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2004 725.43 18048.78 18774.20 
Ghana ECOWAS   2005 447081.12 663086.18 1110167.30 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2005 14.57 47964.15 47978.72 
Ghana ECOWAS   2006 557316.40 628014.56 1185330.96 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2006     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2007 351491.01 734007.80 1085498.81 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2007     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2008 278016.17 1080287.15 1358303.32 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2008     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2009 572274.26 325510.69 897784.95 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2009     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2010 478478.74 207343.39 685822.13 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2010     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2011 6106597.80 1118946.67 7225544.47 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2011     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2012 1801832.71 831628.68 2633461.39 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2012     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2013 1118210.87 746290.42 1864501.29 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2013     0.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2014     0.00 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2014     0.00 
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Ghana ECOWAS   2015     0.00 
Guinea-
Bissau ECOWAS   2015     0.00 
 
Import and Export of each Country to ECOWAS (total 1000s US$) Import and Export of each Country to ECOWAS (total 1000s US$) 
Country Region Year Exports (X) Imports (M) TTL trade (X+M) Country Region Year Exports (X) Imports (M) TTL trade (X+M) 
Mali ECOWAS   1996 291882.49 263009.98 554892.47 Nigeria ECOWAS   1996 715217.79 41953.78 757171.56 
Mali ECOWAS   1997 280252.44 265303.99 545556.43 Nigeria ECOWAS   1997 808900.36 51906.70 860807.06 
Mali ECOWAS   1998 233628.01 291700.53 525328.53 Nigeria ECOWAS   1998 538695.85 43529.39 582225.24 
Mali ECOWAS   1999 236940.45 243508.01 480448.46 Nigeria ECOWAS   1999 1046524.44 20401.56 1066926.00 
Mali ECOWAS   2000 175150.78 304525.13 479675.91 Nigeria ECOWAS   2000 1375589.23 77371.29 1452960.52 
Mali ECOWAS   2001 96561.10 344126.16 440687.27 Nigeria ECOWAS   2001 818007.34 351174.85 1169182.19 
Mali ECOWAS   2002 76040.56 355688.82 431729.38 Nigeria ECOWAS   2002 1210384.53 88433.37 1298817.90 
Mali ECOWAS   2003 93032.77 487038.84 580071.62 Nigeria ECOWAS   2003 1092939.08 361986.21 1454925.29 
Mali ECOWAS   2004 142004.60 568061.07 710065.67 Nigeria ECOWAS   2004     0.00 
Mali ECOWAS   2005 113210.51 680204.13 793414.64 Nigeria ECOWAS   2005     0.00 
Mali ECOWAS   2006 96265.22 749946.45 846211.67 Nigeria ECOWAS   2006 3719236.36 268339.66 3987576.02 
Mali ECOWAS   2007 129759.36 1009123.37 1138882.73 Nigeria ECOWAS   2007 2286146.44 748114.00 3034260.43 
Mali ECOWAS   2008 251553.78 1114748.51 1366302.29 Nigeria ECOWAS   2008 5932594.46 925970.28 6858564.74 
Mali ECOWAS   2009     0.00 Nigeria ECOWAS   2009 2151228.16 71633.48 2222861.64 
Mali ECOWAS   2010 160883.06 1678220.65 1839103.71 Nigeria ECOWAS   2010 2044824.87 182836.39 2227661.26 
Mali ECOWAS   2011 275641.07 1399882.30 1675523.37 Nigeria ECOWAS   2011 3575004.14 743923.00 4318927.14 
Mali ECOWAS   2012 279873.45 1608531.96 1888405.41 Nigeria ECOWAS   2012 5545052.08 151832.75 5696884.83 
Mali ECOWAS   2013     0.00 Nigeria ECOWAS   2013 4831359.14 2205464.75 7036823.89 
Mali ECOWAS   2014     0.00 Nigeria ECOWAS   2014 5208896.27 292778.69 5501674.96 
Mali ECOWAS   2015     0.00 Nigeria ECOWAS   2015     0.00 
Niger ECOWAS   1996 210613.63 94062.86 304676.49 Senegal ECOWAS   1996 88450.91 230497.83 318948.73 
Niger ECOWAS   1997 156839.16 99710.81 256549.97 Senegal ECOWAS   1997 87411.40 233167.98 320579.37 
Niger ECOWAS   1998 185131.75 108410.79 293542.53 Senegal ECOWAS   1998 132674.84 134367.88 267042.73 
Niger ECOWAS   1999 72035.09 118525.24 190560.33 Senegal ECOWAS   1999 137157.69 167050.08 304207.78 
Niger ECOWAS   2000 100089.90 108652.83 208742.73 Senegal ECOWAS   2000 151068.25 340033.61 491101.86 
Niger ECOWAS   2001 81801.01 118231.29 200032.30 Senegal ECOWAS   2001 167594.75 231365.22 398959.97 
Niger ECOWAS   2002 87010.46 132346.27 219356.73 Senegal ECOWAS   2002 127752.02 480062.11 607814.13 
Niger ECOWAS   2003 90794.85 169803.22 260598.07 Senegal ECOWAS   2003 376018.09 396365.02 772383.11 
Niger ECOWAS   2004 97191.23 189506.68 286697.92 Senegal ECOWAS   2004 459683.96 454039.94 913723.90 
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Niger ECOWAS   2005 97823.64 210773.22 308596.87 Senegal ECOWAS   2005 555701.31 504768.36 1060469.67 
Niger ECOWAS   2006 85816.73 202798.59 288615.32 Senegal ECOWAS   2006 261190.34 281488.54 542678.87 
Niger ECOWAS   2007 81226.17 212139.47 293365.64 Senegal ECOWAS   2007 704816.02 582257.01 1287073.03 
Niger ECOWAS   2008 221340.44 215263.39 436603.83 Senegal ECOWAS   2008 897225.03 1061862.04 1959087.07 
Niger ECOWAS   2009 181753.91 233574.47 415328.38 Senegal ECOWAS   2009 800218.70 625597.22 1425815.92 
Niger ECOWAS   2010 74606.06 254853.27 329459.33 Senegal ECOWAS   2010 923043.63 633421.87 1556465.50 
Niger ECOWAS   2011 106073.36 277665.84 383739.19 Senegal ECOWAS   2011 943861.22 782313.79 1726175.00 
Niger ECOWAS   2012 368126.13 318847.42 686973.55 Senegal ECOWAS   2012 962967.02 995313.34 1958280.36 
Niger ECOWAS   2013 451497.53 354081.87 805579.41 Senegal ECOWAS   2013 1024759.15 898652.61 1923411.76 
Niger ECOWAS   2014 325764.30 371554.59 697318.88 Senegal ECOWAS   2014 1075239.31 739149.66 1814388.97 
Niger ECOWAS   2015 177907.38 342858.85 520766.23 Senegal ECOWAS   2015 986637.61 606015.83 1592653.44 
 
Import and Export of each Country to ECOWAS (total 1000s US$) Import and Export of each Country to ECOWAS (total 1000s US$) 
Country Region Year Exports (X) Imports (M) TTL trade (X+M) Country Region Year Exports (X) Imports (M) TTL trade (X+M) 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   1996     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   1996 15202.54 157833.65 173036.20 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   1997     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   1997 18717.25 129738.03 148455.28 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   1998     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   1998 40633.30 107537.87 148171.17 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   1999     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   1999 58043.41 153043.80 211087.21 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2000 1968.36 37110.66 39079.02 Togo ECOWAS   2000 67367.56 57719.19 125086.75 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2001     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   2001 128186.26 43378.28 171564.53 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2002 29.63 141017.35 141046.97 Togo ECOWAS   2002 142441.70 50361.30 192802.99 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2003     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   2003 230224.94 77194.65 307419.59 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2004     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   2004 226581.28 88018.07 314599.35 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2005     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   2005 242812.05 71233.93 314045.98 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2006     0.00   ECOWAS   2006   80409.65 80409.65 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2007     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   2007 145292.16 162431.22 307723.39 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2008     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   2008 307958.38 127221.15 435179.53 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2009     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   2009 368060.02 132486.97 500546.98 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2010     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   2010 119061.38 155537.87 274599.25 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2011     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   2011 466859.39 168804.96 635664.35 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2012     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   2012 456161.22 204248.51 660409.73 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2013     0.00 Togo ECOWAS   2013 535947.15 157847.69 693794.84 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2014 21682.48 822740.90 844423.38 Togo ECOWAS   2014 405805.24 152445.59 558250.84 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2015 4967.71 497927.01 502894.72 Togo ECOWAS   2015 366429.24 178713.86 545143.10 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). Note: No data was available for Liberia and some years are missing for selected 
countries especially Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone. 
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Appendix A7: Regional Trade and GDP Data (computed regional trade as % of GDP) 
      X+M   convert to 1000s US$   
Country Region Year TTL trade GDP (constant 2010 US$) GDP (constant 2010 US$) 
Regional 
trade % of 
GDP 
Benin ECOWAS   1996 82584.53 3888602421 3888602 2.12 
Benin ECOWAS   1997 91923.68 4111601652 4111602 2.24 
Benin ECOWAS   1998 132474 4274462693 4274463 3.10 
Benin ECOWAS   1999 102386.1 4502780954 4502781 2.27 
Benin ECOWAS   2000 121325.6 4766643562 4766644 2.55 
Benin ECOWAS   2001 160901.1 5020725248 5020725 3.20 
Benin ECOWAS   2002 216724.3 5253911327 5253911 4.13 
Benin ECOWAS   2003 222436.7 5434858389 5434858 4.09 
Benin ECOWAS   2004 278306.6 5675602454 5675602 4.90 
Benin ECOWAS   2005 270023.3 5772744796 5772745 4.68 
Benin ECOWAS   2006 323505.1 6000595826 6000596 5.39 
Benin ECOWAS   2007 391398.2 6359822427 6359822 6.15 
Benin ECOWAS   2008 401930.9 6671033591 6671034 6.03 
Benin ECOWAS   2009 489167.3 6825749998 6825750 7.17 
Benin ECOWAS   2010 559914.6 6970240895 6970241 8.03 
Benin ECOWAS   2011 492633.6 7176751732 7176752 6.86 
Benin ECOWAS   2012 524019.7 7521973830 7521974 6.97 
Benin ECOWAS   2013 565503.8 8063036668 8063037 7.01 
Benin ECOWAS   2014 531157.4 8575645914 8575646 6.19 
Benin ECOWAS   2015 517738.4 8755259214 8755259 5.91 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   1996 304436.4 3930392032 3930392 7.75 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   1997 218723.6 4178668401 4178668 5.23 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   1998 238920.2 4484033772 4484034 5.33 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   1999 284996.5 4816039657 4816040 5.92 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2000 256159.8 4903703229 4903703 5.22 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2001 189049.8 5228004716 5228005 3.62 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2002 190958.7 5455579987 5455580 3.50 
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Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2003 625991.8 5881248337 5881248 10.64 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2004 735504.2 6144638535 6144639 11.97 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2005 757586.5 6676878621 6676879 11.35 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2006 652419 7094394431 7094394 9.20 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2007 547251.4 7495582799 7495583 7.30 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2008 628360.5 8042347948 8042348 7.81 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2009 586655.5 8280563450 8280563 7.08 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2010 665451.5 8979966766 8979967 7.41 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2011 746911.5 9565619495 9565619 7.81 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2012 990341 10182857809 10182858 9.73 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2013 1260600 10469470948 10469471 12.04 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2014 2277885 10907717217 10907717 20.88 
Burkina Faso ECOWAS   2015 832869.8 11343810190 11343810.19 7.34 
 
      X+M   convert to 1000s US$   
Country Region Year TTL trade GDP (constant 2010 US$) GDP (constant 2010 US$) 
Regional trade 
% of GDP 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   1996 8796.171 596807529.5 596807.5295 1.47 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   1997 5278.963 663163133.2 663163.1332 0.80 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   1998 4242.286 746173157.1 746173.1571 0.57 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   1999 4077.224 829913547.9 829913.5479 0.49 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2000 2719.591 948465609.7 948465.6097 0.29 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2001 3079.692 969632085 969632.085 0.32 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2002 4276.685 1020546411 1020546.411 0.42 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2003 14539.27 1063167076 1063167.076 1.37 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2004 7255.746 1171578994 1171578.994 0.62 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2005 8140.744 1252563900 1252563.9 0.65 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2006 6844.566 1352565476 1352565.476 0.51 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2007 8234.444 1557758965 1557758.965 0.53 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2008 12428.65 1661358044 1661358.044 0.75 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2009 13351.49 1640251720 1640251.72 0.81 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2010 10331.85 1664310770 1664310.77 0.62 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2011 7224.356 1730365372 1730365.372 0.42 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2012 9286.366 1749086512 1749086.512 0.53 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2013 7972.951 1763128136 1763128.136 0.45 
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Cape Verde ECOWAS   2014 5150.643 1773904599 1773904.599 0.29 
Cape Verde ECOWAS   2015 6594.233 1792815240 1792815.24 0.37 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   1996 977103.9 20585330896 20585330.9 4.75 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   1997 1304209 21355953698 21355953.7 6.11 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   1998 1350439 22408947356 22408947.36 6.03 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   1999 1339653 22771418229 22771418.23 5.88 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2000 1671769 22300414202 22300414.2 7.50 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2001 1425154 22327480641 22327480.64 6.38 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2002 1670970 21955138166 21955138.17 7.61 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2003 1529995 21656650171 21656650.17 7.06 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2004 2485685 21923410906 21923410.91 11.34 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2005 3316413 22300767039 22300767.04 14.87 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2006 3617404 22638811513 22638811.51 15.98 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2007 3789881 23038394864 23038394.86 16.45 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2008 5035351 23624224724 23624224.72 21.31 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2009 4095572 24392355457 24392355.46 16.79 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2010 4732723 24884505035 24884505.03 19.02 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2011 4078142 23792758396 23792758.4 17.14 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2012 5578612 26340131050 26340131.05 21.18 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2013 3768758 28681616270 28681616.27 13.14 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2014 5341913 31203899802 31203899.8 17.12 
Cote d'Ivoire ECOWAS   2015 3342676 34063231935 34063231.94 9.81 
 
      X+M   convert to 1000s US$   
Country Region Year TTL trade GDP (constant 2010 US$) GDP (constant 2010 US$) 
Regional trade 
% of GDP 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   1996 37449.48 536162432.5 536162.4325 6.98 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   1997 46958.46 562434386.8 562434.3868 8.35 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   1998 32790.54 582119582 582119.582 5.63 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   1999 20323.19 619375231.2 619375.2312 3.28 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2000 34818.57 653440870 653440.87 5.33 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2001 14017.29 691340442 691340.442 2.03 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2002 13533.96 668871875.5 668871.8755 2.02 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2003 13390.12 714823372.1 714823.3721 1.87 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2004 37335.58 765218419.3 765218.4193 4.88 
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Gambia, The ECOWAS   2005 42370.83 758012541.8 758012.5418 5.59 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2006 37581.12 766533358.5 766533.3585 4.90 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2007 37584.44 794366380.5 794366.3805 4.73 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2008 46560.56 839920448.1 839920.4481 5.54 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2009 56418.56 894092762.5 894092.7625 6.31 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2010 69855.82 952429030.4 952429.0304 7.33 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2011 91517.84 911201531.5 911201.5315 10.04 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2012 125847.3 964618263.9 964618.2639 13.05 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2013 102730.3 1010735774 1010735.774 10.16 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2014 101393.4 1019604583 1019604.583 9.94 
Gambia, The ECOWAS   2015 100056.4 1067687903 1067687.903 9.37 
Ghana ECOWAS   1996 209116.7 15541590590 15541590.59 1.35 
Ghana ECOWAS   1997 471658.6 16193771305 16193771.3 2.91 
Ghana ECOWAS   1998 281564.6 16954941838 16954941.84 1.66 
Ghana ECOWAS   1999 538480.7 17700958746 17700958.75 3.04 
Ghana ECOWAS   2000 667280.1 18355894240 18355894.24 3.64 
Ghana ECOWAS   2001 713370.6 19090130010 19090130.01 3.74 
Ghana ECOWAS   2002 604515.2 19949185803 19949185.8 3.03 
Ghana ECOWAS   2003 762027.5 20986543461 20986543.46 3.63 
Ghana ECOWAS   2004 936097.4 22161789893 22161789.89 4.22 
Ghana ECOWAS   2005 1110167 23469336373 23469336.37 4.73 
Ghana ECOWAS   2006 1185331 24971353346 24971353.35 4.75 
Ghana ECOWAS   2007 1085499 26056812916 26056812.92 4.17 
Ghana ECOWAS   2008 1358303 28440958948 28440958.95 4.78 
Ghana ECOWAS   2009 897784.9 29819138460 29819138.46 3.01 
Ghana ECOWAS   2010 685822.1 32174772956 32174772.96 2.13 
Ghana ECOWAS   2011 7225545 36694042412 36694042.41 19.69 
Ghana ECOWAS   2012 2633461 40103840659 40103840.66 6.57 
Ghana ECOWAS   2013 1864501 43036444041 43036444.04 4.33 
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Ghana ECOWAS   2014 1791801 44751818870 44751818.87 4.00 
Ghana ECOWAS   2015 1719100 46504253396 46504253.4 3.70 
 
      X+M   convert to 1000s US$   
Country Region Year TTL trade GDP (constant 2010 US$) GDP (constant 2010 US$) 
Regional 
trade % of 
GDP 
Guinea ECOWAS   1996 144086.1 3154196569 3154196.569 4.57 
Guinea ECOWAS   1997 66943.86 3317634528 3317634.528 2.02 
Guinea ECOWAS   1998 59546.27 3438533152 3438533.152 1.73 
Guinea ECOWAS   1999 53906.09 3569610175 3569610.175 1.51 
Guinea ECOWAS   2000 144133 3658959679 3658959.679 3.94 
Guinea ECOWAS   2001 103497.4 3792817102 3792817.102 2.73 
Guinea ECOWAS   2002 107806.1 3988701293 3988701.293 2.70 
Guinea ECOWAS   2003 0 4038504267 4038504.267 0.00 
Guinea ECOWAS   2004 203052.9 4133010005 4133010.005 4.91 
Guinea ECOWAS   2005 316471.7 4256887580 4256887.58 7.43 
Guinea ECOWAS   2006 195242.5 4363170508 4363170.508 4.47 
Guinea ECOWAS   2007 79269.89 4439861186 4439861.186 1.79 
Guinea ECOWAS   2008 94139.86 4659054145 4659054.145 2.02 
Guinea ECOWAS   2009 0 4645999835 4645999.835 0.00 
Guinea ECOWAS   2010 0 4735956493 4735956.493 0.00 
Guinea ECOWAS   2011 0 4921073735 4921073.735 0.00 
Guinea ECOWAS   2012 0 5115166394 5115166.394 0.00 
Guinea ECOWAS   2013 92653.69 5232815182 5232815.182 1.77 
Guinea ECOWAS   2014 101540.7 5253746370 5253746.37 1.93 
Guinea ECOWAS   2015 240702.8 5258999828 5258999.828 4.58 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   1996 0 809528294.7 809528.2947 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   1997 0 862147633.8 862147.6338 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   1998 0 619884323.5 619884.3235 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   1999 0 626241469.1 626241.4691 0.00 
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Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2000 0 660227514.5 660227.5145 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2001 0 674679279.6 674679.2796 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2002 0 668032491 668032.491 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2003 10560 671830323.7 671830.3237 1.57 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2004 18774.2 690382259.6 690382.2596 2.72 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2005 47978.72 719829998.4 719829.9984 6.67 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2006 0 736456272.7 736456.2727 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2007 0 760060047.1 760060.0471 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2008 0 784438039.8 784438.0398 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2009 0 810416099.1 810416.0991 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2010 0 846332456.4 846332.4564 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2011 0 925330348.6 925330.3486 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2012 0 908693015.2 908693.0152 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2013 0 916146773.3 916146.7733 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2014 0 939426750.9 939426.7509 0.00 
Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS   2015 0 984488983.7 984488.9837 0.00 
 
      X+M   convert to 1000s US$   
Country Region Year TTL trade GDP (constant 2010 US$) GDP (constant 2010 US$) 
Regional 
trade % of 
GDP 
Mali ECOWAS   1996 554892.5 5096827925 5096827.925 10.89 
Mali ECOWAS   1997 545556.4 5342954986 5342954.986 10.21 
Mali ECOWAS   1998 525328.5 5747505780 5747505.78 9.14 
Mali ECOWAS   1999 480448.5 6075167846 6075167.846 7.91 
Mali ECOWAS   2000 479675.9 6071472020 6071472.02 7.90 
Mali ECOWAS   2001 440687.3 7005036096 7005036.096 6.29 
Mali ECOWAS   2002 431729.4 7222634110 7222634.11 5.98 
Mali ECOWAS   2003 580071.6 7881269148 7881269.148 7.36 
Mali ECOWAS   2004 710065.7 8004216841 8004216.841 8.87 
Mali ECOWAS   2005 793414.6 8527273414 8527273.414 9.30 
Mali ECOWAS   2006 846211.7 8924830837 8924830.837 9.48 
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Mali ECOWAS   2007 1138883 9236630227 9236630.227 12.33 
Mali ECOWAS   2008 1366302 9677529939 9677529.939 14.12 
Mali ECOWAS   2009 1602703 10130347923 10130347.92 15.82 
Mali ECOWAS   2010 1839104 10678749467 10678749.47 17.22 
Mali ECOWAS   2011 1675523 11024767958 11024767.96 15.20 
Mali ECOWAS   2012 1888405 10932581179 10932581.18 17.27 
Mali ECOWAS   2013 1840102 11184422458 11184422.46 16.45 
Mali ECOWAS   2014 1791798 11972181171 11972181.17 14.97 
Mali ECOWAS   2015 1743494 12686032241 12686032.24 13.74 
Niger ECOWAS   1996 304676.5 3288171553 3288171.553 9.27 
Niger ECOWAS   1997 256550 3378726668 3378726.668 7.59 
Niger ECOWAS   1998 293542.5 3730866431 3730866.431 7.87 
Niger ECOWAS   1999 190560.3 3709646817 3709646.817 5.14 
Niger ECOWAS   2000 208742.7 3657358998 3657358.998 5.71 
Niger ECOWAS   2001 200032.3 3917190239 3917190.239 5.11 
Niger ECOWAS   2002 219356.7 4034671555 4034671.555 5.44 
Niger ECOWAS   2003 260598.1 4248509147 4248509.147 6.13 
Niger ECOWAS   2004 286697.9 4252757656 4252757.656 6.74 
Niger ECOWAS   2005 308596.9 4444131751 4444131.751 6.94 
Niger ECOWAS   2006 288615.3 4701891392 4701891.392 6.14 
Niger ECOWAS   2007 293365.6 4849839715 4849839.715 6.05 
Niger ECOWAS   2008 436603.8 5314826498 5314826.498 8.21 
Niger ECOWAS   2009 415328.4 5276949262 5276949.262 7.87 
Niger ECOWAS   2010 329459.3 5718589799 5718589.799 5.76 
Niger ECOWAS   2011 383739.2 5850769296 5850769.296 6.56 
Niger ECOWAS   2012 686973.5 6541959480 6541959.48 10.50 
Niger ECOWAS   2013 805579.4 6886614682 6886614.682 11.70 
Niger ECOWAS   2014 697318.9 7372107103 7372107.103 9.46 
Niger ECOWAS   2015 520766.2 7637893798 7637893.798 6.82 
 
      X+M   convert to 1000s US$   
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Country Region Year TTL trade GDP (constant 2010 US$) GDP (constant 2010 US$) 
Regional 
trade % of 
GDP 
Nigeria ECOWAS   1996 757171.6 1.40933E+11 140933005.9 0.54 
Nigeria ECOWAS   1997 860807.1 1.44882E+11 144882310.1 0.59 
Nigeria ECOWAS   1998 582225.3 1.48817E+11 148816792.3 0.39 
Nigeria ECOWAS   1999 1066926 1.49523E+11 149522537.5 0.71 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2000 1452961 1.57474E+11 157474285.6 0.92 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2001 1169182 1.64421E+11 164420579 0.71 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2002 1298818 1.70643E+11 170643319.5 0.76 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2003 1454925 1.88312E+11 188312043.7 0.77 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2004 2299142 2.51841E+11 251840571.2 0.91 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2005 3143359 2.60516E+11 260515639.8 1.21 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2006 3987576 2.81906E+11 281906487.4 1.41 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2007 3034261 3.01156E+11 301156185.3 1.01 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2008 6858565 3.20039E+11 320039472.3 2.14 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2009 2222862 3.42232E+11 342232340.7 0.65 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2010 2227661 3.69062E+11 369062464.6 0.60 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2011 4318927 3.871E+11 387099974.1 1.12 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2012 5696885 4.03665E+11 403665055.4 1.41 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2013 7036824 4.2544E+11 425440429 1.65 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2014 5501675 4.52285E+11 452284521.4 1.22 
Nigeria ECOWAS   2015 3966527 4.64282E+11 464282244.1 0.85 
Senegal ECOWAS   1996 318948.7 7225946450 7225946.45 4.41 
Senegal ECOWAS   1997 320579.4 7451687424 7451687.424 4.30 
Senegal ECOWAS   1998 267042.7 7891238062 7891238.062 3.38 
Senegal ECOWAS   1999 304207.8 8393108414 8393108.414 3.62 
Senegal ECOWAS   2000 491101.9 8660566489 8660566.489 5.67 
Senegal ECOWAS   2001 398960 9057299801 9057299.801 4.40 
Senegal ECOWAS   2002 607814.1 9116607334 9116607.334 6.67 
Senegal ECOWAS   2003 772383.1 9725891001 9725891.001 7.94 
Senegal ECOWAS   2004 913723.9 10296875907 10296875.91 8.87 
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Senegal ECOWAS   2005 1060470 10875828758 10875828.76 9.75 
Senegal ECOWAS   2006 542678.9 11143544923 11143544.92 4.87 
Senegal ECOWAS   2007 1287073 11693867227 11693867.23 11.01 
Senegal ECOWAS   2008 1959087 12124496741 12124496.74 16.16 
Senegal ECOWAS   2009 1425816 12418294627 12418294.63 11.48 
Senegal ECOWAS   2010 1556466 12937300245 12937300.25 12.03 
Senegal ECOWAS   2011 1726175 13165141375 13165141.37 13.11 
Senegal ECOWAS   2012 1958280 13745879495 13745879.5 14.25 
Senegal ECOWAS   2013 1923412 14224953272 14224953.27 13.52 
Senegal ECOWAS   2014 1814389 14838198265 14838198.27 12.23 
Senegal ECOWAS   2015 1592653 15800484321 15800484.32 10.08 
Senegal ECOWAS   2016 1602551 16851141949 16851141.95 9.51 
 
      X+M   convert to 1000s US$   
Country Region Year TTL trade GDP (constant 2010 US$) GDP (constant 2010 US$) 
Regional 
trade % of 
GDP 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   1996 0 1384449201 1384449.201 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   1997 0 1303083986 1303083.986 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   1998 0 1326344221 1326344.221 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   1999 0 1300092081 1300092.081 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2000 39079.02 1386583669 1386583.669 2.82 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2001 0 1287577162 1287577.162 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2002 141047 1625805355 1625805.355 8.68 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2003 0 1778344672 1778344.672 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2004 0 1892470594 1892470.594 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2005 0 1974461587 1974461.587 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2006 0 2083567040 2083567.04 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2007 0 2251467572 2251467.572 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2008 0 2373039542 2373039.542 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2009 0 2483374322 2483374.322 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2010 0 2616610911 2616610.911 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2011 0 2742474775 2742474.775 0.00 
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Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2012 0 3158830962 3158830.962 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2013 0 3813207065 3813207.065 0.00 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2014 844423.4 3986966231 3986966.231 21.18 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2015 502894.7 3170003041 3170003.041 15.86 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS   2016 250506.1 3362327554 3362327.554 7.45 
Togo ECOWAS   1996 173036.2 2255767596 2255767.596 7.67 
Togo ECOWAS   1997 148455.3 2580087820 2580087.82 5.75 
Togo ECOWAS   1998 148171.2 2520748985 2520748.985 5.88 
Togo ECOWAS   1999 211087.2 2583307709 2583307.709 8.17 
Togo ECOWAS   2000 125086.7 2563068020 2563068.02 4.88 
Togo ECOWAS   2001 171564.5 2521371869 2521371.869 6.80 
Togo ECOWAS   2002 192803 2498121012 2498121.012 7.72 
Togo ECOWAS   2003 307419.6 2621887861 2621887.861 11.73 
Togo ECOWAS   2004 314599.3 2677447378 2677447.378 11.75 
Togo ECOWAS   2005 314046 2709052153 2709052.153 11.59 
 Togo ECOWAS   2006 80409.65 2818834122 2818834.122 2.85 
Togo ECOWAS   2007 307723.4 2883398218 2883398.218 10.67 
Togo ECOWAS   2008 435179.5 2947567675 2947567.675 14.76 
Togo ECOWAS   2009 500547 3051036045 3051036.045 16.41 
Togo ECOWAS   2010 274599.3 3172945645 3172945.645 8.65 
Togo ECOWAS   2011 635664.3 3327904820 3327904.82 19.10 
Togo ECOWAS   2012 660409.7 3488321264 3488321.264 18.93 
Togo ECOWAS   2013 693794.8 3626730618 3626730.618 19.13 
Togo ECOWAS   2014 558250.8 3839682315 3839682.315 14.54 
Togo ECOWAS   2015 545143.1 4045715351 4045715.351 13.47 
Source:  The Trade Data comes from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). The GDP (constant 2010 US$) comes from the World Development 
Indicators. Note: TTL trade is total trade of each country {(exports (X) + Imports (M)} to ECOWAS only (see Appendix 5A). This Data has been used in chapter 
four table 4.8 and in chapter five econometric analysis. 
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Appendix A8: Human Development Index 
Benin 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.6 0.6 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
Education 
Index 
0.25 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.3 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 
HDI 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 
Burkina Faso 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.31 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.6 0.6 0.61 0.61 
Education 
Index 
0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.2 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.31 
HDI 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.3 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.41 0.41 0.42 
Cape Verde 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.76 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.8 0.8 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84 
Education 
Index 
0.28 0.3 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.57 
HDI 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.6 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65 
Cote d'Ivoire 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.45 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.5 
Education 
Index 
0.27 0.28 0.29 0.3 0.3 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 
HDI 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 
Gambia 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
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Income 
Index 
0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.39 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.53 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.6 0.6 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 
Education 
Index 
0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.3 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 
HDI 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.4 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 
Ghana 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.51 0.51 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.6 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Education 
Index 
0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.5 0.52 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.6 0.61 0.62 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.67 
HDI 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.6 0.6 0.61 
Guinea 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.5 0.5 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.6 0.61 0.62 
Education 
Index 
0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.3 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.39 
HDI 0.3 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 
Guinea-
Bissau 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.4 0.41 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.56 
Education 
Index 
0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.3 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.4 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.44 
HDI 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 
Liberia 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.13 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
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Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.49 0.5 0.5 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.6 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.65 
Education 
Index 
0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.4 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.51 
HDI 0.28 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.4 0.4 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 
Mali 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.4 0.4 0.41 0.41 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.6 0.6 
Education 
Index 
0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29 
HDI 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.3 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.4 0.41 0.41 
Niger 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.29 0.29 0.3 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.3 0.3 0.31 0.31 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.6 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66 
Education 
Index 
0.09 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 
HDI 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.3 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37 
Nigeria 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.52 
Education 
Index 
0.35 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.4 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 
HDI 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 
Senegal 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.4 0.4 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.6 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.7 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74 
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Education 
Index 
0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.35 
HDI 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.48 
Sierra Leone 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.32 0.31 0.31 0.3 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.4 0.36 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.4 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.49 
Education 
Index 
0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.3 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.4 
HDI 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.42 0.43 0.42 
Togo 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Income 
Index 
0.36 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Life 
Expectancy 
Index 
0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.6 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.63 
Education 
Index 
0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.59 
HDI 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.51 
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Appendix 4A: Total ECOWAS Trade with selected partners and the Rest of the World 
Appendix 4A.0: Total ECOWAS exports to the World by product and to selected trade partners and share 
    ECOWAS exports by destination export share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  To ECOWAS To EU27 To OECD To China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Food and live animals 3465311.6 208976.1 2596013.5 2891995.9 1463.2 6.0 74.9 83.5 0.0 
1997 Food and live animals 3159938.1 180466.5 2344653.2 2543118.3 8051.5 5.7 74.2 80.5 0.3 
1998 Food and live animals 3352998.8 199520.0 2368854.7 2747505.5 13562.2 6.0 70.6 81.9 0.4 
1999 Food and live animals 3165475.9 235840.9 2158758.4 2588974.6 2429.3 7.5 68.2 81.8 0.1 
2000 Food and live animals 2716075.2 256913.2 1778733.7 2127006.2 16310.1 9.5 65.5 78.3 0.6 
2001 Food and live animals 2852753.6 321777.7 1881186.1 2202472.6 14369.4 11.3 65.9 77.2 0.5 
2002 Food and live animals 3272525.6 405548.1 2132368.3 2497790.5 6566.2 12.4 65.2 76.3 0.2 
2003 Food and live animals 4508580.3 399610.5 3116743.4 3617076.0 22510.1 8.9 69.1 80.2 0.5 
2004 Food and live animals 3692912.3 432118.4 2111800.2 2669711.1 8518.8 11.7 57.2 72.3 0.2 
2005 Food and live animals 4487203.6 472556.7 2546407.5 3332963.6 35370.4 10.5 56.7 74.3 0.8 
2006 Food and live animals 4865350.7 366435.2 2992887.6 3774184.5 39775.9 7.5 61.5 77.6 0.8 
2007 Food and live animals 5813222.3 547387.0 3514298.3 4289165.4 58637.1 9.4 60.5 73.8 1.0 
2008 Food and live animals 6959721.0 779646.4 3773099.0 4635603.9 87946.5 11.2 54.2 66.6 1.3 
2009 Food and live animals 8744025.2 796795.2 4402685.6 5597870.2 49391.8 9.1 50.4 64.0 0.6 
2010 Food and live animals 8848697.6 816265.3 4395912.6 5660368.2 41041.7 9.2 49.7 64.0 0.5 
2011 Food and live animals 11219384.1 1201017.5 5250298.9 7104306.4 115882.0 10.7 46.8 63.3 1.0 
2012 Food and live animals 14787403.2 1168878.3 6676235.7 9347914.4 193933.9 7.9 45.1 63.2 1.3 
2013 Food and live animals 10731061.9 1126295.7 5804590.6 7188978.8 111913.8 10.5 54.1 67.0 1.0 
2014 Food and live animals 8533932.9 843424.5 4359525.5 5767321.7 60909.6 9.9 51.1 67.6 0.7 
2015 Food and live animals 7604027.5 722365.1 4088495.6 5444417.5 37907.1 9.5 53.8 71.6 0.5 
 
    ECOWAS exports by destination export share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Beverages and tobacco 19655.4 10629.3 6346.3 5888.7   54.1 32.3 30.0 0.0 
1997 Beverages and tobacco 11378.6 6582.8 1781.0 2345.8   57.9 15.7 20.6 0.0 
1998 Beverages and tobacco 17386.1 10384.5 1877.4 2044.8   59.7 10.8 11.8 0.0 
1999 Beverages and tobacco 23691.4 14141.0 2106.3 2371.8   59.7 8.9 10.0 0.0 
2000 Beverages and tobacco 44929.8 29249.0 3713.3 10681.1   65.1 8.3 23.8 0.0 
2001 Beverages and tobacco 77559.4 40611.3 10712.8 33505.5   52.4 13.8 43.2 0.0 
2002 Beverages and tobacco 49900.3 37630.4 2718.3 10350.6 29.4 75.4 5.4 20.7 0.1 
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2003 Beverages and tobacco 97115.5 78563.2 1788.7 5567.2 30.8 80.9 1.8 5.7 0.0 
2004 Beverages and tobacco 98584.9 82124.2 2473.0 5917.3 137.3 83.3 2.5 6.0 0.1 
2005 Beverages and tobacco 121354.1 87356.3 16384.6 22339.3 735.6 72.0 13.5 18.4 0.6 
2006 Beverages and tobacco 87926.9 75287.2 4170.8 5927.1 246.9 85.6 4.7 6.7 0.3 
2007 Beverages and tobacco 207447.4 151358.1 17750.9 19526.1 626.5 73.0 8.6 9.4 0.3 
2008 Beverages and tobacco 268165.1 163896.6 21065.3 22242.8 554.9 61.1 7.9 8.3 0.2 
2009 Beverages and tobacco 312884.0 156407.3 25660.4 36154.3 1702.2 50.0 8.2 11.6 0.5 
2010 Beverages and tobacco 424174.2 161668.6 70090.5 89191.7 1613.4 38.1 16.5 21.0 0.4 
2011 Beverages and tobacco 455175.1 264696.8 77033.7 82773.1 1491.3 58.2 16.9 18.2 0.3 
2012 Beverages and tobacco 515289.1 367403.3 43136.8 55881.6 8333.4 71.3 8.4 10.8 1.6 
2013 Beverages and tobacco 518228.2 389275.1 22986.5 24575.7   75.1 4.4 4.7 0.0 
2014 Beverages and tobacco 427081.8 290667.4 13066.8 13486.2 29.2 68.1 3.1 3.2 0.0 
2015 Beverages and tobacco 210055.0 147643.3 2380.4 2886.7 11.7 70.3 1.1 1.4 0.0 
 
    ECOWAS exports by destination export share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 2518285.9 537696.0 1050434.5 1272179.3 35586.3 21.4 41.7 50.5 1.4 
1997 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 2006653.5 405058.1 793699.9 1029601.7 21428.0 20.2 39.6 51.3 1.1 
1998 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 2037956.5 383195.1 790085.9 1050914.4 13224.4 18.8 38.8 51.6 0.6 
1999 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 1807242.5 332351.0 796277.5 984661.0 7789.5 18.4 44.1 54.5 0.4 
2000 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 1660032.0 270589.1 717481.1 929256.9 10635.9 16.3 43.2 56.0 0.6 
2001 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 1479941.8 50881.2 704875.3 964005.0 11480.0 3.4 47.6 65.1 0.8 
2002 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 1427846.7 112848.2 666091.6 842692.0 25269.3 7.9 46.7 59.0 1.8 
2003 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 1820818.4 308290.2 634178.6 780846.4 170260.6 16.9 34.8 42.9 9.4 
2004 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 2360399.5 371513.4 949092.6 1148578.0 212789.3 15.7 40.2 48.7 9.0 
2005 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 2438892.1 299623.4 1075182.3 1284814.6 266793.5 12.3 44.1 52.7 10.9 
2006 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 2146349.0 59234.4 975407.3 1161569.4 216250.2 2.8 45.4 54.1 10.1 
2007 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 3579991.8 194499.6 1893048.3 2420938.2 163632.3 5.4 52.9 67.6 4.6 
2008 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 4200843.5 167168.8 2015178.4 2620617.5 198082.3 4.0 48.0 62.4 4.7 
2009 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 2609207.6 103019.4 1051531.8 1366217.5 185999.3 3.9 40.3 52.4 7.1 
2010 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 4893267.8 136955.7 1396544.2 2490184.8 349486.3 2.8 28.5 50.9 7.1 
2011 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 12163753.9 327178.6 6813746.9 8563506.5 881735.8 2.7 56.0 70.4 7.2 
2012 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 13978267.4 200331.7 6567683.0 7061637.4 1730358.3 1.4 47.0 50.5 12.4 
2013 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 8110633.1 188280.7 3528685.4 4709907.5 732120.5 2.3 43.5 58.1 9.0 
2014 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 4897460.7 182323.7 1617185.9 2516580.5 615934.8 3.7 33.0 51.4 12.6 
2015 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 3163546.7 125789.9 1215075.4 1724503.1 224658.5 4.0 38.4 54.5 7.1 
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    ECOWAS exports by destination export share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 11636679.6 956019.1 4461173.9 9525306.2 407.1 8.2 38.3 81.9 0.0 
1997 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 11443047.8 1134651.8 3043931.3 8672410.7 101.6 9.9 26.6 75.8 0.0 
1998 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 7230226.8 845511.0 1979205.6 5249467.9 31620.1 11.7 27.4 72.6 0.4 
1999 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 16638354.2 1405261.4 3502779.7 9991375.9 187771.1 8.4 21.1 60.1 1.1 
2000 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 27907808.9 1871796.6 6246330.9 19051686.5 140337.4 6.7 22.4 68.3 0.5 
2001 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 18807535.5 1209964.5 4424373.5 12529972.8 127129.9 6.4 23.5 66.6 0.7 
2002 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 18076209.5 1017203.7 3925007.9 10813696.2 72043.0 5.6 21.7 59.8 0.4 
2003 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 24311016.6 1393771.7 5193732.8 16234358.3 109949.2 5.7 21.4 66.8 0.5 
2004 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 1490389.5 822748.1 117303.0 346439.5 72.2 55.2 7.9 23.2 0.0 
2005 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 2414672.0 1281040.5 327564.3 755135.0 217.8 53.1 13.6 31.3 0.0 
2006 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 61214648.1 4824626.1 13331163.1 45635930.2 57787.6 7.9 21.8 74.6 0.1 
2007 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 53538728.8 3428546.7 8898914.6 36110436.3 735351.2 6.4 16.6 67.4 1.4 
2008 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 79580392.4 5965556.1 16817558.2 53964622.0 147692.5 7.5 21.1 67.8 0.2 
2009 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 48680678.1 3759640.7 10886004.9 26524626.9 545480.0 7.7 22.4 54.5 1.1 
2010 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 78312366.0 3136928.1 17010396.8 49322623.1 626340.2 4.0 21.7 63.0 0.8 
2011 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 122394664.8 8766551.4 31914501.3 67197703.0 1251366.7 7.2 26.1 54.9 1.0 
2012 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 128706229.7 7289446.5 44077583.8 73432791.1 6840714.8 5.7 34.2 57.1 5.3 
2013 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 86323908.0 5667610.0 36069829.8 48321388.6 1069980.2 6.6 41.8 56.0 1.2 
2014 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 97003499.6 6372098.0 36974653.6 48149025.5 1510627.4 6.6 38.1 49.6 1.6 
2015 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 1882086.6 909021.0 536727.4 555276.0 3.7 48.3 28.5 29.5 0.0 
 
    ECOWAS exports by destination export share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 114052.9 27192.7 83331.2 86311.1   23.8 73.1 75.7 0.0 
1997 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 85204.6 42917.3 39541.3 38375.1   50.4 46.4 45.0 0.0 
1998 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 165263.6 46081.5 113960.5 101326.8   27.9 69.0 61.3 0.0 
1999 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 128597.1 56000.9 70774.0 70908.3   43.5 55.0 55.1 0.0 
2000 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 129705.0 40333.1 84132.5 87712.7   31.1 64.9 67.6 0.0 
2001 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 135340.2 47671.4 81857.3 87011.5 104.0 35.2 60.5 64.3 0.1 
2002 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 76174.9 45760.1 64702.9 69053.4   60.1 84.9 90.7 0.0 
2003 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 122356.4 79223.2 39673.2 41218.9   64.7 32.4 33.7 0.0 
2004 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 134121.1 88705.6 41403.7 43986.5   66.1 30.9 32.8 0.0 
2005 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 143960.1 83164.7 42806.1 58687.2 6.4 57.8 29.7 40.8 0.0 
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2006 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 118902.5 86107.2 18237.4 25966.3 349.0 72.4 15.3 21.8 0.3 
2007 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 213524.2 109357.5 57163.1 99478.5 41.2 51.2 26.8 46.6 0.0 
2008 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 245565.6 153726.5 81485.0 82214.6 104.8 62.6 33.2 33.5 0.0 
2009 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 245052.4 121654.7 83969.9 85839.9 13510.7 49.6 34.3 35.0 5.5 
2010 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 300168.5 134606.7 95870.2 111024.4 281.9 44.8 31.9 37.0 0.1 
2011 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 498263.2 288211.0 124131.8 136865.5 352.8 57.8 24.9 27.5 0.1 
2012 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 548177.3 347171.2 163676.8 168853.4 636.1 63.3 29.9 30.8 0.1 
2013 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 558282.9 296177.6 206799.8 216077.6 1938.7 53.1 37.0 38.7 0.3 
2014 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 363612.6 246307.1 57683.4 67461.7 20316.4 67.7 15.9 18.6 5.6 
2015 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 361399.0 228779.1 72427.6 76576.7 27102.5 63.3 20.0 21.2 7.5 
 
    ECOWAS exports by destination export share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Chemicals 340172.4 112793.0 32150.6 47126.3 30.0 33.2 9.5 13.9 0.0 
1997 Chemicals 400085.7 227039.7 24957.8 40368.8 14.0 56.7 6.2 10.1 0.0 
1998 Chemicals 547527.9 272414.4 41226.0 46483.9 0.0 49.8 7.5 8.5 0.0 
1999 Chemicals 480419.6 265123.8 53550.5 59961.1 6.8 55.2 11.1 12.5 0.0 
2000 Chemicals 350687.4 185279.3 22606.3 22416.1 240.0 52.8 6.4 6.4 0.1 
2001 Chemicals 452082.8 229673.5 51298.2 52305.9 278.5 50.8 11.3 11.6 0.1 
2002 Chemicals 607565.6 298577.9 31392.0 46985.4 9835.8 49.1 5.2 7.7 1.6 
2003 Chemicals 521689.0 306822.0 15726.8 19012.0 408.7 58.8 3.0 3.6 0.1 
2004 Chemicals 743430.6 391144.2 17417.6 19434.7 79.0 52.6 2.3 2.6 0.0 
2005 Chemicals 667171.0 356620.8 15924.0 54896.0 226.1 53.5 2.4 8.2 0.0 
2006 Chemicals 548757.4 392310.8 14253.8 41271.6 1502.6 71.5 2.6 7.5 0.3 
2007 Chemicals 863945.0 478488.2 74902.3 132814.5 13028.0 55.4 8.7 15.4 1.5 
2008 Chemicals 2185078.5 1074512.9 372225.9 474178.8 28578.9 49.2 17.0 21.7 1.3 
2009 Chemicals 1119546.3 575411.3 120303.3 160392.7 19271.8 51.4 10.7 14.3 1.7 
2010 Chemicals 1379167.4 509778.1 33082.2 134723.7 37914.7 37.0 2.4 9.8 2.7 
2011 Chemicals 1654918.1 906017.3 83518.6 194883.1 24513.8 54.7 5.0 11.8 1.5 
2012 Chemicals 1530738.6 867727.8 46887.1 112244.5 104126.6 56.7 3.1 7.3 6.8 
2013 Chemicals 1508306.4 965216.5 99419.5 121926.8 47033.9 64.0 6.6 8.1 3.1 
2014 Chemicals 917895.3 621631.1 76316.3 83975.0 6377.8 67.7 8.3 9.1 0.7 
2015 Chemicals 585733.6 352600.0 20668.2 33219.1 712.0 60.2 3.5 5.7 0.1 
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    ECOWAS exports by destination export share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Manufactured goods 531273.6 77462.4 348042.3 365292.2 311.3 14.6 65.5 68.8 0.1 
1997 Manufactured goods 650743.6 210591.8 340688.4 332067.0 208.6 32.4 52.4 51.0 0.0 
1998 Manufactured goods 554025.4 209165.7 251293.9 268448.0 55.0 37.8 45.4 48.5 0.0 
1999 Manufactured goods 688252.1 282502.8 236990.0 260901.0 407.3 41.0 34.4 37.9 0.1 
2000 Manufactured goods 634956.2 239212.1 272644.2 281388.6 17120.3 37.7 42.9 44.3 2.7 
2001 Manufactured goods 699349.4 324609.6 269816.9 217596.2 12230.8 46.4 38.6 31.1 1.7 
2002 Manufactured goods 624467.9 404490.4 134920.8 151285.3 585.4 64.8 21.6 24.2 0.1 
2003 Manufactured goods 689456.5 373626.6 207391.2 238267.7 6894.6 54.2 30.1 34.6 1.0 
2004 Manufactured goods 608592.9 380596.2 141371.3 147591.3 888.4 62.5 23.2 24.3 0.1 
2005 Manufactured goods 1275374.5 791885.4 312726.4 367312.0 2799.7 62.1 24.5 28.8 0.2 
2006 Manufactured goods 1099146.8 582446.6 301821.8 378622.1 4858.3 53.0 27.5 34.4 0.4 
2007 Manufactured goods 1668052.7 639346.1 539031.9 641575.9 52359.5 38.3 32.3 38.5 3.1 
2008 Manufactured goods 2332456.9 814014.8 653242.2 755915.6 53851.9 34.9 28.0 32.4 2.3 
2009 Manufactured goods 2040990.3 906311.5 548961.7 646645.8 65085.3 44.4 26.9 31.7 3.2 
2010 Manufactured goods 5139409.9 803073.0 1383299.4 1968836.0 602805.5 15.6 26.9 38.3 11.7 
2011 Manufactured goods 3254761.7 1336920.0 1098523.2 1270582.2 110895.6 41.1 33.8 39.0 3.4 
2012 Manufactured goods 3702720.3 1248702.4 1260752.8 1527959.8 252709.5 33.7 34.0 41.3 6.8 
2013 Manufactured goods 3356094.9 1225888.4 877334.3 1136658.3 91027.3 36.5 26.1 33.9 2.7 
2014 Manufactured goods 3003510.8 892062.6 1262212.6 1516726.7 37893.5 29.7 42.0 50.5 1.3 
2015 Manufactured goods 852742.2 685474.2 82427.8 91231.6 4836.0 80.4 9.7 10.7 0.6 
 
    ECOWAS exports by destination export share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Machinery and transport equipment 96448.6 20643.2 32402.0 55936.0 2196.3 21.4 33.6 58.0 2.3 
1997 Machinery and transport equipment 497469.1 46624.2 337580.8 371484.6 53.9 9.4 67.9 74.7 0.0 
1998 Machinery and transport equipment 361094.5 150273.7 72134.1 126013.6 34.5 41.6 20.0 34.9 0.0 
1999 Machinery and transport equipment 439896.4 46996.2 105789.6 191949.9 319.7 10.7 24.0 43.6 0.1 
2000 Machinery and transport equipment 141932.6 43537.2 46608.6 79462.3 269.6 30.7 32.8 56.0 0.2 
2001 Machinery and transport equipment 294180.2 58437.8 59017.8 96260.5 390.4 19.9 20.1 32.7 0.1 
2002 Machinery and transport equipment 1097011.4 449188.0 593903.0 629480.7 1527.7 40.9 54.1 57.4 0.1 
2003 Machinery and transport equipment 1123588.5 69576.1 642976.4 879051.3 8799.2 6.2 57.2 78.2 0.8 
2004 Machinery and transport equipment 692376.4 78982.8 561496.9 579158.1 481.3 11.4 81.1 83.6 0.1 
2005 Machinery and transport equipment 1080097.8 82509.7 483495.5 517739.5 9127.4 7.6 44.8 47.9 0.8 
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2006 Machinery and transport equipment 1193356.5 36090.0 449102.0 682839.9 2882.9 3.0 37.6 57.2 0.2 
2007 Machinery and transport equipment 861283.3 116456.3 588079.4 632916.1 27226.0 13.5 68.3 73.5 3.2 
2008 Machinery and transport equipment 2879448.6 1323813.7 552472.5 897232.4 9442.9 46.0 19.2 31.2 0.3 
2009 Machinery and transport equipment 1483431.2 127920.3 793675.6 557588.7 35715.8 8.6 53.5 37.6 2.4 
2010 Machinery and transport equipment 2150155.0 745627.9 567674.7 865366.7 35300.1 34.7 26.4 40.2 1.6 
2011 Machinery and transport equipment 2065402.5 340010.5 365222.3 649959.8 697351.4 16.5 17.7 31.5 33.8 
2012 Machinery and transport equipment 2596411.2 433070.9 1071123.8 1362880.8 56292.0 16.7 41.3 52.5 2.2 
2013 Machinery and transport equipment 3341524.6 1901647.6 443715.0 638435.4 35466.7 56.9 13.3 19.1 1.1 
2014 Machinery and transport equipment 4128456.4 379443.8 2302158.1 2444710.5 56251.1 9.2 55.8 59.2 1.4 
2015 Machinery and transport equipment 637989.7 251099.8 166162.1 231577.3 16115.7 39.4 26.0 36.3 2.5 
 
    ECOWAS exports by destination export share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 66907.2 20512.7 31192.7 36189.2 5.4 30.7 46.6 54.1 0.0 
1997 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 142058.9 89277.0 28027.0 27009.4 0.0 62.8 19.7 19.0 0.0 
1998 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 202973.7 125267.6 36394.7 35720.8 36.1 61.7 17.9 17.6 0.0 
1999 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 191221.4 100214.7 34526.4 43228.4 1511.4 52.4 18.1 22.6 0.8 
2000 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 225177.6 112545.4 54090.2 83997.7 109.1 50.0 24.0 37.3 0.0 
2001 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 193958.7 106583.6 51822.5 62855.2 121.5 55.0 26.7 32.4 0.1 
2002 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 255186.7 201556.2 22337.7 27852.6 47.6 79.0 8.8 10.9 0.0 
2003 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 221892.1 131155.0 39939.6 53009.2 88.7 59.1 18.0 23.9 0.0 
2004 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 186061.3 110894.8 47283.6 51281.6 46.5 59.6 25.4 27.6 0.0 
2005 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 220351.6 148337.6 46050.6 52202.8 94.4 67.3 20.9 23.7 0.0 
2006 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 475199.8 303990.9 94067.4 115331.1 247.5 64.0 19.8 24.3 0.1 
2007 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 644141.7 241058.0 319178.5 346530.1 5832.6 37.4 49.6 53.8 0.9 
2008 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 679424.3 237861.3 230277.0 349440.5 1805.4 35.0 33.9 51.4 0.3 
2009 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 586670.0 326718.0 59032.5 80307.4 10769.9 55.7 10.1 13.7 1.8 
2010 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 985659.9 246904.4 26748.8 450127.2 14433.2 25.0 2.7 45.7 1.5 
2011 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 837538.1 544124.9 83192.3 112401.9 3980.6 65.0 9.9 13.4 0.5 
2012 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 738809.7 477481.1 45342.5 77972.4 9870.5 64.6 6.1 10.6 1.3 
2013 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 1106944.0 632345.7 117609.4 248036.1 35182.6 57.1 10.6 22.4 3.2 
2014 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 2605494.4 475858.2 1534646.5 1842483.3 6287.8 18.3 58.9 70.7 0.2 
2015 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 442295.9 241972.2 29736.4 56476.8 839.3 54.7 6.7 12.8 0.2 
 
 
319 
 
 
    ECOWAS exports by destination export share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World (export only) ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 26820.8 8327.4 12325.0 14057.9 49.0 31.0 46.0 52.4 0.2 
1997 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 31806.1 9174.5 15873.5 18113.0 12.8 28.8 49.9 56.9 0.0 
1998 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 21952.2 5597.5 9969.1 11985.4   25.5 45.4 54.6 0.0 
1999 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 23611.2 8023.5 9564.0 13203.9 1.9 34.0 40.5 55.9 0.0 
2000 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 36817.9 8483.1 13537.5 16481.7 42.6 23.0 36.8 44.8 0.1 
2001 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 56709.6 8649.7 16099.5 18714.8 1.1 15.3 28.4 33.0 0.0 
2002 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 34758.7 10667.5 12535.1 14768.5 37.4 30.7 36.1 42.5 0.1 
2003 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 344730.7 150234.0 100709.5 109460.5 109.4 43.6 29.2 31.8 0.0 
2004 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 506803.6 12967.9 481217.5 482702.5 11.6 2.6 95.0 95.2 0.0 
2005 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 543754.6 13376.8 506777.7 509693.2 4.8 2.5 93.2 93.7 0.0 
2006 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 575588.3 9567.5 357026.8 358872.5   1.7 62.0 62.3 0.0 
2007 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 1054603.9 65367.5 438465.8 981355.1 1209.7 6.2 41.6 93.1 0.1 
2008 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 301365.7 22166.2 57944.7 59725.4 44.2 7.4 19.2 19.8 0.0 
2009 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 178590.0 22828.0 76248.1 78860.9 1846.3 12.8 42.7 44.2 1.0 
2010 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 149529.6 15007.3 46599.7 71429.4 12069.1 10.0 31.2 47.8 8.1 
2011 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 227448.7 24725.0 52869.1 158526.5 3956.6 10.9 23.2 69.7 1.7 
2012 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 838821.0 26367.3 490184.5 754743.2 33605.8 3.1 58.4 90.0 4.0 
2013 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 211644.3 46935.9 138215.7 150064.6 863.6 22.2 65.3 70.9 0.4 
2014 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 215236.4 14575.6 154489.1 182826.8 105.6 6.8 71.8 84.9 0.0 
2015 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 195034.4 30940.9 49254.0 54407.7 40304.6 15.9 25.3 27.9 20.7 
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Appendix 4A.1: Total ECOWAS imports to the World and from selected trade partners by product categories 
    ECOWAS Imports by destination Import share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Food and live animals 2828545 107137 1119357 1500362 48552 3.8 39.6 53.0 1.7 
1997 Food and live animals 2970781 108406 1134066 1519761 49392 3.6 38.2 51.2 1.7 
1998 Food and live animals 3212554 132682 1281741 1661061 102467 4.1 39.9 51.7 3.2 
1999 Food and live animals 3126442 115395 1340879 1967405 88769 3.7 42.9 62.9 2.8 
2000 Food and live animals 2751492 135970 1294014 1718539 139031 4.9 47.0 62.5 5.1 
2001 Food and live animals 3619514 253372 1561981 2145578 196703 7.0 43.2 59.3 5.4 
2002 Food and live animals 3902405 242010 1544170 2213337 217595 6.2 39.6 56.7 5.6 
2003 Food and live animals 4610217 244719 1811618 2772382 181257 5.3 39.3 60.1 3.9 
2004 Food and live animals 2334281 221023 935004 1108114 105347 9.5 40.1 47.5 4.5 
2005 Food and live animals 3479962 243912 1137460 1451725 79824 7.0 32.7 41.7 2.3 
2006 Food and live animals 7211321 263009 2569932 4351386 317681 3.6 35.6 60.3 4.4 
2007 Food and live animals 10553473 361249 3892538 6559828 335986 3.4 36.9 62.2 3.2 
2008 Food and live animals 8258265 339510 2322063 3661543 313241 4.1 28.1 44.3 3.8 
2009 Food and live animals 8248548 270479 2404311 3315791 404734 3.3 29.1 40.2 4.9 
2010 Food and live animals 9279525 414333 2214114 4178037 456309 4.5 23.9 45.0 4.9 
2011 Food and live animals 24315599 538124 5106143 10008352 1157094 2.2 21.0 41.2 4.8 
2012 Food and live animals 14424362 597123 3040768 5600543 853899 4.1 21.1 38.8 5.9 
2013 Food and live animals 13587606 737782 3498502 6006292 879198 5.4 25.7 44.2 6.5 
2014 Food and live animals 13401862 466258 3727083 6147457 598653 3.5 27.8 45.9 4.5 
2015 Food and live animals 5334003 376117 1615165 1943826 183524 7.1 30.3 36.4 3.4 
    ECOWAS Imports by destination Import share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Beverages and tobacco 228433 9969 177781 196938 150 4.4 77.8 86.2 0.1 
1997 Beverages and tobacco 239367 6736 173249 211969 476 2.8 72.4 88.6 0.2 
1998 Beverages and tobacco 228947 9043 163248 190848 2103 3.9 71.3 83.4 0.9 
1999 Beverages and tobacco 223799 11328 153787 200392 1192 5.1 68.7 89.5 0.5 
2000 Beverages and tobacco 257293 20751 149458 224492 1065 8.1 58.1 87.3 0.4 
2001 Beverages and tobacco 413849 55077 251937 326000 1494 13.3 60.9 78.8 0.4 
2002 Beverages and tobacco 355644 42685 222999 273705 2803 12.0 62.7 77.0 0.8 
2003 Beverages and tobacco 367967 56729 215651 251234 4541 15.4 58.6 68.3 1.2 
2004 Beverages and tobacco 334024 77653 172511 208311 6196 23.2 51.6 62.4 1.9 
2005 Beverages and tobacco 369274 67877 184137 215521 2610 18.4 49.9 58.4 0.7 
2006 Beverages and tobacco 447383 47435 236518 286022 9339 10.6 52.9 63.9 2.1 
2007 Beverages and tobacco 687456 98307 319505 386427 19656 14.3 46.5 56.2 2.9 
2008 Beverages and tobacco 707615 142674 308269 348399 22248 20.2 43.6 49.2 3.1 
2009 Beverages and tobacco 592067 113994 226936 267026 17391 19.3 38.3 45.1 2.9 
2010 Beverages and tobacco 696120 136260 283093 348048 13756 19.6 40.7 50.0 2.0 
2011 Beverages and tobacco 877892 154734 392698 443837 32825 17.6 44.7 50.6 3.7 
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2012 Beverages and tobacco 1076988 165578 321656 637857 25197 15.4 29.9 59.2 2.3 
2013 Beverages and tobacco 2260996 1525192 387990 430948 34075 67.5 17.2 19.1 1.5 
2014 Beverages and tobacco 908621 203531 399496 449818 24935 22.4 44.0 49.5 2.7 
2015 Beverages and tobacco 546288 149012 299864 309995 1636 27.3 54.9 56.7 0.3 
 
    ECOWAS Imports by destination Import share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 351200 64243 128587 230857 2147 18.3 36.6 65.7 0.6 
1997 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 480301 66933 167500 342905 1838 13.9 34.9 71.4 0.4 
1998 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 490617 53396 197379 332508 1567 10.9 40.2 67.8 0.3 
1999 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 424851 48333 185910 306292 1576 11.4 43.8 72.1 0.4 
2000 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 358610 65425 152072 238861 2440 18.2 42.4 66.6 0.7 
2001 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 542279 228423 143598 233571 5037 42.1 26.5 43.1 0.9 
2002 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 435854 75824 166055 283786 15404 17.4 38.1 65.1 3.5 
2003 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 509171 107101 185651 288801 15241 21.0 36.5 56.7 3.0 
2004 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 307995 79893 111980 162320 1653 25.9 36.4 52.7 0.5 
2005 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 395402 79906 150542 223524 3014 20.2 38.1 56.5 0.8 
2006 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 591018 76452 197776 373033 34818 12.9 33.5 63.1 5.9 
2007 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 896690 107969 321810 581035 45969 12.0 35.9 64.8 5.1 
2008 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 1185293 121196 321953 694080 54516 10.2 27.2 58.6 4.6 
2009 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 1010237 91745 316660 492752 49687 9.1 31.3 48.8 4.9 
2010 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 1257755 119830 328439 607647 60836 9.5 26.1 48.3 4.8 
2011 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 4329231 133800 2046180 3523846 245273 3.1 47.3 81.4 5.7 
2012 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 1301466 117691 342045 705405 117140 9.0 26.3 54.2 9.0 
2013 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 2217345 206228 1176784 1426484 172910 9.3 53.1 64.3 7.8 
2014 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 1127952 93566 298089 580431 161141 8.3 26.4 51.5 14.3 
2015 Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 507159 66111 174460 273392 26083 13.0 34.4 53.9 5.1 
  
 
   ECOWAS Imports by destination Import share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 2278535 1335721 389292 461079 118 58.6 17.1 20.2 0.0 
1997 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 2548310 1430477 693326 731048 384 56.1 27.2 28.7 0.0 
1998 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 2026911 1024240 695609 664882 656 50.5 34.3 32.8 0.0 
1999 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 2043509 1222299 469277 515038 1909 59.8 23.0 25.2 0.1 
2000 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 2737695 1981087 407591 476567 11220 72.4 14.9 17.4 0.4 
2001 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 2495366 1464608 502999 665615 13578 58.7 20.2 26.7 0.5 
2002 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 2441747 1527108 308670 389329 14717 62.5 12.6 15.9 0.6 
2003 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 4799122 1962089 327037 400181 7386 40.9 6.8 8.3 0.2 
2004 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 2802621 2155731 304895 311572 1028 76.9 10.9 11.1 0.0 
2005 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 4308685 3287602 497774 541060 3099 76.3 11.6 12.6 0.1 
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2006 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 5325580 3213944 1134470 1244333 79776 60.3 21.3 23.4 1.5 
2007 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 6803329 3708686 1792721 2054209 22989 54.5 26.4 30.2 0.3 
2008 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 8995505 5414362 1899872 2108559 24899 60.2 21.1 23.4 0.3 
2009 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 4553458 2525077 1209500 1292238 14981 55.5 26.6 28.4 0.3 
2010 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 6701018 3752958 1714835 1953789 18285 56.0 25.6 29.2 0.3 
2011 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 13865154 4733700 3269804 7126950 132346 34.1 23.6 51.4 1.0 
2012 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 9318280 5522470 2057296 2303231 22248 59.3 22.1 24.7 0.2 
2013 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 17662876 5062188 7618491 8201550 21106 28.7 43.1 46.4 0.1 
2014 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 16235493 5297516 8353102 8877448 53026 32.6 51.4 54.7 0.3 
2015 Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal 5873102 2822548 1747602 2019073 8974 48.1 29.8 34.4 0.2 
 
    ECOWAS Imports by destination Import share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 185803 30679 76531 113435 134 16.5 41.2 61.1 0.1 
1997 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 158226 32728 81239 81652 75 20.7 51.3 51.6 0.0 
1998 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 213834 38755 76427 118025 21 18.1 35.7 55.2 0.0 
1999 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 259294 82148 98956 128615 28 31.7 38.2 49.6 0.0 
2000 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 162836 37349 70488 94099 68 22.9 43.3 57.8 0.0 
2001 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 180259 43436 59954 83734 197 24.1 33.3 46.5 0.1 
2002 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 206831 46349 67173 91878 386 22.4 32.5 44.4 0.2 
2003 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 367906 64515 69459 120631 2728 17.5 18.9 32.8 0.7 
2004 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 250220 56768 47469 76482 2017 22.7 19.0 30.6 0.8 
2005 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 291794 66302 35502 66187 5435 22.7 12.2 22.7 1.9 
2006 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 393964 51525 57891 114722 23450 13.1 14.7 29.1 6.0 
2007 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 595371 75797 78834 175924 18421 12.7 13.2 29.5 3.1 
2008 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 717773 110465 93309 177685 18197 15.4 13.0 24.8 2.5 
2009 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 441135 40723 43576 89628 17548 9.2 9.9 20.3 4.0 
2010 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 732319 83414 49318 150356 12511 11.4 6.7 20.5 1.7 
2011 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 952217 155748 72041 251560 20575 16.4 7.6 26.4 2.2 
2012 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 920087 241113 86883 167517 8602 26.2 9.4 18.2 0.9 
2013 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 967084 236503 79451 121774 14592 24.5 8.2 12.6 1.5 
2014 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 1082521 238165 51075 133442 17386 22.0 4.7 12.3 1.6 
2015 Animals and vegetable oils and fats 485928 123170 41434 58930 12857 25.3 8.5 12.1 2.6 
    ECOWAS Imports by destination Import share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Chemicals 2202680 125812 1310718 1539063 77662 5.7 59.5 69.9 3.5 
1997 Chemicals 2700247 130397 1361584 1612246 419356 4.8 50.4 59.7 15.5 
1998 Chemicals 2539370 160132 1488150 1769941 61203 6.3 58.6 69.7 2.4 
1999 Chemicals 2145472 127980 1280688 1576259 49023 6.0 59.7 73.5 2.3 
2000 Chemicals 2435883 123978 1321870 1649256 65776 5.1 54.3 67.7 2.7 
2001 Chemicals 2781483 181182 1471670 1904448 99864 6.5 52.9 68.5 3.6 
2002 Chemicals 3071980 186864 1522056 2043424 140775 6.1 49.5 66.5 4.6 
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2003 Chemicals 3210633 265198 1494171 2054766 158823 8.3 46.5 64.0 4.9 
2004 Chemicals 1561747 213401 870160 1014773 39595 13.7 55.7 65.0 2.5 
2005 Chemicals 2122895 222642 1068413 1316962 86844 10.5 50.3 62.0 4.1 
2006 Chemicals 5833197 183332 2369342 3542065 573125 3.1 40.6 60.7 9.8 
2007 Chemicals 8265030 245725 3414587 5030423 669812 3.0 41.3 60.9 8.1 
2008 Chemicals 7131866 240576 2615792 3757839 691586 3.4 36.7 52.7 9.7 
2009 Chemicals 7523171 214096 2023799 2986042 1063428 2.8 26.9 39.7 14.1 
2010 Chemicals 8555264 298001 2350791 4019104 873025 3.5 27.5 47.0 10.2 
2011 Chemicals 9606360 334771 3205794 4665393 1280389 3.5 33.4 48.6 13.3 
2012 Chemicals 9385078 426018 3116435 4572952 1330098 4.5 33.2 48.7 14.2 
2013 Chemicals 10430022 410252 3227220 4735579 1803759 3.9 30.9 45.4 17.3 
2014 Chemicals 9554190 309394 3023931 4337736 1594517 3.2 31.7 45.4 16.7 
2015 Chemicals 3375661 210040 1293760 1662673 399299 6.2 38.3 49.3 11.8 
 
    ECOWAS Imports by destination Import share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Manufactured goods 2911535 171577 1650240 1932304 117386 5.9 56.7 66.4 4.0 
1997 Manufactured goods 2801022 155461 1585527 1889592 137246 5.6 56.6 67.5 4.9 
1998 Manufactured goods 2981445 189657 1572928 1844452 128437 6.4 52.8 61.9 4.3 
1999 Manufactured goods 2690874 171638 1347257 1674847 143395 6.4 50.1 62.2 5.3 
2000 Manufactured goods 2704924 180029 1189675 1550328 155330 6.7 44.0 57.3 5.7 
2001 Manufactured goods 3278094 225709 1346961 1785100 239784 6.9 41.1 54.5 7.3 
2002 Manufactured goods 3465387 322108 1266530 1899741 254630 9.3 36.5 54.8 7.3 
2003 Manufactured goods 4312861 406438 1722548 2363157 358308 9.4 39.9 54.8 8.3 
2004 Manufactured goods 1990765 285866 750950 955741 170457 14.4 37.7 48.0 8.6 
2005 Manufactured goods 3103488 358114 1058827 1443993 370669 11.5 34.1 46.5 11.9 
2006 Manufactured goods 6620784 328097 2291282 3315129 925786 5.0 34.6 50.1 14.0 
2007 Manufactured goods 11525437 1123802 3295130 4930697 1922544 9.8 28.6 42.8 16.7 
2008 Manufactured goods 11999057 1389946 3049088 4415408 2174138 11.6 25.4 36.8 18.1 
2009 Manufactured goods 10242672 369990 2674971 3870386 2177792 3.6 26.1 37.8 21.3 
2010 Manufactured goods 15091482 606827 3816708 6549308 2999952 4.0 25.3 43.4 19.9 
2011 Manufactured goods 13379618 871179 3382488 5840746 3244182 6.5 25.3 43.7 24.2 
2012 Manufactured goods 11989928 813392 2557605 4482585 3332097 6.8 21.3 37.4 27.8 
2013 Manufactured goods 12594423 650588 3008314 4659098 4194823 5.2 23.9 37.0 33.3 
2014 Manufactured goods 11168998 527546 2729728 4520366 3568324 4.7 24.4 40.5 31.9 
2015 Manufactured goods 4036622 381645 1347117 1707676 1089173 9.5 33.4 42.3 27.0 
    ECOWAS Imports by destination Import share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Machinery and transport equipment 4691295.1 18022.8 2650742.3 3973590.5 135603.6 0.4 56.5 84.7 2.9 
1997 Machinery and transport equipment 5387924.1 26648.1 2854828.9 4573343.3 166177.7 0.5 53.0 84.9 3.1 
1998 Machinery and transport equipment 5160946.8 27508.0 2837557.9 4232662.7 170940.7 0.5 55.0 82.0 3.3 
1999 Machinery and transport equipment 4529884.8 41191.8 2606978.8 3806018.2 177603.9 0.9 57.6 84.0 3.9 
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2000 Machinery and transport equipment 4464337.7 59760.0 2648170.3 3702293.6 168456.5 1.3 59.3 82.9 3.8 
2001 Machinery and transport equipment 4996438.2 95538.4 2811130.0 3949931.4 283134.0 1.9 56.3 79.1 5.7 
2002 Machinery and transport equipment 5802216.3 90410.1 2924838.8 4333161.5 386321.1 1.6 50.4 74.7 6.7 
2003 Machinery and transport equipment 8702971.3 96538.2 4149770.0 6513944.1 725393.3 1.1 47.7 74.8 8.3 
2004 Machinery and transport equipment 2931624.6 76447.2 1852911.5 2488823.9 149541.4 2.6 63.2 84.9 5.1 
2005 Machinery and transport equipment 5032181.2 124311.4 2737304.0 3762869.1 313101.0 2.5 54.4 74.8 6.2 
2006 Machinery and transport equipment 13670990.1 75394.5 6539013.9 10014444.1 1391641.7 0.6 47.8 73.3 10.2 
2007 Machinery and transport equipment 18485734.5 136819.8 8243386.1 12202767.6 3336564.9 0.7 44.6 66.0 18.0 
2008 Machinery and transport equipment 21909980.7 121998.7 8484625.0 13419326.2 3350163.9 0.6 38.7 61.2 15.3 
2009 Machinery and transport equipment 22949453.9 115332.5 6870073.2 10640293.6 3974096.2 0.5 29.9 46.4 17.3 
2010 Machinery and transport equipment 31942888.2 687480.8 8626118.1 16906406.7 5924918.4 2.2 27.0 52.9 18.5 
2011 Machinery and transport equipment 30462144.0 250855.2 9342122.4 17450354.3 6433033.7 0.8 30.7 57.3 21.1 
2012 Machinery and transport equipment 27822454.6 252892.1 9170533.8 15996987.3 5809009.2 0.9 33.0 57.5 20.9 
2013 Machinery and transport equipment 27649465.4 237433.1 8418167.0 14181513.1 7180316.8 0.9 30.4 51.3 26.0 
2014 Machinery and transport equipment 24236711.1 210532.5 7486836.1 12842018.7 6390172.1 0.9 30.9 53.0 26.4 
2015 Machinery and transport equipment 7535992.2 172007.6 3363487.7 4605912.2 1541566.3 2.3 44.6 61.1 20.5 
 
    ECOWAS Imports by destination Import share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 889013 24484 523356 633959 63182 2.8 58.9 71.3 7.1 
1997 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 835548 24026 467384 576231 71829 2.9 55.9 69.0 8.6 
1998 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 856755 26882 449799 557112 85827 3.1 52.5 65.0 10.0 
1999 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 846781 22965 411651 544557 99019 2.7 48.6 64.3 11.7 
2000 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 782577 28015 386199 488318 94230 3.6 49.3 62.4 12.0 
2001 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 912942 40356 473331 567446 117340 4.4 51.8 62.2 12.9 
2002 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 951213 46213 462320 562351 153538 4.9 48.6 59.1 16.1 
2003 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 1105909 50828 483756 609174 203917 4.6 43.7 55.1 18.4 
2004 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 687199 50025 365379 414515 110945 7.3 53.2 60.3 16.1 
2005 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 1112865 51807 573706 643958 235595 4.7 51.6 57.9 21.2 
2006 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 1929701 47262 856058 1040173 490430 2.4 44.4 53.9 25.4 
2007 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 2435724 85075 930405 1148384 767085 3.5 38.2 47.1 31.5 
2008 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 2998045 81479 1021359 1260196 849646 2.7 34.1 42.0 28.3 
2009 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 3098821 57523 840447 1103088 1010575 1.9 27.1 35.6 32.6 
2010 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 3962909 119987 968105 1631545 1078559 3.0 24.4 41.2 27.2 
2011 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 4066138 192394 819932 1585272 1415964 4.7 20.2 39.0 34.8 
2012 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 3162396 141946 816509 1197009 1223832 4.5 25.8 37.9 38.7 
2013 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 3267326 135072 840785 1241390 1291890 4.1 25.7 38.0 39.5 
2014 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 3271613 112771 831975 1105499 1221818 3.4 25.4 33.8 37.3 
2015 Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary 1371484 74805 456760 580532 454165 5.5 33.3 42.3 33.1 
    ECOWAS Imports by destination Import share (%) by destination 
Year Product category Total to the World  ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 249807.4 4391.9 160840.6 193153.1 5449.7 1.8 64.4 77.3 2.2 
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1997 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 286713.5 3442.2 178405.0 216890.2 7940.1 1.2 62.2 75.6 2.8 
1998 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 107110.1 6120.7 60044.2 72348.3 1289.5 5.7 56.1 67.5 1.2 
1999 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 70605.5 6885.5 26705.9 43673.9 529.8 9.8 37.8 61.9 0.8 
2000 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 47916.5 4226.9 15897.7 28389.5 120.6 8.8 33.2 59.2 0.3 
2001 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 25903.8 2933.6 12940.6 16724.1 1483.9 11.3 50.0 64.6 5.7 
2002 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 18443.9 1705.7 10808.5 13669.3 591.9 9.2 58.6 74.1 3.2 
2003 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 452267.0 9310.1 424317.7 430443.4 1142.6 2.1 93.8 95.2 0.3 
2004 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 509136.2 2398.2 482034.4 488600.3 1510.0 0.5 94.7 96.0 0.3 
2005 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 1413086.7 226733.7 589493.4 599873.1 988.2 16.0 41.7 42.5 0.1 
2006 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 1242144.0 8444.7 372891.8 478495.2 648942.6 0.7 30.0 38.5 52.2 
2007 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 397835.3 3107.2 312572.7 334262.4 26209.7 0.8 78.6 84.0 6.6 
2008 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 109340.7 3407.8 53663.6 65704.2 20279.2 3.1 49.1 60.1 18.5 
2009 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 570550.7 2571.9 237649.7 267139.3 113539.2 0.5 41.7 46.8 19.9 
2010 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 92924.0 2431.3 33232.8 41067.2 12831.8 2.6 35.8 44.2 13.8 
2011 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 132590.5 3979.2 20193.4 26245.0 15821.4 3.0 15.2 19.8 11.9 
2012 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 84479.3 12273.6 30627.9 38367.8 13026.0 14.5 36.3 45.4 15.4 
2013 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 246172.8 20082.8 88729.5 145221.5 33570.0 8.2 36.0 59.0 13.6 
2014 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 128146.4 2826.7 47300.8 58303.9 15166.4 2.2 36.9 45.5 11.8 
2015 Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. 198583.0 4628.8 153074.3 159477.8 5972.8 2.3 77.1 80.3 3.0 
 
 
Appendix 4A.2: Total ECOWAS imports to the World and from selected trade partners and share 
  Total ECOWAS imports by destination Share by destination (%) 
Year World ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 16816857 1892047 8187574 10774938 450388 11.3 48.7 64.1 2.7 
1997 18408451 1985260 8697268 11755862 854721 10.8 47.2 63.9 4.6 
1998 17818300 1668845 8823183 11444199 554603 9.4 49.5 64.2 3.1 
1999 16361421 1850573 7922390 10763540 563159 11.3 48.4 65.8 3.4 
2000 16703539 2636874 7635747 10171571 637816 15.8 45.7 60.9 3.8 
2001 19246128 2590635 8636501 11678146 958616 13.5 44.9 60.7 5.0 
2002 20651721 2581277 8495619 12104382 1186761 12.5 41.1 58.6 5.7 
2003 28439024 3263465 10883979 15804714 1658738 11.5 38.3 55.6 5.8 
2004 13709613 3219206 5893294 7229252 588289 23.5 43.0 52.7 4.3 
2005 21629634 4729207 8033159 10265672 1101178 21.9 37.1 47.5 5.1 
2006 43266082 4294894 16625173 24759802 4494990 9.9 38.4 57.2 10.4 
2007 60646082 5946537 22601488 33403956 7165235 9.8 37.3 55.1 11.8 
2008 64012741 7965614 20169994 29908739 7518915 12.4 31.5 46.7 11.7 
2009 59230113 3801531 16847922 24324386 8843770 6.4 28.4 41.1 14.9 
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2010 78312202 6221522 20384754 36385309 11450982 7.9 26.0 46.5 14.6 
2011 101986945 7369282 27657394 50922554 13977503 7.2 27.1 49.9 13.7 
2012 79485518 8290497 21540358 35702453 12735149 10.4 27.1 44.9 16.0 
2013 90883316 9221321 28344432 41149849 15626240 10.1 31.2 45.3 17.2 
2014 81116107 7462107 26948616 39052520 13645139 9.2 33.2 48.1 16.8 
2015 29264821 4380085 10492723 13321486 3723251 15.0 35.9 45.5 12.7 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions. The data is total ECOWAS imports by destination to the world and selected trade 
partners and their percentage share in the last four columns. 
Appendix 4A.3: Total ECOWAS exports to the World and to selected trade partners and share 
  Total ECOWAS exports by destination Share by destination (%) 
Year World ECOWAS EU27 OECD China ECOWAS EU27 OECD China 
1996 18815608.0 1980252.0 8653414.8 14300285.7 40048.8 10.5 46.0 76.0 0.2 
1997 18428386.4 2352383.9 6970734.9 13074895.4 29870.4 12.8 37.8 70.9 0.2 
1998 14491406.6 2247442.4 5665046.9 9639964.7 58532.8 15.5 39.1 66.5 0.4 
1999 23586759.9 2746479.8 6971159.8 14207587.2 200237.1 11.6 29.6 60.2 0.8 
2000 33848123.4 3057978.8 9239909.1 22690128.7 185065.2 9.0 27.3 67.0 0.5 
2001 25049411.1 2398860.3 7551059.9 16264700.0 166105.7 9.6 30.1 64.9 0.7 
2002 25521647.0 2983470.5 7585977.6 15103955.2 115941.8 11.7 29.7 59.2 0.5 
2003 33761244.0 3290872.4 9992860.2 21977867.5 319051.2 9.7 29.6 65.1 0.9 
2004 10513672.0 2771795.6 4470859.5 5494800.5 223024.4 26.4 42.5 52.3 2.1 
2005 13392831.3 3616472.0 5373319.0 6955783.1 315376.1 27.0 40.1 51.9 2.4 
2006 72325225.9 6736095.8 18538137.8 52180514.7 323900.9 9.3 25.6 72.1 0.4 
2007 68444941.2 5971865.1 16340833.0 45674736.3 1057944.2 8.7 23.9 66.7 1.5 
2008 99632461.6 10702363.3 24574548.2 63861793.4 528104.2 10.7 24.7 64.1 0.5 
2009 66001074.9 6896706.5 18048073.9 35134504.3 928773.0 10.4 27.3 53.2 1.4 
2010 102582595.9 6706815.0 25026219.2 61163875.3 1721286.2 6.5 24.4 59.6 1.7 
2011 154771310.2 13999453.0 45863038.1 85471508.0 3091526.5 9.0 29.6 55.2 2.0 
2012 167942867.5 12426580.5 60442606.8 93902878.7 9230580.8 7.4 36.0 55.9 5.5 
2013 115766628.3 12439673.3 47309185.9 62756049.4 2125527.3 10.7 40.9 54.2 1.8 
2014 122096180.8 10318391.8 48351937.7 62584597.9 2314733.2 8.5 39.6 51.3 1.9 
2015 15934910.5 3695685.4 6263354.8 8270572.3 352491.2 23.2 39.3 51.9 2.2 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions. The data is total ECOWAS exports by destination to the world and selected trade 
partners and their percentage share in the last four columns. 
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Appendix 4A.4: RCA calculation data 
  WORLD data ECOWAS data RCA 
Year World export Food and live animals ECOWAS export to world Food and live animals RCA 
1996 4925070773 358577357 18815608 3465312 2.5 
1997 5113944854 353743588 18428386 3159938 2.5 
1998 5078295008 338852552 14491407 3352999 3.5 
1999 5277849583 329708639 23586760 3165476 2.1 
2000 6028801339 325008433 33832052 2716075 1.5 
2001 5798093139 339583510 25049400 2852754 1.9 
2002 6073158748 357301901 25806580 3272526 2.2 
2003 7053265440 411937589 33761244 4508580 2.3 
2004 8543503480 470012244 10513672 3692912 6.4 
2005 9702236285 516071628 13392831 4487204 6.3 
2006 11235768601 569866530 72325226 4865351 1.3 
2007 13003022177 680523919 68444941 5813222 1.6 
2008 14994261894 816788915 99632462 6959721 1.3 
2009 11464801281 742081794 66001075 8744025 2.0 
2010 14074717118 833580418 102582596 8848698 1.5 
2011 16826600110 1005619121 154771310 11219384 1.2 
2012 16644764180 1014457088 167942867 14787403 1.4 
2013 17277140470 1080973477 115766628 10731062 1.5 
2014 17297109160 1115267474 122096181 8533933 1.1 
2015 14005513961 938059140 15934910 7604028 7.1 
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  WORLD data ECOWAS data RCA 
Year World export Beverages and tobacco ECOWAS export to world Beverages and tobacco RCA 
1996 4925070773 57034683 18815608 19655 0.1 
1997 5113944854 57285040 18428386 11379 0.1 
1998 5078295008 55238641 14491407 17386 0.1 
1999 5277849583 55732446 23586760 23691 0.1 
2000 6028801339 54018369 33832052 44930 0.1 
2001 5798093139 54816058 25049400 77559 0.3 
2002 6073158748 58976360 25806580 49900 0.2 
2003 7053265440 67364271 33761244 97115 0.3 
2004 8543503480 75525847 10513672 98585 1.1 
2005 9702236285 80210826 13392831 121354 1.1 
2006 11235768601 88477176 72325226 87927 0.2 
2007 13003022177 103586679 68444941 207447 0.4 
2008 14994261894 114519904 99632462 268165 0.4 
2009 11464801281 104826648 66001075 312884 0.5 
2010 14074717118 111337695 102582596 424174 0.5 
2011 16826600110 129801359 154771310 455175 0.4 
2012 16644764180 134609422 167942867 515289 0.4 
2013 17277140470 142035670 115766628 518228 0.5 
2014 17297109160 142330526 122096181 427082 0.4 
2015 14005513961 118837659 15934910 210055 1.6 
 
  WORLD data ECOWAS data RCA 
Year World export 
Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 
ECOWAS export to 
world 
Crude materials, inedible except fuels; mineral fuel 
RCA 
1996 4925070773 181849147 18815608 2518286 3.6 
1997 5113944854 185471248 18428386 2006653 3.0 
1998 5078295008 167427017 14491407 2037957 4.3 
1999 5277849583 159898007 23586760 1807243 2.5 
2000 6028801339 181730847 33832052 1660032 1.6 
2001 5798093139 171574583 25049400 1479942 2.0 
2002 6073158748 179088961 25806580 1427847 1.9 
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2003 7053265440 212203312 33761244 1820818 1.8 
2004 8543503480 269540196 10513672 2360399 7.1 
2005 9702236285 309834002 13392831 2438892 5.7 
2006 11235768601 378335119 72325226 2146349 0.9 
2007 13003022177 460953475 68444941 3579992 1.5 
2008 14994261894 529591245 99632462 4200844 1.2 
2009 11464801281 403169664 66001075 2609208 1.1 
2010 14074717118 582806803 102582596 4893268 1.2 
2011 16826600110 745503911 154771310 12163754 1.8 
2012 16644764180 695612809 167942867 13978267 2.0 
2013 17277140470 701601807 115766628 8110633 1.7 
2014 17297109160 664221103 122096181 4897461 1.0 
2015 14005513961 517571781 15934910 3163547 5.4 
 
  WORLD data ECOWAS data RCA 
Year World export Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal ECOWAS export to world Mineral fuels - petroleum, gas, coal RCA 
1996 4925070773 378132359 18815608 11636680 8.1 
1997 5113944854 353662341 18428386 11443048 9.0 
1998 5078295008 298232851 14491407 7230227 8.5 
1999 5277849583 381665644 23586760 16638354 9.8 
2000 6028801339 641185288 33832052 27907809 7.8 
2001 5798093139 581594743 25049400 18807535 7.5 
2002 6073158748 563037398 25806580 18076209 7.6 
2003 7053265440 685714412 33761244 24311017 7.4 
2004 8543503480 892745027 10513672 1490389 1.4 
2005 9702236285 1245052706 13392831 2414672 1.4 
2006 11235768601 1567280009 72325226 61214648 6.1 
2007 13003022177 1772528223 68444941 53538729 5.7 
2008 14994261894 2572015850 99632462 79580392 4.7 
2009 11464801281 1576288608 66001075 48680678 5.4 
2010 14074717118 2162365883 102582596 78312366 5.0 
2011 16826600110 2955032016 154771310 122394665 4.5 
2012 16644764180 2889796825 167942867 128706230 4.4 
2013 17277140470 3078344415 115766628 86323908 4.2 
2014 17297109160 2794237648 122096181 97003500 4.9 
2015 14005513961 1556048243 15934910 1882087 1.1 
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  WORLD data ECOWAS data RCA 
Year World export Animals and vegetable oils and fats ECOWAS export to world Animals and vegetable oils and fats RCA 
1996 4925070773 23529852 18815608 114053 1.3 
1997 5113944854 25651932 18428386 85205 0.9 
1998 5078295008 26976713 14491407 165264 2.1 
1999 5277849583 23429026 23586760 128597 1.2 
2000 6028801339 18844154 33832052 129705 1.2 
2001 5798093139 18465008 25049400 135340 1.7 
2002 6073158748 23977360 25806580 76175 0.7 
2003 7053265440 30241269 33761244 122356 0.8 
2004 8543503480 36406428 10513672 134121 3.0 
2005 9702236285 37262031 13392831 143960 2.8 
2006 11235768601 43103537 72325226 118902 0.4 
2007 13003022177 59417676 68444941 213524 0.7 
2008 14994261894 86349207 99632462 245566 0.4 
2009 11464801281 62926288 66001075 245052 0.7 
2010 14074717118 78182090 102582596 300168 0.5 
2011 16826600110 107144887 154771310 498263 0.5 
2012 16644764180 104731637 167942867 548177 0.5 
2013 17277140470 96150043 115766628 558283 0.9 
2014 17297109160 94206176 122096181 363613 0.5 
2015 14005513961 79443320 15934910 361399 4.0 
 
   WORLD data ECOWAS data RCA 
Year  World export Chemicals ECOWAS export to world Chemicals RCA 
1996  4925070773 471476660 18815608 340172 0.2 
1997  5113944854 494992752 18428386 400086 0.2 
1998  5078295008 509979969 14491407 547528 0.4 
1999  5277849583 526056318 23586760 480420 0.2 
2000  6028801339 554404064 33832052 350687 0.1 
2001  5798093139 576668209 25049400 452083 0.2 
2002  6073158748 645314645 25806580 607566 0.2 
2003  7053265440 773121596 33761244 521689 0.1 
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2004  8543503480 946323674 10513672 743431 0.6 
2005  9702236285 1067241727 13392831 667171 0.5 
2006  11235768601 1207538063 72325226 548757 0.1 
2007  13003022177 1420234263 68444941 863945 0.1 
2008  14994261894 1618274222 99632462 2185078 0.2 
2009  11464801281 1376694770 66001075 1119546 0.1 
2010  14074717118 1622731563 102582596 1379167 0.1 
2011  16826600110 1900394817 154771310 1654918 0.1 
2012  16644764180 1865737311 167942867 1530739 0.1 
2013  17277140470 1931335780 115766628 1508306 0.1 
2014  17297109160 1959443623 122096181 917895 0.1 
2015  14005513961 1688874559 15934910 585734 0.3 
 
  WORLD data ECOWAS data RCA 
Year World export Manufactured goods ECOWAS export to world Manufactured goods RCA 
1996 4925070773 775361019 18815608 531274 0.2 
1997 5113944854 796372991 18428386 650744 0.2 
1998 5078295008 781415540 14491407 554025 0.2 
1999 5277849583 773293961 23586760 688252 0.2 
2000 6028801339 828525721 33832052 634956 0.1 
2001 5798093139 798372034 25049400 699349 0.2 
2002 6073158748 844918357 25806580 624468 0.2 
2003 7053265440 977995423 33761244 689456 0.1 
2004 8543503480 1224806762 10513672 608593 0.4 
2005 9702236285 1365093451 13392831 1275374 0.7 
2006 11235768601 1614572877 72325226 1099147 0.1 
2007 13003022177 1899077085 68444941 1668053 0.2 
2008 14994261894 2082643164 99632462 2332457 0.2 
2009 11464801281 1482653746 66001075 2040990 0.2 
2010 14074717118 1849332174 102582596 5139410 0.4 
2011 16826600110 2223209019 154771310 3254762 0.2 
2012 16644764180 2116703681 167942867 3702720 0.2 
2013 17277140470 2156989506 115766628 3356095 0.2 
2014 17297109160 2193010229 122096181 3003511 0.2 
2015 14005513961 1811779872 15934910 852742 0.4 
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  WORLD data ECOWAS data RCA 
Year World export Machinery and transport equipment ECOWAS export to world Machinery and transport equipment RCA 
1996 4925070773 1928275677 18815608 96449 0.0 
1997 5113944854 2052282185 18428386 497469 0.1 
1998 5078295008 2118817599 14491407 361095 0.1 
1999 5277849583 2220760866 23586760 439896 0.0 
2000 6028801339 2454527058 33832052 141933 0.0 
2001 5798093139 2309765185 25049400 294180 0.0 
2002 6073158748 2409544823 25806580 1097011 0.1 
2003 7053265440 2744311183 33761244 1123589 0.1 
2004 8543503480 3284809440 10513672 692376 0.2 
2005 9702236285 3603482435 13392831 1080098 0.2 
2006 11235768601 4149095902 72325226 1193357 0.0 
2007 13003022177 4696704606 68444941 861283 0.0 
2008 14994261894 5038360051 99632462 2879449 0.1 
2009 11464801281 3859505024 66001075 1483431 0.1 
2010 14074717118 4718511155 102582596 2150155 0.1 
2011 16826600110 5360986909 154771310 2065403 0.0 
2012 16644764180 5373117431 167942867 2596411 0.0 
2013 17277140470 5550156189 115766628 3341525 0.1 
2014 17297109160 5711341048 122096181 4128456 0.1 
2015 14005513961 5088094488 15934910 637990 0.1 
 
  WORLD data ECOWAS data RCA 
Year World export Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary ECOWAS export to world Miscellaneous- furniture and sanitary RCA 
1996 4925070773 617639634 18815608 66907 0.0 
1997 5113944854 654631045 18428386 142059 0.1 
1998 5078295008 656451469 14491407 202974 0.1 
1999 5277849583 679463903 23586760 191221 0.1 
2000 6028801339 732421879 33832052 225178 0.1 
2001 5798093139 723604749 25049400 193959 0.1 
2002 6073158748 760724755 25806580 255187 0.1 
2003 7053265440 880861732 33761244 221892 0.1 
2004 8543503480 1029344968 10513672 186061 0.1 
2005 9702236285 1136805618 13392831 220352 0.1 
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2006 11235768601 1268220422 72325226 475200 0.1 
2007 13003022177 1420148395 68444941 644142 0.1 
2008 14994261894 1544948658 99632462 679424 0.1 
2009 11464801281 1350209846 66001075 586670 0.1 
2010 14074717118 1552604740 102582596 985660 0.1 
2011 16826600110 1799512115 154771310 837538 0.1 
2012 16644764180 1861206267 167942867 738810 0.0 
2013 17277140470 1954087348 115766628 1106944 0.1 
2014 17297109160 2031436901 122096181 2605494 0.2 
2015 14005513961 1774424779 15934910 442296 0.2 
 
  WORLD data ECOWAS data RCA 
Year World export Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. ECOWAS export to world Commodity -firearms, zoo animals, coin etc. RCA 
1996 4925070773 133274006 18815608 26821 0.1 
1997 5113944854 135184225 18428386 31806 0.1 
1998 5078295008 119832398 14491407 21952 0.1 
1999 5277849583 127840778 23586760 23611 0.0 
2000 6028801339 238135526 33832052 36818 0.0 
2001 5798093139 223649060 25049400 56710 0.1 
2002 6073158748 230274188 25806580 34759 0.0 
2003 7053265440 269514653 33761244 344731 0.3 
2004 8543503480 313988894 10513672 506804 1.3 
2005 9702236285 341181862 13392831 543755 1.2 
2006 11235768601 349278968 72325226 575588 0.3 
2007 13003022177 489847855 68444941 1054604 0.4 
2008 14994261894 590770678 99632462 301366 0.1 
2009 11464801281 506444893 66001075 178590 0.1 
2010 14074717118 563264596 102582596 149530 0.0 
2011 16826600110 599395956 154771310 227449 0.0 
2012 16644764180 588791708 167942867 838821 0.1 
2013 17277140470 585466234 115766628 211644 0.1 
2014 17297109160 591614432 122096181 215236 0.1 
2015 14005513961 432380120 15934910 195034 0.4 
Source: Author’s Calculation. Data from the World Integrated Trade Solutions 
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Appendix 4A.5: TCI calculation data 
Country imports as base and ECOWAS as exporter 
Country/Products 
Food and live 
animals 
Animal and 
Veg fats and 
oil 
Beverages 
and tobacco 
Chemicals 
Crude 
materials 
Machinery Manufactures 
Minerals fuels and 
lubricants 
Miscellaneous 
Benin 65 97 100 95 97 81 87 91 98 
Burkina Faso 92 99 99 87 99 76 85 79 96 
Cape Verde 74 98 97 95 99 85 86 84 93 
Cote D'Ivoire 89 100 99 91 99 65 92 79 98 
Gambia, The 70 95 99 97 99 85 90 81 95 
Ghana 86 99 99 88 99 62 83 101 94 
Guinea 83 99 98 92 99 81 89 74 95 
Niger 75 97 97 91 96 75 85 100 96 
Nigeria 88 100 97 89 97 72 87 85 98 
Senegal 81 98 99 91 98 82 90 75 97 
Togo 90 98 99 84 99 82 80 83 96 
The country exports as a base and ECOWAS imports 
Benin 92 103 98 89 98 72 92 81 97 
Burkina Faso 90 99 98 89 103 72 91 90 97 
Cape Verde 85 99 98 89 98 70 86 81 96 
Cote D'Ivoire 87 101 98 91 98 84 88 91 98 
Gambia, The 87 0 98 88 98 70 86 0 96 
Ghana 86 99 98 94 98 71 91 81 97 
Guinea 86 99 98 89 98 71 86 81 99 
Niger 88 99 98 89 98 70 87 112 96 
Nigeria 85 99 98 89 98 70 86 85 97 
Senegal 100 99 100 93 99 71 99 87 98 
Togo 89 105 102 98 99 71 115 81 106 
Source: Authors calculation. Data from WITS 
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Appendix 4A.6: ECOWAS net trade with the world by product category (exports minus imports) 2013 
Product Categories Value Deficit/ Surplus 
Food and Live Animals 2.5      billion Deficit 
Beverages and Tobacco 518     million Deficit 
Manufactures 9.5       billion Deficit 
Animal and Vegetable Fats and Oils 428.8 million Deficit 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 68.7      billion Surplus 
Chemicals 9.3       billion Deficit 
Crude Materials, inedible except fuels 5.3       billion Surplus 
Machinery and Transport equipment 25.6     billion Deficit 
Miscellaneous- Furniture and Sanitary etc 2.4       billion Deficit 
Source: Authors Calculations. Data from the World Integrated Trade Solutions 
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Appendix 5A and 5B: Summary Statistics without and with rescaling the institutional quality indices 
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Appendix 5C: Frequency Distribution of the Dataset- Normality observation of the IQ indicators 
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Appendix 5C1: The Frequency Distribution of the Dataset- Normality observation of the independent variables 
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Appendix 5D: Summary statistics: Detailed data observation- institutional quality indices 
 
Appendix 5D1: Summary statistics: Detailed data observation independent variables 
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Appendix 5E: Correlation Test  
  hdi state fdig fditt regtrade exports  imports ecowas corrupt goveff political regqual rule  voice 
hdi 1               
state 0.091 1              
estate 0.288 -0.151              
fdig 0.074 -0.045 1             
fdit 0.352 -0.159 0.025627             
fditt 0.352 -0.159 0.025627 1            
regtrade -0.07 -0.035 -0.15517 -0.15328 1           
exports  0.293 -0.141 -0.11669 0.730306 0.094977 1          
imports 0.064 0.1333 -0.15184 0.118474 0.519338 0.427136 1         
ecowas 0.249 -0.055 -0.14945 0.604472 0.279072 0.933076 0.723767 1        
corrupt 0.403 0.5146 -0.09566 -0.12892 -0.24723 -0.15234 -0.01467 -0.1221 1       
goveff 0.432 0.4254 -0.22613 -0.02298 -0.23264 -0.03587 0.040874 -0.01112 0.799518 1      
political 0.242 0.448 -0.11887 -0.31698 0.014984 -0.3584 -0.15267 -0.33425 0.611569 0.637665 1     
regqual 0.311 0.4775 -0.32469 0.013892 -0.04341 0.019403 0.165456 0.080625 0.754245 0.832758 0.654935 1    
rule  0.417 0.4871 -0.14697 -0.09015 -0.11712 -0.12647 0.014924 -0.09058 0.814089 0.870375 0.790797 0.830083 1   
voice 0.454 0.5361 -0.01057 -0.00282 -0.1415 -0.07493 0.054065 -0.03568 0.692123 0.735539 0.637208 0.623881 0.766212 1 
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Appendix 5F: Wooldridge Autocorrelation Test 
 
 
           Prob > F =      0.0002
    F(  1,      13) =     26.574
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial   lgoveff goveffin lhdi lstate  lfdit  lestate lfdig lregtrade limport lecowas  lexport zone
           Prob > F =      0.0001
    F(  1,      13) =     30.647
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial  lcorrupt  corruptin corruptim lhdi lstate  lfdit  lestate lfdig lregtrade limport lecowas  lexport zone
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,      13) =    102.356
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial  lregq regim regin lhdi lstate  lfdit  lestate lfdig lregtrade limport lecowas  lexport zone
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,      13) =     64.616
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial  lvoice voicein voiceimm lhdi lstate  lfdit  lestate lfdig lregtrade limport lecowas  lexport zone
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,      13) =     43.068
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial  lpolitical politicalin politicalim lhdi lstate  lfdit  lestate lfdig lregtrade limport lecowas  lexport zone
           Prob > F =      0.0001
    F(  1,      13) =     33.251
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial   lrule rulein ruleimm lhdi lstate  lfdit  lestate lfdig lregtrade limport lecowas  lexport zone
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Appendix 5G: Wooldridge Autocorrelation test after using generalised least square regression 
 
 
 
Where regin= regulatory quality autocorrelation test; corruption= corruption perception index test; rulein= rule of law autocorrelation test; 
politicalin=political stability autocorrelation test; voicein= voice and accountability autocorrelation test. 
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Appendix 5H: Unitroot root and test for convergence 
Appendix 5H1: Regulatory quality unit root test using LLC (Levin-Lin and Chu) 
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 Adjusted t*         -2.0648        0.0195
 Unadjusted t        -2.9797
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 8.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 1 lag
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                      
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for lregq
. xtunitroot llc  lregq if numbcountry==15
                                                                              
 Adjusted t*         -0.9029        0.1833
 Unadjusted t        -1.5521
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 8.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 1 lag
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                      
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for lregq
. xtunitroot llc  lregq if numbcountry==14
                                                                              
 Adjusted t*         -0.8622        0.1943
 Unadjusted t        -2.1428
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 8.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 1 lag
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                      
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for lregq
. xtunitroot llc  lregq if numbcountry==13
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Appendix 5H2: Regulatory quality unit root test using Harris Tzavalis 
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 rho                  0.9702        0.7640       0.7776
                                                                              
                    Statistic         z         p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included                                   T Fixed
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                        
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for lregq
. xtunitroot ht lregq if numbcountry==9
                                                                              
 rho                  0.8479       -0.0625       0.4751
                                                                              
                    Statistic         z         p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included                                   T Fixed
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                        
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for lregq
. xtunitroot ht  lregq if numbcountry==8
                                                                              
 rho                  0.3927       -3.1396       0.0008
                                                                              
                    Statistic         z         p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included                                   T Fixed
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                        
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for lregq
. xtunitroot ht  lregq if numbcountry==7
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Appendix 5H3: Regulatory quality unit root test using breitung 
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Appendix 5H4: Regulatory quality unit root test using IM PEARSON SHIN 
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 Z-t-tilde-bar        0.2040        0.5808
 t-tilde-bar         -1.2380
 t-bar               -1.3411                     -3.130  -2.820  -2.670
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value         1%      5%      10%
                                              Fixed-N exact critical values
                                                                              
ADF regressions: No lags included
Time trend:   Included
Panel means:  Included                                        sequentially
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T,N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels are stationary              Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =      1
                                        
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for lregq
. xtunitroot ips  lregq if numbcountry==14,trend
                                                                              
 Z-t-tilde-bar       -0.7473        0.2274
 t-tilde-bar         -1.9700
 t-bar               -2.1616                     -2.500  -2.190  -2.040
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value         1%      5%      10%
                                              Fixed-N exact critical values
                                                                              
ADF regressions: No lags included
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included                                        sequentially
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T,N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels are stationary              Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =      1
                                        
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for lregq
. xtunitroot ips  lregq if numbcountry==14
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    Appendix 5H5: Regulatory quality unit root test using FISHER 
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Appendix 5H6: Regulatory quality unit root test using HADRI LM 
 
 
                                                                              
 z                    5.1632        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Included                Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                         
Hadri LM test for lregq
. xtunitroot hadri  lregq, kernel(bartlett 4) trend
                                                                              
 z                    6.4248        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Not included            Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                         
Hadri LM test for lregq
. xtunitroot hadri  lregq, kernel(bartlett 4)
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Appendix 5H7: Corruption Perception unit root test using LLC (Levin-Lin and Chu) 
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Appendix 5H8: Corruption Perception unit root test using Harris Tzavalis 
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 rho                  0.8718        0.0989       0.5394
                                                                              
                    Statistic         z         p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included                                   T Fixed
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                           
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for lcorrupt
. xtunitroot ht lcorrupt if numbcountry==9
                                                                              
 rho                  0.7852       -0.4861       0.3134
                                                                              
                    Statistic         z         p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included                                   T Fixed
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                           
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for lcorrupt
. xtunitroot ht  lcorrupt if numbcountry==8
                                                                              
 rho                  0.8719        0.0996       0.5397
                                                                              
                    Statistic         z         p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included                                   T Fixed
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                           
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for lcorrupt
. xtunitroot ht  lcorrupt if numbcountry==7
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Appendix 5H9: Corruption Perception unit root test using breitung 
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Appendix 5H10: Corruption Perception unit root test using IM PEARSON SHIN 
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Appendix 5H11: Corruption Perception unit root test using FISHER 
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Appendix 5H12: Corruption Perception unit root test using HADRI LM 
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Appendix 5H13: Rule of law unit root test using LLC (Levin-Lin and Chu) 
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Appendix 5H14: Rule of law unit root test using Harris Tzavalis 
 
 
 
372 
 
 
 
                                                                              
 rho                  0.5747       -1.9097       0.0281
                                                                              
                    Statistic         z         p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included                                   T Fixed
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                        
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for lrule
. xtunitroot ht lrule if numbcountry==11
                                                                              
 rho                  0.9034        0.3130       0.6228
                                                                              
                    Statistic         z         p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included                                   T Fixed
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                        
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for lrule
. xtunitroot ht lrule if numbcountry==10
                                                                              
 rho                  0.9424        0.5764       0.7178
                                                                              
                    Statistic         z         p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included                                   T Fixed
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                        
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for lrule
. xtunitroot ht lrule if numbcountry==9
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Appendix 5H15: Rule of law unit root test using breitung 
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 Adjusted t*         -2.3238        0.0101
 Unadjusted t        -7.4706
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 8.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 1.13 lags average (chosen by AIC)
Time trend:   Included                      Cross-sectional means removed
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     15
                                      
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for lrule
. xtunitroot llc lrule,trend demean lags(aic 4)
                                                                              
 Adjusted t*          1.2632        0.8967
 Unadjusted t        -7.0387
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 8.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 4.20 lags average (chosen by AIC)
Time trend:   Included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     15
                                      
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for lrule
. xtunitroot llc lrule,trend lags(aic 10)
                                                                              
 Adjusted t*         -2.7353        0.0031
 Unadjusted t        -6.4509
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 8.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 0.87 lags average (chosen by AIC)
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     15
                                      
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for lrule
. xtunitroot llc lrule, lags(aic 4)
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Appendix 5H16: Rule of law unit root test using IM PEARSON SHIN 
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Appendix 5H17: Rule of law unit root test using FISHER 
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Appendix 5H18: Rule of law unit root test using HADRI LM 
 
 
                                                                              
 z                    6.0800        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Included                Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                         
Hadri LM test for lrule
. xtunitroot hadri lrule, kernel(bartlett 4) trend
                                                                              
 z                    5.8071        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Not included            Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                         
Hadri LM test for lrule
. xtunitroot hadri lrule , kernel(bartlett 4)
                                                                              
 z                    5.6333        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags Cross-sectional means removed
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Not included            Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                         
Hadri LM test for lrule
. xtunitroot hadri lrule, kernel(bartlett 4) demean
                                                                              
 z                    6.1093        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags Cross-sectional means removed
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Included                Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                         
Hadri LM test for lrule
. xtunitroot hadri lrule, kernel(bartlett 4) trend demean
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Appendix 5H19: Political stability unit root test using LLC (Levin-Lin and Chu) 
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Appendix 5H20: Political stability unit root test using Harris Tzavalis 
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Appendix 5H21: Political stability unit root test using breitung 
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Appendix 5H22: Political stability unit root test using IM PEARSON SHIN 
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 Z-t-tilde-bar       -1.6254        0.0520
 t-tilde-bar         -2.6456
 t-bar               -3.1936                     -3.130  -2.820  -2.670
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value         1%      5%      10%
                                              Fixed-N exact critical values
                                                                              
ADF regressions: No lags included
Time trend:   Included
Panel means:  Included                                        sequentially
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T,N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels are stationary              Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =      1
                                             
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for lpolitical
. xtunitroot ips lpolitical if numbcountry==15,trend
                                                                              
 Z-t-tilde-bar       -1.4245        0.0772
 t-tilde-bar         -2.4910
 t-bar               -2.9906                     -2.500  -2.190  -2.040
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value         1%      5%      10%
                                              Fixed-N exact critical values
                                                                              
ADF regressions: No lags included
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included                                        sequentially
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T,N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels are stationary              Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =      1
                                             
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for lpolitical
. xtunitroot ips lpolitical if numbcountry==15
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Appendix 5H23: Political stability unit root test using FISHER 
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 z                    5.6956        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags Cross-sectional means removed
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Not included            Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                              
Hadri LM test for lpolitical
. xtunitroot hadri lpolitical, kernel(bartlett 4) demean
                                                                              
 z                    6.3716        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags Cross-sectional means removed
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Included                Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                              
Hadri LM test for lpolitical
. xtunitroot hadri lpolitical, kernel(bartlett 4) trend demean
                                                                              
 z                    6.3497        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Included                Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                              
Hadri LM test for lpolitical
. xtunitroot hadri lpolitical, kernel(bartlett 4) trend
                                                                              
 z                    5.6549        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Not included            Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                              
Hadri LM test for lpolitical
. xtunitroot hadri lpolitical, kernel(bartlett 4)
391 
 
 
Appendix 5H24: Political stability unit root test using HADRI LM 
                                                                               
 z                    5.6956        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags Cross-sectional means removed
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Not included            Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                              
Hadri LM test for lpolitical
. xtunitroot hadri lpolitical, kernel(bartlett 4) demean
                                                                              
 z                    6.3716        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags Cross-sectional means removed
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Included                Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                              
Hadri LM test for lpolitical
. xtunitroot hadri lpolitical, kernel(bartlett 4) trend demean
                                                                              
 z                    6.3497        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Included                Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                              
Hadri LM test for lpolitical
. xtunitroot hadri lpolitical, kernel(bartlett 4) trend
                                                                              
 z                    5.6549        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Not included            Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                              
Hadri LM test for lpolitical
. xtunitroot hadri lpolitical, kernel(bartlett 4)
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Appendix 5H25: Voice and accountability unit root test using LLC (Levin-Lin and Chu) 
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Appendix 5H26: Voice and accountability unit root test using Harris Tzavalis 
 
                                                                              
 rho                  0.7171        1.0633       0.8562
                                                                              
                    Statistic         z         p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Included
Panel means:  Included                                   T Fixed
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     15
                                         
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for lvoice
. xtunitroot ht lvoice,trend
                                                                              
 rho                  0.7201        1.1196       0.8686
                                                                              
                    Statistic         z         p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Included                      Cross-sectional means removed
Panel means:  Included                                   T Fixed
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     15
                                         
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for lvoice
. xtunitroot ht lvoice,demean trend
                                                                              
 rho                  0.7857       -1.8708       0.0307
                                                                              
                    Statistic         z         p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Not included                  Cross-sectional means removed
Panel means:  Included                                   T Fixed
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     15
                                         
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for lvoice
. xtunitroot ht lvoice , demean
                                                                              
 rho                  0.8021       -1.4407       0.0748
                                                                              
                    Statistic         z         p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included                                   T Fixed
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     15
                                         
Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for lvoice
. xtunitroot ht lvoice 
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Appendix 5H27: Voice and accountability unit root test using breitung 
 
 
                                                                              
 lambda               0.7847        0.7837
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
                                            Cross-sectional means removed
Time trend:   Included                      Prewhitening: Not performed
Panel means:  Included                                        sequentially
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics:  T,N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     15
                                    
Breitung unit-root test for lvoice
. xtunitroot breitung lvoice,demean trend 
                                                                              
 lambda              -1.2011        0.1149
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
                                            Cross-sectional means removed
Time trend:   Not included                  Prewhitening: Not performed
Panel means:  Included                                        sequentially
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics:  T,N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     15
                                    
Breitung unit-root test for lvoice
. xtunitroot breitung lvoice, demean 
 * Lambda robust to cross-sectional correlation
                                                                              
 lambda*              0.0831        0.5331
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Included                      Prewhitening: Not performed
Panel means:  Included                                        sequentially
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics:  T,N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     15
                                    
Breitung unit-root test for lvoice
. xtunitroot breitung lvoice,trend robust
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 lambda              -0.5232        0.3004
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Included                      Prewhitening: Not performed
Panel means:  Included                                        sequentially
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics:  T,N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                    
Breitung unit-root test for lvoice
. xtunitroot breitung  lvoice if numbcountry==3,trend
 * Lambda robust to cross-sectional correlation
                                                                              
 lambda*             -1.2956        0.0976
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Not included                  Prewhitening: Not performed
Panel means:  Included                                        sequentially
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics:  T,N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     20
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =      1
                                    
Breitung unit-root test for lvoice
. xtunitroot breitung lvoice if numbcountry==3, robust
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Appendix 5H28: Voice and accountability unit root test using IM PEARSON SHIN 
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 Z-t-tilde-bar       -1.3569        0.0874
 t-tilde-bar         -2.4390
 t-bar               -3.0310                     -3.130  -2.820  -2.670
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value         1%      5%      10%
                                              Fixed-N exact critical values
                                                                              
ADF regressions: No lags included
Time trend:   Included
Panel means:  Included                                        sequentially
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T,N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels are stationary              Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =      1
                                         
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for lvoice
. xtunitroot ips lvoice if numbcountry==12, trend
                                                                              
 Z-t-tilde-bar       -1.7495        0.0401
 t-tilde-bar         -2.7411
 t-bar               -3.4900                     -2.500  -2.190  -2.040
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value         1%      5%      10%
                                              Fixed-N exact critical values
                                                                              
ADF regressions: No lags included
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included                                        sequentially
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T,N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels are stationary              Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =      1
                                         
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for lvoice
. xtunitroot ips lvoice if numbcountry==12
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Appendix 5H29: Voice and accountability unit root test using FISHER 
 
                                                                              
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels.
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite.
                                                                              
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        1.1856       0.1179
 Inverse logit t(79)       L*        1.0124       0.8428
 Inverse normal            Z         1.2260       0.8899
 Inverse chi-squared(30)   P        39.1838       0.1217
                                                                              
                                  Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
Drift term:   Not included                  ADF regressions: 7 lags
Time trend:   Included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T -> Infinity
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =     15
                                      
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
Fisher-type unit-root test for lvoice
. xtunitroot fisher lvoice, dfuller lags(7) trend
                                                                              
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels.
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite.
                                                                              
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        2.4996       0.0062
 Inverse logit t(79)       L*       -2.0459       0.0220
 Inverse normal            Z        -1.9581       0.0251
 Inverse chi-squared(30)   P        49.3621       0.0144
                                                                              
                                  Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
Drift term:   Not included                  ADF regressions: 1 lag
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T -> Infinity
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels  =     15
                                      
Based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
Fisher-type unit-root test for lvoice
. xtunitroot fisher lvoice, dfuller lags(1)
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Appendix 5H30: Voice and accountability unit root test using HADRI LM 
                                                                               
 z                    3.3020        0.0005
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags Cross-sectional means removed
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Not included            Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                          
Hadri LM test for lvoice
. xtunitroot hadri lvoice, kernel(bartlett 4) demean
                                                                              
 z                    5.2482        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags Cross-sectional means removed
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Included                Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                          
Hadri LM test for lvoice
. xtunitroot hadri lvoice, kernel(bartlett 4) trend demean
                                                                              
 z                    5.3183        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Included                Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                          
Hadri LM test for lvoice
. xtunitroot hadri lvoice, kernel(bartlett 4) trend
                                                                              
 z                    4.4289        0.0000
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:        Bartlett kernel, 4 lags
Heteroskedasticity: Robust                                    sequentially
Time trend:         Not included            Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity
Ha: Some panels contain unit roots          Number of periods =     20
Ho: All panels are stationary               Number of panels  =     15
                          
Hadri LM test for lvoice
. xtunitroot hadri lvoice, kernel(bartlett 4)
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Appendix 5I: Hausman test to use fixed or random effect 
 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      215.57
                  chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
   lregtrade     -.0006825     .0008459       -.0015283         .000575
       lfdig      .0016296     .0038597       -.0022301               .
      lstate     -.0034302     .0243008        -.027731         .001064
        lhdi      .0046808    -.0132446        .0179254        .0041383
       regim      .2010941    -.6151777        .8162718               .
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
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Appendix 5J: Breusch Pegan test for random or fixed effect 
 
 
Results show we use random effect. Null hypothesis is that variances across entities is zero or more specifically that there is no 
significant difference across units (no panel effect).   
 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
                              chi2(1) =   321.53
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u            0              0
                       e     .0000797       .0089262
                   lregq     .0003686       .0191995
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        lregq[country_n,t] = Xb + u[country_n] + e[country_n,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
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Appendix 5K: Ben-David Convergence test 
Appendix 5K1: Regulatory Quality  
 
 
 
407 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0007869   .0005379     1.46   0.143    -.0002673    .0018411
  diflagregq     .9498014   .0190294    49.91   0.000     .9125045    .9870983
                                                                              
    difregul        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  489.4661          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)       =   2491.24
Estimated coefficients     =         2          Time periods       =        19
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =         7
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       133
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls difregul diflagregq if zone==0 
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00598635
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     .0007869   .0005275     1.49   0.136     -.000247    .0018208
  diflagregq     .9498014   .0103521    91.75   0.000     .9295117    .9700912
                                                                              
    difregul        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 7 clusters in country_n)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =   8417.97
       overall = 0.9493                                        max =        19
       between = 0.9983                                        avg =      19.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.7741                         Obs per group: min =        19
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =         7
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       133
. xtreg difregul diflagregq if zone==0, re robust
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Appendix 5K2: Corruption Perception  
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       _cons     .0005737   .0005577     1.03   0.304    -.0005195    .0016668
 diflcorrupt       .98618   .0187317    52.65   0.000     .9494665    1.022893
                                                                              
  difcorrupt        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  482.6042          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)       =   2771.77
Estimated coefficients     =         2          Time periods       =        19
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =         7
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       133
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls difcorrupt diflcorrupt if zone==0
                                                                              
         rho    .07331686   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00577102
     sigma_u    .00162326
                                                                              
       _cons     .0006314    .001184     0.53   0.594    -.0016892    .0029521
 diflcorrupt     .9447449   .0275422    34.30   0.000     .8907632    .9987267
                                                                              
  difcorrupt        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 7 clusters in country_n)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =   1176.61
       overall = 0.9542                                        max =        19
       between = 0.9957                                        avg =      19.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.8197                         Obs per group: min =        19
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =         7
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       133
. xtreg difcorrupt diflcorrupt if zone==0,re robust
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Appendix 5K3: Rule of Law  
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       _cons     .0005163   .0005207     0.99   0.321    -.0005042    .0015369
    diflrule     .9587444    .013378    71.67   0.000      .932524    .9849648
                                                                              
     difrule        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  491.5999          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)       =   5135.99
Estimated coefficients     =         2          Time periods       =        19
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =         7
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       133
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls difrule diflrule if zone==0
                                                                              
         rho     .0145141   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0059237
     sigma_u    .00071889
                                                                              
       _cons     .0005162   .0005715     0.90   0.366    -.0006039    .0016363
    diflrule      .956084   .0128359    74.49   0.000     .9309262    .9812418
                                                                              
     difrule        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 7 clusters in country_n)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =   5548.08
       overall = 0.9748                                        max =        19
       between = 0.9987                                        avg =      19.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.8081                         Obs per group: min =        19
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =         7
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       133
. xtreg difrule diflrule if zone==0,re robust
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Appendix 5K4: Political Stability  
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       _cons      .000921   .0011169     0.82   0.410    -.0012681    .0031101
diflpoliti~l     .9548073   .0207821    45.94   0.000     .9140751    .9955394
                                                                              
difpolitical        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  390.8897          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)       =   2110.83
Estimated coefficients     =         2          Time periods       =        19
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =         7
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       133
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls difpolitical diflpolitical if zone==0
                                                                              
         rho    .00606998   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01264377
     sigma_u    .00098808
                                                                              
       _cons     .0009072   .0011175     0.81   0.417    -.0012831    .0030975
diflpoliti~l      .952447    .021263    44.79   0.000     .9107724    .9941216
                                                                              
difpolitical        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 7 clusters in country_n)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =   2006.48
       overall = 0.9407                                        max =        19
       between = 0.9968                                        avg =      19.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.7668                         Obs per group: min =        19
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =         7
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       133
. xtreg difpolitical diflpolitical if zone==0,re robust
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       _cons     .0010054   .0007327     1.37   0.170    -.0004307    .0024415
   diflvoice     .9618005   .0194687    49.40   0.000     .9236426    .9999585
                                                                              
    difvoice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  446.1692          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)       =   2440.60
Estimated coefficients     =         2          Time periods       =        19
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =         7
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       133
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls difvoice diflvoice if zone==0
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00828503
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     .0010054   .0006937     1.45   0.147    -.0003542     .002365
   diflvoice     .9618005    .018216    52.80   0.000     .9260979    .9975032
                                                                              
    difvoice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 7 clusters in country_n)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =   2787.82
       overall = 0.9483                                        max =        19
       between = 0.9983                                        avg =      19.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.7574                         Obs per group: min =        19
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =         7
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       133
. xtreg difvoice diflvoice if zone==0,re robust
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       _cons    -.5341219   1.018939    -0.52   0.600    -2.531206    1.462962
      sqlhdi     .0565636   .0105228     5.38   0.000     .0359392    .0771879
     lgoveff     .5454817   .0341346    15.98   0.000     .4785791    .6123843
   lregtrade        .0025   .0004435     5.64   0.000     .0016308    .0033692
        zone    -.0038396   .0019748    -1.94   0.052    -.0077101     .000031
       lfdig     .0025237    .000586     4.31   0.000     .0013752    .0036721
      lstate     .0045425   .0024232     1.87   0.061     -.000207    .0092919
       regim     .1606079   .1705105     0.94   0.346    -.1735866    .4948024
       regin     .3395574   .0462308     7.34   0.000     .2489467    .4301682
        lhdi     .0900061   .0199734     4.51   0.000     .0508588    .1291533
                                                                              
       lregq        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  919.3454          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =    969.00
Estimated coefficients     =        10          Time periods       =        20
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        14
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       280
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls lregq  lhdi  regin regim lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00795032
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons    -.5341219   1.037637    -0.51   0.607    -2.567852    1.499609
      sqlhdi     .0565636   .0107159     5.28   0.000     .0355608    .0775664
     lgoveff     .5454817    .034761    15.69   0.000     .4773515     .613612
   lregtrade        .0025   .0004516     5.54   0.000     .0016148    .0033851
        zone    -.0038396    .002011    -1.91   0.056    -.0077811     .000102
       lfdig     .0025237   .0005967     4.23   0.000     .0013541    .0036932
      lstate     .0045425   .0024677     1.84   0.066    -.0002941    .0093791
       regim     .1606079   .1736394     0.92   0.355    -.1797191    .5009349
       regin     .3395574   .0470792     7.21   0.000     .2472839     .431831
        lhdi     .0900061     .02034     4.43   0.000     .0501405    .1298716
                                                                              
       lregq        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =    934.40
       overall = 0.7758                                        max =        20
       between = 0.9430                                        avg =      20.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.2065                         Obs per group: min =        20
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       280
. xtreg lregq  lhdi  regin regim lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi, re
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       _cons     9.459582   1.797583     5.26   0.000     5.936384    12.98278
    sqlstate     -.015459   .0056115    -2.75   0.006    -.0264573   -.0044607
      sqlhdi     .0980078   .0124445     7.88   0.000      .073617    .1223986
     lgoveff      .442187   .0379256    11.66   0.000     .3678542    .5165197
   lregtrade    -.0028326   .0006048    -4.68   0.000     -.004018   -.0016472
        zone     .0028541   .0019121     1.49   0.136    -.0008935    .0066016
       lfdig     .0023023   .0006467     3.56   0.000     .0010348    .0035698
      lstate     .0807257    .028149     2.87   0.004     .0255547    .1358968
   corruptim    -1.564223   .3085117    -5.07   0.000    -2.168895   -.9595514
   corruptin     .3168463   .0362078     8.75   0.000     .2458803    .3878123
        lhdi     .1845783   .0237942     7.76   0.000     .1379426     .231214
                                                                              
    lcorrupt        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  878.5272          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =   1180.70
Estimated coefficients     =        11          Time periods       =        20
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        14
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       280
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls  lcorrupt  lhdi   corruptin corruptim lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi  sqlstate
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0087002
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     9.459583   1.833969     5.16   0.000      5.86507     13.0541
    sqlstate     -.015459   .0057251    -2.70   0.007      -.02668   -.0042381
      sqlhdi     .0980078   .0126964     7.72   0.000     .0731233    .1228923
     lgoveff      .442187   .0386932    11.43   0.000     .3663496    .5180243
   lregtrade    -.0028326    .000617    -4.59   0.000     -.004042   -.0016232
        zone     .0028541   .0019508     1.46   0.143    -.0009693    .0066775
       lfdig     .0023023   .0006598     3.49   0.000     .0010091    .0035954
      lstate     .0807257   .0287188     2.81   0.005     .0244379    .1370136
   corruptim    -1.564223   .3147564    -4.97   0.000    -2.181134   -.9473121
   corruptin     .3168463   .0369407     8.58   0.000     .2444438    .3892487
        lhdi     .1845783   .0242758     7.60   0.000     .1369986     .232158
                                                                              
    lcorrupt        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(10)      =   1134.32
       overall = 0.8083                                        max =        20
       between = 0.9304                                        avg =      20.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.4102                         Obs per group: min =        20
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       280
. xtreg  lcorrupt  lhdi   corruptin corruptim lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi  sqlstate, re
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       _cons     5.994883    1.67186     3.59   0.000     2.718098    9.271668
      sqlhdi     .0343813   .0126384     2.72   0.007     .0096105    .0591521
     lgoveff     .4765034   .0477258     9.98   0.000     .3829625    .5700443
   lregtrade     .0021756    .000547     3.98   0.000     .0011034    .0032477
        zone     -.004171   .0019391    -2.15   0.031    -.0079715   -.0003704
       lfdig     .0018248   .0006725     2.71   0.007     .0005067    .0031429
      lstate     .0146541    .002893     5.07   0.000     .0089839    .0203242
        lhdi     .0633168   .0245971     2.57   0.010     .0151074    .1115262
     ruleimm    -.9867954   .2829423    -3.49   0.000    -1.541352   -.4322386
      rulein      .361623   .0313687    11.53   0.000     .3001415    .4231045
                                                                              
       lrule        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  868.3375          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =   1809.84
Estimated coefficients     =        10          Time periods       =        20
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        14
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       280
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls lrule rulein ruleimm lhdi lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00826763
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     5.994883   1.702539     3.52   0.000     2.657968    9.331797
      sqlhdi     .0343813   .0128703     2.67   0.008      .009156    .0596066
     lgoveff     .4765034   .0486016     9.80   0.000     .3812461    .5717608
   lregtrade     .0021756    .000557     3.91   0.000     .0010838    .0032673
        zone     -.004171   .0019747    -2.11   0.035    -.0080413   -.0003007
       lfdig     .0018248   .0006848     2.66   0.008     .0004825     .003167
      lstate     .0146541   .0029461     4.97   0.000     .0088798    .0204283
        lhdi     .0633168   .0250485     2.53   0.011     .0142227    .1124109
     ruleimm    -.9867954   .2881344    -3.42   0.001    -1.551528   -.4220624
      rulein      .361623   .0319443    11.32   0.000     .2990133    .4242327
                                                                              
       lrule        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =   1745.20
       overall = 0.8660                                        max =        20
       between = 0.9441                                        avg =      20.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.2815                         Obs per group: min =        20
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       280
. xtreg lrule rulein ruleimm lhdi lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi, re
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         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .02039695
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     27.73822   2.710187    10.23   0.000     22.42635    33.05009
      sqlhdi     .0139453   .0313864     0.44   0.657     -.047571    .0754615
     lgoveff     .4528196   .1003827     4.51   0.000     .2560731    .6495661
   lregtrade     .0010508    .001317     0.80   0.425    -.0015305    .0036321
        zone    -.0036441   .0050298    -0.72   0.469    -.0135022    .0062141
       lfdig     .0028964   .0016625     1.74   0.081    -.0003621    .0061548
      lstate     .0119019   .0072108     1.65   0.099     -.002231    .0260348
        lhdi     .0016475   .0602823     0.03   0.978    -.1165037    .1197986
 politicalim    -4.780504   .4681345   -10.21   0.000    -5.698031   -3.862977
 politicalin     .2222779   .0521939     4.26   0.000     .1199797    .3245761
                                                                              
  lpolitical        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =    453.18
       overall = 0.6266                                        max =        20
       between = 0.8445                                        avg =      20.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.2221                         Obs per group: min =        20
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       280
. xtreg lpolitical politicalin politicalim lhdi lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi, re 
                                                                              
       _cons     27.73822   2.661351    10.42   0.000     22.52207    32.95437
      sqlhdi     .0139453   .0308208     0.45   0.651    -.0464625     .074353
     lgoveff     .4528196   .0985739     4.59   0.000     .2596184    .6460208
   lregtrade     .0010508   .0012933     0.81   0.417     -.001484    .0035855
        zone    -.0036441   .0049391    -0.74   0.461    -.0133246    .0060364
       lfdig     .0028964   .0016326     1.77   0.076    -.0003034    .0060961
      lstate     .0119019   .0070809     1.68   0.093    -.0019763    .0257801
        lhdi     .0016475   .0591961     0.03   0.978    -.1143746    .1176696
 politicalim    -4.780504    .459699   -10.40   0.000    -5.681497   -3.879511
 politicalin     .2222779   .0512534     4.34   0.000     .1218231    .3227328
                                                                              
  lpolitical        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  619.6421          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =    469.96
Estimated coefficients     =        10          Time periods       =        20
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        14
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       280
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls lpolitical politicalin politicalim lhdi lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi 
420 
 
Appendix 5L5: Voice and accountability determinants 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01171159
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons    -4.178184   1.252117    -3.34   0.001    -6.632288   -1.724079
      sqlhdi     .0809005    .019469     4.16   0.000     .0427419    .1190591
     lgoveff     .6349075   .0626934    10.13   0.000     .5120307    .7577843
   lregtrade    -.0007195   .0008985    -0.80   0.423    -.0024804    .0010415
        zone     .0038571   .0030392     1.27   0.204    -.0020996    .0098139
       lfdig     .0023677    .001043     2.27   0.023     .0003234     .004412
      lstate     .0017494   .0049128     0.36   0.722    -.0078795    .0113784
        lhdi     .1380475    .037571     3.67   0.000     .0644096    .2116853
    voiceimm     .7251611   .2033118     3.57   0.000     .3266773    1.123645
     voicein     .4230043   .0413494    10.23   0.000      .341961    .5040476
                                                                              
      lvoice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =    804.56
       overall = 0.7487                                        max =        20
       between = 0.8539                                        avg =      20.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.2805                         Obs per group: min =        20
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       280
. xtreg lvoice voicein voiceimm lhdi lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi, re 
                                                                              
       _cons    -4.178184   1.229555    -3.40   0.001    -6.588066   -1.768301
      sqlhdi     .0809005   .0191182     4.23   0.000     .0434295    .1183715
     lgoveff     .6349075   .0615637    10.31   0.000     .5142449    .7555702
   lregtrade    -.0007195   .0008823    -0.82   0.415    -.0024487    .0010097
        zone     .0038571   .0029845     1.29   0.196    -.0019923    .0097065
       lfdig     .0023677   .0010242     2.31   0.021     .0003602    .0043751
      lstate     .0017494   .0048243     0.36   0.717     -.007706    .0112049
        lhdi     .1380475    .036894     3.74   0.000     .0657365    .2103584
    voiceimm     .7251611   .1996483     3.63   0.000     .3338577    1.116465
     voicein     .4230043   .0406043    10.42   0.000     .3434214    .5025873
                                                                              
      lvoice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  748.5757          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =    834.36
Estimated coefficients     =        10          Time periods       =        20
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        14
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       280
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls lvoice voicein voiceimm lhdi lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi
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         rho    .09639701   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00312067
     sigma_u    .00101927
                                                                              
       _cons     .0001604   .0003537     0.45   0.650     -.000533    .0008537
  diflagregq     .9496567   .0088115   107.78   0.000     .9323866    .9669269
                                                                              
    difregul        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                             (Std. Err. adjusted for 15 clusters in country_n)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =  11615.47
       overall = 0.9778                                        max =        17
       between = 0.9967                                        avg =      16.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.8768                         Obs per group: min =        16
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =        15
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       254
. xtreg difregul diflagregq, re robust
                                                                              
       _cons      .000162    .000208     0.78   0.436    -.0002456    .0005696
  diflagregq     .9649588   .0091218   105.79   0.000     .9470804    .9828372
                                                                              
    difregul        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  1089.784          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)       =  11190.64
                                                               max =        17
                                                               avg =  16.93333
Estimated coefficients     =         2          Obs per group: min =        16
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        15
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       254
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls difregul diflagregq 
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       _cons    -.0002047   .0003802    -0.54   0.590    -.0009499    .0005404
 diflcorrupt      .955741   .0174929    54.64   0.000     .9214556    .9900264
                                                                              
  difcorrupt        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  427.8091          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)       =   2985.10
Estimated coefficients     =         2          Time periods       =        17
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =         6
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       102
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls difcorrupt diflcorrupt if zone==0
                                                                              
         rho    .18149972   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00333033
     sigma_u    .00156825
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0004628   .0008534    -0.54   0.588    -.0021354    .0012099
 diflcorrupt      .917535   .0274556    33.42   0.000     .8637229     .971347
                                                                              
  difcorrupt        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 6 clusters in country_n)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =   1116.82
       overall = 0.9670                                        max =        17
       between = 0.9931                                        avg =      17.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.8989                         Obs per group: min =        17
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =         6
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       102
. xtreg difcorrupt diflcorrupt if zone==0,re robust
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       _cons      .000336   .0003704     0.91   0.364      -.00039     .001062
    diflrule      .963117   .0112813    85.37   0.000     .9410061     .985228
                                                                              
     difrule        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  430.4524          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)       =   7288.49
Estimated coefficients     =         2          Time periods       =        17
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =         6
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       102
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls difrule diflrule if zone==0
                                                                              
         rho    .22317635   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00329029
     sigma_u    .00176359
                                                                              
       _cons     .0002522   .0007686     0.33   0.743    -.0012541    .0017585
    diflrule     .9548923     .00808   118.18   0.000     .9390559    .9707288
                                                                              
     difrule        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 6 clusters in country_n)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =  13966.56
       overall = 0.9862                                        max =        17
       between = 0.9967                                        avg =      17.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.9354                         Obs per group: min =        17
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =         6
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       102
. xtreg difrule diflrule if zone==0,re robust
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Appendix 5M4: Political Stability 
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       _cons     .0006797   .0009151     0.74   0.458    -.0011139    .0024732
diflpoliti~l      .969888   .0184759    52.49   0.000      .933676      1.0061
                                                                              
difpolitical        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  340.7778          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)       =   2755.71
Estimated coefficients     =         2          Time periods       =        17
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =         6
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       102
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls difpolitical diflpolitical if zone==0
                                                                              
         rho     .1816119   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00793459
     sigma_u    .00373781
                                                                              
       _cons     .0001133   .0017532     0.06   0.948    -.0033229    .0035495
diflpoliti~l     .9394226   .0149963    62.64   0.000     .9100305    .9688147
                                                                              
difpolitical        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 6 clusters in country_n)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =   3924.25
       overall = 0.9643                                        max =        17
       between = 0.9920                                        avg =      17.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.8991                         Obs per group: min =        17
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =         6
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       102
. xtreg difpolitical diflpolitical if zone==0,re robust
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Appendix 5M5: Voice and Accountability 
 
 
 
430 
 
 
 
                                                                               
       _cons     .0010913   .0006434     1.70   0.090    -.0001697    .0023522
   diflvoice     .9798232   .0219095    44.72   0.000     .9368813    1.022765
                                                                              
    difvoice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  376.1687          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(1)       =   2000.00
Estimated coefficients     =         2          Time periods       =        17
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =         6
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       102
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls difvoice diflvoice if zone==0
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00592994
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     .0010913   .0006038     1.81   0.071    -.0000922    .0022748
   diflvoice     .9798232   .0237123    41.32   0.000     .9333479    1.026298
                                                                              
    difvoice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 6 clusters in country_n)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =   1707.45
       overall = 0.9515                                        max =        17
       between = 0.9979                                        avg =      17.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.8660                         Obs per group: min =        17
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =         6
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       102
. xtreg difvoice diflvoice if zone==0,re robust
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Appendix 5N: Three-year moving Average estimates; determinants of institutional quality 
Appendix 5N1: Regulatory quality 
                                                                               
       _cons     .1483485   .9909973     0.15   0.881     -1.79397    2.090668
      sqlhdi     .0557463   .0095908     5.81   0.000     .0369486     .074544
     lgoveff      .501959   .0335456    14.96   0.000     .4362108    .5677072
   lregtrade      .001791   .0004217     4.25   0.000     .0009645    .0026175
        zone    -.0033426   .0012887    -2.59   0.009    -.0058684   -.0008167
       lfdig     .0033467   .0006465     5.18   0.000     .0020796    .0046137
      lstate     .0086537    .002541     3.41   0.001     .0036733     .013634
       regim     .0416343   .1675241     0.25   0.804     -.286707    .3699756
       regin     .3746749   .0397203     9.43   0.000     .2968244    .4525253
        lhdi     .0923114     .01817     5.08   0.000     .0566989    .1279239
                                                                              
       lregq        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  871.8573          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =   1339.57
                                                               max =        18
                                                               avg =  17.92857
Estimated coefficients     =        10          Obs per group: min =        17
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        14
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       251
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls lregq  lhdi  regin regim lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00638509
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     .1483485   1.011348     0.15   0.883    -1.833858    2.130555
      sqlhdi     .0557463   .0097878     5.70   0.000     .0365626      .07493
     lgoveff      .501959   .0342345    14.66   0.000     .4348606    .5690575
   lregtrade      .001791   .0004304     4.16   0.000     .0009475    .0026345
        zone    -.0033426   .0013152    -2.54   0.011    -.0059203   -.0007648
       lfdig     .0033467   .0006597     5.07   0.000     .0020536    .0046397
      lstate     .0086537   .0025932     3.34   0.001      .003571    .0137363
       regim     .0416343   .1709644     0.24   0.808    -.2934498    .3767184
       regin     .3746749    .040536     9.24   0.000     .2952257    .4541241
        lhdi     .0923114   .0185431     4.98   0.000     .0559676    .1286552
                                                                              
       lregq        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =   1286.20
       overall = 0.8422                                        max =        18
       between = 0.9482                                        avg =      17.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.2970                         Obs per group: min =        17
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       251
. xtreg lregq  lhdi  regin regim lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi, re
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Appendix 5N2: Corruption perception 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     17.97045   2.269327     7.92   0.000     13.52265    22.41825
    sqlstate    -.0122842   .0055374    -2.22   0.027    -.0231372   -.0014311
      sqlhdi     .0739593   .0113314     6.53   0.000     .0517502    .0961685
     lgoveff     .3679577   .0369423     9.96   0.000      .295552    .4403633
   lregtrade    -.0020946   .0005307    -3.95   0.000    -.0031348   -.0010544
        zone     .0029589   .0014195     2.08   0.037     .0001768     .005741
       lfdig     .0028351   .0007004     4.05   0.000     .0014624    .0042078
      lstate     .0632914   .0280136     2.26   0.024     .0083857     .118197
   corruptim    -3.057975   .3902382    -7.84   0.000    -3.822828   -2.293122
   corruptin     .3413926   .0424701     8.04   0.000     .2581527    .4246325
        lhdi      .133448   .0214004     6.24   0.000      .091504    .1753921
                                                                              
    lcorrupt        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  839.1038          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =   1648.12
                                                               max =        18
                                                               avg =  17.92857
Estimated coefficients     =        11          Obs per group: min =        17
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        14
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       251
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls  lcorrupt  lhdi   corruptin corruptim lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi  sqlstate
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00671005
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     17.97045    2.32075     7.74   0.000     13.42187    22.51904
    sqlstate    -.0122842   .0056628    -2.17   0.030    -.0233831   -.0011852
      sqlhdi     .0739593   .0115882     6.38   0.000      .051247    .0966717
     lgoveff     .3679577   .0377794     9.74   0.000     .2939113     .442004
   lregtrade    -.0020946   .0005427    -3.86   0.000    -.0031584   -.0010308
        zone     .0029589   .0014516     2.04   0.042     .0001138    .0058041
       lfdig     .0028351   .0007162     3.96   0.000     .0014313    .0042389
      lstate     .0632914   .0286484     2.21   0.027     .0071416    .1194412
   corruptim    -3.057975    .399081    -7.66   0.000    -3.840159    -2.27579
   corruptin     .3413926   .0434325     7.86   0.000     .2562665    .4265187
        lhdi      .133448   .0218854     6.10   0.000     .0905535    .1763426
                                                                              
    lcorrupt        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(10)      =   1575.89
       overall = 0.8678                                        max =        18
       between = 0.9550                                        avg =      17.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.4516                         Obs per group: min =        17
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       251
. xtreg  lcorrupt  lhdi   corruptin corruptim lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi  sqlstate, re
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Appendix 5N3: Rule of Law 
                                                                               
       _cons     15.90767   2.103799     7.56   0.000      11.7843    20.03104
      sqlhdi     .0406898   .0118244     3.44   0.001     .0175143    .0638653
     lgoveff     .4135397   .0488699     8.46   0.000     .3177564    .5093231
   lregtrade     .0022814   .0005102     4.47   0.000     .0012815    .0032813
        zone      -.00063   .0015827    -0.40   0.691     -.003732     .002472
       lfdig     .0041278   .0007732     5.34   0.000     .0026123    .0056433
      lstate     .0136781   .0031778     4.30   0.000     .0074497    .0199064
        lhdi     .0840178   .0227577     3.69   0.000     .0394135    .1286221
     ruleimm    -2.688642   .3577805    -7.51   0.000    -3.389878   -1.987405
      rulein     .2976614   .0316688     9.40   0.000     .2355916    .3597312
                                                                              
       lrule        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  818.6428          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =   2256.81
                                                               max =        18
                                                               avg =  17.92857
Estimated coefficients     =        10          Obs per group: min =        17
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        14
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       251
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls lrule rulein ruleimm lhdi lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi
                                                                              
         rho    .00250308   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00652528
     sigma_u    .00032687
                                                                              
       _cons     15.65366   2.145623     7.30   0.000     11.44831      19.859
      sqlhdi     .0401699   .0120709     3.33   0.001     .0165114    .0638284
     lgoveff     .4178854   .0500632     8.35   0.000     .3197634    .5160075
   lregtrade      .002289   .0005231     4.38   0.000     .0012638    .0033142
        zone    -.0005288   .0016252    -0.33   0.745    -.0037141    .0026564
       lfdig     .0040564   .0007871     5.15   0.000     .0025137    .0055991
      lstate     .0134164   .0032416     4.14   0.000      .007063    .0197699
        lhdi     .0831048   .0232334     3.58   0.000     .0375682    .1286414
     ruleimm    -2.646007   .3647826    -7.25   0.000    -3.360968   -1.931046
      rulein     .2985956   .0325062     9.19   0.000     .2348845    .3623066
                                                                              
       lrule        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =   2111.95
       overall = 0.8999                                        max =        18
       between = 0.9563                                        avg =      17.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.3496                         Obs per group: min =        17
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       251
. xtreg lrule rulein ruleimm lhdi lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi, re
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Appendix 5N4: Political Stability 
                                                                               
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01694469
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons     36.70416   3.033504    12.10   0.000      30.7586    42.64972
    sqlstate    -.0148427   .0150926    -0.98   0.325    -.0444237    .0147382
      sqlhdi     .0084045   .0306122     0.27   0.784    -.0515943    .0684033
     lgoveff     .5260419    .098639     5.33   0.000      .332713    .7193708
   lregtrade     .0007962   .0013823     0.58   0.565     -.001913    .0035054
        zone     .0098856    .004098     2.41   0.016     .0018536    .0179176
       lfdig     .0040814   .0019515     2.09   0.036     .0002566    .0079062
      lstate     .0695273   .0770296     0.90   0.367    -.0814479    .2205026
        lhdi    -.0144817    .058483    -0.25   0.804    -.1291062    .1001428
 politicalim    -6.366906   .5230271   -12.17   0.000     -7.39202   -5.341792
 politicalin     .1030623   .0476448     2.16   0.031     .0096802    .1964443
                                                                              
  lpolitical        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(10)      =    550.90
       overall = 0.6965                                        max =        18
       between = 0.8902                                        avg =      17.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.2718                         Obs per group: min =        17
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       251
. xtreg lpolitical politicalin politicalim lhdi lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi sqlstate, re 
                                                                              
       _cons     36.70416   2.966288    12.37   0.000     30.89034    42.51797
    sqlstate    -.0148427   .0147582    -1.01   0.315    -.0437682    .0140828
      sqlhdi     .0084045   .0299339     0.28   0.779    -.0502649    .0670739
     lgoveff     .5260419   .0964534     5.45   0.000     .3369968     .715087
   lregtrade     .0007962   .0013516     0.59   0.556    -.0018529    .0034454
        zone     .0098856   .0040072     2.47   0.014     .0020316    .0177396
       lfdig     .0040814   .0019082     2.14   0.032     .0003413    .0078214
      lstate     .0695273   .0753228     0.92   0.356    -.0781026    .2171573
        lhdi    -.0144817   .0571871    -0.25   0.800    -.1265664     .097603
 politicalim    -6.366906   .5114379   -12.45   0.000    -7.369306   -5.364506
 politicalin     .1030623   .0465891     2.21   0.027     .0117494    .1943752
                                                                              
  lpolitical        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  586.3603          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =    576.15
                                                               max =        18
                                                               avg =  17.92857
Estimated coefficients     =        11          Obs per group: min =        17
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        14
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       251
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls lpolitical politicalin politicalim lhdi lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi sqlstate
435 
 
Appendix 5N5: Voice and Accountability 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .15025892   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .00962996
     sigma_u     .0040495
                                                                              
       _cons    -5.011267   1.343482    -3.73   0.000    -7.644443   -2.378092
      sqlhdi     .0429589    .017804     2.41   0.016     .0080636    .0778542
     lgoveff     .7465987   .0763166     9.78   0.000      .597021    .8961765
   lregtrade    -.0000639   .0009554    -0.07   0.947    -.0019365    .0018086
        zone     .0016373    .003543     0.46   0.644    -.0053069    .0085816
       lfdig     .0031227   .0011764     2.65   0.008      .000817    .0054284
      lstate     .0020948   .0048939     0.43   0.669    -.0074971    .0116866
        lhdi     .0661596   .0342647     1.93   0.054     -.000998    .1333172
    voiceimm     .8277249   .2153009     3.84   0.000     .4057429    1.249707
     voicein     .3868017    .068347     5.66   0.000      .252844    .5207594
                                                                              
      lvoice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =    430.45
       overall = 0.7546                                        max =        18
       between = 0.8153                                        avg =      17.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.3864                         Obs per group: min =        17
Group variable: country_n                       Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       251
. xtreg lvoice voicein voiceimm lhdi lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi, re 
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.739776   1.518836    -1.80   0.071     -5.71664    .2370868
    sqlstate     .0015423   .0100808     0.15   0.878    -.0182156    .0213002
      sqlhdi     .0961413   .0198042     4.85   0.000     .0573259    .1349567
     lgoveff     .5474167   .0678575     8.07   0.000     .4144184     .680415
   lregtrade     .0004928   .0009926     0.50   0.620    -.0014527    .0024382
        zone    -.0026147   .0026975    -0.97   0.332    -.0079018    .0026724
       lfdig     .0043435   .0012821     3.39   0.001     .0018305    .0068565
      lstate      .001192   .0512213     0.02   0.981    -.0991999     .101584
        lhdi     .1622035    .037802     4.29   0.000      .088113     .236294
    voiceimm     .4924802   .2476682     1.99   0.047     .0070594     .977901
     voicein     .4655334   .0512886     9.08   0.000     .3650097    .5660572
                                                                              
      lvoice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood             =  689.4618          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =    848.61
                                                               max =        18
                                                               avg =  17.92857
Estimated coefficients     =        11          Obs per group: min =        17
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Number of groups   =        14
Estimated covariances      =         1          Number of obs      =       251
Correlation:   no autocorrelation
Panels:        homoskedastic
Coefficients:  generalized least squares
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression
. xtgls lvoice voicein voiceimm lhdi lstate lfdig zone lregtrade lgoveff sqlhdi sqlstate
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Appendix 5O: Definition of the variables used in the analysis 
Variable Indicators Definition 
state proxy for state capacity total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
estate 
General government final consumption expenditure 
(constant 2010 US$) General government final consumption expenditure (constant 2010 US$) 
hdi proxy for development level human development index 
fdig FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP Percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
fdit Foreign direct investment: Inward flows and stock US Dollars at current prices in millions 
regtrade regional trade as % of GDP regional imports plus exports divided by GDP Constant 2010 US$ 
exports  total ECOWAS exports by country total ECOWAS exports by country 
imports total ECOWAS imports by country total ECOWAS imports by country 
ecowas total ECOWAS trade (export plus imports total ECOWAS trade (export plus imports 
corrupt Control of Corruption Control of Corruption 
goveff Government Effectiveness Government Effectiveness 
political Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
regqual Regulatory Quality Regulatory Quality 
rule  Rule of Law Rule of Law 
voice Voice and Accountability Voice and Accountability 
Log Initial IQ Initial value of institutional quality  
The initial values of each of the institutional quality indices. This is the 1996 
values for each country. 
Log IQ 
Ecowas (V-i) IQ of the rest of ECOWAS members 
IQ of the rest of ECOWAS members (it is the summation of the other ECOWAS IQ 
values) 
sqlhdi Log of squared HDI The log of the squared human development index 
sqlstate Log of squared state capacity Log of squared state capacity 
 
